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


WITH THE  
**KURRAM FIELD FORCE,**  
1878-79.

BY

MAJOR J. A. S. COLQUHOUN, R.A.

WITH ILLUSTRATIONS BY THE AUTHOR.



LONDON:

W. H. ALLEN & CO., 13, WATERLOO PLACE.

1881.

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LONDON

PRINTED BY W. H. ALLEN AND CO., 13, WATERLOO PLACE, S.W.

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TO  
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL  
SIR FREDERICK SLEIGH ROBERTS, BART., G.C.B., V.C.,  
*This Work,*  
WHICH HAS TAKEN SHAPE THROUGH HIS KIND ENCOURAGEMENT,  
IS BY PERMISSION  
DEDICATED.

## N O T E.

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*The Proofs of this Work have been revised in the absence of the Author ; it is, therefore, hoped that any mistake left uncorrected may be excused on this account.*

## P R E F A C E.

THE following pages profess to be nothing beyond a mere recital of facts and incidents connected with the Kurram Valley Force of the Cabul Campaign of 1878-79.

To the readers of the present day it cannot, therefore, offer anything either new or original ; but to those who were engaged in this expedition, under Sir Frederick Roberts, or to the future historian who would learn how the emancipation of the Kurram Valley from Afghan rule occurred, this account may possibly prove interesting or useful.

The Author was only appointed in time to reach the Kurram Force on the 2nd December, during the action of the left attack on the Peiwar Kotal, and consequently would have been unable to give the record of the proceedings up to that date, unless Major (now Lieut.-Colonel, C.B.) Collett, Assistant Quartermaster-General of the Force, had kindly placed his Diary of operations at the writer's disposal.

One of the most interesting features in the campaign was the employment of the troops of the Punjab chiefs



on the line of communications. Major W. C. Anderson, who was employed as Assistant Adjutant-General with these troops, has (with the permission of General Watson, C.B., V.C.) kindly furnished a short account of the numbers and dispositions of this force, which will be found at the end of the book.

This record, which could not otherwise have been obtained, as the contingent was chiefly detached from the other troops, will add, it is hoped, a material value to this work, and at the same time prevent the friendly action of the Punjab chiefs from being forgotten.

No political question as to the advisability of the advance into Afghan territory has been discussed, it being sufficient in a work of this kind to detail simply the orders which affected the force, and, consequently, for the soldier, the Viceroy's proclamation, which recounts the causes which led to the break of the strained relations between Cabul and England, deals sufficiently with the politics of the question. This order is placed at the beginning of the book, as occupying its natural position in the course of affairs, and is followed by the names of the officers and regiments detailed for the force.

The next chapter gives a general outline of the Kurram Valley, and its inhabitants and neighbours. Most of these people, previous to the occupation, had either been unknown, or, if their locale were known, any information which existed regarding them dated from twenty years back, when the expedition of General Chamberlain, in 1855, and the mission of the Lumsdens

in 1857, opened out some knowledge of these countries, but after this their existence was forgotten. The oppressed Turis, who inhabit the Kurram Valley, in vain petitioned the British Government for their release from the galling rule of the Afghans. In vain they rebelled and tried to recover their lost freedom and territory from their hated rulers, who, secure of the British alliance, arms, and money, committed every atrocity that an armed semi-civilisation with savage instincts could perform.

The copy of the petition of the Turis to the British Government in 1862, given in the Appendix, is sufficient to show the state of affairs in the Kurram Valley at that time; since then the Afghan rule has not softened. The country was virtually laid waste; the people, a prey to their hill neighbours as well as to the Afghans, existed on sufferance, and all hope of recovering their position and status was abandoned, while the population was kept down by the forcible abduction of the children, both boys and girls, for immoral purposes. To have put a stop for ever, it is hoped, to this state of affairs, is an action of which the British nation may be proud.

The narrative portion of the book is divided into chapters, which detail the successive steps in the campaign till its close. Thus, the gradual collection of the troops at Thull, III.; the advance into the Kurram Valley, IV.; the action of the Peiwar Kotal, V.; the expedition to Khost, VI.; the preparations for the advance into Cabul, VII., which caused the declaration

of peace; and the subsequent events in the Kurram Valley till the passage of the Cabul Mission,—form the natural divisions of the subject.

The diary form of narrative has been retained, as it enables the orders affecting the force, published from time to time, to be given in their original form. It would have been possible to have placed all the orders in the narrative, by describing the results; but though more continuity in the account would have been gained by so doing, yet it would have only been possible by losing the brevity and clearness with which facts are described in an order-book. In addition to this, the gain to the student of military matters is increased by leaving the order-book to tell its own story of deficiencies in the personnel and material for a campaign; to show where the constitution of an army in the field differs from a garrison in peace time, and to indicate the many points which have to be attended to, in order to bring a force together in the field. These advantages seemed to counterbalance the disadvantage of breaking from one topic to another. Wherever any explanation was necessary to elucidate any order which might not be generally understood, it has been given, though for those who were with the force such explanations will be useless.

To Lieut.-Colonel Galbraith, 85th Regt., Assistant Adjutant-General of the Force, and to Lieut.-Colonel Palmer, Superintendent of Transport, the Author is indebted for the Tables in the Appendix, giving the numbers of men present with the force at various dates,

and the number of camels and baggage-animals which were employed during the operations.

In conclusion, the Author would wish to thank General Lindsay, C.B., R.H.A., for his kindness in looking over the manuscripts giving the detailed account of the forcing of the Spingawi Kotal, at which the Author was not present, and for that portion of the affair at Matun, in Khost, which did not come under his own observation. Captain Barstow, 72nd Highlanders, has also kindly given assistance in this way.

It has not been the writer's wish to criticise, nor, indeed, is there much room for criticism in the narration of facts, and, though there are always two sides to every question, it has been his object to place matters in the point of view that they would naturally present to an unbiassed mind. Every incident affecting the history of the force in a military aspect has been recorded as far as possible, and as far as was patent to the world; and if, either by omission or mistake of these facts, anyone may consider that his interests have suffered, the error, he may be assured, is unintentional, and the writer is only desirous of securing for the Kurram force, as far as lies in his power, the estimation due to its deserts, which no one can be more willing to concede than himself.

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# WITH THE KURRAM FIELD FORCE.

## CHAPTER I.

### PRELIMINARY.

- THE VICEROY OF INDIA TO THE AMIR SHER ALI KHAN OF KABUL, TO HIS SIRDARS AND SUBJECTS, AND TO ALL THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN.

**I**T is now ten years since the Amir Sher Ali Khan, after a prolonged struggle, had at last succeeded in placing himself upon the Throne of Kabul. At that time his dominion still needed consolidation, and the extent of it was still undefined. In these circumstances, the Amir, who had already been assisted by the British Government with money and with arms, expressed a wish to meet the Viceroy of India. His wish was cordially complied with. He was courteously received, and honourably entertained by the Viceroy, at Umballa. The countenance and support he had come to seek were then assured to him. He, at the same time, obtained further unconditional assistance in arms and money. These tokens of the good-will of the British Government, which he gratefully acknowledged, materially aided the Amir, after his return to his own country, in there securing his position and extending his authority.



Since then, the Amir Sher Ali Khan has received from the British Government, in confirmation of its good-will, large additional gifts of arms. The powerful influence of the British Government has secured for him formal recognition by the Emperor of Russia of a fixed boundary between the Kingdom of Kabul and the Khanate of Bokhara and Kokand. The Amir's sovereignty over Wakhan and Badakshan was thereby admitted and made sure; a sovereignty which had, till then, been disputed by the Russian Government. His subjects have been allowed to pass freely throughout the Indian Empire, to carry on trade, and to enjoy all the protection afforded by the British Government to its own subjects. In no single instance have they been unjustly or inhospitably treated within British jurisdiction.

For all these gracious acts the Amir Sher Ali Khan has rendered no return. On the contrary, he has requited them with active ill-will and open discourtesy. The authority over Badakshan, acquired for him by the influence of the British Government, was used by him to forbid passage through that province to a British officer of rank, returning from a mission to a neighbouring State. He has closed against free passage to British subjects, and their commerce, the roads between India and Afghanistan. He has maltreated British subjects and permitted British traders to be plundered within his jurisdiction, giving them neither protection nor redress. He has used cruelly and put to death subjects of his own on the mere suspicion that they were in communication with the British Government. He has openly and assiduously endeavoured, by words and deeds, to stir up religious hatred against the English, and incite war against the Empire of India. Having previously excluded British officers from every part of his dominions, and refused to receive a British mission; having left unanswered friendly communications addressed to him by the Viceroy, and repelled all efforts towards amicable intercourse between the

British Government and himself; he has, nevertheless, received formally and entertained publicly at Kabul an Embassy from Russia. This he has done at a time when such an act derived special significance from the character of contemporaneous events in Europe, and the attitude of England and Russia in relation thereto. Furthermore, he has done it, well knowing that the Russian Government stands pledged, by engagements with England, to regard his territories as completely beyond the sphere of Russian influence. Finally, while this Russian Embassy is still at his capital, the Amir has forcibly repulsed, at his outposts, an English Envoy of high rank, of whose coming he had formal and timely announcement by a letter from the Viceroy attesting the importance and urgency of the Envoy's mission.

Even then the British Government, still anxious to avert the calamities of war, deferred hostile action, and proffered to the Amir a last opportunity of escaping the punishment merited by his acts. Of this opportunity the Amir has refused to avail himself.

It has been the wish of the British Government to find the best security for its Indian frontier in the friendship of a State whose independence it seeks to confirm, and of a prince whose throne it has helped to support. Animated by this wish, the British Government has made repeated efforts to establish with the Amir Sher Ali Khan those close and cordial relations which are necessary to the interests of the two neighbouring countries. But its efforts, after being persistently repulsed, have now been met with open indignity and defiance.

The Amir Sher Ali Khan, mistaking for weakness the long forbearance of the British Government, has thus deliberately incurred its just resentment. With the sirdars and people of Afghanistan this Government has still no quarrel, and desires none. They are absolved from all responsibility for the recent acts of the Amir, and as they have given no offence, so the

British Government, wishing to respect their independence, will not willingly injure or interfere with them. Nor will the British Government tolerate interference on the part of any other Power in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.

Upon the Amir Sher Ali Khan alone rests the responsibility of having exchanged the friendship for the hostility of the Empress of India.

### FIELD OPERATIONS—KABUL.

GOVERNMENT GENERAL ORDER No. 1101, DATED 9TH  
NOVEMBER, 1878.

G. G. O. No. 931, dated the 4th October, 1878, is cancelled, and the following order, showing the revised constitution of the force detailed for field service, published for general information :—

The Right Hon. the Governor-General in Council having been pleased to direct the assembly of a force for service in the field, the corps herein-after specified will move from their respective cantonments, under instructions which will be issued by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India.

2. For the staff duties of this force the following appointments are made, and will have effect from the date on which the officers named may enter upon the duties thereof.

*I.—For a Column to be assembled in the Kurram Valley.\**

Major-General F. S. Roberts, C.B., V.C., Royal Artillery, Commanding.

Captain G. T. Pretyman, R.A., Aide-de-camp.

\* The names of officers employed departmentally, or who joined subsequent to this order, are printed in *Italics*.

*Lieutenant Neville Chamberlain, Central India Horse, and Lieutenant John Shearston, Rifle Brigade, Orderly Officer.*

Major W. Galbraith, 85th Foot, Assistant Adjutant-General.

Major H. Collett, Bengal Staff Corps, Assistant Quartermaster-General.

Captain R. G. Kennedy, Bengal Staff Corps, and Captain F. S. Carr, General List Infantry, 5th Punjab Cavalry, Deputy Assistants Quartermaster-General.

#### *Medical Department.*

Deputy Surgeon-General F. F. Allen, C.B., Principal Medical Officer.

*Deputy Surgeon-General Townsend, subsequently took charge.*

#### *Commissariat Department.*

Captain A. R. Badcock, Deputy Assistant Commissary-General, Chief Commissariat Officer.

*Major Bunbury, Major E. M. Marriott, Lieutenant P. Buckland, Lieutenant G. Eliot, Captain Keighley, Bengal Commissariat Department; Captain Cook, Madras Commissariat Department; Lieutenant Adye, Hyderabad Contingent.*

#### *Engineer Department.*

Lieut.-Colonel Æ. Perkins, R.E., Commanding Engineer.

Lieutenant F. T. N. Spratt, R.E., and Lieutenant S. Grant, R.E., Assistant Field Engineers.

*Lieutenant Longe, R.E., Lieutenant Buxton, R.E., Captain Wallace, R.E., Lieutenant Onslow, R.E., Lieutenant Nugent, R.E., and Lieutenant Burn Murdoch, R.E., Assistant Field Engineers.*

Captain A. S. Wynne, 51st Foot, Superintendent Field Telegraphs.

*Captain E. Straton, 22nd Regiment, subsequently took charge.*

7th Company Bengal Sappers and Miners  
 23rd Bengal Native Infantry (Pioneers) (Colonel Currie).  
 Engineer Field Park.

*Artillery.*

Lieut.-Colonel A. H. Lindsay, R.A., Commanding.  
 Lieutenant E. G. Osborne, R.A., Adjutant.  
 F-A, Royal Horse Artillery (Lieut.-Colonel Stirling, R.H.A).  
 G/3, Royal Artillery (Major Sidney Parry, R.A.).  
 No. 1 Mountain Battery, P. F. F. (Captain Kelso, R.A.).  
 No. 2           "           "           (Captain G. Swinley, R.A.).  
 Ordnance Field Park (Captain Colquhoun, R.A.).  
*Captain James, R.A., Captain Shafto, R.A., and Captain*  
*S. Pemberton, R.A., Ordnance Officers.*

*Cavalry.*

10th/1 Hussars (one squadron) (Captain Bulkeley).  
 12th Bengal Cavalry (Colonel Hugh Gough, C.B., V.C.).

*1st Infantry Brigade.*

Colonel A. H. Cobbe, 17th Foot, Commanding.  
 Captain A. Scott, V.C., Bengal Staff Corps, Brigade-Major.  
*Orderly Officer, Captain T. Barstow, H.M. 72nd<sup>\*</sup> High-*  
*landers.*

2nd Battalion 8th Foot (Colonel Barry Drew).  
 29th Bengal Native Infantry (Colonel J. H. Gordon).  
 5th Punjab Infantry (Major McQueen).  
*Colonel H. Forbes, Commanding Bhopal Contingent.*  
*Lieutenant Forbes, H.M. 92nd Highlanders, Orderly Officer.*

*2nd Infantry Brigade.*

Colonel J. B. Thelwall, C.B., Commanding.  
 Captain G. De C. Morton, 6th Foot, Brigade-Major.  
 Lieut. G. V. Turner, 2/8th Regiment, Orderly Officer.  
 72nd Highlanders (Lieut.-Colonel F. Brownlow).

- 21st Native Infantry (Major Collis, B.S.C.).
- 2nd Punjab Infantry (Lieut. Colonel Tyndall, B.S.C.).
- 5th Goorkha Regiment (Major FitzHugh, B.S.C.).

NAMES OF OFFICERS APPOINTED TO THE TRANSPORT DEPARTMENT, KURRAM FIELD FORCE.

1. Major D. Moriarty, Bengal Staff Corps, Superintendent. Subsequently in charge Field Treasure Chest.
2. Major G. Palmer, 9th Bengal Cavalry, Superintendent.
3. Captain H. Goad, Hyderabad Contingent, Assistant Superintendent. Died from wounds received in action.
4. Captain F. Morrison, 1st Royal Scots, Assistant Superintendent. Transferred to Bengal Staff.
5. Lieutenant G. Money, Central India Horse, Assistant Superintendent.
6. Lieutenant G. Eyre, 5th Bengal Native Infantry, Assistant Superintendent. Transferred to Civil Employ.
7. Lieutenant Maisey, 30th Bengal Native Infantry, Assistant Superintendent.
8. Lieutenant D. Waterfield, Royal Horse Artillery, Assistant Superintendent. In charge Ordnance Transport.
9. Major Forde, Madras Staff Corps, Assistant Superintendent.
10. Major J. E. Baines, 6th Regiment, Assistant Superintendent.
11. Captain W. H. Browne, Bengal Staff Corps, Assistant Superintendent.
12. Captain Abbott, Bengal Staff Corps, Assistant Superintendent. Resigned.
13. Captain E. Lushington, 8th Hussars, Assistant Superintendent.
14. Captain W. A. Wynter, 83rd Regiment, Assistant Quartermaster-General for Transport.

15. Lieutenant L. E. Booth, 83rd Regiment, Assistant Superintendent.

16. Lieutenant J. W. Kitchener, 14th Regiment, Assistant Superintendent.

17. Captain A. Turner, 2nd Punjaub Infantry, temporarily employed.

NAMES OF OFFICERS HOLDING MISCELLANEOUS APPOINTMENTS  
IN THE KURRAM FIELD FORCE.

*Political Department.*

1. Colonel G. Waterfield, Political Officer, subsequently invalidated.

2. A. Christie, Esq., B.C.S., Assistant Political Officer.

3. Mahommed Hyat Khan, C.S.I., Assistant Political Officer.

4. Colonel J. Gordon, C.S.I., Political Officer, subsequently invalidated.

5. Captain R. H. F. Rennick, B.S.C., Assistant Political Officer, subsequently invalidated.

6. Captain A. Conolly, B.S.C., Assistant Political Officer.

*Chaplain's Department.*

1. Rev. J. W. Adams.

2. Rev. J. Jolly, H.M. 72nd Highlanders.

3.

*Survey Department.*

1. Captain R. G. Woodthorpe, R.E.

2. Captain Gerald Martin, B.S.C.

3. Lieutenant Manners Smith, 3rd Sikhs.

*Telegraph Department.*

1. Samuel Josephs, Esq.

*Postal Department.*

1. Mr. P. Walsh, Postmaster.





# STRENGTH OF THE KURRAM FIELD FORCE.

Dates.	Europeans.				Native Officers, N.C. Officers, and Men.			Followers.		Ordnance.		Animals.						REMARKS.							
	Effective.		Sick and Wounded.		Total.			Public.	Private.	9-pr. R. M. L.	7-pr. R. M. L.	Battery and Cavalry.							Carriage.						
	Officers.	Warrant Officers, and Men.	Officers.	Warrant Officers, and Men.								Officers.	Mules.	Bullocks.	Elephants.	Grass-cutters' Ponies.	Camels.			Bullocks.	Mules.				
On 1st November .	83	843	936	5	101	106	1032	3451	258	3769	4741	2179	1660	6	4	12	811	108	50	..	..	..	..	671	(These figures give the totals of the troops who fought at the Peiwar.)
On 1st December .	83	969	1052	5	11	16	1068	2851	82	2936	4004	2150	715	9	4	15	501	108	..	26	..	772	..	1188	
On 1st January .	140	1711	1800	3	98	101	1961	5302	433	5815	7776	3539	2170	12	8	21	1306	247	62	26	..	1275	..	1196	
On 4th January (Khost Column) }	44	278	322	..	4	4	326	1721	89	1760	4862	1133	565	..	8	..	323	217	..	..	..	539	..	565	(Exclusive of the troops at Kohat, which were withdrawn from the Kurram Field Force.)
On 1st February .	184	2557	2741	6	131	137	2878	5788	476	6264	9142	3987	1497	12	8	24	1646	217	105	..	..	1342	..	1295	
On 1st March .	139	1769	2928	5	49	54	1082	5713	386	6109	8081	2423	1226	9	8	18	1488	217	58	..	..	429	..	775	
" " (Punjab Chief's Contingent) }	9	..	9	..	..	..	9	2559	11	2561	2570	539	450	S.-bored. 7	..	7	725	50	40	8	..	..	..	..	607
On 1st April .	139	1866	2005	4	87	91	2096	5609	228	5837	7983	2869	1406	9	8	18	1270	217	57	..	638	592	..	516	(With 7 smooth-bores and Waggon.)
On 1st May (including Punjab Chief's Contingent) .	219	3511	3730	5	95	100	3830	9180	259	9439	13269	4073	2260	15	12	30	2613	277	26	58	800	507	..	360	

(To face page 9.)

REGIMENTS DETAILED TO JOIN THE KURRAM FORCE AFTER THE  
COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES.

*Artillery.*

C Battery, 4th Brigade Royal Artillery (Captain F. C. Clarke).

*Cavalry.*

Squadron 9th Lancers (Captain Butson).

1st Bengal Cavalry (Lieut.-Colonel Jenkins).

14th Bengal Lancers (Colonel Ross).

*Infantry.*

2nd Regiment Native Infantry (Queen's Own Light Infantry).

11th Regiment Native Infantry (Colonel Lamb).

H.M. 67th Regiment (Lieut.-Colonel C. B. Knowles).

H.M. 92nd Gordon Highlanders (Lieut.-Colonel Parker).

The following few remarks may help to explain some of the variations in the opposite table.

The figures are taken from the weekly general state prepared in the Assistant Adjutant-General's Office, in which the numbers of each regiment and battery are detailed; as it would have been unnecessary to copy each of the weekly states, the totals only have been extracted.

The strength of the Kurram Field Force rose gradually from 4,741 men of all ranks on the 1st November to 13,269, inclusive of the Punjab Chiefs' Contingent. The first total, however, represents only the troops who had joined up to that date.

The entries under the date of the 1st December give only the numbers who fought at the battle of the Peiwar Kotal, as it seemed desirable to keep this figure on record.

The entries on the 1st January would represent the normal strength of the Kurram Field Force, which was raised to a higher figure on the 1st February by including the troops of the Kohat garrison in the strength of the force. As some of

these, however, had not been specially detailed for service, in the following month the numbers were reduced, and remained nearly stationary during March and April, when the arrival of the troops who were to hold the Kurram Valley raised the numbers to their highest point. The proportion of sick was large at the commencement, being nearly 12 per cent. among the Europeans, and 7 per cent. among the natives, and was owing chiefly to the troops detailed for the campaign not having got free from a severe epidemic of fever which had affected the whole of the Punjab.

During the winter months the high rate of sickness was kept up from the effects of the cold; this brought on pneumonia, which was fatal to constitutions already enfeebled by fever; but as the spring came on and the weather moderated, the proportion of sick became reduced to 4 per cent. for the Europeans and somewhat less for the natives in April, and to below 3 per cent. for both classes in May.

The public followers include hospital establishments, dooly-bearers, camel and mule men attached to regiments, and the syces and grasscutters taken with the artillery and cavalry. The private followers include the regimental cooks, barbers, bhusteas and sweepers, officers' servants, syces, and grasscutters.

When the advance was ordered in December, the latter classes were reduced to the lowest possible point, but still the numbers of so-called private followers (715) bear a high proportion to the number of fighting-men (4,004), and when both classes of followers are considered, the total number approaches to nearly three fourths of this number.

It would be undoubtedly possible for a force to do without followers of any description, but it would be possible only to do so at the expense of reducing the fighting strength, abolishing a good many of the present hospital arrangements and part of camp equipage, and making each man carry his own kit. To draw

the line between efficiency on the one hand, and the reduction of followers on the other, is a problem yet to be solved, and its solution would be much facilitated by the institution of a permanent Transport Department.

The carriage shown is that which was allotted to regiments at the commencement of the campaign, and does not include any employed by the Commissariat Department. During February, however, most of the carriage animals were transferred to the Commissariat, and but a small number were retained for regimental purposes. This arrangement continued in force till the 1st of June, when, the Transport Department having been re-organized, carriage was allowed to each regiment again, but was available for general transport under its own officers.

The total number of camels employed during the campaign is given in the Appendix.

## CHAPTER II.

## DESCRIPTION OF THE KURRAM VALLEY.

THE Kurram Valley had, of all the Afghan border of India, been the only part which had been traversed by the foot of an Englishman since the previous Cabul war; consequently when the present war broke out, there were maps and a certain amount of information available regarding it. The narrative of the expedition of General Chamberlain, who reached the Kurram Valley in 1856, to punish some of the inhabitants who had raided down within our border; the journals of the Mission to Cabul by the Lumsdens in 1857, which travelled by this route, furnished the amount of information which existed at the time war was declared, and this was compiled in a manual for the use of the force by Major Collett, B.S.C., 23rd Pioneers, who was detailed at Simla for this purpose. The information, scanty as it was, was useful in giving an idea as to the country and its inhabitants, to those who had not been thrown into contact with them before, and thus enabled the advance, when ordered, to be made with greater celerity than would otherwise have been possible had it been necessary to feel one's way.

In all mountainous countries the river and valleys form the natural means of communication, the road or track running

PORTIONS

OF THE


# KURRAM AND KHOSH VALLEYS

Surveyed by  
CAPTAIN R. G. WOODTHORPE, R. E.,  
AND SECRET PARTY ATTACHED TO THE

KURRAM COLUMN

AFGHANISTAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

1878-1879.



1 ————— Kurram River  
 2 ————— Khosh River  
 3 ————— Road or Path  
 4 ————— Railway  
 5 ————— Telegraph Line  
 6 ————— Boundary of Districts  
 7 ————— Boundary of Provinces  
 8 ————— Boundary of Countries  
 9 ————— Boundary of the Empire



either along the stony bed, or, where the bank is alluvial, flat, and easy of access, preference is naturally given to the smoother ground.

It is but seldom that the track ventures either to rise high over a shoulder of a projecting spur, or to cut across cultivated ground; for though in the winter season the road could be shortened by making a path across the fields, yet as soon as the rain falls or the neighbouring ground is irrigated, the road becomes a hopeless swamp till dry again. In countries without organised government and with a sparse population, anything like systematic road-making is out of the question, so that when the force under General Roberts had to bring its guns and carriages, it was not to be expected that a driving-road would be found ready for them. After some exploration it was decided to make the advance on the right bank of the Kurram; the ground for the decision being generally that this track was more open than the other, which was blocked, as it were, by a spur of a hill, Kadi Makt, and which passed through some difficult country, besides being open to more chance of interruption from marauders of the Zymukhts than the one on the right bank. This road was also the one most generally used by such traffic as passed along, and, moreover, it was the means of communication with the fortified Afghan outposts at Kapyang, close to Thull and Ahmed-i-Shama, at the next halting-place.

These fortified places were merely enclosures of huts on four sides of a square, with a raised parapet wall and circular bastions at the corners. Like the government that built them, they were in a semi-ruinous condition when the country was occupied.

The drawback of this road, which might have been felt later in the season, was that it had to cross the river twice, and though there was no difficulty in this in the winter months, yet some might be expected when the snow began to melt. As it turned out, however, even after the road on the left bank was made, the river was passable; but this was purely accidental,



owing to the favourable condition of the absence of a heavy snowfall in the winter.

The actual river-bed at Thull is about 500 yards wide, the banks being about 40 feet high, and is formed of white boulders of no great size, with occasional small patches of sand. In the winter months the river is reduced to a single channel about 3 feet deep and 40 feet wide, which approached the left bank behind a spur about half a mile from the standing camp in Thull. It was bridged at this place by a trestle-bridge for infantry and baggage. The artillery and cavalry had to use the fords, but there was no difficulty in crossing anywhere at this time. The width of the Kurram river varies but little where the nature of the ground allows it to spread its surface of shingle and stones. Where it leaves the mountains at Keraish its width spreads at once from 100 yards to 150; at the Kurram Fort its width, 20 miles lower, is about 250 yards, though in this distance it receives no affluent or river of any size, as the drainage of the ravines from the Sufaid Koh is mostly absorbed in cultivation. At Budesh Kheyl, where the river takes a right-angle bend, eighteen miles further down, the bed is about 400 yards wide, and as the valley opens out from this point it expands in a corresponding degree, till it is again contracted in the hilly country close to Thull.

Though the river has given its name to the valley through which it passes, yet it is not the river which gives character to the country. Almost from every point the range of high mountains, "the Sufaid Koh," which bounds the valley to the north, forms the principal object in the landscape.

This range, which is almost uninhabited, consists of a high central ridge, averaging 14,000 feet high, from which on both sides spurs run out at right angles, enclosing narrow valleys with brawling torrents rushing over their boulders, the slopes of these valleys being covered with beautiful vegetation, till the limit of trees is reached at about 11,000 feet, above which, in the

summer, the green Alps furnish pasturage to the herds owned by the nomad Ghilzais, who move about from place to place as the seasons come round. The beauty of these lateral valleys is hardly to be described, so much do they impress the eye after the bleak and desert look of the Kurram Valley, where hardly a tree exists away from the villages to relieve the monotony of the plain. The absence of all trees, except fruit-trees, can be accounted for chiefly by the fact that the severity of the climate in winter would probably cause every tree, that was readily accessible and not a fruit-tree, to be cut down for fuel. Nearly every village is marked by a huge chunar or oriental plane. Under this tree, or perhaps under two or three of them, planted close together to make a better shade, the villagers rest during the noonday heat, and here also the mullah brings his Koran, and recites, for his own benefit and the information of the others, the Arabic texts which he does not understand. The origin of these trees is doubtful; they point to the time when there were more intimate relations between Cashmere and Afghanistan, about 300 years ago, and it is possible from the size of the trees that some of them are at least of this age. They are not indigenous, and no young ones are visible. The river Kurram takes its rise in the upland valleys of the mountain "Saratiga" (the Black Stone mountain), and of the mass of hills that look down upon the Logar valley at the Shutar Gardan.

It is difficult to account for the continuous amount of water that passes along it, as neither of these sources have any glaciers at their head to feed the supply; the only explanation appears to be that the melted snow penetrates deep into the hill-sides, and gradually finds its way out into the river-bed at different levels.

The course of the river during its passage through the mountains is naturally a tortuous one, with the exception of the portion between Rokian and Alikheyl, where it runs straight north and south. Below the valley of Alikheyl it enters into

the Hassan Kheyl and Mangal country, finding its way through gorges of a wildness almost amounting to sublimity, if the unhospitable look of the country did not take away somewhat from the feeling of pleasure, and substitute a sense of relief when a cultivated valley, studded with villages, fields, and orchards, showed that all the country was not so repugnant and forbidding.

Previous to the explorations of the force, it was a matter of uncertainty where the Kurram river actually did rise and how its course lay. All that was known was that the river coming out of the mountains in the west end of the upper valley ran nearly east, while the river that ran north and south at Alikheyl and hid itself in the defiles of the Mangal country might be led away into the Khost country or elsewhere. After some time and with some trouble the connection of the two rivers was settled, and a corresponding gain to the geographical knowledge of the world resulted. One of the most striking things in Afghanistan is the ingenuity shown in developing watercourses. At first sight, sometimes, it seems a hopeless task to change the current of a stream running over loose boulders, but still it is done. Where the stream nears the bank on either side it is induced, by means of a small dam of brushwood and stones, to enter into a channel cut on the slope of the bank. How the proper level is kept in cutting this channel is a puzzle, but it is made as straight as if it had been accurately surveyed. Sometimes the whole work is lost, and the fields depending on it are thrown out of cultivation by the headworks being carried away, and, instead of an easy sloping bank in which to cut the channel, nothing but a vertical wall of rock remains.

The Afghan cultivator has overcome this difficulty in most cases, by building up a wall of loose boulders and brushwood, and by means of earth and clay at the top, making it sufficiently water-tight to carry on the water. Of course the alluvial soil in the river-bed is, when deep enough, the most favourable for cultivation, and a good deal of land-reclamation has been carried

on in times past, to enable more and better crops to be raised. In this contest with nature the labourer is apt to be beaten, as the torrents sometimes refuse to be directed, and, changing their direction, wash away the fields, and leave in their place a crop of boulders. The only remedy for the loss, is to press the river into the service, and to let it repair the damage by making fresh deposits. This is done by laying lines of boulders across the piece of ground to be reclaimed, filling up the interstices between the stones with brushwood and smaller ones. When sufficient ground in this way has been prepared, the water is let on at the top, and gradually deposits its mud between the lines of boulders till a series of terraces results.

Wherever cultivation depends upon irrigation from mountain streams, all the fields become terraces; this may partly be the result of experience, which has taught that cultivated soil on a slope is apt to be washed away, but it is possible that the nature of the cultivation has had its share—all rice cultivation requiring flooded fields. Wherever water is or has been available, the ground in its neighbourhood is sure to be terraced. The labour that has been expended on these fields shows that in past times the mountainous country, not only in Afghanistan but also to the north of India, was much more under cultivation than it is at present. Agricultural labour needs a settled government, and, consequently, when the British rule brings peace into these countries, it may be expected that cultivation and population will follow. When the Douranies occupied the Kurram valley, there was a large amount of terraced land that they marked off as Government land, and which the neighbouring cultivators of the villages agreed to till for half the profits. By degrees the officials repented themselves of this agreement, and altered the share to one-third, and ultimately ended by taking the whole crop. The Turis refused to labour on these terms, and consequently all the Amir's land has lain fallow ever since.

At present the cultivation only lies where water is accessible,

either along the banks of the main river or of its feeders ; but when the supply of water is increased by economy, large tracts of land will be available for cultivation in addition to the Government land now fallow.

The Kurram valley may be divided into three parts, as far as this narrative is concerned ; the first, or the river part, extending from Thull to the bend of the river at Badesli Kheyl ; the second from Badesli Kheyl to Keraiah, embracing all the wide open part of the valley ; and the third from Keraiah to its source in the Shutargardan range, or the mountainous part.

All along the banks of the river, in the first part, on both sides, villages or hamlets are dotted down wherever the soil admits of cultivation, occupied by the clans of Bangash in the lower part, and by Turis towards the upper ; the Bungash were the original occupiers of the valley, and were gradually dispossessed and driven down it by the advancing Turis. The chief village on the left bank, close to the right-angle bend, is called Suddur ; on the right bank, up to the same point, the best-known place is an old ziarat or tomb named Hazir Pir, close to a collection of villages. The Governor of Kurram used to make this part of the valley his winter quarters, and the cavalry lines for the troopers that accompanied him, that were standing, showed where his camp used to be pitched.

In the second part of the valley the villages are spread further apart along the bank ; at first, and till the actual open valley is reached at the Kurram fort, there are no villages away from the river, nor are there many on the right bank.

The appearance of the Kurram valley is very deceptive as to distance in the bright clear air of winter and spring ; from the Kurram fort to the Peiwar range, which bounds the valley to the west, is a distance of 18 miles, but when the air is thus clear, it hardly looks 10 miles. Another curious effect is, that owing to the rise being so gradual, the village of Peiwar, which is close to the foot of the hill, does not appear to be 1,000 feet higher

than the fort at Kurram, which it is in reality. The idea that naturally impresses the mind on entering this part of the valley, is that it has formed at some period a large inland lake, or else an arm of the sea in the prehistoric ages.

The geological feature of the country, however, is stones, from a large-sized boulder, in some of the side streams, to a small pebble; but except on the terraced lands for cultivation there is hardly a square yard of Afghanistan generally that is free from stones, both above and below the surface, varied of course with rocks, which crop up here and there in ridges, or with a conglomerate formation in which the boulders are imbedded in a natural concrete. It is difficult to describe the various natures of the boulders, which appear to have sprung from every known kind of rock, and been carried by the torrents far away from their original sites. The high range of the Sufaid Koh is chiefly a limestone formation, which stands out bare and light-coloured for the most part above the line of vegetation, except in places where the rocks, being coloured dark, look as if a passing cloud had thrown a shadow over the range. Granite, porphyry, and trap are found amongst the boulders, so these must exist in places; slate and lately copper ore of good quality have been found. It is possible that the dark colour of the rocks is attributable to lead ore, as on the top of the Sufaid Koh range to the west of Sika Ram, a deposit of black ore, from which lead is extracted, exists. The range, lying east and west, is exposed to the full action of the sun, and consequently by the middle of summer all the winter and spring snow is melted off the south side, except in a few ravines, where it lies. Till the snow falls in the winter, the aspect of the Kurram valley, seen from a distance, is cheerless in the extreme. A bare line of rock cuts the sky, below this comes a dark band of pines to about a level of 7,000 feet, while below this the lower slopes and hills are covered with a dried, reddish-brown vegetation, which comes down and mixes with the bare and arid look of the plain. In

the spring, however, the whole colouring is changed ; the Sufaid Koh deserves its name of the White mountains, which stand out clear against the blue sky ; the air, more full of moisture, softens the colouring of the distant ranges, which are now of every shade of blue and purple ; the lower hills are bright with the young grass and foliage of the bushes, while the level ground is green with the crops and with the scant herbage that is hardly observable when near, but which in the distance is sufficient to hide the colour of the ground. Altogether, spring in the valleys is charming.

The west end of the Kurram valley proper, is blocked by a spur that leads down from the highest peak of the Sufaid Koh ; this spur, with its outlying buttresses and intervening ravines, gradually slopes down till it reaches the level of the valley and the river, a distance of about ten miles ; on the other side of the river the range of low hills is about two miles off, so that the average width of the valley at its widest part is about twelve miles. From the end of the spur westwards to Keraiah, a distance of nine miles, the valley narrows to about two miles on each side of the river, the intervening distance between the river and the backbone of the ridge of the Sufaid Koh being filled up with an upland valley, the Hurriab, which descends gradually from the Peiwar Kotal towards the west, and is bounded on the south by a range of high mountains which occupy the space between the Hurriab and the Kurram valleys. The Kurram valley in its upper part at this place is not much populated or cultivated, though signs of previous cultivation are as abundant here as in other places ; but the neighbourhood of the predatory hillmen, who inhabit the ranges to the south and west, naturally prevents the inhabitants from increasing to any extent. Worse, however, than their evil-disposed neighbours, has been the curse of the Afghan rule, which, not satisfied with oppressing the subject tribes and living on their already small resources, kept down the population as well by carrying off the children.

The oppressed Turis hailed the arrival of the British deliverer with joy, as might naturally have been expected, and since the occupation of the valley have not given the least trouble, though in past days they rebelled as often as they could against the Afghans, and on two occasions destroyed the Kurram fort. With a settled government there is no doubt now that a good future is in store for them, and that the deliverance for which they waited so long will bring some reward for their past troubles.

The villages at the head of the valley, on both sides of the glen, where the river comes out from the mountains, are inhabited by Chukmunnies, or, as they are sometimes called, Chumkunnies, a small tribe whose territory extends about five miles up the glen, beyond which border the lands of the Mangals intervene between them and the next two tribes living along the river-sides, the Ahmed Kheyls and the Hassan Kheyls, whose lands extend close to Alikheyl at the west end of the Hurriab valley.

The mass of mountains lying to the south of the Hurriab valley belong to the Mangals; but they have no villages there, the ranges being used only as hiding-places, from whence to harry the valleys on each side. There are several passes from the Hurriab to the lower valley of the Kurram; these were all explored, and nearly the whole of this country accurately surveyed and reconnoitred. A wild land of bare stony valleys, with the higher hill-sides covered with oak and pine. The Suppri defile from Alikheyl to Keruah is one of the most difficult passes ever traversed by troops, and though it was crossed by stealing a march on the Mangals, yet their attack on the convoy and rearguard showed what difficulties might have arisen if an assault had been made when unexpected. The ascent of the pass, though steep, was not very difficult; but the descent, on a winter's morning, when the ground was slippery with frost and ice, was most trying for the baggage animals.

The most difficult part of the defile was, however, at the



bottom of the hill, where the road ran along the bed of the nullah, in some places not more than wide enough to enable a laden camel to pass through; frequent small ravines led into the main passage, so that it would have been a most tedious affair to dislodge a determined enemy, as the work of flanking parties would have delayed the march.

The Hurriab valley begins at the Peiwar Kotal, and slopes down gently till it reaches the village of Alikheyl, not far from the Kurram river. The valley is intersected by some deep nullahs, which carry down the drainage of the Sufaid Koh range on the right. At the Laridar stream the mountains recede and diminish in height, the Laridar ravine forming a pass—the Lakkerai—over the range which comes out at Gundamuk, an easy road, but which has not been altogether explored. The end of the range of the Sufaid Koh, at the angle where it turns to the north at the Kurram river, is filled up with a fine peaked mountain called Matungi. In a hollow between two spurs<sup>”</sup> from this mountain, at about twelve miles from the Peiwar Kotal, is the village of Alikheyl, a large place for these parts, consisting of about fifty houses, with cultivation and fruit-trees all round it. About one mile beyond Alikheyl is a level plateau, about 400 yards wide and two miles long, cut into three parts by the ravines that run down from the mountain Matungi. Between Alikheyl and the plateau is a spur from the hill. This spur and the plateau which lay nearest it were ultimately fortified by redoubts and intrenchments, so as to prevent any enemy taking possession of it, and firing into the camps, which were placed on the plateaus. The ravines between the plateaus are about 100 feet deep, and their sides, generally at an angle of 45, were sufficiently steep to prevent any rush being made.

The elevation of Alikheyl is about 6,800 feet,

The Peiwar Kotal ridge forms, as has been stated, a portion of the large spur that descends from Sika Ram in a southerly direction; but the ground, on its western side, instead of being

precipitous as on the eastern, forms at first an upland valley—the Hurriab—and then rises again into the mountainous country already mentioned.

From the southern face of Sika Ram, a very large dry watercourse, that shows white for many miles, descends with a slope, very steep at first, and subsequently more gentle. This watercourse turns east as soon as it meets the first projecting spur, or buttress, that starts from the Sika Ram main spur. The watercourse follows the spur, descending at an easy gradient for about two miles, when it runs into another one at nearly a right angle, at the end of the spur, and the wider watercourse proceeds towards the south, carrying the drainage of Sika Ram and the western part of the Sufaid Koh, and reaches ultimately the Kurram river. About four miles from the first junction, the watercourse enters the actual plain of the Kurram valley, passing the village of Peiwar on the right side, and leaving the deserted Afghan cantonment of Peiwar, or Habib Killa, on the left, as it debouches on to the plain. This watercourse is known as the "Spingawi," or the White Track, and it was the road used by the force under General Roberts on the night of the 2nd December. About four miles below the village of Peiwar another watercourse joins in; this one takes the drainage of the valley and neighbouring ravines up which the direct road to the Peiwar Kotal runs. The track from Kurram itself was not particularly direct to this point, as it kept as much as possible on the lower level of the valley, so as to pass in the neighbourhood of the villages bordering the river, till it was necessary to turn towards the village of Peiwar. From this point the road was taken over the broad slope on which the village is built, and after proceeding for two miles through cultivation, continued towards the foot of the hills in a direct line, passing through a scrub jungle of hill-oak, and thorny bushes, over broken ravine ground, for about four miles. At this point a Mangal village—Turrai—to the left of the road, is situated at the end of a projecting spur which runs

for about a mile down the centre of the valley, up which the road is taken. To the right or north side of this spur the road ascends up a glen at the side of the dry torrent-bed for about half a mile. When the two watercourses which supply the torrent are reached, the one to the left is short and precipitous, as is the left spur, which is quite inaccessible on this side; the other, to the right, leads parallel to the general direction of the Peiwar range, between precipitous sides, and ends about a quarter of a mile after a steep ascent, in a wooded ravine that rises to a gully at the south end of the central hill, which marks the position between the Peiwar and Spingawi kotals.

The road at the bifurcation of the nullahs is taken up a spur in zigzags, where laden animals had found the gradient too steep, but mostly in as direct an ascent as possible, till the summit was reached. The whole of this road was commanded by the spur to the left, as also the nullah to the right, which was completely enfiladed. Neither of these roads was practicable while the projecting central spur was held.

This spur, which was afterwards called One-Gun Hill, from the position of the enemy's gun upon it, commanded thus the valley to the left; while it equally protected the valley on the right from being occupied, had such a plan been thought of; but the nature of the ground in this valley was still more difficult, and with the exception of one or two mountain tracks, which could only be scaled with great labour in single file, was utterly impracticable for troops. The spur to the south enclosing this valley trended away to the east, forming the boundary of the Peiwar Valley road on that side; it extended for about four miles down into the plain, terminating about three miles south from the Peiwar village. This spur was used on the 2nd December for a flanking party of Turis, under Major Palmer, 8th Bengal Cavalry. The elevation of the Peiwar Kotal is 8,500 feet above the sea. The village of Turrai is about 6,500, but the actual ascent begins a mile lower down from the bed of a

ravine, which would be about 6,000 feet. The ascent to the end of the glen is about  $1\frac{3}{4}$  miles, and the gradient between these points is about 1 in 8, making the elevation at the foot of the actual ascent about 7,000 feet. The rise, over 1,000 feet, to the summit of the pass was accomplished by the native track in about half a mile; by the present road, which has been made as long as the nature of the ground will admit, the slope is about 1 in 16, which is very steep for laden animals. The road for the whole of the ascent passes through pines, and all the hill-sides at this elevation are covered with these trees. The pine found here is chiefly a kind of deodar, which does not grow to any great size as compared with the deodars of the Himalayas; but this may be owing to the close growth of the trees, which may prevent their lateral expansion. A few *Excelsa* pines are found, and also a few *Abies Webbiana*, with other trees; but the timber is chiefly deodar, which extends in a belt about two miles deep from the top of the Peiwar Kotal toward the west, and down to the lower spurs on the east. The ranges to the south of the Hurriab are covered with these trees, except towards the lower slopes on the south, which, like those on the north side of this valley, are bare, for the most part, till the wooded slopes of Matungi are reached.

On reaching the top of the Peiwar Kotal the descent begins at once; a gentle grassy slope in an open glade, about 100 yards wide, between wooded declivities; 200 yards down this glade another branch is reached, which extends for about 300 yards till it reaches the edge of the ridge. A pyramidal hill occupies the intervening ground, easy of access on the west and north, but precipitous on the east side. Opposite this, to the left of the road down the glen, is another height, which forms the end of the chain of mountains bordering the south of the Hurriab. The projecting spur, One-Gun Hill, is commanded by this point, as no one could advance along the narrow ridge on the top of the spur if its junction with the range were held.

These two glades, being the only open ground in the neighbourhood of the road, were used for the camps of the Afghan troops holding the position, and, being out of sight from below, were well placed as long as they could not be seen. The west side of the second glade is formed by the end of another mountainous ridge, which, from its having been held in great force by the enemy, was called Afghan Hill. This hill extends for about  $\frac{3}{4}$  of a mile due north; its eastern face slopes down into the right-hand glen of the Peiwar; its western trends away into various spurs towards the west and north. At its northern end it is joined by a neck of land or gully to another hill. This, from the fact of the force having halted there for refreshment, is known as Picnic Hill. Between Afghan Hill and Picnic Hill is a ravine, leading to the north, in which a good deal of fighting took place.

Picnic Hill is the last hill which intervenes between the Peiwar and the Spingawi kotals. On its eastern and southern sides, it descends to the plain in several spurs and ravines, one of which forms the left-hand side, going down, of the Peiwar glen, and was the ridge which was held, under heavy fire from the surrounding mountains, by six companies of the 2nd Battalion 8th Kings. The 5th Punjab Infantry ascended another spur, so as to come up close to the centre of the position, and after a day's hard climbing effected a junction with General Roberts; and from the knowledge of the ground gained by this movement, the weak point of the Afghan position was discovered.

The most interesting part of the Peiwar Kotal range is the Spingawi plateau, or murg, following the term used in Cashmere to denote a similar upland plain. This plateau extends between the foot of the actual mountain mass of Sika Ram and Picnic Hill. It is about a mile long, and about  $\frac{3}{4}$  of a mile at the widest part; its shape is somewhat oval, and on its eastern and southern sides, till it joins with the Picnic Hill spurs, it is

bounded by ridges, which overlook the plain. The plateau has a gentle slope from the east towards the west; it gradually terminates in a glen, down which the drainage of the plain finds its way. This glen extends for about two miles, and the rivulet that drains it finds its way out in the Hurriab valley at a place called Zabbar dast Killa,\* a high-sounding name for a ruined collection of huts inhabited by a few families. The ground between the rivulet which drains the Peiwar and the Spingawi glens, forms a triangular net-work of mountain, ravine, and glade. There are a few springs hidden in the ravines, but otherwise water is scarce in these regions.

The Peiwar glen starts from the drainage of the two glades; the soft soil soon gets cut down to the underlying rock, and the road passes along the bank of a dry watercourse at first, till a spring is reached, about a mile down, where the glen opens out into a swampy grassy meadow, and thence it descends gently to Zabbar dast Killa. Except close to the edge of the road and on the flat parts, this glen is covered with forest trees, like all the rest of the mountains at this elevation. The scenery in consequence is of a high order, an afternoon light in the Peiwar glen producing beautiful effects of light and shade and colour, by the strong contrast of the pine trees when in shade, to where they show bright green under the effects of sunlight.

At Zabbar dast Killa the road emerges on the Hurriab. The native track followed the Peiwar stream, which, on debouching into the open valley, and after being joined by the watercourse that started from the Spingawi plain, soon grew to a river-bed of about 100 yards wide, which dimensions increased gradually in its downward course to about 250 yards, where it joins the Kurram river, a mile below Alikheyl. The river-bed keeps on the south side of the valley, and quite close to the range that borders it on this side, whose projecting spurs command it

\* The Fort of Oppression—literally “Strong-hand.”

during its course. The native track followed the river-bed, and when the road was made between Alikheyl and the Peiwar this track was improved upon, the right bank being cut away and the road opened out to a width of ten feet. This road followed the bank, and, by so doing, crossed all the drainage of the valley into the river bed; it had also the defect of being, like the river itself, commanded from the opposite bank for about half the way down, or six miles, and below this point, in one place, it had to be taken along the face of a mud cliff, about 100 feet high, the base of which was being eaten away by the river. With all these drawbacks, as soon as opportunity offered, the road was taken away from the river; starting from the village of Zabbar dast Killa, it was taken to a village, "Beloot," situated about the middle of the valley on the banks of a deep-water ravine, from whence it is taken back towards the river bank, which it meets at Byan Kheyl, about five miles from Alikheyl. This new road, like all the roads that were made by us, was thirty feet wide; it led through fields for the most part, with an occasional moraine of stones and boulders brought down from the mountains. At Byan Kheyl there is a sufficient width of valley, in addition to the river-bed, to make the road there quite safe from annoyance. The village of Byan Kheyl, though still inhabited, is a mass of ruins, as indeed all the neighbouring villages are, except Alikheyl. One would naturally attribute their decay to the effect of the unsettled state of affairs during the Afghan rule; but the only reason that could be ascertained was that the villages had been deserted, owing to a succession of bad crops driving away the inhabitants, a movement the more likely to happen when they could pay no taxes. At an elevation between 7,000 and 8,000 feet, it is not surprising that cultivation should be uncertain; but anyone seeing this Hurriab during the summer months, from May to October, would, judging from the amount of land under cultivation under British rule, think that even with very reduced crops there would be ample food for more

inhabitants than the valley holds now. Where the river-bed begins to widen, the low lands are all cultivated ; sometimes only a little patch now left shows that the river has eaten up the produce of much labour ; but in other places a broad piece of terraced land, which looks beautifully green with the young rice crop that covers it, shows how much soil has been reclaimed. In some places attempts have been made by planting willow trees to make a channel for the water ; this, if systematically done, might be successful ; but the thick stems of old willow trees lying perished in the river-bed, in some places show where their purpose has failed. In other places rows of willows still line the edge of the stream, but generally on one side alone. From Byan Kheyl to the village of Alikheyl, the road, now thirty feet wide, follows the end of the spurs cut out of the table-land of the valley by the drainage falling into the river. In some places there are regular ravines, but in others only the high bank has been curved out for some distance inland, and all these bays are terraced in steps of generally three feet high, and cultivated. The road had to be taken across this cultivation, and having been made in the spring months, before the water was turned on for irrigation, it is a very good one.

The village of Alikheyl, as before stated, is situated in a deep bay, three-quarters of a mile across, and trending up towards the south side of the mountain Mutungi. A conical hillock in the centre of the village is covered with houses, and if the valley were only a little wider it would be a position of great strength ; but it is commanded by the eastern sides of the bay, at a distance of about 300 yards, which necessitated an outlying picquet tower being built at this point, when the conical hill was intrenched. This fortified hill, which completely overlooked the village, was taken for the storage of the provisions of the force when they were sent on ahead, as soon as the melting of the snow allowed the road, then unmade, to be used by the natives of the country. The village would contain about fifty houses, as stated already,



and farmsteadings, the latter meaning walled enclosures; and its population are Jajis, a tribe who inhabit the Hurriab, and extend for a short way up the Kurram river towards the Shutargardan. Though some of the farmsteads are capable of defence, to a slight degree, there are no watch-towers about the place, nor is there any attempt at an enclosing wall. These facts argue that the Jajis are quite at peace among themselves, and are also on good terms with their neighbours; and, as they only submitted to the British rule after the 2nd December, when they fought against us with the Afghan troops, there is no doubt that their being of the same sect\* as the Afghans, as also of the surrounding tribes, has saved them some of the persecution that fell on the Turis. At the same time, the Afghans did not attempt to hold the Hurriab valley; consequently, except on the passage of troops through to relieve those in the Kurram valley, the Jajis were cut off from all contact with the outer world, on one side by the Kurram valley, into which they could not enter, being at feud with the Turis, and on the other three sides mountains blocked their exit from their own houses.

From the village of Alikheyl the road proceeds, over the spurs and plateaus before mentioned, in a north-west direction for about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles, and then drops down into the Kurram river-bed. The river-bed itself is about 400 yards wide at this point,

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\* The Turis belong to the Shiah persuasion of Mahomedanism, being thus at variance with the majority of the Pathan and Afghan tribes, till their co-religionists in Persia and of Persian descent in Afghanistan are reached; this fact keeps up the mutual hatred between themselves and their neighbours, and thus added to the willingness they showed to accept the settled rule of the British Government. An incident, small as it is, may help to describe the fanatical—or, perhaps, Puritanical—feeling which exists on this subject, showing how it influences even their conduct in daily life. A Mahomedan servant went into a village in the Kurram valley to purchase supplies. Entering a house, he asked the occupant, an old woman, to sell him some eggs. “Are you a Shiah?” inquired the old woman. “No, I am a Sunni,” was the answer. “Then I won’t sell you any.” Profiting by experience, at the next house he represented himself as a Shiah, and obtained what he wanted, and for the rest of his stay in the valley he was always ready to call himself a Shiah when necessary.

and the alluvial soil on either side makes the valley about half a mile wide, where the actual gorge begins. This proceeds in a north-westerly direction for about eight miles from this point, gradually ascending and narrowing till a bifurcation is reached. Near lies Dre Kullah, or the three glens or mouths, a scattered hamlet of a few houses. The gorge from Alikheyl to Dre Kullah is not a very difficult one; there is one place near Rokian, which, if held by a determined enemy, would take some time to force, where two spurs, 200 yards apart, from opposite sides of the gorge, push out into the stream; the left bank above the first spur is inaccessible, the right bank is difficult, as the hill-sides are very steep and rocky. This place and several similar to it might have been held by the Afghans in their retreat in December, when they crossed the Shutargardan; but their force was too utterly demoralized to think of stopping anywhere.

There is a very curious rock-formation at Dre Kullah; about three-quarters of a mile from the bifurcation, on the ravine which leads to a village—Gogizah—the east side of the valley recedes for about three-quarters of a mile, sloping up at an angle of  $45^{\circ}$ , till a vertical wall of what appears to be rock rises for a height of about 100 feet, with a curious peaked outline against the sky. The face of this rock is seamed with straight vertical lines, which add to its curious appearance. On examination, the rock is found to be a soft clay conglomerate, which accounts for the action of the water cutting straight lines down its face. The further side of the formation lies at an angle of  $45^{\circ}$ . No one who has seen the castellated appearance of this cliff, with its little outlying natural towers of mud, will forget it. There are several smaller instances of this clay-formation along this gorge. Looking from the plateaus of Alikheyl—about four miles off—what appears to be a square walled fort stands out on a ridge. On passing this place below, it is found to be only, as it were, a

wall of some thickness, but it is curious that it should have remained when all the spur on each side of it had been washed away.

The mass of mountains to the left of the river in ascending centres in a peak called Sara-tiga, whose spurs and branches fill up the whole of the ground between the road to Cabul by the Shutargardan, and the road to Ghazni from Alikheyl. This peak is situated closer to the Shutargardan road, and thus its spurs towards the Ghazni side are much longer than the others, which descend to the ravine that runs into the Kurram river at Dre Kullah. This ravine, or river-bed, which is known as the Hazardarakht defile, is, at its junction, about 300 yards wide, and is, like the rest of the road above Alikheyl, completely commanded by the mountain-sides the whole way to its source; but there are only one or two places that would detain a force, and that for only a short time. About six miles up this ravine the valley opens out to about half a mile wide, and advantage of this has been taken by the Afghans to place a fortified enclosure here. This place is known as Jaji Thanna; it is now in ruins, and might have held 200 men when in repair.

From Jaji Thanna the glen narrows again, the river-bed here being about fifty yards; but the bank, covered with tall juniper trees, is sufficiently wide to offer camping-grounds in several places. At a distance of half a mile from Jaji Thanna, a tolerably wide ravine comes in on the right side in ascending. The road up this leads to the Shutargardan, though it is too difficult to be used for ordinary traffic. Three miles further on, a broad ravine to the left opens out a view of the top of Sara-tiga, which is distant about an eight hours' climb from this point. The open ground at the mouth of the ravine forms a fair camping-ground, as camping-grounds go in this part of the world; though at an elevation of nearly 9,500 feet in an unpopulated glen, anything required for man or beast, except water and wood, must be imported. The boundary of the Ghilzai tribe is reached

half a mile from this point. A wide-projecting rock comes down to the edge of the stream and forms a sufficiently striking object. The place is known as Kara-tiga, or the White Rock, as the overhanging mountain to the right is, as before mentioned, called the Black Rock, or Sara-tiga. The Pushtu vocabulary is, like those of all savage tribes, only adapted to express the ordinary wants of civilisation, and a few natural objects; while the Pushtu-speaking people's ideas are still further narrowed by their being shut up by tribes, or sections, each in its own valley, and not holding any intercourse with their neighbours. Probably there is not a valley in all Cabul that has not equally its Black and White rock, though in some places where Persian is spoken these have their Persian names. Similarly, the names Sufaid Koh and Syah Koh are given to ranges widely apart, and this arises from the fact that the White range (Sufaid Koh), where the snow would lie, is the only one that is known to the neighbouring people, and the Black mountain, which is not necessarily black in winter, is generally black in comparison with the white one.

In fixing their boundary at Kara-tiga, on the southern side of the Shutargardan range, the Ghilzais have acted wisely, as the line is drawn nearly at the point where the trees come to an end, and above this, on the hill-sides and upland valleys, there is plenty of grazing for their flocks, and in addition they hold the Shutargardan road, and might be able to block it, if they could collect in sufficient numbers. By right this tribe should have kept on the north side of the range, but, either by force of arms or want of anyone to oppose them, they have spread over the crest, and there is no great harm in their having done so, as the Jaji population is not so extensive as to require more land.

From Kara-tiga the road proceeds two miles up the glen, and then turns to the right in zigzags up the sides of a very small ravine, which leads up to the point where the range is crossed which separates the watershed of the Hazardarakt defile from

the slope leading into the Kassim Kheyl plain. This pass is known as the Surkhai Kotal, from the red colour of the ground over which it is taken. At the top, on another hill, there is a tower which commands the road very completely, but being of small size it would not offer any great opposition to a force. The Surkhai Kotal, if held in strength, would be a difficult pass to force by a direct attack ; but it could be turned without difficulty, and the hill-sides on the opposite side of the Hazardarakht glen, being sufficiently near, would enable mountain guns to shell the position very effectually.

The road, after passing the foot of the hill on which the town stands, proceeds through a little valley for about half a mile ; it then skirts round the base of another spur, following the sides of a watercourse, till it debouches on to a large open plain, which extends for about three miles and one mile wide, surrounded by low mountains and ridges from which spurs descend. The general direction of this plain is from west to north-east in a crescent shape. The track leads north-east across the plain, crossing the end of a spur, and drops into the space between this spur and the next one, where there is a mud enclosure called Kassim Kheyl. The track then ascends this glen in a westerly direction for about two miles ; a small stream runs down the glen, but where this and the drainage of the plain made its exit from the basin there was no opportunity to observe at that time, as the visits to the Shutargardan were but few, and no survey of the country was allowed for fear of offending the prejudices of the Ghilzais. At first the remains of terraced cultivation are passed, but no crops were observed here, though by a small mud enclosure on the eastern side of the valley a few small fields of barley were observed ripening in the hot sun, for though the elevation of their upland valley exceeds 10,000 feet above the sea, yet the heat of the sun is considerable in June. The glen narrows as it ascends up a gentle slope, and after turning to the north, about a quarter of a mile before its end is reached, a

ruined round tower marks the Shutargardan, or the Camel's Neck, pass. The comparison to a camel's neck must refer to the steepness of the declivity, for there is nothing in the road from Alikheyl either to present any great difficulty, or to be compared to any part of the animal.

The road abuts on the descent in the centre of a circus of mountains, which converge further on and make a narrow glen through which the drainage of the valley and the road find their way. The road is taken down the ridge of a central buttress, on both sides of which are lateral glens. That to the right or east seemed practicable for infantry, and there appeared to be a road leading up it which would enable the Shutargardan pass to be turned by it if necessary. The ravine to the left seemed impracticable, the hill-sides ending in vertical limestone precipices. The view from the top of the Shutargardan on a fine day would be grand. At its foot runs the Logar valley, bare and uncultivated along the broken ground at the foot of the hills, but with a broad belt of vegetation marking the course of the Logar river in the middle of the valley. On the further side of the river lies the Paghman or Paman mountains, the southern continuation of the Hindoo Koosh. At the foot of the hills, beyond the point where the glen contracts, the road is taken over an open plain, avoiding the river-bed, as this becomes too difficult and rocky for easy passage. The village of Dobundi is observed here, after which the road crosses a low spur known as the Shinkai Kotal, and then turns westward to Kooshi—a large village situated more in the plain and about half way to the river. A high shoulder of the spur that closes the Shutargardan valley shuts out the view of the north and the course of the Logar river, which runs into the Cabul river below the town of Cabul, which is also hid from view, though only distant, in a direct line, about thirty-seven miles.

From Drekullah a road goes across the Guggur pass into the valley of the Cabul river, and several messengers passed this

way between Gandamak and Alikheyl when the forces occupied these places. As yet nothing is known of this road, except that it is passable for infantry and mountain guns.

The third road that comes in at Drekullah leads from the Shutargardan plain and Mir Alam's fort at the north end, passes a village Gogizah *en route*, and is known therefore by the name of that village. Till the actual descent down the glen is commenced, the road leading across the plain is an excellent one, but the track down the ravine to Drekullah is very nearly impracticable for laden animals, but as an alternative road and for turning the position on the Surkhai Kotal and taking it in rear it would be very useful.

All the range of the Shutargardan mountains has a high elevation, being between 8,000 and 12,000 feet above the sea. In the northern latitude  $34^{\circ}$ , in which they are situated, this elevation is naturally covered with snow during the winter months, and the road is stopped for traffic from the beginning of November till the beginning of May, so the Kurram road to Cabul can never be as generally useful as the Khyber road, which is open all the year round. The ascent of the Shutargardan and Peiwar kotals form also difficulties in the way, which were nearly insuperable taken in addition to the hardships of the road, traders being exposed to be plundered in the Hazardarakt defile by the Jajis, whose domain it was. A settled rule and improved road will doubtless bring a certain amount of traffic along this road in the summer time, but it will require nursing at first, and increased production, to provide a continuous summer trade.

Starting from Kurram, and proceeding along the bed of the river, past the Chukmunnies and the Saffi Mangals, the Ahmed Kheyl district is reached, and in it lies the Ghunzai or Surki river, with a kotal of the same name over which the road to Ghazni is taken. Another track turns off from this road, passing the Spiga Kotal, and leads to Cabul. The road down the valley from Alikheyl joins the first of these roads at the

Surki stream, and the country to about ten miles has been surveyed, but the hostility of the Mangals would not allow of any ascent, except in force, of any of the high ridges overlooking the road to Ghazni, though it would have been most interesting to explore this road, which had been used by the various invaders of India at different times. Among others Chingiz Khan and Timur both used this road. This bare outline of the general features of the Kurram and Hurriab valleys, with the road beyond to the Shutargardan, has been given to allow the reader to form some idea of the country in which the operations were conducted, even though in the course of the narrative the same places are referred to in connection with the events that took place. It may not be now out of place to refer briefly to the tribes with whom the troops came in contact. Some of these have already been mentioned in reference to their *locale*, but will be again referred to in the order in which they touch each other. The Bangash, besides occupying the lower part of the Kurram valley, inhabit the fertile plains of the Miranzai valley within our border—between Kohat and Thull—into which they came when dispossessed of the Kurram valley. They can muster 15,000 fighting men.

The ranges bounding the west side of the Mirunzai valley are formed from the spurs which extend for many miles from the east end of the Sufaid Koh. Roughly speaking, the whole of these spurs are Afridi territory, and where the inhabitants are known by their own name instead of that of the larger class, yet the tribe considers itself an Afridi one.

This tribe and its ramifications have been at the bottom of all the frontier disturbances of late years; but owing to their numbers and the large and difficult country which they occupy, which was inaccessible except to the east, as long as the Khyber and Kurram were closed to us no operations could have been undertaken against them. With the command of these roads, by which their retreat could be blocked, there would be less diffi-



culty in bringing them into subjection if ever it should be necessary. The Afridi tribes who occupy the triangle of mountain country between the Miranzai and Kurram valleys, are the Orakzais, who are subdivided again into Alizais and Alisharzais. In the apex of the triangle, however, are the Zymukhts, a small and hostile tribe of 5,000 men, who are bent on getting the conceit taken out of them by continual raids and murders, which require reprisal. These Zymukhts are, however, independent of the Afridi clan. The Afridis boast that they have never been subject to any rulers, but have always been independent. The boast is a vainglorious one when it is remembered that it is not the bravery of the people which has kept them independent, but the difficult nature of their country, which has fought on their side. The Alizais' territory comes very nearly to the Kurram valley, and, in fact, as their native mountains cannot furnish all the food they require, they cultivate some of the valley of the Kermanah stream close down to the village of Suddur. The next hill-tribe, from whom they are divided by the glen of this stream, are the Musazais, who inhabit the slopes of the Kermanah valley, and part of whose land comes down into the Kurram valley close to the village of Budesh Kheyl. There are two deserted villages here, which mark the border of their territory. For some reason they claimed the land, and requested the Turi inhabitants to withdraw, which they did, and rebuilt their villages about 200 yards nearer the river. The Kermanah valley has hardly been explored since the time it was mapped down by Captain Garnett and Lieutenant Lumsden. Its scenery must be of the wildest description. The Kermanah river, which comes out of it, is the largest of the affluents of the Kurram, and, judging by the size of the boulders it has brought down, its course must be very precipitous. The Turis are supposed to be of Mangal extraction, but this seems doubtful, for though their round faces are different from the narrow, thin faces of the Pathan tribes, yet the obliquity of the eyes, which is the mark of

the Mongolian, is quite absent, and though there may be a strain of this blood in the race, yet it must be but a slight one. As a race, though not tall, the Turis are fine, broad-shouldered men ; in their youth their round pleasant faces, with ruddy cheeks, form a striking contrast to the hungry-looking savages of the mountains. The Turi women are supposed to be very beautiful, and the Afghans had no objection to marrying them either by fair or foul means. Wali Mahomed, the half-brother of the Amir, is a Turi by his mother's side. None of these beauties were, of course, observed among the labouring classes who worked in the fields, and as the rest of their female population was kept indoors in the eastern style, there was no opportunity of proving the statement. It has been asserted that the Turi character is rather worse, instead of better, than that of their neighbours. As far as there has been an opportunity of judging, this is a libel, for though, as regards the Afghans, there may be some cause for a Turi to show his evil disposition, as regards the English their conduct has been excellent, and they have never given a single cause for complaint. The tribe of Turis is not a large one, numbering only about 5,000 men, but with the era of peace in store for them they may be expected to increase and multiply very considerably.

All poor races that live in mountainous and cold regions are naturally dirty, avoiding cold water as much as possible, and these Pathans, Jajis, Turis, and Afghans, are no exception to this rule, but of the three the Turi is the cleanest.

The Jajis chiefly occupy the Hurriab ; there is a branch of them that occupy the north end of the mountains close to Khost, at Jaji Maidan and Jaji Danni. The remainder are divided into eight sections, Ada Kheyls, Lehwaunis, Ahmed Byan Kheyls, Hassan Kheyls, Pitta Ali Sangis, Ali Kheyls, Shamu Kheyls, and Ahmed Kheyls of Tangi.

The Hassan Kheyls live to the west of the Hurriab, and command the road to Ghazni ; as they have but little culti-

vable land, they are naturally freebooters and robbers by profession. The Ahmed Kheyls are nearly as bad, being bigoted as well as thievish. The total number of the Jajis would amount to 25,000, of whom one-fifth might be reckoned as fighting men. The Lehwaunis, who are supposed to be the bravest of the tribe, fought against us at the Peiwar Kotal, but though they have the reputation of being good swordsmen, they did not exhibit much of their bravery on that occasion, nor were many found wounded in the Jaji villages after the battle.

The remaining tribes with which we have come in contact are the Ghilzais, a very large tribe extending along the north and western slopes of the Sufaid Koh, from Jellalabad to Kelat-i-Ghilzai. Some sections of the tribe who inhabit out-of-the-way mountains—the Babber Ghilzais to the north, the Machalqu Tota Kheyl and Bago Kheyl Ghilzais to the south-west—are robbers, but other sections of the tribe who occupy the valleys and low lands are peaceful cultivators. There are besides some nomad Ghilzais, who wander with their flocks, in a primitive patriarchal way, from the Logar, and other valleys, where they return every spring, to the neighbourhood of India, wherever they can find grass at any time of the year for their numerous flocks.

The total number of the Ghilzais of all the sections might be about 100,000, of whom 20,000 would represent the fighting strength of the tribe; but as this number is scattered over a wide space of 180 miles, the tribe is never likely, as in its old days, to distinguish itself as a warlike one, when it invaded Persia and set a king on its throne.

The Mangals are an equally large tribe, but as yet we know but little of them from direct intercourse; their country is situated to the south of the Kurram river, on which one section, as has already been stated, adjoin. They start southward from this point and extend from the western Suliman range, across the valley of Furlul, to the western range which

bounds the Khost valley. In appearance they are the wildest of the tribes; physically they cannot compare with any of their neighbours, the continuous effects of hardship and seclusion in their own valley having resulted in making the race rather small and undersized; the expression of the faces of those that were seen in Khost was compared to that of a wild beast; their eyes had a hungry look, with a quick restless motion, like a bird or beast of prey on the watch for its food. The western hills of the Khost valley are inhabited by Jadrans, another cognate tribe, whom it would be impossible to distinguish from the real Mangal. The Mangals might number about 100,000, and as they are not so much scattered as the Ghilzai tribe, they can muster more men in a quicker time for fighting than the other tribe; but they are not brave—no robbers by profession are or can be.

The south of the Khost valley is inhabited by a section of the Waziri tribe, the Garbaz Waziri. The territory of the Waziris extends from this point to Thull, and then eastward towards Bunnoo, and south as far as the Gomal pass, which is their main road into Hindostan. As a tribe they are the finest of any on the north-west frontier. The men are physically finer and braver than their neighbours, and if the tribe had not been on good terms with us, and disposed to give us annoyance, they would have taken a good deal of time and trouble to punish; but though the Amir did his best to stir them up he was only partially successful, and only in one isolated instance was there any attack made on our border.

With the Waziris the circle of tribes or clans surrounding the Kurram valley comes to an end; there is, however, one other independent small tribe, the Makbals, or Mukhbils as they are sometimes called, who inhabit the range to the south of the Kurram river, and between it and Khost. They are the only tribe who have not shown any disposition to be on friendly terms with us; their headmen refuse to come in, nor has the

rupee any attraction for them as yet, as they are hardly acquainted with the value of money. They are thieves and robbers, but as long as they conduct themselves with moderation towards their neighbours they will be tolerated. There was but little to complain of against them except their refusal to admit the survey party into their hills; their country, therefore, forms a blank on the map at present, but it will only be a question of time how far the policy of allowing savages to shut themselves up in their ignorant pride will continue to be in force. The more access is had to any race, the sooner civilisation with its benefits will follow.

The chapter which narrates the expedition will give such notices of the road traversed, and the country generally, as could be obtained during the short time the country was occupied.

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## CHAPTER III.

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### PREPARATIONS FOR THE CAMPAIGN.

KOHAT, 9th October.—Divisional Order, No. 1.—“The Major-General, having arrived at Kohat, assumes command of the column detailed for field service.”

The 29th Punjab Native Infantry (Colonel John Gordon) had arrived on the 7th October at Kohat; the 5th Punjab Infantry (Major Macqueen) and F Battery A Brigade Royal Horse Artillery (Colonel Stirling) arrived on the 9th, and were brought on the strength of the force.

No time was lost in pushing on the Punjab frontier regiments. The 5th Punjab Infantry and the head-quarters and wing of the 5th Punjab Cavalry, a regiment which was then in garrison at Kohat, were ordered to march on the 10th, the next day, to Thull, to arrive there in four marches.

These troops were to be followed on the next day, the 11th October, by the Horse Artillery battery and the 29th Punjab Native Infantry; but these latter troops not being required to arrive so quickly at the frontier, were ordered to do the distance in five marches.



The senior officer (Colonel Gordon) was to command the troops at Thull.

Captain A. Scott, V.C., appointed as Brigade Major to the force, was ordered to march with the 29th Regiment, N. I.; and Captain Carr, 5th Punjab Cavalry, posted as Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, was to proceed with his regiment; thus the small advanced brigade was nearly complete as regards its staff on its arrival at Thull.

Lieutenant Neville Chamberlain, Central India Horse, appointed Orderly Officer to the Major-General, was brought on the strength of the column, and was directed to act as Aide-de-Camp till further orders. Kohat, where the Kurram Valley force was ordered to assemble, is a small cantonment which lies to the south of Peshawur, and separated from it by intervening ranges of rugged mountains, which may be called the outlying spurs of the Sufaid Koh range. Though prettily situated in a wide open valley, yet it is not a healthy place, and it is difficult to see how it ever could be. The water from the hill-stream that comes down the Hangu glen, lodges in the cultivation all round the place; while for purposes of protection, the cantonment is crowded very much together and overgrown with trees. The fort is situated about half a mile from the cantonment. It is more like a fort than most constructions in India of its class; but it has the drawback of being almost commanded by a ridge of rock parallel to the mound on which it is built. The fort commands the Hangu valley, up which the road to Thull proceeds in a westerly direction. The winter wind that blows down this valley is known as the Hangu breeze. It comes from the snow slopes of the Sufaid Koh, and makes Kohat as bitterly cold in the winter months as it is heated in the summer time by the ranges of the Afridi hills, which are about three miles off.

The ordinary garrison at Kohat in peace time is three regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, one mountain battery, and a native garrison battery in the fort.

*Clothing for Followers.*

Kohat, October 10th.—D. O. No. 9.—“Officers commanding regiments are directed to send to the Executive Commissariat Officer indents showing the number of followers for whom warm clothing will be required. The following supply has been sanctioned for each public follower :—

“One good blanket.

“One pair Cashmere putties, in lieu of warm stockings.

“One poshteen or wadded coat.

“One pair of shoes.”

This order was published on the receipt of the orders of Government authorising the supply; but with the exception of the blanket and the shoes, the Commissariat Department was not in a position to comply with the demands till some time had elapsed, as but few poshteens were procurable, and it took some time to make up the wadded coats and the putties, or leg-bandages. These bandages are made of a strip of woollen cloth, about two and a half yards long and three inches wide, with a tape sewn on to one end. They are worn wound round the calf of the leg, from the ankle to below the knee, and secured by passing the tape round and round so as to keep the folds in their place. For either mounted men or infantry soldiers they are a most useful, warm, and neat-looking dress, and the only objection to them is that they take a little time to put on. Nearly everyone, officers and men, wore them all through the campaign.

An order was published this day, directing the empty cavalry lines at Kohat to be made over to the Commissariat as a *dépôt* for their supplies, which were in course of being collected; but at this early date there was not a sufficient stock to supply the native troops, nor was it necessary to deviate from the established precedent of supplies being furnished by the civil authorities. An order, however, was published directing officers commanding

to draw their supplies for native troops and for followers of British regiments from the Burdaster Khanas, or supply depôts, established by the civil authorities in the Kohat district up to the frontier at the various halting-places. It was also notified that the Commissariat Department would not furnish supplies to British officers until the frontier were crossed.

*Sickles to be provided Regimentally.*

D. O. No. 13.—“The Major-General directs that officers commanding Native Infantry regiments provide grass-cutters’ sickles, at the rate of four per company, for their regiments before leaving Kohat. These are to be purchased from the regimental funds, and will be found very useful in cutting grass for the men’s bedding.”

*Ration and Forage Rolls.*

October 12th.—D. O. No. 15.—“Officers commanding regiments are directed to send in rolls of Europeans and Natives and animals, for whom rations of food and forage will be required, to enable the Commissariat Department to provide for the future requirements of the force.”

*Shoes for Native Soldiers.*

D. O. No. 16.—“Five thousand pairs of shoes will shortly arrive for Native Infantry regiments, and will be available for issue, at Rawul Pindi, at the rate of one rupee per pair Hindustani pattern, and one rupee four annas Punjab pattern.” These shoes, which were supplied by the Commissariat, were hardly suitable for the rough country they were to be used in, and soon wore out. They were the ordinary pattern of shoe adapted for the plains of India, but not of much use for marches in stony countries.

October 12th.—Though the road from Kohat to Thull led all through our own territory, yet this part of the district was so seldom visited by anyone, except the civil authorities when occasion required, that it was hardly safe to trust to the good will of the frontier tribes, whose country came down to the foot of the hills bordering the valley, not to interfere with the traffic that was about to proceed before their eyes. A 12-foot road had indeed been made up to the civil bungalow at Hangu, twenty-six miles from Kohat, but it ran within a quarter of a mile in some places of independent Afridi territory. Beyond Hangu no road existed in the lower and upper Miranzai valley, and the only sign of British rule was a well-built thannah or police station at Gundour, thirty miles on towards Thull. It was necessary, therefore, that precautions should be taken, and accordingly an order was issued forbidding camp-followers to travel singly, and to accompany baggage guards. The grass-cutters of the cavalry were equally to be protected. This order was subsequently cancelled and a different system introduced.

*Free Rations sanctioned beyond British Territory.*

October 15th.—D. O. No. 24.—“Extract of Adjutant-General,” No. 3968 cy., 10th October, 1879, Simla.

“The Government of India have been pleased to direct that native troops and public followers will be, when employed beyond British territory, entitled to free rations or compensation in lieu thereof.”

This order was equivalent to raising the pay of the native army about thirty per cent., and was duly appreciated by the recipients. It almost amounted to over-liberality, as the troops were sometimes unable to eat the free ration as supplied, and it led to flour being either sold or collected in the men's kits, making an additional weight to be carried.

*Movements.*

October 16th.—D. O. No. 25.—“The 7th company Sappers to march to Thull to-morrow. Mr. Nigel Jones, Superintendent of Telegraphs, to accompany the detachment, which will be employed in putting up the telegraph line.

“The 5th Goorkhas to march on the 18th, leaving a detachment of two companies under a British officer at Kohat. The detachment of the 29th P. N. I. will march with the 5th Goorkhas.”

*Kohat-Thull Route.*

D. O. No. 26.—List of stages to Thull from Kohat :—

	Miles.
1. To Sherkot . . . . .	10
2. „ Ibrahimzai . . . . .	11
3. „ Thog . . . . .	13
4. „ Surrizai . . . . .	12
5. „ Gundiour . . . . .	9
6. „ Thull . . . . .	8
•	—
Total . . . . .	63
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The road to Sherkot crosses an unbridged nullah, which in flood would be difficult, and passes along and through cultivation nearly the whole way. The country is very pretty about Sherkot, which is raised on a plateau and wooded to a greater extent than is generally found in the Trans-Indus plains. From Sherkot to Ibrahimzai the road, after crossing another unbridged torrent-bed, is taken in a southerly direction, till the gorge where the “Kohat Towi,” or stream, comes out of the Hangu valley. The gorge is a narrow one, with limestone cliffs on the western side, along the face of which the road is taken, after a rather steep ascent. The descent is less marked, as the elevation of the Hangu valley is higher than that of the lower one. The

road proceeds at a moderate level, crossing another torrent bed about half-way to Hangu, a large village, in which is the residence of the Khan of Hangu, Mahomed Ameen, in whose charge is this valley and all this part of the frontier, and through whom all the communications that exist with the neighbouring tribes are carried on.

October 16th.—Major Moriarty, Bengal Staff Corps, appointed Superintendent of Transport, reported his arrival at Kohat on the 14th October.

The transport arrangements were under the charge of the Commissariat Department during the campaign, and the Superintendent of Transport was subordinate to the Principal Commissariat Officer of the force. This arrangement worked perfectly satisfactorily in the Kurram Field Force. An order was published directing carriage indents to be sent in to the Principal Commissariat Officer in accordance with the scale of carriage laid down in the Quartermaster-General's Circular Memorandum of 26th September, in which all the details of camp equipment and private and public baggage were laid down. With the exception of private servants for officers, who did not belong to regiments and who had thus the regimental establishment to fall back on, the number of followers allowed were ample, but only one servant was hardly sufficient for individual staff officers attached to the force.

October 16th.—The 12th Bengal Cavalry marched on the 15th, and were ordered to halt at Thog till further orders.

October 17th.—D. O. No. 33.—“Lieutenant Bagot, R.E., commanding 7th company of Sappers, is appointed a field engineer.”

“Lieutenant Grant, R.E., reported his arrival.”

#### *Cavalry Posts on Kohat-Thull Route.*

D. O. No. 40.—“Cavalry posts of one duffadar and three sowars will be established on the Kohat-Thull road, for expresses

and for officers on duty, at Chika Koti Raison, by the 5th Punjab Cavalry, from Kohat Hangu and Thog by the 12th Bengal Cavalry, Surrizai and Gundiour by the 5th Punjaub Cavalry at Thull. No express will be furnished except on the written order of the general officer commanding at Thull or Assistant Quartermaster-General at Kohat."

*Kajawahs for Engineer Field Park.*

D. O. No. 41.—"The Commissariat Officer is authorised to supply, as far as possible, the requirements of the Officer commanding Royal Engineers for kajawahs for the transport of field park equipment."

*Movements—Reserve Ammunition, Engineer Park.*

October 19th.—D. O. No. 43.—"The detachment 5th Goorkhas will march for Thull, taking the divisional reserve ammunition and all field park equipment which the C. R. E. may have ready for despatch, and also the furniture and tents for the field post-office."

• *Civil Armed Escorts or Badraggas.*

October 20th —D. O. No. 51.—"The Deputy Commissioner has arranged for the supply of Badraggas, or armed safe conducts, on the Kohat-Thull road, for the protection of camels, grass-cutters, &c For camels: One jemadar at five annas a day, and eight men at three annas a day for every 100 camels. For grass-cutters: One jemadar at four annas a day, and five men at three annas a day for every 100 grass-cutters.

"The Badragga will be paid by the Khan's agent at each camping-ground in the evening on the arrival of the grass-cutters or camels in camp. The agent will report to the officer commanding in camp that the money has been paid.

"Badraggas will not be supplied to troops when halted, or by cavalry, who will be responsible for the protection of their followers. This order cancels D. O. No. 57."

The object of this order was to throw the responsibility of the protection of the road on the inhabitants of the district, and at the same time often to save escorts of troops.

*Officers to be Armed.*

October 21st.—D. O. No. 58.—“Officers travelling on the Kohat-Thull road, unaccompanied by troops, should always be armed, and should travel only by day. If obliged to go by night, they should apply for an escort.”

*Swords for Followers.*

D. O. No. 70.—“Indents for swords for followers are to be sent in.” The swords provided in most cases for followers were the old stock of the arsenals. It was odd to see a small grass-cutter perched on his pony, with a long dragoon-sword in a steel scabbard, tied round his neck with a piece of string, in such a position that he could not draw it. The grass-cutter, when at his work, ran some risk of being cut up; but a grass-cutter with a sword ran a greater one, as the temptation of the sword would be sufficient to insure his destruction by a Pathan, if so disposed.

The order was subsequently modified, and swords were only to be issued to a certain number of followers, and given to those men who could, or would, be likely to use them.

October 23rd.—D. O. No. 73.—“The 21st Punjab Native Infantry arrived this day; the 23rd Pioneers arrived on the 22nd.”

The Assistant Quartermaster-General called for a report from officers commanding, as to the number of tents they had in excess of the authorised scale, as corrected by a Quartermaster-General's Circular, which allowed forty-four men per Sepoy's tent of two pals. This tent in peace time is calculated to hold half a company, or thirty-two men, so that when the additional twelve men were put into it, it was rather a tight fit; still it was possible, as the ground area of this tent is  $32 \times 16$  ft. = 312, which, divided by 44 gives nearly eleven square feet per man.



supposing every man to have been present; but, with the deduction for sick and men absent on guard, there was ample room.

*Artificers entertained Regimentally.*

A report of how many artificers were to be entertained regimentally, under the orders conveyed in the same Circular, was also asked for. This order came rather late in the day, as the artificers of India have a wholesome dread of fighting. It was found very difficult to induce any men of this class to cross the frontier, except at exorbitant wages.

*Second Blanket for British Soldiers.*

October 23rd.—Officers commanding British regiments were ordered to indent on the Commissariat Department for a second blanket for their men. This order was necessary on account of the cold, which began to be felt at this time of the year.

The blankets supplied to the troops are of English make and fairly good quality. For India, except in the winter months, they are unnecessarily warm, and, being in one piece, they cannot be adapted to the weather like the native blanket which used to be supplied, and which was of double length, requiring to be folded, so that when the weather was moderately cold only one fold of the blanket could be used.

The most suitable arrangement would be to provide English blankets to sleep on, and native ones as coverings.

*Blanket Tents for Pickets.*

October 25th.—D. O. No. 91.—“The officer commanding at Kohat is requested to make over to the Commissary of Ordnance the small blanket tents stored in the fort, and the Commissary of Ordnance is authorised to have them repaired for service with the field force.”

These blanket tents were made up for the Jowaki expedition, in which the blockade of this tribe was kept up for several months, necessitating standing pickets. The tents were made

of two blankets sewn together, with triangular ends sewn in. They were about eight feet square on the ground, and when properly pitched and filled with men, were fairly useful ; but they were loosely woven, and, in consequence, cold, and rather leaky.

October 25th.—The three regiments at Kohat, the 8th King's, 21st Punjab Native Infantry and 23rd Pioneers, were, as a temporary measure, formed into a brigade under Brigadier-General Cobbe. Captain Morton, brigade major, was ordered to do duty with the brigade till it should be absorbed into the Kurram Field Force.

*Transport Followers, Camp Equipage, and Transport.*

It was also notified in orders of this date that camel-men or mule-men were not entitled to tent accommodation, or to have their baggage carried for them, but that all other public followers were entitled to both these privileges. Private servants were not entitled to any Government tentage, and their masters were only allowed 10 lbs. of baggage on their account, and that on payment.

With the present transport arrangements it is impossible that any other system than that here detailed should be carried into effect. Each mule-man owns two or four mules as a rule, and one camel-man is allowed to four camels, though in most cases he is not the owner but only the servant of the contractor.

In the case of the mules : supposing the animals to have been hired by an officer who loads them up to their full loads, the mule-man's kit has to be carried in addition, and though 10 lbs. is the regulation weight of a native-follower's baggage, yet in every case it amounts to more, and so does the mule-man's. The consequence of this was that in most cases private mules were overladen. In ordinary dry weather the hardy mule and camel men slept out in the open, but when rain came on they had to pitch their blankets as tents and cower beneath them.

*Carriage of Pansari Stores.*

In the ordinary routine of garrison life in India the native soldier is fed under regimental arrangements by the regimental bunniah, who supplies him with all the necessaries of his diet. In the field, however, this is only allowed on sufferance as it were, and no carriage, except in the case of the Punjab Frontier regiments, is allowed for his use. In addition to the ordinary rations of flour and ghee which satisfy the native soldier, there are many condiments which are necessary, either in the preparation of his vegetable or animal diet, or else from their stimulating or cooling tendencies, to keep up his frame to the requisite pitch, and which in some cases are as necessary to him as actual food. This point was brought to notice by the Deputy Surgeon General, and in consequence an order (D. O. No. 106) was issued authorising each regiment to be supplied with five camels for the carriage of a two-months' supply of the following articles :—

Tobacco.	Chilies.
Opium.	Dried lemons.
Bhang.	Alum.
Salt.	Assafœtida.
Black pepper.	Kalajura.
Oil (mustard).	Oil (sweet).
Spices.	

The camels allowed for these supplies were not to be taken for any other purpose.

*Supply of Horse-shoes and Nails.*

November 28th.—D. O. No. 104.—“ Officers commanding regiments of cavalry and batteries of artillery will arrange for an immediate supply of horse-shoes and nails sufficient for four months' expenditure; this reserve will be constantly maintained under regimental arrangements. Extra carriage will, when necessary, be furnished by the Commissariat Department under sanction of a Divisional Order.”

There is no subject of more importance than the shoeing of horses in the field, and the present arrangements for peace time are unsuited to campaign work. In British regiments and batteries the farrier-sergeant has to provide iron for shoeing and to keep up a spare set for each horse, receiving a contract price for shoeing. This arrangement holds good in peace time in cantonments; but when the battery or regiment is suddenly ordered off, there is no arrangement for the carriage of any quantity of iron, nor, probably, can it be procured just before a march; the consequence is that the Ordnance Department is called on suddenly to supply iron for shoeing purposes when no provision has been made for its supply, as it is not an ordinary article of issue. As the campaign progressed, the Ordnance Department made arrangements both for the supply of horse-shoes and iron, but the shoes sent out from England were found on receipt to be too small for the artillery horses, and only suited to the small horses of the native cavalry, to whom they were given.

*1st and 2nd Regimental Ammunition Reserves to be carried in Bullock-boxes.*

October 29th.—D. O. No. 117.—“Commanding officers of regiments arriving at Thull will indent on the divisional ammunition reserves for the number of boxes of ammunition, of 500 rounds each, required to enable the whole of the 1st and 2nd regimental reserves to be carried on mules by their corps. All boxes containing 750 rounds and upwards will be transferred to the divisional reserve.”

Every regiment in India kept up its service ammunition at the rate of 200 rounds per man. This ammunition was packed by the Ordnance Department in two kinds of boxes, camel and bullock boxes, in the days when Brown Bess and the Enfield rifle were the arms with the troops. When the Snider rifles were given to the troops it was decided at first to keep to the

same pattern box, only making it smaller, to hold 500 rounds. A large quantity of the Snider ammunition that had been sent out from England had been packed in boxes containing about 2,000 rounds, and of the same size as the camel-box used in India. In some cases this ammunition was transferred to the Indian camel boxes. The ammunition was also packed in the old bullock-boxes, which held 750 rounds, and sometimes in new pattern camel-boxes holding 1,500 rounds. A good deal of it was packed in teak slide ammunition-boxes, holding 560 rounds, which, according to the orders on the subject that had lately been published, was the only kind of ammunition-box that should be taken into the field; there were thus six kinds of boxes containing Snider ammunition with regiments, and only three out of the six were adapted for mule carriage. Hence the necessity for changing the regimental ammunition at the last moment. The regimental first reserve was forty rounds, the second reserve 100 rounds per man, and the ordnance park was supposed to carry 300 rounds per man when carriage was available for it.

#### *Movements—23rd Pioneers.*

D. O. No. 131.—“The 23rd Pioneers will march on Saturday, 2nd November, towards Thull. The regiment will be employed in working on the Kohat-Thull road, under instructions from the Commanding Royal Engineer.”

This was the beginning of much useful road-making that this regiment was employed on during the campaign; but though it did its full share of road-making, yet every regiment was called on to assist when necessary, to the full extent of their power as regards the number of tools in their possession.

#### *Intrenching Tools—Regimental.*

October 29th.—An order, calling attention to the scale of intrenching tools, was published this day, so that every regiment should be as complete as possible.

*Warm Clothing for Animals.*

November 3rd.—D. O. No. 147.—Extract from Military Department Letter No. 504 K, is published for information:—"The provision of shools (warm clothing) is sanctioned for Government cattle only. As regards hired cattle, it should be impressed upon the owners by commanding officers, heads of departments, and all concerned, that the provision of proper clothing for their animals is a matter to which Government expects them to pay very strict attention, and that no compensation will be paid for cattle which may be lost in consequence of the inclemency of the weather, should it be proved on investigation that this very necessary precaution has been neglected."

Had the loss of a baggage animal been capable of being apportioned between Government and the owner, the shares would not have been in any measure equal; for though the owner might have lost his animal, yet Government lost the means of carrying food and stores, a loss which cannot be expressed by any money value. As a rule, the hired mules were generally fairly protected, their pack-saddles being left on them when their owners did not pay due attention to the order that they were to provide warm clothing; but as regards the camels, not more than half were properly clothed, and here again the difficulty of arranging for the comfort of transport animals was shown. The camel, if he were provided with a coat, was obliged to wear it all day, as there was no means of carrying it, except when worn. A camel-shool is a rather large and heavy hair-cloth when properly made, not capable of being conveniently folded up. The wretched animal had thus to wear this coat, which covered his tail and hind-quarters well; but as the nose-string of the following camel is always fastened to the tail of the preceding one, the heavy cloth pulled the head of the second camel down. With the allowance of one man to four camels, it would not have been possible to do what would have been the right thing—to let

the camels wear their coats at starting on a frosty morning, but as soon as the sun was up, to unload and take them off; besides which the camel-men are such thieves that they would steal, if possible, the coverings of their neighbours' camels, if these were found loose and not on the animal.

#### *Ammunition-cartouches.*

The infantry regiments of the force were ordered to indent for painted canvas cartouches, or hand-bags, for the carriage and distribution of ammunition in the field. Three of these bags were to be attached to each box of the first regimental reserve. The only objection to these bags was that they were detached from the boxes and liable to be lost. They were intended for use with a special ammunition-box furnished with a strap to retain them; but none of this pattern of box was with the force.

#### *Turn-screws for Ammunition-boxes.*

There being a mixture of ammunition-boxes of different kinds, as already stated, and regiments being liable to receive boxes of ammunition with sliding lids, which were screwed down, eight turn-screws were ordered to be obtained by each regiment, for the purpose of opening such boxes when necessary. It is laid down in the English equipment tables, that these boxes should always have the screw withdrawn previous to being sent on service; but the contingency of mule transport was not present to the originator of this order. The sliding lids would soon work out and get broken if they were not secured.

#### *Increase of Baggage Allowance to Native Troops.*

November 8th —The allowance for baggage for native non-commissioned officers and soldiers was raised, under the orders of Government, from 20 to 26 lbs. per man, and regiments were ordered to obtain the additional carriage necessitated by this increase. The necessity of having an ample supply of warm

clothing and bedding in prospect of a winter campaign rendered this increase imperative.

*Iron Picketting-pegs for Cavalry Horses.*

Another small but important change was also ordered, viz. the substitution of iron for wooden picketting-pegs for cavalry horses. The ground at Kohat is similar, as regards its stones, to the rest of Afghanistan, and the wooden pegs which were suited to the plains of India were not adapted to it.

*Scale of Carriage for Medical Stores.*

November 10th.—D. O. No. 196.—The following scale of carriage for medical stores and camp furniture was published :—

British Troops.	Medical Stores.	Camp Furniture.
Battery Royal Artillery.	2 Camels.	1 Camel.
Regiment of Cavalry.	5 „	1 „
Regiment of Infantry.	6 „	1 „
In mountain batteries three mules instead of two camels.		

Native Troops.	Camels.	Mules.
Regiment Native Infantry.		
Hospital Furniture, 210lbs. }	1	1
Hospital Equipment, 339lbs. }		
Regiment Native Cavalry.		
Hospital Furniture, 210lbs. }	1	1
Hospital Equipment, 265lbs. }		
Native Mountain Battery.		
Hospital Furniture, 177lbs. }	—	2
Hospital Equipment, 150lbs. }		
Company of Sappers.		
Hospital Furniture, 177lbs. }	—	2
Hospital Equipment, 150lbs. }		



*Divisional Hospital at Kohat.*

November 11th.—Surgeon-Major Martin, 6th Royal Regiment, was ordered to obtain seven European tents for the divisional hospital at Kohat. The station hospital was adapted to the use of the field forces as a base hospital, but its accommodation was insufficient to meet the number of cases of autumnal fever, which is very prevalent at this season of the year. The 2nd battalion 8th King's, a regiment of young soldiers, suffered much from the effects of this fever, and at one time had over sixty men in hospital with it. The European base hospital was calculated to contain fifty-six patients.

Surgeon-Major Costello, Indian Medical Department, held charge of the native base hospital, which was on a larger scale, and calculated to accommodate 150 patients.

Every regiment had in addition its own regimental hospital for the primary treatment of all cases, from which, if necessary, patients were transferred to the divisional field hospitals, and thence on to that at the base if the case were a prolonged one. The divisional field hospital was moved onwards as the force advanced. It was primarily located at Thull, and subsequently moved on to Kurram.

*Riding Post-horses.*

November 12th.—D. O. No. 201.—“Officers furnished with sowars' horses under authority of D. O. No. 40, will be careful never to ride at a pace exceeding six miles an hour; any loss or injury caused by over-riding will be made good by the officer for whom the horse or horses have been provided.”

The horses of a native cavalry regiment are the property of the sowar in most cases, or of the regiment, and not public animals. Though in cases of necessity they are made use of as if they were public property, it is necessary to guard the owner and the regiment from loss or damage in any way.

*Diminution of Native Establishments.*

Some of the syces of the Horse Artillery battery, who were in excess of the complement ordered for field service, were transferred for duty to the ordnance park.

*Formation of Troops into Brigades.*

D. O. No. 233.—“Until further orders, the following will be the organization of the infantry brigades of the Kurram column :—

“1ST BRIGADE :

“Colonel A. H. Cobbe, commanding.

“Captain A. Scott, V.C., brigade-major.

“2nd battalion 8th Regiment, The King's:

“29th Punjab Native Infantry.

“5th Punjab Infantry.

“2ND BRIGADE :

“Colonel Thelwall, C.B., commanding.

“Captain G. de C. Morton, brigade-major.

“21st Punjab Native Infantry.

“5th Goorkhas.

“One other regiment to be hereafter detailed.

“The 23rd Pioneers will, as a temporary measure, be attached to this brigade for orders.”

*Divisional Hospital at Thull formed.*

October 15th.—D. O. No. 235.—“The executive commissariat officer at Thull is directed to make over, for the use of the hospital about to be formed there, sixteen European privates' tents; ten for the European divisional hospital, and six for the Native general hospital. The commissariat will receive a similar number of European privates' tents from those now *en route* from Kohat.”

*Camel-kajawahs for Sick and Wounded.*

D. O. No. 236.—“ Camel-kajawahs, for the conveyance of foot-sore men and others who are temporarily incapacitated from marching, will be issued to regiments of British and Native Infantry, at the rate of eight pairs for British and six pairs for Native corps.”

In the Punjab Frontier Force, kajawahs, of a native pattern, formed part of the equipment of the regiments, as experience had shown their necessity; they were simply a small litter about 4' x 2', with sides about a foot high, which were attached together by chains and hooks passed across the camel-saddle. Each would hold two native soldiers in a squatting position, or one lying down. A variety of these kajawahs were constructed, however, all more or less heavy; but as they were designed primarily for use with British troops, who could not be compressed into the small space sufficient for natives, there was no help for this. The first pattern tried was simply a strong chair with a foot-rest hanging from it. This was experimented on by a British cavalry regiment, in the annual relief of 1877-78. The report on these chairs was, that though they answered the purpose, yet it might be possible to devise one with a more comfortable leg-rest and sloping back. This was accordingly constructed, and some of this pattern were made in the Ferozepore arsenal for the Candahar Field Force. The ones made at Kohat were of the first pattern, as being the strongest and less likely to get out of order. Subsequently others were made in India by the Commissariat Department, all on the suspensory canvas chair principle, but these were very heavy, and almost a full camel-load when empty.

*Head-quarters reach Thull.*

The Major-General and head-quarters reached Thull on the 18th November, to be prepared for the advance, which was

expected on the 20th, though up to the receipt of the orders to cross the frontier, no one could say what the reply of the Amir to the ultimatum of the Indian Government would be.

The troops who had been located at Thull during the month had not been idle; the road up to the Kurram river had been constructed from the camp by the 29th Native Infantry; the company of Sappers had been at work on the road on the Kohat side, which had also employed the labour of the 23rd Pioneers. The Deputy Commissioner, Captain Plowden, had also aided in opening out this road with 800 men. Two months' supply of provisions had been collected by the Commissariat Department, and stored away in a large number of tents. The telegraph line was completed, and Thull was no longer an unknown and unheard-of place, but in communication with the rest of the world. The post-office worked with as much regularity in a tent as it did in more settled places, the mails being conveyed in horsed mail-carts, the horses and carts being taken off the Pindi-Murree line, which was always closed during the winter months. The field hospital was ready to receive its expected patients. At this period of the campaign the transport animals had not begun to suffer, and the transport, though on a much smaller scale than was required afterwards, worked between Thull and Kohat without any friction.

The Engineer Park and Ordnance Reserve ammunition were ready at Thull for an onward move. In every branch, except as regards light tents, some of which were still due to the regiments, the force was equipped and ready for the expected advance.

On the 19th, General Roberts reconnoitred the river, and settled the position for the bridge, which was placed away, a mile above the camp as it was then located. A commanding position overlooked the point, from which, if necessary, the Afghan fort at Kapyang could have been shelled, as it was within a 1,500 yards range.

*Troops now Engaged on Active Service.*

November 20th.—The general state of uncertainty as to the advance was removed by the publication of the following Divisional Order, No. 242:—"The Major-General commanding Kurram Field Force notifies that all troops and others who are now, or hereafter may, come under his command, will, from to-day and until further orders, be held to be engaged 'on active service in the field' in the sense of the 118th Article of War."

The bridge by which to cross the river was now constructed. It was a plain trestle bridge, with a twelve-feet roadway, but quite sufficient for the purpose. Some of the Afghan soldiers from the fort at Kapyang came down to observe its construction, but they were not interfered with.

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## CHAPTER IV.

## ADVANCE OF THE FORCE FROM THULL TO THE PEIWAR KOTAL.

THULL, November 20th.—D. O. No. 255.—“The following movements are ordered for to-morrow :—

“ *Movements for the Advance.*

“ 10th Hussars,

“ 12th Bengal Cavalry,

“ 29th Punjab Native Infantry,

“ No. 1 Mountain Battery :

“ To march at daylight under verbal orders from the Major-General, the whole under command of Colonel J. J. K. Gordon, 29th Punjab Native Infantry.

“ The 5th Punjab Infantry to strike camp at 6 A.M. and move off with the head-quarter's camp at 7.30 A.M., except the two companies detailed for rear-guard.

“ F/A Royal Horse Artillery,

“ 7th company Sappers,

“ 8th Foot,

“ 23rd Pioneers :

“ To strike camp at 7 A.M., breakfast afterwards, and move off at 9 A.M.

“ The column to be formed on the road between the ruined village of Cheydi Kot, and the village of Thull, in the following order:—

“ Advanced Guard:

“ Head of column on the Bridge.

“ Wing 23rd Pioneers.

“ 1st company 8th Foot.

“ Main Body:

“ Head of column immediately behind the Advanced Guard.

“ Wing 23rd Pioneers.

“ F/A Royal Horse Artillery.

“ 8th Foot.

“ The first regimental reserve of ammunition, bheestees, &c., will be in rear of regiments, as directed in the orders for the march already issued. Regimental baggage and the remaining followers to remain on their respective camping-grounds until the troops have passed the bridge.

“ Baggage mules will cross the river by the bridge. Baggage camels will cross by a ford, which will be marked out by flags, about 300 yards below the bridge.

“ The rear-guard will consist of two companies of the 5th Punjab Infantry, and will form up near the Commissariat yard.

“ The whole of the above troops, except those under the command of Colonel Gordon, will be under the command of Brigadier-General Cobbe, and will encamp at Kapiyang on ground which will be pointed out by the Assistant Quartermaster-General.

“ Quartermasters of regiments and camp-colourmen to march with the 5th Punjab Infantry at 7.30 A.M.

“ Brigadier-General Cobbe will detail an officer's party to keep order on the bridge and the approaches thereto.

“ The 5th Punjab Infantry will furnish the guard, and a fatigue party of fifty men for the head-quarter camp, the fatigue party to report to the Assistant Adjutant-General at 6 A.M.

“ The following troops will cross the frontier on the 22nd inst., encamping for the day at Kapiyang :—

“ Half G/3 Royal Artillery.

“ Wing 72nd Highlanders.

“ 5th Goorkhas.

“ 2nd Punjab Infantry.

“ The above will be under the command of Brigadier-General J. B. Thelwall, C.B., who will issue all necessary instructions.

“ The following troops, under the command of Major Stewart, 5th Punjab Cavalry, will remain at Thull :—

“ No. 2 Mountain Battery.

“ Wing of 5th Punjab Cavalry.

“ 21st Punjab Native Infantry.

“ Orders regarding the disposal of the Thull garrison will be issued hereafter.

“ Field Force Head-quarters will be established at Kapiyang on the morning of the 21st.”

November 21st.—The orders regarding the advance across the frontier were duly carried out. The Major-General and staff proceeded with the troops under Colonel Gordon. The 29th Punjab Native Infantry crossed the river by the bridge. One company crossed the river higher up, and the 10th Hussars crossed below the bridge, to act as flanking parties, and to intercept the flight of the garrison, and then advanced in skirmishing order across the river bed and the level plain on the top of the further bank. This plain extended for about three-quarters of a mile, till the foot of the hills was reached. It was a good camping-ground, though rather covered with bushes and stones.

Colonel Gordon's orders were to surprise the post, and prevent its being burnt or destroyed, as information had been received that the Amir had sent orders for this to be done. When, however, the post was gained, it was found to be deserted, the garrison having taken themselves off in the night, except two



men who were taken prisoners on the bridge. They were evidently deserters, but they said that they had been placed as sentries on the bridge. One man was a Turi, the other a Ghilzai.

This fortified post of Kapiyang was found to be a square mud enclosure, with round towers at the corners. Its late garrison had left in a hurry, as some of their food was found. The towers were useful as signal-posts, and the place was occupied by a signalling party for a few days at this time. The troops under General Cobbe reached the camping-ground about eleven o'clock, with the exception of the battery, for whom a road had to be constructed by the Pioneers up the steep bank of the river; but they and all the baggage were in camp by noon. As the ground was commanded by the low hills to the south and west, pickets were placed on them as soon as possible.

As soon as the fort at Kapiyang had been gained and occupied by Colonel Gordon's advance force, the place being deserted, it was necessary to find out the position of the enemy. The squadron 10th Hussars and the 12th Bengal Cavalry proceeded accordingly to reconnoitre. The road for the first four miles lay along the bank of the river, after which it turned inland up a gorge, to surmount a low kotal, and then dropped down to the river-bank again by another ravine, the road then following the bank till Ahmed-i-Shama is reached. The kotal in this march would have made a good position for defence, if it had been occupied. The distance, about eight miles, between Kapiyang and Ahmed-i-Shama, was covered by the cavalry in about an hour: but they were still too late to catch up the retreating garrison, who had started from Kapiyang in the middle of the night.

The Infantry and No. 1. Mountain Battery followed the Cavalry, and the advance force halted at Ahmed-i-Shama for the night.

This post, like the one at Kapiyang, is a mud enclosure, though in a more ruinous state, and situated where the mountains, receding, leave a triangular plain of about half a mile

base and height ; the upper part is stony, but the lower part bordering on the river is terraced, showing that it has been cultivated, most probably by the garrison, as no hamlet is in sight ; nor, in fact, between Kapiyang and this place is there a single habitation. The road is generally a six-foot track, passing through a tangled brake of dwarf palm in places, or through stony gullies, except where it runs along the steep bank of the river.

The Horse Artillery battery had, however, some difficulty in doing this march. The object of this post would doubtless have been originally to keep open the communication between Hazir Pir and the frontier, at a point where this was liable to attack from the Zymukht clan on the other side of the river, where a ravine comes down on the western side of the Kafir Kot to the Kurram river, forming a highway into their country, as also to guard the communications into the Khost country, which debouch on the right bank not far from this.

#### *Movements.*

November 21st.—Camp Kapiyang, D. O. No. 258.—“ The following troops will march at 7 A. M. to-morrow towards Ahmed-i-Shama, distance eight miles, under the command of Colonel Stirling, R.H.A.:—

“ F/A, Royal Horse Artillery.

“ Wing, 5th Punjab Native Infantry.

“ 23rd Pioneers.

“ 7th company Sappers and Miners.

“ The commissariat camels, with twelve-days' supply, will accompany the above, and a sufficient escort will be detailed for their protection.

“ The remaining troops, under Brigadier-General Cobbe, will march the next day, 23rd inst, to Ahmed-i Shama. The engineer park and treasure-chests will accompany this column.

“ Field Force Head-quarters will halt at Kapiyang on the 22nd, and march to Ahmed-i-Shama on the 23rd inst.

“ The troops at Thull, under orders to move to-morrow to Kapiyang, will halt for the 22nd, and march on the 23rd, bringing the divisional reserve ammunition with them.

“ Attention is directed to the orders which have been issued regarding baggage animals following the column, in the same order as the regiments are marching.”

November 22nd.—The advanced force under Colonel Gordon moved on from Ahmed-i-Shama to Hazir Pir Ziarat, and found the distance about fifteen miles, the road being difficult for wheeled carriages.

About a mile from the camp at Ahmed-i-Shama, a reef of rocks crops up in vertical strata, the track going along the edges of these rocks, and the intervening spaces of earth. The continuous traffic of ages has, however, worn a fairly good path even along this, but here and there detached boulders from the heights above had bedded themselves, blocking the pathway, and till these were removed or blasted away, the guns could not be taken along. The banks were too high and difficult to allow an alternative road to be made down into the river bed at this place, without more labour than was involved in the removal of the obstructions, which were speedily cleared away by the united labours of the pioneer regiment and of the sappers and miners, when the artillery marched on the following day.

The troops under the command of Colonel Stirling reached the camping-ground at Ahmed-i-Shama at 2.30 P.M.; the road, though not actually difficult, was sufficiently unsuited to wheeled traffic to prevent the march of eight miles being done in less time. Beyond the supplies brought with the troops, there was nothing to be obtained at this place, which is the most inhospitable locality almost in the whole of the march to Kurram. Hardly any bushes ever grow on the rocky slopes of the mountains, and at this time of the year any grass or forage for the

horses, or tree-grazing for the camels, was out of the question.

The head-quarters and the remainder of the troops remained in the camp at Kapiyang.

### *Issue of Rations.*

November 22nd.—D. O. No. 263.—“The following regulations regarding the issue of rations are published for general guidance:—

“ 1. British officers and British regiments will, unless specially ordered, draw their rations daily.

“ 2. British officers of native regiments attached to brigades, will draw rations from that British corps which the commissariat officer of the brigade may appoint.

“ 3. British officers of native regiments not attached to brigades, or who may be temporarily detached from a brigade, will draw rations from the nearest British corps.

“ 4. Indents for rations required by officers must be sent to the Commissariat Department by 4 P.M. on the day previous to the required issue.

“ 5. Officers must arrange to draw their rations at the ration-stands.

“ 6. Rations for native soldiers and followers must be drawn from the brigade commissariat godown in bulk of three days issue; carriage for the conveyance of the above has already been supplied to corps.

“ 7. If a native regiment is not attached to a brigade, or if it be temporarily detached, the commanding officer must apply to the nearest commissariat officer for instructions whence to draw its supplies.

“ 8. The above rules apply to all departments such as the Post Office, Telegraph, Survey, Signalling, &c., the heads of which are responsible that the necessary indents are duly sent in, and that no double or excess drawing is permitted.

" 9. Blank indent forms can be procured, on application to the brigade commissariat officers.

" 10. The following commissariat officers are appointed to brigades :—

" 1st Infantry Brigade, Lieutenant Buckland, B.S.C.

" Cavalry                   "                   "

" 2nd Infantry           ,,           Major Bunbury, B.S.C."

D. O. No. 265 —" Lieutenant Osborne, R.A., will indent for carriage for the divisional reserve ammunition, including the whole of the small-arm ammunition at present stored at Thull.

" Sub-conductor Sapsford, Ordnance Department, will accompany the divisional reserve, which will be in charge of the 2nd Punjab Infantry.

" All surplus gun-ammunition will be given into charge of the officer commanding No. 2 Mountain Battery at Thull."

This last order had reference to instructions which had been conveyed to officers commanding mountain batteries, to change the established proportions of shrapnels and common shell. The previous relative proportions had been two common shell for one shrapnel carried, but with a view to the nature of the service about to be undertaken, it was considered desirable to increase the shrapnel and reduce the common shell, in the proportion of two shrapnel to one common shell. The batteries had therefore a double supply of common shell; half of which had now become surplus, and had to be left behind.

The ordnance officer who afterwards had charge of all the divisional reserve ammunition, would, had he been appointed in sufficient time to join the force at the commencement of the campaign, have obviated the necessity of directing other officers to perform what was naturally his duty, both as regards the carriage of the reserve, and the storage of the surplus ammunition.

November 23rd.—The Horse Artillery battery, wing of the 5th Punjab Infantry, 23rd Pioneers, and the company of Sappers, marched towards Hazir Pir; but the delays on the road were so

great, that they only reached the village of Esoar, four miles short of Hazir Pir, in time to camp.

The head-quarters moved from Kapiyang to Hazir Pir.

Brigadier-General Cobbe, with his troops, wing 5th Punjab Infantry, and 8th Regiment King's, moved from Kapiyang to Ahmed-i-Shama.

Brigadier Thelwall's troops—viz., half battery G/3 Royal Artillery, 5th Goorkhas, 2nd Punjab Infantry, wing 72nd Highlanders—moved from Thull to Kapiyang.

After the difficulties which occupied the first four miles of the road were passed, the ground presented no obstacle to a quick advance, the road running through a succession of cultivated areas, belonging to a number of villages, that lined the river-bank as a rule. This belt of cultivation was about half a mile wide. The feeling of the inhabitants of all this part was most friendly. As the Major-General passed along the road, the headmen of all the different villages paid their respects. The villagers lined the roads as the troops passed, offering fowls, eggs, milk, and dried fruit for sale. On approaching Hazir Pir this goodwill took a more active form, for a repast in the native style was prepared for the General, and spread out under the shade of a tree by the wayside.

When Colonel Gordon arrived at Hazir Pir, two of the leading syuds of Kurram, Syud Mahomed Khan and Syud Badshah Mir, came in to see him. They reported that Mahommed Zaman had only thirty men with him in the fort at Kurram.

From the opposite side of the river, a messenger was sent in by Shinawaz Khan of Durani Zymukht, to say that he himself would come, but that he feared his son had been detained by the Duranis.

Supplies of grass, fuel, &c. were freely brought in by the villagers about Hazir Pir, but high prices were asked. This arose from several causes, the first being that coin of any kind was not common in these valleys, and consequently some of the

inhabitants had no idea of its relative value ; while others, who may have been more enlightened, imagined that they could fix their own price, as nothing would be taken forcibly from them. Considerable numbers of cattle and sheep were observed between Ahmed-i-Shama and Hazir Pir. The former belong to the Turi villagers, and are sent out for grazing anywhere where a dried blade of grass shows itself. The latter belong to the nomad Ghilzais, who find among the hills in these parts sufficient grazing to keep their flocks through the winter. These flocks seemed in beautiful condition, their fleeces white and clean, as if they had all been washed ; but this was probably from the fact that they had been lately feeding in the pure air of the upper mountains, where there was no dust to speckle their coats. The sheep were of the fat-tailed kind known as Doombas. These Ghilzai shepherds do not care to sell their sheep.

*March to Darwaza Pass.*

November 24th (Sunday).—The head-quarters, with the following troops, moved to an encamping-ground at the south end of the Darwaza pass, distance ten miles :—Squadron 10th Hussars, 12th Bengal Cavalry, No. 1 Mountain Battery, 29th Punjab Native Infantry, and wing 5th Punjab Infantry. There is no difficulty in this march of any kind, the road going through open broad valleys covered with dwarf palm ; towards the end of the march, the ground, as it rises towards the pass, is more broken. The whole of this march is through an uninhabited country, but which is suitable in many places for cultivation, as there are several streams with water and fish in them, which shows that the streams are perennial. Beyond the camping-ground, which had no name, about two miles distant, are a few huts, but no supplies of any kind can be relied on.

Intelligence was received this day that the Amir's troops had evacuated Kurram fort, leaving one gun behind, and that they were retreating across the Peiwar Kotal. Before leaving Hazir

Pir, Major-General Roberts held a durbar of the leading men in the lower Kurram valley, and assured them that the British Government was animated with friendly intentions towards them, and that as long as they behaved well, and showed that they had no ill-feeling towards us, they would receive protection.

The following movements took place this day :—

E/A Royal Horse Artillery	} From Esoar to Hazir Pir.
23rd Pioneers	
Sappers	

The troops under Brigadier-General Cobbe :

Wing 5th Punjab Infantry	} Moved from Ahmed-i Shama to Hazir Pir.
8th Foot	

Brigadier-General Cobbe taking command of all troops at that station.

Brigadier-General Thelwall's troops :

Half G/3 Royal Artillery	} Moved from Kapiyang to Ahmed-i-Shama.
Wing 72nd Highlanders	
2nd Punjab Infantry	
5th Goorkhas	

The dwarf palm scrub at this camp was set alight, and, with the dried grass that was mixed with it, burned with such rapidity as to threaten the safety of the tents ; it, unfortunately, was usually set alight at most halting-places, either by the troops or camp-followers, and in course of time most of it in the immediate vicinity of the road had been burned down. The dwarf palm is a most useful plant, as its leaves, when dried, are made into matting, and when thoroughly dried, the fibres are beaten out of the leaf with a wooden mallet, and twisted into rope, about half an inch thick, by rolling it between the hands. From this rope a kind of net-bag pannier is made, which, placed across the back of a baggage animal, forms a very light receptacle for the carriage of loose loads ; the Afghan troops used these for the conveyance of their ammunition. The grass sandals used by most of the



hillmen are also made from this rope, while little baskets for carrying eggs are made from the matting. The spreading leaf is ingeniously turned into a drinking cup by wayfarers, the stalk forming a handle, and the fronds of the leaf being split down and interwoven.

### *Darwaza Pass.*

The camping-ground at this place is about a mile distant from the entrance of the Darwaza pass. This pass, which has a gentle slope on each side, crosses the south chain of mountains which bounds the Kurram valley. The ascent is about five miles, and the descent into the Kurram valley about three miles, long. The path would not be difficult, but for the watercourse, which cuts it up, and has to be crossed several times. In some places the ground was boggy and very awkward, being on a slope, for camels or any laden beasts.

Towards the summit of the defile the ground opens out on each side, the road being much impeded by loose boulders and rocks cropping out. The descent into the Kurram valley was quite easy, the surface being merely strewed with shingle, and the watercourse, which was dry, passing some distance away from the track. There were several Ghilzai encampments on this arid slope, the flocks grazing about, and finding something to eat, which was not apparent to human eyes. There must also be water-springs within a convenient distance, though the Ghilzai women often have to walk a mile or two to fill their water-skins, and bring them back on their heads.

The cold at the south camp of the Darwaza pass began to be severe, the thermometer marking 26°, but there was no wind and but little dew, so that it was not as unbearable as it otherwise would have been.

A cavalry post was left at this camp, to keep open communications.

*Occupation of Kurram.*

November 25th.—The head-quarters, and the troops detailed in yesterday's orders, marched from the south end of the Darwaza defile to the vacated Kurram fort. The road was difficult for the camels, which did not reach camp till late. The anticipation that the Amir's troops would destroy the fort at Kurram was not realized; but as soon as they had vacated the place, the Turis swarmed in, and carried off every bit of roofing that they could lay their hands on. Intelligence was received that the Amir's troops were retreating across the Peiwar, but the information regarding their movements was very conflicting. Brigadier-General Cobbe's troops marched from Hazir Pir to the camp at the south end of the Darwaza pass. Brigadier-General Thellwall's troops moved on from Ahmed-i-Shama to Hazir Pir.

*Kurram Fort.*

November 26th.—The head-quarters and the troops with it halted at Kurram fort, in the neighbourhood of which the camp was pitched, about half a mile distant, to the west of the fort, on an open plain between two nullahs. The one nearest the fort had a good supply of water running down it, and so afforded ample facility for watering the animals, while springs of water, both in the plain and on the bank, gave a pure supply for the troops.

The fort at Kurram had always been entered in our maps as fort Mohammed Azim, after its builder, but it did not retain this name when we occupied it.

The fort was constructed of mud, the usual fashion of architecture in this part of the world, but from the time it was built no repairs had been executed, so that its appearance, externally and internally, was as untidy as possible. Whenever any new buildings had been required for any purpose inside, the earth had been taken from the spot, but the hole so made had never

been filled up, and in consequence the interior of the fort was a series of excavations which were half filled with rubbish and filth. It was built in the form of a square, with round bastions at the corners; the length of the side being about 120 yards. The outer walls were about twenty feet high originally, though in some places the earth had been washed away for some feet. The thickness of the wall at the ground was about six feet. In the centre space there was a square keep with round bastions. The wall of the keep averaged thirty feet high; the length of the side about fifty yards. There was only one gateway, and this was lined on each side and overhead by accommodation for the garrison. The gate was protected by a walled outwork.

Outside the wall there was a broad *fausse-braye*, about twelve yards wide, to the edge of the ditch, which was deeper on the north and west sides, owing to the ground falling away to the south.

There was a parapet wall on the edge of the ditch on the west and south sides, but like the parapets on the inside the walls were too high to fire over, and they were not loop-holed.

The available interim space was curtailed by the governor's quarters, which, as they contained his harem, were completely walled off from the rest of the place, with only an entrance gateway and a small passage to allow of access. There was a plot of garden in the yard; and the bastion in the corner, where the quarters were, was raised into a three-storied house, from which a pleasant view all round could be had. The upper room was open, the middle story had had windows, chiefly of coloured panes of glass, and formed a comfortable room; the lower cell was perfectly dark and uninhabitable. There was also a hamam or warm bath in the enclosure, but this was wrecked, like most of the place, by the friendly Turi, whose hatred of the Afghan was only exceeded by his desire to obtain wood for building or burning.

Opposite the entrance gate of the governor's quarters was a

raised building used as a mosque. It contained one long room, about fifty feet long by twenty-five wide, which was used for the services, and two other smaller rooms for the resident priests. This building was less damaged than any of the others, and it was selected for use as the British base hospital, in which capacity it was used for some months. The native hospital was located in the buildings of the governor's quarters, when these were repaired.

Surrounding the four sides of the wall were the huts in which the garrison lived. On two of the circular bastions were officers' quarters; the one on the south-west angle was well finished, and glazed with coloured glass.

The inner keep was used as the treasury and for quarters. A small tank in the centre was surrounded by willow-trees and rose-bushes. Another large tank was outside the keep, but both were filled from a surface drain-cut, which brought the water from a ravine some distance off. There was no well in the fort, but a good spring existed in the ditch, from which water could be obtained. The main road to the fort passed across a bridge just over this spring, and as it was liable to be defiled by the traffic, it was subsequently closed.

Two made roads at right angles followed the direction of the north and west sides of the fort, the intersection being at the bridge above mentioned. The road running north and south extended in a southerly direction for about three-quarters of a mile, and northwards about a quarter of a mile, when it terminated at a walled barrack enclosure.

This place was a square of about 100 yards, divided into four squares of about fifty yards, with the usual hut-buildings, and with stables for the cavalry horses. A gateway of the ordinary construction, with a guard-room, allowed access to the interior, and there were only two round bastions at the corners.

This place was known as the Upper Fort, as it was situated on the higher slope of the ground, which dropped from the foot of the hills to the river in a gentle slope.

Close to the cross road, on the north side of the fort, was a two-roomed building, with a broad raised verandah with pillared arches on three sides. This structure was built quite after the pattern of the houses in India, with glazed windows, and at first it was used as an officers' hospital, but subsequently it was transferred to the political officers for use as a court-house, for which purpose it had been originally erected.

Outside this was a small garden in the eastern style, with cross paths at right angles, and water-ditches, supplying irrigation to the beds when necessary. Close by this, but on the eastern side of the fort, was the large garden or orchard which was planted out by Mahommed Azim. This garden, of nearly eighty yards square, contained a small vineyard of low-growing grapes; pears, apples, quinces, apricots, peaches, and mulberries bordered the paths.

At this time of the year there was not a leaf on the trees, except a few withered ones on the willow avenues.

The ground between the upper and lower fort on each side of the road was terraced, and had been cultivated by the inhabitants of the neighbouring villages, and below the fort to the river there was one continuous terraced slope of rice fields, from which a few villages emerged like islands when the water was standing on the fields all round. A brass 9-pr. gun was left lying on the ground, as having no carriage it could not be removed. A few boxes of ammunition were also found in the fort.

This, then, was the first objective point gained in the campaign, and the possession of the two forts, though they were practically useless for purposes of defence, afforded all that was necessary in the way of accommodation and storage room at the outset. Afterwards they were found to be rather small, but at first they gave the security that was wanted, for the collection of the hospital, commissariat, engineer, and ordnance park stores that accompanied the force.

As the Major-General and staff were approaching the fort,

which lay half hidden in the yellow-brown foliage of the willows,—the mud wall being much of the same colour—one of the principal men in the valley, Mahommed Noor, came, with an attendant following of horse and foot men, to pay his respects.

As soon as the inspection of the forts was concluded, the Major-General started with two squadrons of the 12th Bengal Cavalry, to reconnoitre in the direction of the Peiwar Kotal.

As the village of Peiwar was approached, about twelve miles distant, two other villages in flames were seen, and a report was brought in that the Afghans had vacated their cantonment at Habib Killa, about a mile to the east of the Peiwar village, and were passing through the village with twelve guns and three regiments of infantry.

With the small force at his disposal it was not possible to attack the enemy, who could be seen through telescopes retiring towards the valley leading to the foot of the Peiwar. The villagers reported that they were encumbered by the field guns that were with them, and that forced labour was procured from the villages to assist in moving the gun and ammunition carriages. It was difficult, however, to obtain any satisfactory information on this point; but there seemed so much truth in the statement, which was repeated on several occasions, that it was believed at last, and when the report reached the form that the twelve carriages were stuck in the ravine at the immediate foot of the kotal, it was so thoroughly believed that the advance on the 29th December was made with the intention of capturing these guns. On this afternoon nothing could be done but to return to the camp at Kurram.

The Turis of the valley now saw some chance of taking a fair revenge on their hated oppressors, and volunteered to assist in harassing the enemy; but though they were willing to fight and destroy the Afghans when they were demoralized and beaten, yet they were afraid to go too much into their neighbourhood,

and obtain the information requisite; thus their assistance, when it was most wanted, was not given.

*Returns of Effective Men for Operations.*

November 26th.—D. O. No. 274.—“Officers commanding regiments will send in as soon as possible to the Assistant Adjutant-General, the number of men they will be able to take with them for operations in passes. All sick and men who are weakly or likely to knock up will be left at Kurram.”

*Reduction of Baggage.*

D. O. No. 274.—“The Major-General is anxious to march as light as possible in moving to the passes.

“Officers’ baggage will be limited to half a mule-load, and officers will double up in their present tents, two officers occupying one tent of 80 pounds.

“Commanding officers and heads of departments are to be as at present.

“Sepoys, one tent of two pals\* to fifty men.

“British soldiers, one tent of two pals to forty men.

“Followers, one tent of two pals to sixty men.

“Fifteen British soldiers to a bell-tent.

“Twenty native soldiers or followers to a bell-tent.

“The camp equipage will be allowed as at present for offices and guard-tents.

“Entrenching tools as at present.

“All spare ammunition with regiments to be taken. The baggage of British soldiers and sepoys to be reduced as much as possible, by leaving at Kurram all spare light clothing. Bedding and warm clothing to be taken as at present. Cooking utensils to be reduced as much as possible.

\* The superficial area of a tent of two pals is  $32 \times 16 = 512$  square feet; the height of the tent, which is triangular in section, is eight feet. It can be separated into two pals by being unlaced in the centre.

“ Quartermasters' and veterinary stores will be left at Kurram.

“ The baggage allowance for stable gear and followers to be as at present.

“ Armourers' tools will be left at Kurram.

“ Signalling equipment will be taken.

“ The same number of camels as at present authorised will be allowed for carriage of the arms of sick.

“ Officers' mess stores and cooking utensils, two mules per British, one per native regiment or battery Royal Artillery.

“ Followers to be reduced as much as possible at the direction of commanding officers.

“ Hospital establishments, doolies, and dandies will be taken in accordance with instructions which will be issued by the Deputy Surgeon-General. Five mules per regiment will be allowed for the carriage of sick men. Bazar establishments, artificers, and workmen will be reduced to a minimum, commanding officers being responsible that no more followers or baggage are taken than are essential to the efficiency of the troops.

“ It is probable that the force may be absent ten days.”

“ All carriage becoming surplus under the above arrangements will be made over to the Transport Department, but all mules are to be retained, and also carriage for provisions for the number of natives advancing, sufficient till the 4th December, 1878.

*Supplies to be taken Regimentally.*

D. O. No. 277.—“ Officers commanding corps, except G/3 Royal Artillery, 12th Bengal Cavalry, 10th Hussars, and 7th company Sappers, will immediately indent for and draw from the commissariat godown in the fort, supplies sufficient to last till the 4th December, inclusive, for all native soldiers, for public followers including dooly-bearers, camp-followers, mule and camel men employed with regimental equipment, and for chargers.



The numbers to be drawn for will be those detailed to advance from Kurram on the 28th inst."

D. O. No. 278.—" Each mounted officer will be allowed one charger only."

The first brigade, under General Cobbe, marched this day from the camp at the south end of the Darwaza defile, to Kot Mangi, on the right bank of the Kurram river, about a mile below the fort.

The troops were halted at this place to await the arrival of the Horse Artillery battery, which, owing to the difficulty of the road, was only able to reach this place late, when the passage of the river in the dark would have been difficult.

November 26th.—Brigadier-General Thelwall's troops reached the camp at the south end of the Darwaza pass this day.

November 27th.—Brigadier-General Cobbe's troops crossed the river and came into the Kurram camp, and Brigadier General Thelwall, marching through the Darwaza pass, reached Kurram in the afternoon. The whole force, which had been obliged to move separately by detachments up to this point, was now able to be massed together. The difficulty of moving troops along a single line of communication, necessitated the separate movements of each brigade and of the advance guard. There would not in some places have been available ground for the camp of the whole force, besides which, the delay and difficulty of moving a large number of men, with the necessary convoys of provisions and stores, along a mountain track, would have caused more loss to the transport animals than what actually took place. As it was, in some of their marches the rear-guards did not reach the camps till late at night.

*Orders for the Advance of the Force.*

November 27th.—D. O. No. 280, Kurram.—The following orders regarding the advance of the force on the 28th inst. are published :—

" 1. The following garrison will be left at Kurram fort

under command of a field officer, 2/8th Regiment, to be detailed by Brigadier-General Cobbe :

“ Two guns, F/A Royal Horse Artillery.

“ Squadron 10th Hussars.

“ Three guns G/3 Royal Artillery.

“ 7th company Sappers and Miners.

“ Details of sick and weakly men of all regiments.

“ Captain Rennick, 29th Regiment, is appointed staff officer to the Kurram Fort garrison.

“ 2. The force advancing to the passes will be constituted as follows :—

“ 1st brigade under command of Brigadier- General Cobbe.	{	2/8th Regiment, 400 men.	} attached.
		5th Punjab Infantry.	
		29th Punjab Native Infantry.	
		F/A Royal Horse Artillery, four	
		guns . . . . .	
		23rd Pioneers . . . . .	

“ 2nd brigade under command of Brigadier-General Thelwall, C.B.	{	Wing 72nd Highlanders.
		5th Goorkhas.
		2nd Punjab Infantry.
		No. 1 Mountain Battery, attached.

“ 3. The 12th Bengal Cavalry will march with the field force to Habib Killa, and remain there, furnishing the following parties for duty :—

“ To Divisional Head-quarters, one native officer and twenty sowars.

“ Brigadier-General Cobbe, two orderlies.

“ Brigadier-General Thelwall, two orderlies.

“ At Kurram Fort, one native officer and twenty sowars.

“ The regiment will take its present equipment of tents. The sick, &c. will be left at Kurram.

“ 4. The surplus tents and baggage of the troops will be stored in the small fort. Captain Carr, D.A.Q.M.G., will

make the necessary arrangements. Regiments on marching will have their surplus baggage on their present encamping-grounds in charge of details.

“ 5. The Commanding Royal Engineer will issue orders to the 7th company Sappers regarding work required at Kurram.

“ 6. The troops to advance will parade at 5 A.M. on brigade rendezvous, which will be fixed by brigadiers.

“ 7. The force will march in two parallel columns towards Habib Killa. Captain Kennedy, D.A.Q.M.G., will accompany the advance guard. 1st brigade to point out the road.

*“ Order of March.*

*Left Column.*

One squadron, 12th Bengal  
Cavalry.

Two guns, Mountain Battery.

Four companies, 5th Punjab  
Infantry.

Remainder of 1st brigade, 5th  
Punjab Infantry, 23rd  
Pioneers, 29th Punjab Na-  
tive Infantry, 8th Foot.

Two guns F/A, Royal Horse  
Artillery, on elephants.

*Right Column.*

One squadron, 12th Bengal  
Cavalry.

Two guns, Mountain Battery.

Four companies, Native In-  
fantry.

Remainder of 2nd brigade, 5th  
Goorkhas, 72nd Highlanders,  
2nd Punjab Infantry.

Two guns F/A, Royal Horse  
Artillery, on elephants.

“ 8. Captain Wynne, with all available signallers, will accompany the advance.

“ 9. A fatigue party of thirty men, Native Infantry, will be detailed by the officer commanding Kurram garrison to parade at the divisional head-quarter camp after the troops have marched, and load surplus tents, &c.”

*Three Issues of Rum for Native Regiments.*

D. O. No. 281.—“ Officers commanding native regiments may take with them a sufficient quantity of rum for three issues to men advancing from Kurram.”

*Waste of Ammunition to be checked.*

November 21st.—D. O. No. 290.—“The Major-General desires that officers commanding regiments may be warned to exercise the greatest care in seeing that no useless expenditure of ammunition is incurred. Company officers, especially, and non-commissioned officers, must be constantly on the alert to prevent unnecessary or wasteful firing.”

Depôt hospitals were formed for both European and native troops inside the fort. The available space in the two forts was detailed for the commissariat, ordnance, and engineer park stores, but the difficulty of taking large convoys of camels into the forts to unload and then file out again, prevented the ordnance stores being placed at once in the keep of the fort, which was assigned for their reception. One of the squares in the upper fort was accordingly assigned for these; another square was detailed for the surplus baggage; a third square was detailed for the native hospital temporarily, while the buildings in the larger fort were being repaired and made ready for use. The company of sappers, aided by artificers from the British regiments, were set to work to re-roof the sheds, which had been unroofed by the Turis, and local labour was entertained to clear out the filth and rubbish in which the Afghans had preferred to live. It took some little time to conclude the repairs which were set on foot; ultimately the fort had a level surface. A second gate was placed to allow the traffic to file through without blocking the gateway. But all this was not the work of a day, and it took some months to get these places into a proper state.

November 28th.—The regiments for the advance formed up at the time ordered, 5 A.M., but owing to the ravines and water-courses in front of the camps, it took longer for the columns to assemble in the dark of a winter morning than was expected, so that it was nearly 6 o'clock before the columns were ready

to start, and then the four guns of F/A were with the right column, instead of being divided between the two. The cold was very severe, and intensified by some of the troops having to wait for nearly an hour while other regiments were trying to find their way in the dark across broken ground, till the approach of the dawn showed the direction of the rendezvous.

The head of the left column, with which was the Major-General and staff, arrived near Habib Killa at 10.15 A.M.; the march of fourteen miles up to this point having taken somewhat over four hours.

Intelligence was here received that the Amir's troops were abandoning their guns at the foot of the Peiwar Kotal, and that they were in disorderly retreat. This information proved to be false, but it was necessary to ascertain the truth of the report, and in the meantime to act on it as if it were true that the guns were lying ready to fall into our hands. The moral effect of such a capture would be great, while the distance to the foot of the Peiwar Kotal, about seven miles by the road, was so short, that, with the best part of the day to do it in, there was every inducement to make the push forward, instead of waiting at Habib Killa to give time to the enemy to strengthen their position.

The road from Peiwar village to the kotal runs up a valley; the ground at the entrance is very broken by the drainage of the spurs between which it is taken, and the whole of the ground for about  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles is covered with a scrub jungle, after passing through a mile of cultivation belonging to the village of Peiwar. A village, "Turrai," inhabited by Mangals, who have cultivated the land in its vicinity, is reached at the end of the jungle, and is distant about a mile from the actual ascent of the kotal. The Afghan troops were known to have been in the village, and might yet be there, so that it was necessary to make this point the objective of the end of the first day's march.

The left column—the 5th Punjab Infantry and 29th Punjab

Native Infantry in advance, with the 2/8th Regiment and the 23rd Pioneers, and two guns No. 1. Mountain Battery in support—were sent to the left with instructions to turn a ridge forming the south boundary of the valley, and seize the village of Turrai. They were also to follow up closely any body of retreating Afghan troops they might come across. Orders were sent to the right brigade to march by the village of Habib Killa up the regular road to the Peiwar, thus forming a support to the attack of the left brigade.

Brigadier-General Cobbe with his brigade carried out the orders given, except that the supporting regiments did not round the southern side of the spur, but kept to the north, working their way along the ravine which collects the drainage of the valley. The two mountain guns under Lieutenant Jervis, R.A., were, however, with the advance. No enemy were seen on the south side of the spur, so when a track leading across it to Turrai was reached, the troops moved down towards the village. The supporting regiments of this brigade eventually met the right brigade as they moved up the road.

The mountain path that the advanced troops were now filing down did not lead exactly to the village, but dropping into a ravine, proceeded to the "Punch-bowl" valley on the south of the Peiwar Kotal. As soon as the head of the column found itself in the narrow passage that closes the entrance of the "Punch-bowl," they came in sight of the Afghans, who showed themselves on the crest of the mountain high above their heads. Nothing, however, could be done in this direction: the high precipitous mountains, rising up straight from the ravine, seemed to bar the way, and there were no orders to go on to attack, so that the only thing to be done was to fall back on the village of Turrai, which was about a quarter of a mile to the rear. This retrograde movement excited the Afghans to something more active than the war-dances they had been performing on the top of the mountain. A party of them moved down from the picket at the

end of the spur, and commenced an attack on the regiments as they were moving towards the village. The 29th Punjab Native Infantry proceeded to drive the enemy back, and a smart skirmish ensued for some time. A wing of the 5th Punjab Infantry, under the command of Captain Hall, was in support, and was posted lower down, on a knoll of the spur. The 29th Punjab Native Infantry were eager to get up the hill, and climbed the steep face till the difficulty of the ground prevented their ascending any further. The two mountain guns under Lieutenant Jervis were brought into action, and fired shells at the enemy, but as most of the Afghans by this time were behind shelter-trenches and tree-stems scattered over the face of the hill, not much damage resulted.

The right column arrived at Turrat about 2 P.M., and the Major-General and staff came up at the same time. Observing that an engagement was going on with the Afghan troops in position, which formed no part of the programme of the day, the regiments engaged were recalled by the Major-General, while, to assist their retreat, the 5th Goorkhas were ordered up from the right brigade, and the line was then withdrawn by alternate regiments.

Our loss in this affair was slight, considering the number of men who had been engaged. Captain A. Reed, 29th Punjab Native Infantry, was shot through the back sideways, the bullet luckily only slightly injuring the spine, and though the wound was a most severe one he recovered, and was able to return to duty in a few months. A native officer of the 5th Punjab Infantry, who subsequently died, was severely wounded on this occasion. The other casualties were one driver of the mountain battery killed, and eight sepoy wounded.

The falsehood of the story regarding the abandonment of the guns at the foot of the kotal was by this time ascertained, and as the march across the Kurram valley had clearly shown that it was empty, and that there was no enemy lurking in the

ravines or neighbourhood of the road to Turrai to disturb the camp, orders were given to mark out the ground about 3 o'clock, and this was done on the terraced fields below the village, on the ground which had that morning been vacated by the Afghans.

Though, when our troops had been withdrawn, the Afghans had retired up the hill, they had not concluded the engagement on their side, but had sent back to the main ridge, about three-quarters of a mile distant, to bring up a mountain gun to the point of the spur overlooking the village of Turrai, from which all our movements could be observed as plainly as on a map.

The arms were piled, and the troops were resting on the ground, awaiting the arrival of their baggage, which was on the point of coming up, when, at 4 P.M., the Afghan gun came into play at a range of about 1,700 yards, right on to the ground where the troops were to have camped, and which was covered with men. Fortunately, no one was hit, but the hint to move off the ground was very strong.

The guns of F/A Royal Horse Artillery were brought at once into action, and fired several rounds at the gun on the top of the spur, and at a cluster of riflemen who were annoying a picket of the 5th Punjab Infantry.

The winter day was shortening, when the order was given to move the camp back, and it was nearly dark when the spot selected was reached. It was about a mile and a quarter to the rear, on the road that had just been traversed, and which was now full of baggage animals.

It is a difficult matter to pitch a camp in the dusk on a plain, and in this case the difficulty was increased by having to pitch the tents in a scrub-jungle, amidst a scattered growth of hill oak and thorny bushes, on the remains of some very ancient terraces, which were also covered and bordered by large stones. It was not a spot that would have been selected, had time availed to search for other camps; but this jungle and broken ground extended for  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles, so that there was no help



for it but to take up the best position which the ground gave, and this was done after a ravine, with steep banks, had been passed, which formed a kind of clear line of observation in front of the camp, while the view in every other direction was obscured by trees.

The eagerness of the Afghans to commence hostilities was the salvation of the force. If, knowing the range as they did, and being in an inaccessible position, they had been content to wait till the camp was pitched at Turrai, and had commenced to shell the camp with all their mountain guns after dark had set in, the consequences would have been most serious.

Nothing could have then been done, except to withdraw from the camp, but, in all probability, there would have been a stampede among the mules and their owners, who, with the other camp-followers, would have taken themselves well out of reach of danger. The camp, with all the bedding and baggage, might have been burned down, and the Kurram Field Force have been rendered *hors de combat* for some time. All these possible dangers and contingencies were, however, avoided by the firing of the mountain gun on the peak ; which, moreover, did no harm, as most of its shells were blind, and those that did burst, luckily hit no one. The elephants of F/A stood the shells uncommonly well. As a rule, these animals object to a baptism of fire, and run away ; however, in this case they were staunch, even when shells burst close in front of them.

This retrograde movement was most annoying, as the troops had been on foot since early dawn, and had been marching and on the move all day, and, just as they were on the point of enjoying their well-earned rest, they had to retire for over a mile. It was not till late that the regiments could find their baggage, which was wandering in the scrub in the dark, and many men went supperless to bed, or to the strong pickets which were placed on the adjoining heights. The camp, however, was not disturbed during the night.

Thus ended the reconnaissance to the foot of the Peiwar Kotal; an operation which has been misconstrued by some as intending and involving a direct attack on an almost impregnable position; but no one acquainted with the ground would have considered it possible to march for twenty miles, and then towards evening, storm an unknown post of great strength, with troops who had not had much rest or food during the day.

November 29th.—Camp Gunbazir.—Owing to the exhaustion of the men and cattle, from the late fatiguing marches, and from the impossibility of keeping up supplies with the troops, it was decided not to attack to-day. The camp was shifted to a more secure site, and the troops arranged in a more systematic manner than had been possible the previous night. A reconnaissance was made by Colonel Perkins, Commanding Royal Engineers, up the valley, beyond the north picket, with the object of ascertaining whether the ridge was connected with the Peiwar Kotal. Two companies of the 23rd Pioneers accompanied this reconnaissance. It was ascertained that a deep valley lay between the picket ridge and the kotal itself, and that it was impossible to direct an attack from this side. Major Collett, A.Q.M.G., with two companies of the 23rd Pioneers, accompanied by Captain Carr, D.A.Q.M.G., proceeded to reconnoitre the Spingawi route. They reached the summit of a ridge, about five miles distant from the camp, and 1,200 feet above it, overlooking the Spingawi nullah, at a point from which the kotal, or head of the pass, could be observed at a distance of a mile and a half. It was ascertained that the road up the kotal seemed easy and practicable for all arms, and that the kotal itself appeared to be on the same ridge as the Peiwar Kotal, and that a force working from the former towards the latter would pass over a series of dominating positions.

It did not appear to Major Collett that the enemy held the Spingawi in force, though a picket and a gun occupied a com-

manding knoll to the south of the kotal, and there seemed to be a gun on the pass itself.

The road from the village of Peiwar, up the Spingawi nullah, from this point, seemed perfectly easy for all arms, but the road traversed by the reconnoitring party was only suitable for infantry.

It had taken two hours for the party to ascend to the ridge, and it was calculated that to reach the Spingawi by this road would take two more, while to move on from there along the ridge to the Peiwar Kotal would take a further time of three hours at least, according to the natives of the country.

Captain Woodthorpe, R.E., and Lieutenant Manners Smith, of the Survey Department, accompanied this reconnaissance

Colonel Gordon, 29th Punjab Native Infantry, with a company of his regiment, reconnoitred the south ridge of the valley, and ascertained that it was continuous with the main ridge, and that an attack could be conducted along it.

Improvements continued to be made in the camp, as far as making roads and lateral means of communication were concerned, but under no circumstances was the site a good one. The ground was confined and broken in every direction. Sufficient ground was cleared to enable the regiments to fall in, but still the camp was surrounded by a thick oak jungle, preventing easy operation. The same drawbacks of ground would, however, have prevented any concerted attack of the enemy by night; though an alarm, if created only by a small party, would have produced a good deal of confusion. The pickets on the hills on each side of the valley protected the camp fairly; but the situation was bad, and could only have been improved by moving three or four miles back towards the village of Peiwar. There was not, besides, a sufficient water-supply; but on the other hand, the leaves of the oak and other trees afforded food for the camels. At first the oak-leaf diet does not agree with camels unaccustomed to it, but after a time they thrive on it.

No trustworthy information regarding the movements and number of the enemy was obtained, but their position had been extended considerably to both flanks, which seemed to indicate an increase in numbers. The Jaji country being occupied by the enemy, very few of their Maliks came in; consequently but little information could be received, either of their intentions or of those of the Ghilzais behind them.

November 30th.—The force remained in the same camp. A squadron of the 12th Bengal Cavalry was ordered up, and also the remaining two guns of F/A Royal Horse Artillery, and the half-battery of G/3 Royal Artillery. The Major-General, with Colonel Currie, 23rd Pioneers, and Captain Kennedy, D.A.Q.M.G., reconnoitred in the direction that Colonel Perkins, R.E., took on the previous day. Major Collett and Captain Carr reconnoitred the road to the Spingawi, and got again to within a mile and a half of the kotal, which still appeared to be held by only a picket of the enemy. The impression formed by the previous reconnaissance was so much strengthened by this visit that Major Collett submitted to the Major General a proposal to make the attack in this direction, where the features of the ground rendered it much less strong as a military position. The plan was to make a night march, and arriving at the foot of the kotal by daybreak, to storm it, and turn the enemy's position.

Colonel Gordon, 29th Punjab Native Infantry, again reconnoitred the hills on the enemy's right. From the best information available the strength of the enemy was considered the same as had marched out of the Kurram valley, viz. three regiments, or about 1,800 men, with five field and six mountain guns, no reinforcements having yet reached them.

December 1st, 1878.—The force remained in the same camp. The Major-General resolved to adopt the night march and turning movement by the Spingawi route. The following regiments were detailed to compose the turning force :—

29th Punjab Native Infantry.	} Under Colonel Gordon.
5th Goorkhas.	

No. 1 Mountain Battery.

Wing 72nd Highlanders.

2nd Punjab Infantry.

23rd Pioneers.

} Under Brigadier-General Thelwall.

Four guns F/A on elephants, with two companies of the 23rd Pioneers as escort. The whole to march from camp at 10 P.M.

The troops to remain in the camp for the direct attack :—

5th Punjab Infantry.

2/8th Regiment.

Two guns F/A Royal Horse  
Artillery.

Three guns G/3 Royal Ar-  
tillery.

12th Bengal Cavalry.

} Under Brigadier-General  
Cobbe.

The brigadiers, with their staff officers and officers commanding regiments, were ordered to attend at the head-quarter camp, when the plan of attack and details were explained to them. Strict orders as to secrecy were given, and the men were ordered not to be told till after tattoo.

In order to encourage the belief in the enemy that a front attack on the Peiwar Kotal was intended, a party of pioneers, with an engineer officer, and a covering party of the 2/8th Regiment, were sent to march out and construct a battery near the village of Turrai.

The enemy fired several shells at this party from the kotal battery, but without doing any damage. The position of the enemy remained unaltered apparently ; his chief strength was on his right and centre, while his left, up to this day, was comparatively weak. They seemed fully to expect an attack on the Peiwar Kotal, and not only were they of this opinion, but every one in camp who had not been let into the secret was confident that the kotal would be stormed on the morrow ; otherwise, why

had frequent reconnoitring parties been sent to examine the ridges leading up to that position ? The arrival of the half-battery of G/3 Royal Artillery and the 12th Bengal Cavalry, in the afternoon, was taken advantage of to strengthen the impression ; they were paraded in full view of the enemy with as much ostentation as possible, to let them know that our reinforcements had come and that we would no longer delay the attack.

If we could have looked behind the wall of rock that rose in our front, we should have seen that the enemy also had received their reinforcements, four regiments of infantry with a mountain battery, and on their side too were meditating an attack on the camp ; but though they had the will, by not attacking on the night of the 1st, but postponing the assault to the 2nd, they lost their opportunity for ever. Their reinforcements may have been tired, and probably were, as the garrisons of the Peiwar and Spingawi kotals were not very much on the alert on the morning of the 2nd December ; but whatever may have been the cause of the delay, whether obligatory or merely arising from the Asiatic habit of procrastination, it was fatal to the Afghans.

## CHAPTER V.

THE ACTION OF THE PEIWAR KOTAL, AND EVENTS TO  
1ST JANUARY 1879.

DECEMBER 2nd.—The camp-fires were burning brightly, when, at 10 o'clock at night, the troops who had been warned formed up in the dark as quietly as possible.


The secret had been well kept; so much so, that the doolies and dandies of the 29th Regiment, which were to have followed their own regiment closely, losing their way in the dark, proceeded up the valley towards the kotal. They were stopped, however, in time to rejoin their regiment, by the challenge of the outlying picket in this direction.

It was very dark, though the stars showed clear till the waning moon rose about the middle of the night; but this did not much benefit the troops, who were then engaged in making their way up the Spingawi ravine, nor was its light strong enough to do more than make the darkness visible.

The orders were that every regiment should be followed by its ammunition mules and by its hospital doolies and dandies, an arrangement, which, though it ensured the presence of both

SKETCH  
of the Position taken up by the  
AFGHAN TROOPS

Holding the PEIWAR KOTAL and SPIN GAWAI PASSES,  
which was attacked and carried  
on the 2nd December 1878,  
by the  
KURAM FIELD FORCE  
under the command of  
MAJOR GENERAL FRED. ROBERTS, C.B., V.C.







of these necessary adjuncts to the fighting power of the regiments, added considerably to the difficulty of a night march. The presence of baggage animals on a narrow road hinders the traffic very completely in the day-time, and at night of course the delays occasioned are much greater. It was a choice of evils; by collecting the ammunition and hospital doolies, &c. in one column, the march would have been facilitated, but at some risk.

To arrive at the Spingawi nullah, the Peiwar village had to be reached, a distance of about three miles and a half across broken ground. The track, however, was a fairly good one, for an unmade road, leading through the oak jungle, and crossing several ravines and stony watercourses before the cultivation depending on the Peiwar village is gained. Here the road runs along a terrace on the cultivated slope, with a succession of terraces above and below it, till the edge of the nullah is reached. The bank here was difficult and trying on a frosty winter night. A watercourse which supplied the water for irrigation purposes when required, in the spring and summer months, was allowed to find its way into the bed of the nullah down the track; as the stream was a strong one, the earth was all washed away, leaving rough boulders of various sizes on the slope, in addition to which the banks of the watercourse and the moist boulders were coated with ice, so that the descent, though but a short one—the bank not being more than twenty feet deep—was not easy for laden animals.

The 29th Punjab Native Infantry and the 5th Goorkhas led the column as ordered. Then the mountain battery, followed by the 72nd, the 2nd Punjab Infantry, and the 23rd Pioneers, escorting the four guns of the Horse Artillery on elephants.

The march along this part of the road, though tedious and slow, presented no difficulty. Every slight block communicated itself through the column with increasing delays as it passed along, but in due course of time the bed of the nullah was reached—about midnight.

The object of starting as early as 10 p.m. was to allow time for the troops to rest on the road, at convenient places; but the experience of the first part of the march showed that there was but hardly time at this rate of progression, to do the remaining six miles from the Peiwar village up the bed of the nullah to the Spingawi, and unless the place were stormed in the early morning, when the effect of a surprise would tell in our favour, the whole of the night's labour would have been lost; for though the Spingawi pass could be forced in daylight, an attack *de vive force* must necessarily have cost more lives than a surprise at dawn.

The cold began to be felt more as the night progressed, the slow pace not allowing much warmth to be gained by the exercise of walking; the mounted officers felt it most, however, hands and feet being perished with cold.

The difficulty of maintaining touch in the dark between regiments was very great, especially with the intervening mules and hospital equipment. At the turn of the road the 2nd Punjab Infantry lost their way, and instead of turning up the nullah, the regiment proceeded to cross it, thinking that the turning point was further on. The regiment in their rear, the 23rd Pioneers, and the four guns of the Horse Artillery that followed the column on elephants, being behind the 2nd Punjab Infantry, naturally went astray also.

Brigadier-General Thelwall, riding at the head of his brigade, was unaware at first of the absence of two of his regiments, but the error was discovered in time, and his orderly officer, Lieutenant G. V. Turner, 2/8th King's, was despatched to bring them back.

A ravine, covered with loose round boulders and cut up by water-channels, is not an easy place for riding in the dark, but Lieutenant Turner soon caught up the missing troops, after a ride of two miles, and showed them the way back to the right road.

As the ascent continued the road became worse, the boulders being larger and the furrows and dried up pools deeper. To drop into these, with banks from two to four feet deep, was unpleasant, when the darkness and the prevailing white colour of the stones prevented the difference of level from being observed.

After having advanced slowly for a mile and a half, an incident occurred which might have led to most serious consequences, but providentially these were averted, though not by any action on our part.

From the head of the column, in the ranks of the 29th Punjab Native Infantry, the report of a rifle was heard, immediately followed by another discharge.

Colonel Gordon, commanding the regiment, halted the advance party, and endeavoured to find out the men who had fired their rifles, and the cause of the firing, but no one could or would identify them.

His suspicions thus roused as to the treacherous nature of the act, were communicated to the General, who, riding close behind the advance party, came up at once to ascertain the reason of the firing. The General then ordered the 29th to continue halted, while the 5th Goorkhas and two companies of the 72nd passed by them.

Though the names of the men who fired their rifles could not be found out at this time, yet one of the native officers, who happened to be close by, took several mens' rifles and smelt them, to ascertain which had been discharged. He soon found out the men who had fired, but being a Mahometan, he tried to screen his co-religionists, who had, as he knew, committed a most serious offence, and he kept the information he had gained to himself.

There is little doubt but that some of the Pathans of this regiment had become imbued with the idea that they should not fight against their neighbours, the Afghans, especially as they

were of the same religion ; and thus these shots were fired with a view of giving notice of the approach of the column. This view is confirmed by the behaviour of a party of men of the regiment, who, in the course of the subsequent engagement, made their way back to camp, with the story that they had lost their way in the dark. Here their names were taken down, and most of them were tried by court-martial, as also the two men who discharged their rifles. If the shots were meant to warn the Spingawi garrison, they were very nearly successful, as an Afghan sentry, so it was afterwards ascertained, heard them, and woke up the commander of the post, who took no action in the matter, hearing no further cause for alarm.

When the change of regiments had been made, the advance was resumed up the bed of the stream for another mile and a half, and about 3 in the morning the main watercourse was quitted, the road now entering the ravine to the left, up which at a distance of about three miles on, was the Spingawi Kotal.

The hamlet of Gandikheyl is situated high up on the plateau above the left bank of the main nullah, but commanding a view of the side ravine up which the march was made. On looking back, some fires were observed in the village, but whether they were signal fires to warn the enemy, or whether they were only village fires flickering into a blaze accidentally, could not then be ascertained, but as the column had now got the start of any one wishing to alarm the Spingawi garrison, signals from the rear became unimportant even if intended.

The column continued its weary way up the ravine, slowly and with trouble stumbling along in the dark. One incident occurred in this part of the road to show the necessity in night marches of keeping up the touch between regiments. In one place a pine-clad island lay in the middle of the ravine, making a broad white highway on either side. When the two companies 72nd Highlanders, that had been following close to the 5th Goorkhas, came to the spot, they were surprised to find that the

regiment in front had suddenly vanished. No explanation was forthcoming as to the cause of this disappearance, at first, so the companies were halted till the mystery was solved ; the leading regiment had taken the passage to the right of the island, while thy 72nd had gone to the left, not noticing the separation of the roads.

Had the roads diverged instead of re-uniting, much inconvenience might have been caused by the delay in collecting the separated portions of the force.

At last the foot of the kotal was reached, where the track left the ravine and turned up the spur.

The two guides, natives of the country, who had been with Major Collett up to this point, refused to go any further ; they had done their share of the work in leading the column to the point where the fighting was to begin, so they were allowed to depart. It was now about 6 o'clock, and the morning was still dark ; the path, which now struck up the spur, shaded as it was by pines and other trees, was almost invisible in their shadow ; the troops still moved on, however, expecting every second to fall in with the enemy, whose outposts had been observed on this spur. There was not long to wait before the challenge of a sentry, followed by two shots, showed that his position had been reached. The reports of these rifles roused the defenders of the first stockade, about fifty yards further up the hill. This stockade was formed by several large felled trees, which blocked up the road completely, lying one on the top of the other, presenting with the slope of the ground an obstacle of about eight feet high to the attacking force. The Afghan picket lining the stockade poured a volley into the Goorkhas, who, led by Major FitzHugh and Captain Cook,\* made a rush at the place, Major FitzHugh showing the way over. A hand-to-hand fight for a

\* Captain (then Brevet-Major) Cook died subsequently in Cabul from the effects of a wound.

few minutes ensued, but the defenders, being overpowered by the advancing troops, gave way and fell back on the second stockade, eighty yards back, which was like the first one. Here another stand was made, but the spur being a little wider, the flanks of the stockade were soon turned by the Goorkhas, and the place was cleared in a short time. The Afghan guns now began to open their fire, but luckily without much effect.

From here to the third picket the ground was quite open, the track ascending the hill in short zigzags, till the breastwork which lined the edge of the highest zigzag was reached. A mountain gun at this point swept the approach to the position, while the hill at its back was now covered with the Afghan troops, who poured volley after volley down in the direction of the advance.

By the time the Goorkhas and the two companies 72nd Highlanders had cleared the second stockade, the rest of the wing of the 72nd Highlanders, ascending by their right flank, partly hidden by the timber that grew close on the precipitous side of the spur, had gradually forced their way up to the fighting line.

The Goorkhas and the Highlanders now advanced together, the British troops still on the right, to the attack of the enemy's last position near the crest of the hill, as it turned out, though in the darkness of the morning it could not be known how many more of these stockades intervened before the actual summit of the pass was reached.

In front of the 72nd was the spur, which came down from the main slopes of Sika Ram. The ground here was tolerably bare, most of the pines having been cut down. Some of them, however, lying across the the slope of the hill as they had fallen, formed a combined breastwork and abattis which was not easy to cross, and the rest of the ground, though clear of trees in this part, was covered with a short undergrowth of bushes, which made the ascent still more difficult.

About 100 yards from the second stockade, the descending spur swelled into a little knoll, the first of the series which bordered the Spingawi plateau, the edges of which, on the eastern side overlooking the approaches, were all protected by shelter trenches, in which some of the garrison had passed the night. The knoll was of course commanded by the woods, which grew about fifty yards on higher up the spur, but it formed, as far as could be seen from below, a commanding position, which it was necessary to take and to hold.

There was not much of a delay at the second stockade; the Goorkhas and the 72nd, pressing on up the hill as quick as the ground would allow, soon captured the third defence, which, as its flank was exposed, did not form such an obstacle as the others, but the fighting was most severe, the ground being fairly level on the path. About forty dead Afghans in as many yards marked the stubbornness of their defence before they were driven out of their position, removing their 7-pounder mountain gun.

The 72nd had reached the summit of the knoll overlooking the ground above the last defence, and with the advance party was the Major-General and the Staff.

An opening to the right of the second stockade having been found by Lieutenant-Colonel Lindsay, commanding the Royal Artillery, two mountain guns under Captain Kelso quickly followed the Goorkhas and 72nd, and were brought into action on the left of the picket, in the battery vacated by the Afghans, and in less than ten minutes after this stockade had been stormed. After firing a few rounds, Captain Kelso was ordered to take one gun to the right of the picket.

There was not much daylight yet, but just sufficient to show that the enemy were in crowds, all about the knoll; so when this point of vantage was reached, it seemed desirable to strengthen it by placing one of the two guns that were at hand there, so as to assist in its defence. The other two guns of the battery were halted at the bottom of the hill by Brigadier-General Thelwall.



As Captain Kelso was leading his guns into the position pointed out, he fell, shot through the head. This gun was disabled by the mule carrying the wheels being wounded and breaking away from its driver. This mule was never found again, though one of the wheels was picked up not far from the scene of action.

The spare wheels never came up, so there were only three guns available for the rest of the day.

The 72nd continued their ascent, the enemy falling back as they advanced, till they had been driven up among the pine woods which clothed the spur. Most of the Goorkhas had pushed on up the hill above the last stockade, and there were but few of them still following the regiment up the hill, when a party of the Afghans made a determined charge down the path.

Major Galbraith, the Assistant Adjutant-General, observed this, and directed the attention of the men who were near to it, who immediately opened fire on the enemy. As he was standing superintending these operations, one of the enemy came up close and presented his rifle at him. Major Galbraith attempted to shoot the man with his revolver, but it refused to go off, when Captain John Cook, of the 3rd Goorkhas, coming up, and observing the state of affairs, closed at once with the Afghan, and after a hard struggle threw him down, by which time Major Galbraith's pistol being restored to order, enabled him to shoot the man. For this act of bravery Captain Cook was subsequently awarded the Victoria Cross.

Captain Cook, having rescued Major Galbraith, turned his attention to the party of the enemy, who, though arrested in their attack, still kept the ground about the picket.

Putting himself at the head of about twenty men, he charged boldly at this party and drove them back at the point of the bayonet.

The dawn was now beginning to show itself, and by half-past 6 o'clock it was possible to see the positions which had been

gained by the 5th Goorkhas and the 72nd Highlanders, assisted by the 29th Punjab Native Infantry; for though the task of taking the position had fallen to the other regiments, they were supported by the 29th, who when they came up to the top of the hill were successfully employed in repelling an attack made on our right by the troops who had fallen back before the determined advance of the 72nd. Lieutenant Munro was wounded.

It was now about 7 o'clock. The enemy, disheartened at the loss of their position, had given up their attacks, and could be seen withdrawing across the Spingawi plateau towards the Peiwar Kotal, and along the edge of the woods to its north, but no forward movement could be effected then in their pursuit. As long as the enemy were within sight and range the mountain guns kept up a fire on them, but as they were lost in the wood the firing ceased.

The regiments on the top of the hill were now re formed and the wounded attended to, while the supports who had remained at the foot of the ascent, under Brigadier-General Thelwall, were being brought up.

By half-past 7 the whole force, except the elephants and their escort, was collected at the top of the hill, and General Roberts was able to flash the news of the successful capture of the enemy's first position to Brigadier General Cobbe, who was commanding the attack on the left.

Captain Wynne, 51st King's Own Light Infantry, in charge of the signalling party, had previously selected points on the intervening ridges near the camp, from which the Spingawi Kotal could be observed, and this first message was flashed without any difficulty. Subsequent messages during the day, however, failed, from the intervening signalling party having taken up a wrong position, and consequently after this no communication was held between the two forces. This led to some inconvenience, but did not altogether affect the fortunes of the

day; but if it had been possible to have communicated the movements of the enemy to the left attack, this might have been delivered somewhat earlier, and thus the defeat of the Afghans would have been more complete, and after the position had been gained there would have been no uncertainty as to the bivouacs of the respective forces, who could have been able to give each other mutual support if it had been required.

The troops under General Cobbe were in the early morning employed in the direction of the Peiwar Kotal, and beyond hearing the noise of the firing could not tell what was going on, but the garrison of Kurram were awakened early by the distant firing. The course of the engagement could be traced by the red flashes which shone bright against the dark background of mountains. It was an anxious time, however, for the lookers on, but still, as the flashes gradually rose higher on the mountains, their spirits rose too. The firing on the part of the Afghans seemed to be severe, sometimes independent, sometimes in volleys; their shells, bursting in the air, gave somewhat the appearance of guns being fired from lower positions, but at a distance of twenty miles in the dark of a December morning, the ~~size~~ and extent of the red flashes were the only guide in determining the nature of the fire.

The firing at the top of the ascent and on the knoll seemed to last for ages; but at last, when no more firing could be seen on the hill-side, there was no necessity to signal the news to Kurram later that the position had been won. The fact was evident, and so the inhabitants of the valley, the Turis and Mangals, who had not already volunteered their services, turned out of their villages to crowd on to the two kotals in search of plunder, and to wreak their vengeance on the hated Afghan.

With the support that came up under General Thelwall were brought up the chargers of the mounted officers, as the open country now before them required their use for the further advance.





Lieutenant Osborne, R.A.,\* Adjutant to the Artillery of the force, had, like the rest of the mounted officers, been obliged to dismount at the commencement of the ascent, and had, in the absence of any one to hold his horse, been obliged to fasten him to a tree. When he went to look for him in the spot where he had left him the horse had vanished, taking with him, of course, the saddle on which were his cloak and haversack. The curious thing was how this horse completely disappeared without ever being traced. The enemy could not have taken him, and so he must have been stolen by the Mangals or Turis, who were following the advance.

The next episode of the fight was now to begin. The enemy had withdrawn across the Spingawi plateau, occupying the dense pine woods that surrounded the plateau, thus barring the way to the Peiwar Kotal, which was the objective of the attack; and to get there he had first to be dislodged from his position.

The regiments, which had been kept in hand as supports in the first attack, were now formed up to take this second position. The time was now about 9.30 a.m., and the troops, having had a rest, were ready for the attack. The morning was beautiful, a bright warm sun moderated the keenness of the air at this height, and lit up the landscape, which was a striking scene. There was no time now, however, to admire its beauties, nor were they appreciated. The pine-covered slopes in the direction of the Peiwar Kotal, among which the enemy was hiding, did not form a picture to please the eye, as under other circumstances they would have done.

The column crossed the plateau without let or hindrance, and began the ascent towards the enemy's position, which, however, could not be made out at all, buried as it was in the forest. The 23rd Pioneers had the duty of leading the way, followed by the 2nd Punjab Infantry and the 29th Punjab Native Infantry.

\* Lieutenant Osborne, subsequently appointed to E/B Royal Horse Artillery for his services in this campaign, was killed at the battle of Maiwand, to the regret of all who knew him.

The Mountain Battery, now under the command of Lieutenant Jervis, followed.

Had it been possible to have made any survey of the ground previous to the attack, a path up a valley leading towards the kotal and ending at a neck which joined the first range overlooking the Kurram valley to the next one, would have accelerated the attacking movement; but nothing was known of the country or of the numbers of the enemy in the woods.

It was therefore necessary to proceed with caution, which was accordingly done.

A line of skirmishers extended in a pine wood over a rocky hill-side is soon lost to the view, nor can the officers do much as regards its superintendence, when, excepting those close at hand, their men cannot be seen. Fighting under these circumstances becomes a series of hand-to-hand combats. Numbers do not tell at first; afterwards, of course, the advantage must be on the side of the troops who can pour the larger force in succession into a given position.

Working slowly through the woods, when every step necessitated climbing over or crawling among the stems of fallen pine-trees and the rocks and bushes that covered the hill-side, the force made its way up, driving the enemy before it.

The ascent was tedious under these circumstances, but at last the summit of the mountain was reached, to find only that it descended at once towards the neck that communicated with the next hill, which was separated from it by the valley previously mentioned.

The enemy had been cleared off the spur on which our troops were; but from the opposite side of the valley they kept up an incessant musketry fire, which was replied to by our men.

Thus the engagement continued; the Afghans on their hill in crowds, and on our side the line of the 23rd Pioneers, 2nd Punjab Infantry, and 29th Punjab Native Infantry, broken up into groups, as the ground or the trees obliged the skirmishers

to collect under shelter from the withering fire from the opposite hill, distant at this point about fifty yards, widening out to 150 as the Afghan hill receded on the further side of the valley.

General Roberts had led the advance the whole of the day, and was now on the left of our line in rear of the Pioneers, opposite the neck that formed the bridge by which the Afghan position could be stormed. If the Peiwar Kotal was to be reached, it must be by that road, but the way was blocked by a line of Afghans extending all along the crest of the Afghan hill for a mile to the left, and half a mile to the right of the neck, which was opposite the left of our line.

The Peiwar Kotal itself could not be seen, nor, beyond the troops immediately in front, within a hundred yards, could the enemy, hidden by the trees, be made out, except by their continuous fire. The Afghans close at hand, however, did not content themselves with merely firing from behind the trees. Time after time they charged down their side of the hill, and tried to force their way up to the fighting line. Whichever regiment they came to, the result was the same; our men, securely posted, drove back the attacks, and held their own.

If on our side nothing more was done, it was that the time for taking the position had not yet arrived. The General, however, was not desirous of letting the Afghans do all the attacking, and he ordered Major Anderson, the second-in-command of the Pioneers, to drive out the enemy in his front. This was done, but the small party, who lost their leader in the attack, had to fall back, leaving Major Anderson's body in the hands of the enemy, and losing besides a havildar and two men, who tried to bring it away. The death of these good soldiers was amply avenged by the regiment—a party, this time under the leadership of the commanding officer, Colonel Currie, storming the position and driving the enemy back after several hand-to-hand attacks, in which one havildar and three men were killed and seven men wounded.



The battle had continued all along the front for two hours without any cessation. The loss on either side was not quite commensurate with the expenditure of ammunition, owing to the nature of the fighting, for though the Afghans were armed with Enfield rifles, yet the range was short, and most of the bullets passed over the heads of the troops engaged, cutting the branches off the trees, and lodging in the stems. There was no lack of ammunition on their side, as reserve boxes were placed along the position, and full use was made of them, the ground being littered with empty cartridge cases, which lay for months, marking the places where the fire had been the hottest.

To drive the enemy from this position was a great task to impose on troops that had been marching and fighting for more than twelve hours; but it would have been done, though at a great loss of life, had not one of those lucky chances occurred by which the fate of battles is often decided.

The 5th Punjab Infantry, commanded by Major Macqueen, had been detailed for the front attack on the Peiwar Kotal, under the orders of Brigadier-General Cobbe.

Leaving camp with the 2/8th King's before dawn, this regiment had been directed to co-operate with the flank attack by climbing one of the principal spurs that descended from the range between the two kotals.

As far as could be judged from the camp, this spur might lead to a central peak, which rose up about the middle of the distance between the two passes; from this point it would be possible to work round to the south, and reach the Peiwar Kotal along the top of the ridge. It was an arduous undertaking to scale a steep mass of mountains in front of an enemy's position, and one that could only be done by troops in a high state of discipline, and accustomed to mountain warfare.

That it was not an easy road is evident, as it took six hours from the time of leaving camp to reach the summit, and for a

part of this time, as they were nearing the top, they came under the fire of the enemy on Afghan hill.

Guided now by the sound of the firing, Major Macqueen led his regiment up to the rear of the hill on which the fighting was taking place; but during this last part of the ascent, a small opening in the pine woods exposed to view the Afghan camp and their baggage animals.

With Major Macqueen had come up Colonel Perkins, the commanding engineer, and Major Macqueen pointed out to this officer the possibility of shelling the Afghan camp from the opening in the woods.

When Colonel Perkins joined the Major-General on the hillside he mentioned this fact, and two guns, under Lieutenant Shirres, R.A., No. 1 M Battery, were sent under the orders of Colonel Lindsay, commanding Royal Artillery, to the spot.

The range was an easy one, about 1,000 yards, across the face of the precipitous mass of mountains that formed the Peiwar Kotal range.

The mountain guns were not long in coming into action, and soon the shells were bursting among the crowd of baggage animals, and in the camp that was placed for shelter in the glade behind the Peiwar Kotal. At first the shells produced a slight alarm, but as the fire continued the tents that were there were set alight, and the alarm turned into a panic. The glade being completely enfiladed was no longer safe, and every one in it hastened down the defile towards Zabbardast Killa.

The Afghan troops on the top of the nearest hill became alarmed for their own safety, and gave way, following the retreating crowd, and when the line of the troops on the hills opposed to us found their right unsupported, they too began to consult their own safety, and the fire sensibly diminished.

The elephants with the four guns under Colonel Stirling had, by 12 o'clock, reached the scene, and had come into action on a spur of the plateau, whence they could fire shell into the pine-

trees on the left of the enemy's hill. The shells, crashing through the trees, may have done some damage beyond the moral effect they may have produced ; but not many rounds were expended in this kind of fire, only just enough to show that the guns were there, and that it would be dangerous to attempt to turn our right. The fire from these guns no doubt accelerated the flight of the Afghans.

As the fire slackened, a reconnaissance was made up the hill lately held by the enemy in front by the Major-General and the staff, but the result only showed that the mountain, covered with forest growth of pines and brushwood, formed an almost impenetrable barrier to the advance of troops in this direction. The growth of trees was so thick, that it was impossible to say in which direction it would be advisable to advance ; the enemy was out of sight at this point, though still keeping up a fire on the left of his position.

It was evident that the enemy was withdrawing, though with what object could not be ascertained, for though the flight of the camp-followers and baggage had been visible, yet there was no certainty that the troops had followed them.

The experience gained in the last two hours of bush-fighting had shown how difficult it was to keep command over troops scattered for half a mile length in a forest, where nothing could be seen beyond a radius of a few yards ; and so, even if the height in front had presented no further obstacles than its forest growth, it was undesirable to continue the contest in this direction, when, by threatening the enemy's line of retreat, he could be forced to evacuate a position in which his numbers told against our troops, and where our superiority in arms was but of little account.

The Major-General, under these considerations, ordered the troops to be drawn out of action, and brought to the eastern side, over the crest of the hill on which they had kept their ground so long.

The 2nd Punjab Infantry were, however, detailed to keep the position in case of the enemy coming again to the attack.

After the troops had been brought under cover of the hill, they were allowed to repose for some time, a repose which all ranks required—the continuous fighting and marching of the previous fourteen hours were telling on all. The want of water, too, was most trying; the water-bottles had long been emptied, and since leaving the bed of the stream none had been met with. However, such refreshment as could be obtained out of their haversacks was welcome, and enjoyed as much as if the expedition had been a pleasure party. This hill was christened at once Pic-nic hill, a name which it is hoped will be handed down.

It did not take so long for the troops to descend the hill on to the Spingawi plateau as it had for them to fight their way up it, and by about 2 o'clock all the troops, except the 2nd Punjab Infantry, were again collected to begin the third movement of the day, the success of which finished the discomfiture of the enemy.

While the attack had been going on above, Brigadier-General Thelwall had remained at the foot of the hill organizing the Field Hospital, having with him the 72nd and 5th Goorkhas, as also the four guns of the Horse Artillery battery. The wounded were all sent down to this spot, as they could be carried off and attended to.

Among the latter was the General himself, who got a graze from a bullet on one of his fingers.

The order was now given for the column to be formed up, which was to penetrate through the Spingawi defile and turn the rear of the enemy.

Notwithstanding their fatigue, the troops formed up with as much regularity as if they had been on an ordinary parade, and moved off in the following order under command of Brigadier-General Thelwall;—

5th Goorkhas.

5th Punjab Infantry.

No. 1 Mountain Battery.

72nd Highlanders.

23rd Pioneers.

Four guns F/A Royal Horse Artillery, on elephants.

As soon as the enemy, who had still been opposing the 2nd Punjab Infantry, saw the head of the column moving across the Spingawi plateau to enter the defile leading into the Hurriab valley, they became afraid of being cut off in rear, and began to retire in a great hurry, as they had to make their way across two mountain ridges before they could reach the open, while our troops in the valley had no great obstacles to contend with in their march.

The advance was necessarily slow, as the track along the bank of the rivulet issuing from the plateau was not a wide road, and it was necessary to examine carefully the valleys on both sides, to prevent being taken in flank by a concealed enemy.

There was no opposition, however, and not a shot was fired on either side during the march down through the woods that lined the stream.

The march had commenced at a little after 2 o'clock, but it was not till close upon 4 that the head of the column emerged from the forest on to the open slopes above the highest cultivated point in the Hurriab valley. The short December day was drawing to a close, no enemy was in sight, for the line of their retreat was hidden in the bed of the stream about a couple of miles further on, and no one knew then where they were to be found. The troops were quite exhausted, from want of rest and sheer fatigue, and were glad to receive the order to bivouac, even though they had no tents or food, and though the cold began to be penetrating, as might have been expected on a winter's day at an elevation of over 9,000 feet above the sea.

As soon as possible the nearest trees were felled by the

Pioneers, and being pines were not long in being set alight. Had it not been for the plentiful supply of fire-wood, the troops would have suffered intensely from the cold; as it was, there was not much in the way of comfort to be had. Those who had anything to eat or to drink were lucky, and more lucky those who had a great coat to put on, to keep out the cold night-air.

Though repose had come at last in a bodily sense to the force, yet round the log-fires there was a certain amount of anxiety for some time. No one knew where the force under General Cobbe was, and whether the attack on the Peiwar Kotal had been successful or not.

About 8 o'clock at night, after a weary time which seemed an age, a messenger reached the bivouac, with a scribbled pencil message to say that the 2/8th King's were in possession of the Peiwar Kotal. The news soon spread, and all ranks, satisfied with the part they had borne during the day, experienced a sense of relief at the prospect of not being disturbed any further during the night.

Having thus followed the fortunes of the column under General Roberts during the 2nd December, it will be necessary to return to the small force which was left under General Cobbe at the camp in the Peiwar valley.

As the enemy's guns on the Kotal commanded the whole of the approaches to the pass, it was an object to get across the more exposed portion of the valley while the darkness of the morning could favour the advance; the troops, therefore, left the camp about 5.30 a.m. with as much silence as possible. No bugle-calls were sounded to give notice of the movements, but possibly even if they had they might not have roused the Afghans, who, having been led to expect an attack, had remained under arms the whole night, and had only been dismissed to rest at 3 a.m., when the quiet in our camp had shown them that their sleep was not likely to be disturbed. The three guns of G/3 Royal Artillery, under Major Parry, together with the two

remaining guns of F/A Royal Horse Artillery, under Lieutenant H. W. Brackenbury, soon reached the position assigned to them, about 800 yards distant from the camp, and drew up in line on a terraced field to the left of the road, just at the end of the oak scrub, about 1,600 yards distant from the summit of the projecting spur that occupied the centre of the valley.

Two companies of the 2/8th were left as escort to the guns, while the remainder of the column moved on, avoiding the road and keeping along the broken ground, among scrub that covered the lower spur of the valley.

The 12th Bengal Cavalry, under Captain Green, were drawn up out of range in front of the camp, which was now only occupied by the men left behind by each regiment, and a party of the cavalry, the camp being left in charge of Lieutenant-Colonel Macrair, of the 12th Bengal Cavalry. Colonel Hugh Gough, C.B., V.C., who commanded this regiment, was Acting Brigadier of the cavalry of the force, and, by the General's orders, he was to remain with General Cobbe, as the only possibility of employing cavalry on this day might be after the capture of the Kotal.

Working their way across the spur, the six companies of the 2/8th King's found themselves before 7 o'clock in the morning on the last spur, which was separated from the Peiwar Kotal by the glen that ran parallel with the ridge.

During the advance the enemy's bugles, sounding the reveillé, were plainly heard, but as yet no alarm was given as to the approach of our troops, and it was not till the day fairly dawned that the artillery drawn up in the valley attracted the notice of the picket on the one-gun spur, whose first shot woke up the Afghan camp to a sense that the attack they expected was now about to begin. The Political Officer of the force, Colonel W. G. Waterfield, had arranged with the leading men of the Turis for a native contingent to assist in the attack; the duty assigned to them was to attack and defeat the enemy's right, and

accordingly their line of march lay up the spur to the south of the valley.

Major A. P. Palmer, 9th Bengal Cavalry, had joined the force the previous day in the capacity of Superintendent of Transport, having been directed to take up this position by the Commander-in-Chief; but Major Moriarty, B.S.C., who had been selected for this post by the Government of India, was already in charge, and had done the work satisfactorily up to this time. Till the question was decided as to which of these officers was to carry on the work, Major Palmer was attached to the 5th Punjab Infantry, and was thus available for any special work that was required. He was, therefore, detailed to take charge of this native contingent, which started off from camp at the same time as the troops.

Beyond the effect of the demonstration they made, they never came into contact with the enemy, who had cleared off before they reached his position. They were, however, in time for the plunder of the camp at the Peiwar Kotal, which they reached a little after the 2/8th had come up. Their actual march in distance had not exceeded about six miles, and the time that was spent in doing this distance will give an idea as to the character of the position against which they were being led, and to show how hopeless would have been the attempt to turn the position from this side.

As soon as the alarm had been raised on the Kotal, the enemy's guns opened fire. Considering that they had six field-pieces at the top of the hill, and that the ground could have been adapted for their use, it is curious that only three of these, two 12-pounder howitzers and one 6-pounder gun, were put in position to command the valley and the ascent. There was an ample supply of ammunition in the four waggons that were packed in rear with the remaining three guns. Of the six mountain guns that had retreated from the Kurram fort, one was placed at the end of the spur, whence it had shelled the advance on the 28th.



Another was placed half-way along the ridge of this spur, from which it could flank the ground on which the 2/8th were posted, and two more were posted on the right, while the remaining two guns were at the Spingawi pass.

The second mountain battery, which had arrived from Kushi on this day, did not appear to have been brought into action. When the panic took place the battery must have been loaded up, but apparently the gunners found that the slow walking pace of the animals when loaded was not quick enough for them to save themselves, so the battery was thrown away as the flight proceeded, and was found later on in the pass, some of the guns being thrown into the stream, where they were subsequently found.

The three field-pieces and the mountain gun on the spur kept up a continuous fire; the round shot and shell coming down the road, and sometimes reaching our battery of five pieces, which was almost out of its range; the mountain gun on the spur, however, was much nearer, and a good number of its shells came plunging into the battery. The great safeguard was that most of these shells burst short, the fuzes being either bad, or badly cut or bored, and this was why so little damage was done when the shells did burst correctly, the powder in the bursting charge being too weak to scatter the fragments of the shell, which, owing to the plunging nature of the fire, fell directly to the ground. Another reason was that the shells were probably cast too thick, so that when they did burst the shell was broken into two or three large pieces, and thus the chance of injury was much diminished.

The fire of our guns was chiefly directed against the mountain gun at the end of the spur, and at any cluster of men who showed themselves in its neighbourhood; the mountain gun itself was invisible, and most judiciously placed just below the end of the hill, but from the valley it appeared as if it were at the very end. The ground sloped away from it nearly precipitously on the right and left, with a slope towards the front of

about 45°, but in its immediate neighbourhood there was not much space on which the fire could be directed. For nearly four hours the battery occasionally shelled the peak, the practice being excellent, nearly every shell bursting over the site of the gun, and all round it, as the marks on the rocks showed, but the gun was so well concealed that, till it was carried off, it was never silenced. The gunners who exposed themselves had been seen to fall, but the fire was still kept up bravely; the screen wall of rocks and stones in front of it, through an embrasure in which it fired, effectually protected it from the fire of the battery.

The other gun on this ridge was also well hidden from our fire by the intervening peak at the end of the ridge.

The three guns at the Kotal were also placed with great judgment, just in rear of the sky line, the howitzer on the left being placed on a prepared and levelled piece of ground, which had been cut out of the hill-side. The other two guns were on natural soil, but, being just on the reverse side of the slope at the top of the hill, they were well protected, and afforded nothing to aim at, except the smoke of their discharge.

The pieces were about thirty yards apart, the centre one sweeping the road leading up to the Kotal, which was here under a rattling fire for about 200 yards. The gun on the right commanded the road lower down the hill in several places, and all three could fire on the spur when the 2/8th were among the pines, but as a rule the guns were more aimed at the battery in the plain, whose shells could reach them without difficulty at a range of over 2,000 yards; but at this range only a few of the 6-pounder round shot reached, their descent after the first graze higher up being checked by the stones which abounded everywhere, even on the cultivated ground, though this was much freer from stones than usual.

While this artillery duel was going on, the six companies of the 2/8th King's were fully employed in firing at the enemy, who

had taken up their position in the woods on the other side of the ravine, and who were keeping up a continuous fire from the hill-side opposite the spur.

Sometimes a party of the enemy would creep down to take a nearer position, but the fire of the Martini-Henry rifles kept the Afghans at a safe distance, though from their commanding position their rifles were quite equal to the range, which varied from 500 to 800 yards; but from this distance anything like aimed fire on either side was almost out of the question, especially as the shelter of the woods on each side of the ravine gave but slender opportunities for marksmen.

This state of affairs continued from 7 o'clock till about 10 o'clock, when there was a movement on the part of the Afghans who were on the north side of the one-gun spur, as if they meant to cross the road leading up to the Kotal to attack the skirmishing line of the 2/8th in rear.

It was necessary to guard against this, so the squadron of the 12th Bengal Cavalry was ordered up.

It was a dangerous task to cross the valley under full fire of the enemy's batteries, and to ride into a stony ravine exposed to the flank fire of the sharpshooters in the woods, but the movement made at speed was successful, and had the desired effect; the enemy retreated up the hill again, and, seeing that they could not venture into the defile without the chance of being cut up by the cavalry, they never repeated the experiment.

As the cavalry could not scale the hill, there was nothing for them to do but to retire, which they did at a gentle trot, so as to avoid any appearance of being driven off.

With a braver and more determined enemy it would have been a hazardous experiment to launch cavalry soldiers into a *cul-de-sac* over stony ground up a road enfiladed by artillery and flanked by sharpshooters, but it was necessary at all hazards to keep the enemy at a distance from the flank of the line, and in this the movement was perfectly successful.

It speaks much for the discipline of the regiment, that it should have retired under the conditions described, as if on parade, the dressing and pace being carefully kept. Of course it might have been desirable to ride over the commanded ground at the same speed at which the advance was made, with the object of getting as quickly out of the fire zone as possible, but no doubt the cool way in which the return was effected had something to say to the fact that the road up the valley was not again attempted. The movement was made with scarcely any loss, only one man being wounded and one horse killed on the return journey.

Thus the morning passed, the artillery firing slowly on our side, and at about 10 o'clock one of the enemy's howitzers became silenced. The cause was then, of course, attributed to the fire of our pieces, but our fire had nothing to say to it; the trail of the howitzer broke at the elevating screw from continuous firing at high elevations; but the fire from the artillery and rifles may have had the result of its not being replaced by one of the pieces that were unused close behind it.

About 11 o'clock, Brigadier-General Cobbe was wounded in the leg, and the command of the troops devolved on the next senior officer, Colonel Barry Drew, who commanded the 2/8th, to whom the orders received by General Cobbe were delivered, which were that the Kotal was not to be attacked till the enemy had been sufficiently shaken to warrant a forward movement.

It was now going on for 12 o'clock, the time when the mountain guns under Lieutenant Shirres were making an impression on the rear of the enemy, but still the Afghan guns kept up their direct and flanking fire; however, it was evident that the infantry fire was becoming less. About 12.30, Captain Bulkely, 10th Hussars, who had been acting as galloper to the General on this occasion, rode back with the order for the artillery to advance and take up a position somewhat nearer the

The guns were limbered up and moved on to the road, and had advanced about 300 yards, when, as they rounded the end of a little detached stony ridge on the left of the road, the leading guns were greeted with a shower of Enfield rifle bullets. A ravine crossed the road here, which prevented the guns coming into action at once, and when this had been crossed the loose stone wall which protected the fields to the left put a stop to any deployment. The leading gun came into action, but the others, halted on the road, could not advance or even retire without unlimbering.

The two companies of the 2/8th that were with the guns immediately opened fire in skirmishing order; the right company extended on the hill-side that came down to the ravine, and the other in the open terraced fields that were on the other side of the low stone wall.

The enemy had perceived the advance of the artillery, and during the time that they were screened from observation by the low ridge, had come down the hill from the one-gun peak, and had lined the woods and jungle at the foot of the hill about 600 yards off. Though the guns were thus exposed to an unpleasant infantry fire for some minutes, there was luckily no casualty of any kind.

The skirmish lasted for about five minutes, when the Afghans were seen making their way up the hill again.

This was the last effort on the part of the enemy to stop the advance, and when they had ceased their fire from the top of the hill, which they did in about twenty minutes after reaching the summit again, there was not a shot fired from any part of the Kotal. This occurred about 1 o'clock in the day. That the enemy had evacuated the chief position was evident, as the artillery were drawn up in column of route on the road which was enfiladed by the Kotal guns, and yet not a shot was fired at them.

Some of the Turis, who had been watching the progress of

the battle from the rear of the camp, now came forward and pushed on up the hill to plunder, but it was not till nearly 2 o'clock that the two companies of the infantry were ordered to follow the regiment up the hill to take the position.

The regiment had to descend into the defile and then to ascend the opposite hill. This operation took about an hour after the order for the advance on the position had been given at half-past 1 by Colonel Barry Drew.

It was a stiff climb for men who had been on their legs since 5 a.m., but there was no hesitation in the steady push up the hill, and by 2.30 p.m. the whole regiment was drawn up in column on the Peiwar Kotal.

The sight that presented itself was a curious one; the Kotal was quite deserted by the enemy, who had evidently fled in a hurry, leaving their tents standing, food ready cooked, and everything that they had. Here was the artillery camp, and the gunners had left their silver-mounted brass helmets and forage caps, as well as their guns and carriages, to mark their late occupancy.

The Turis, who had ascended the southern spur, had now made their way to the deserted camps, and were joined in their search for plunder by their brethren from the valley, who had swarmed up the pass when the advance of the two companies had shown that the road was clear. Some had brought ponies and even camels with them to carry off their spoils, and quickly they made a clearance of everything portable. The soldiers of the 2/8th King's Regiment, who had been allowed to fall out for a time, were not slow in annexing the posteens which they found, and despite their general dirty appearance, they were very glad to wear them, as the cold wind was beginning to blow through the pass, where it was freezing hard in the shade. Every ruffian who had come to the spoil was armed with at least his long Afghan knife. Holding this in front of him with one hand, each snatched up all that he could, putting it away in

bundles made out of the clothes he picked up. Nothing came amiss to them; loaded shell even were carried off, though as far as possible they were prevented taking anything of the kind.

The Political Officer, Colonel Wateriel, considered that it was but fair that the Turis, who had volunteered to assist us, should have their share of what they could get, and so for some time they were allowed to pick what they could, much to the disappointment of the British soldier, who did not like to see them helping themselves to what he considered was his lawful property.

The day was wearing on, and it was time to put an end to the confusion which reigned on the Kotal.

The "fall in" sounded, and the men standing to their arms were detailed some for picket duty, others to clear the ground of the foragers, and some to pack the captured artillery, and to collect the boxes of ammunition that lay in every direction.

When the advance took place the 12th Bengal Cavalry with the artillery moved up the pass, the latter only to return, while some of the former led their horses up the foot-path, which was too steep and rugged for riding, and proceeded under the command of Colonel Hugh Gough, C.B., V.C., to follow the enemy all along the Peiwar glen, where their traces were visible. Besides the mountain battery that was thrown away, here and there a few corpses of men and animals were found, the former carefully stripped and gashed about in the usual Afghan manner.

At the end of the glen no signs of any enemy were seen, so Colonel Gough returned again to the Kotal, and the cavalry went down the hill to their camp.

If anyone had known that General Roberts' force was then within two miles of the point where Colonel Gough turned back, the junction of the forces could have been effected without any difficulty, but it was universally believed that General Roberts was still among the pine-woods on the Spingawi, where it would be difficult to find him in the now approaching darkness.

As soon as Colonel Drew had decided on holding the Kotal for the night, a message was sent to camp for the men's rations and tents, so that most of the 8th passed the night with some degree of comfort.

In the meantime the ground was being cleared of all the boxes of ammunition that were lying about in dangerous proximity to the fires, which were burning in every direction. It was a great mercy that no accident arose from this cause, as might easily have occurred; but when once the dangerous boxes and dubbies containing powder were placed with the captured artillery under a guard, there was not much chance of disaster.

In the battle of the Peiwar the Afghans had every advantage in their favour, as the only point—excepting, of course, the leadership and the discipline of our men—in which the superiority might have been on our side, was nullified by the conditions of the fight. Our long-range artillery could have but little effect on their position, while our rifles in close fighting were but slightly superior to the Enfield rifles opposed to them, except in the matter of breechloading. They had the knowledge of the ground, in which we were deficient; they had their own discipline, which was good, as they obeyed their leaders, who showed them the way to attack; they were defending their own country, and they had ample provisions and ammunition to continue the fight for many a day; but with all these advantages in their favour, and their superiority in numbers, they could not stand against the onset of our troops at the Spingawi, and thus gave us the key of the position, from which we could operate on their flank and rear.

The flank operation had to be given up on account of the difficulty of the ground, but not till an effect had been produced on the enemy which almost obviated the necessity of the movement to the rear. The numbers of the Afghans opposed to us on this occasion could not be well estimated, as the actual amount of reinforcements they received was never accurately



known ; but they had men sufficient to hold about a mile and a half of ground, not counting the men detached at the Spingawi Kotal. Besides the regular troops, who were estimated at eight regiments, or about 4,800 men, there were the natives of the Harriab, and a swarm of fighting men of the neighbouring tribes, who had collected to join in the defeat of the infidel.

Their confidence in their own fighting powers was very great, and if the attack on the Kotal had been postponed for but a day more, they were to have made a night attack on our camp, which lay exposed to their view, and aroused their desire to get possession of it. The arrival of the reinforcements was only awaited to enable them to do this ; but this reinforcement came just too late, luckily, for their plan to be carried out.

Our loss in this battle was two officers and eighteen men killed, and three officers and seventy-five men wounded.

That of the enemy was much larger ; their wounded who had been able to get away crowded the villages in the Hurriab valley. At the Spingawi Kotal seventy-four corpses marked the resistance they made, and on the Peiwar there were about a dozen lying stripped and hacked by the Turi knife ; in the woods many also were found. The brass ordnance captured were of excellent make, and well finished in every respect. The carriages, however, were very shaky, and most of the wheels in a condition that excited some wonder as to how they could have travelled from Kurram to the Kotal.

The ammunition for these guns was fairly made ; some of the shells were, however, badly cast, and the fuzes were of the old pattern previous to the introduction of the Boxer time-fuze. The mountain guns, of which eleven were taken, were of the same pattern as the 150 lb. steel 7-pounder gun in our service, and rifled in the same way, but the construction of the gun was different. As the Afghans were not in possession of machinery to rifle their pieces, it had to be done by hand, and, to ensure it being accurately done, the gun was made in two

pieces—an inner tube which was rifled, and an outer jacket or casing which was shrunk on. The manufacture was so good that the joint did not show at all, and would never have been known had not one of the same patterned guns, which was taken by the Peshawur force, had a bit of the outer casing shot away, exposing the inner tube. This double thickness of iron made the gun heavier than our similar mountain gun.

The carriages for the 7-pounders were of wood, and were perfectly serviceable, requiring only the linch-pins and washers, which had been carried off, to complete them.

The shells for these guns were very fairly made; in some cases the metal was full of air-holes: but they were fit to use, and would have been made use of for our mountain guns had the grooves in the two guns corresponded.

The fuzes for these 7-pounders guns were made on our model; but notwithstanding that their handbooks for instruction in boring these fuzes were among their equipment left behind, they could not have benefited much by them, or else the fuzes were uncertain in their action, as most of their shells burst short.

Their guns were fired with copper friction tubes like ours, and the whole of their mountain-battery equipment was founded on our models, the saddles being identical with some of older date than the present pattern. Comparatively few Enfield rifles were taken, as the friendly Turis and the hostile Jajis were both on the look out for these, and only the few that escaped the keen eyes of both these clans fell into our hands.

The ammunition for these rifles was partly of our own make, a large quantity of Enfields and ammunition having been given to the Amir at different times. The cartridges, though somewhat old, were quite serviceable.

The native-made ammunition was chiefly for use with match-locks; but there were some Enfield rifle cartridges of their own make, which were a fair imitation of our own in everything except the powder.

December 3rd.—The troops under General Roberts moved from the ground they had bivouacked on to a position nearer the mouth of the Peiwar glen, about half a mile from Zabbardast Killa, where their camp was pitched; the 29th Punjab Native Infantry were, however, ordered back to the camp at the foot of the Kotal.

The 2/8th King's remained at the Kotal, where they were employed in arranging the captured ammunition and bringing in the boxes that were scattered along the enemy's position.

A commissariat convoy, under Lieutenant Buckland, B.S.C., which had marched on the morning of the 2nd from Kurram, was ordered on to Zabbardast Killa, to accompany the advance in pursuit of the retreating Afghans, as the rations in possession of the regiments would not have lasted much longer.

December 4th.—Camp Zabbardast Killa.—The troops halted in their various positions this day. The 5th Punjab Infantry, under Major Macqueen, were sent out to bring in a large quantity of provisions left by the Afghans in the neighbouring villages. This rice and flour was divided among the troops and followers in the camps. The task of taking the captured ordnance back to Kurram was commenced, the 2/8th furnishing working parties for this purpose. The long drag-ropes which the Afghans had required to bring the carriages up the hill, came in very handily for the purpose of letting them down.

Working parties had been improving the road on each side of the Kotal, but the steepness of the hill was so great that only two gun-carriages and one limber were let down in the day to the foot of the hill. They were taken on the next day by a party of the 29th to their camp.

Preparations were begun for hutting the troops who were to remain at the Kotal; the company of sappers was ordered up from Kurram to assist in this and the road making. The three guns of G/3 Royal Artillery were ordered to the Kotal for the defence of the position.

*Congratulatory Order.*

D. O. No. 314 —“ Major-General Roberts congratulates the Kurram Field Force on the successful result of the operations of the 2nd December against the Peiwar Kotal, a position of extraordinary strength and held by an enemy resolute and well armed.

“ Not only had the enemy the advantage of ground, but also of numbers, as they were largely reinforced from Cabul the evening previous to the attack.

“ A position apparently impregnable has been gained.

“ A considerable portion of the Afghan army has been completely routed, and seventeen guns, with large stores of ammunition and supplies, have been captured.

“ The result is most honourable, and could only have been achieved by troops in a high state of discipline—capable of enduring hardships—and able to fight as soldiers of the British army have always fought

“ Major-General Roberts deeply regrets the brave men who have fallen in the gallant discharge of their duty, and feels for the suffering of the wounded

“ In Major Anderson, 23rd Pioneers, and Captain Kelso, R.A., the Major-General has lost two personal friends, and the Government two valuable officers ”

D. O. No. 316.—“ Brigadier-General A. H. Cobbe having been wounded in action on the 2nd December 1878, all reports connected with the 1st Brigade are to be made to Colonel J. Barry Drew, 2/8th Regiment, who succeeded to the command on that date.”

D. O. No. 328.—“ The troops now in camp at Zabbar-dast Killa will march at 10 a.m. for Ali Kheyl in the following order :—

Advanced	{	Detachment of 12th Bengal Cavalry.
Guard		Wing 23rd Pioneers
		No. 1 Mountain Battery.

Main Body.	{	72nd Highlanders.
		2nd Punjab Infantry.
		5th Punjab Infantry.
		5th Goorkhas.
Rear Guard.	{	Four guns F/A Royal Horse Artillery, on elephants.
		Wing 23rd Pioneers.

The column will be under the command of Colonel Drew, 1st Infantry Brigade. The ammunition 1st Regimental Reserve, and a proportion of doolies and bheesties will follow immediately in rear of each regiment; the remainder of the baggage will follow the column in the order in which the regiments are detached to march, that of the Divisional Head-quarters leading, and the remainder following in succession."

December 5th.—Brigadier-General Thelwall, C.B., was placed in command of the troops remaining for the winter at and near the Peiwar Kotal, viz. at the Kotal, the 2/8th Regiment, three guns G/3 Royal Artillery, and Sappers; near the village of Turrai, the 29th Punjab Native Infantry; and at the Peiwar village, the 12th Bengal Cavalry. The staff of the 2nd Brigade was attached to the Kotal command.

Lieutenant Grant, R.E., was placed in charge of the work of hutting the troops at the Kotal.

The 5th Punjab Infantry were out again on a foraging expedition in the Hurriab, and brought in forty-three camel-loads of ammunition that were hidden in the villages about five miles off.

Two cases containing percussion caps, and ten dubbies, holding about 2,000lb of powder, were found. The rest of the loads were either Enfield rifles or filled 7-pounder shells, neatly packed in their camel-boxes.

One of the 7-pounder Afghan guns that was thrown down a khud by the enemy, was recovered this day by a party of the 23rd Pioneers, under Lieutenant Chesnaye, who had noted the place where it had been thrown over.

The cold was rather severe at this camp, the thermometer going down to 13° F.

December 6th.—The troops marched as ordered to Alikheyl, without any opposition.

The distance was twelve miles, the road being fairly good, along the bank of the river-bed, and sometimes in it. The camp was pitched on the plateau above the junction of this stream and the Hazardarakt one, beyond the village.

There was but little forage to be had, so the few horses with the force fared badly this time.

The captured ammunition was all moved down to the camp of the 29th at the foot of the Kotal, reaching it only after dark though the distance between the Zabbardast Killa camp and Gaubazi was but four miles; but on its reaching the Kotal it was delayed by another convoy coming up the hill, after which the guns of G/3 Royal Artillery were brought up; so that the descent was not practicable till the road was clear of traffic.

Only the three guns and their ammunition-waggons were brought up the hill. Considering the state of the road, which had been opened out as much as the two previous days' labour could effect, the task of driving the carriages up was a severe trial both on the horses and on the harness. To lighten the carriages, the ammunition-boxes were removed, but even then the weight of the 9-pounder R.M.L. gun and its carriage was not light. The ammunition-boxes were carried up on elephants, and the guns could also have been brought up on them if necessary, but as the road was practicable, though difficult, Major Parry preferred to drive up. As there was no forage on the Kotal, the horses and drivers were sent down the hill again, to be attached to the two guns F/A Royal Horse Artillery still there, and to march back with them to the camp at Kurram on the 7th

Colonel Waterfield, Political Officer, accompanied the force

to Alikheyl, for the purpose of learning the temper of the Jajis—who up to now had been openly hostile to us, but being frightened at the utter defeat of the Afghans, they accepted the inevitable with good grace, and behaved for some months with a perfect sense of order, assisting the transport of the force. There was not a single cause for complaint against these inhabitants of the Hurriab, and in return, they did not suffer by the British occupation.

December 7th.—D. O. No. 330.—“The Major-General has much pleasure in publishing to the troops under his command the following telegrams received this day from Her Majesty the Queen, His Excellency the Viceroy, and His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India:—

“From the Viceroy, Lahore, to General Roberts.

“I have much pleasure in communicating to you and the force under your command the following telegram just received from Her Majesty, and desire at the same time to add my warm congratulations on the success achieved. Message begins: “I have received the news of the decisive victory of General Roberts and the splendid behaviour of my brave soldiers, with pride and satisfaction, though I must ever deplore the unavoidable loss of life. Pray enquire after the wounded in my name. May we continue to receive good news.”

“From the Adjutant-General, Lahore, to Major-General Roberts, Kurram.

“Accept and convey to the troops under your command the Commander-in-Chief’s heartiest congratulations on the success of your operations, the defeat of the enemy, and the capture of the Peiwar Pass’

“The above to be copied in regimental order-books and read to the troops on the first convenient occasion, in English and Hindustani.”

December 7th.—From all that was learnt at Alikheyl, there was not a single unwounded Afghan on the Kurram side of the Shutargardan, so that the way was clear for a reconnaissance. Though the road had been fairly described by Dr. Bellew in his accounts of the mission to Cabul in 1857, yet the actual knowledge to be gained by inspecting it would be of material assistance in the case of the troops entering Cabul by this route. The Major-General proceeded to examine the road, accompanied by a small force of 250 men of the 72nd Highlanders, 250 of the 5th Goorkhas, and two guns of No. 1 Mountain Battery, the whole under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Brownlow,\* 72nd Highlanders. The first regimental reserve of ammunition was ordered to accompany the force, and 4 per cent. of doolies with selected doolie-bearers; only mule carriage was to be employed, except such camels as were required for the carriage of the rations for Europeans. Leaving at 1 P.M., they marched to Rokian,  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles. To support the advance, and to secure the retreat if necessary, two regiments, the 2nd and 5th Punjab Infantry, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Tyndall, 2nd Punjab Infantry, with the two remaining guns of No. 1 Mountain Battery, were ordered to Rokian, to take the place of the force moving on the next day to Jaji Thanna.

December 8th.—The marches were severe, owing to the cold, but the weather was fine and clear, and the snow luckily kept off. The thermometer, which marked 7° F. at Alikheyl, went down 5° at Jaji Thanna, at 7 P.M.

The camp was pitched about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles beyond the mud fort of Jaji Thanna. No opposition of any kind was offered to the advance so far, and none was expected, if the word of the

\* Lieutenant-Colonel Brownlow, C.B., was afterwards killed at the battle of Candahar, while gallantly forcing his way through a village at the head of his regiment.



villagers could be relied on, for even the villages at the foot of the Shutargardan were reported as empty of troops.

December 9th.—The camp was left standing on the 9th, while the General and staff, escorted by fifty men of the 72nd Highlanders and fifty of the Goorkhas, pushed on to the top of the Shutargardan, a distance of about ten miles, and then returned to camp.

Had the force been permitted to advance at this time, the invasion of the Cabul valley could have been effected before the snow fell, without the difficulties as regards transport that afterwards occurred; but it had been decided that the Shutargardan was not to be crossed at this season, so after resting at the top of the pass, the reconnaissance party returned without attempting to explore the descent into the Logar valley, though this in reality formed the real difficulty which would have to be overcome.

It was a disappointment to have to retire, leaving a battery of brass guns, which had been abandoned in the ascent by the Afghans when the reinforcements under Sirdar Wali Mahomed met the retreating troops from the Peiwar, when, instead of checking their flight, they only swelled the number of the fugitives. There was no help for it, however; the Shutargardan was the limit beyond which operations could not be carried out, so the guns were left, to be carried off subsequently by the Afghan troops.

December 10th.—The reconnoitring party returned to Alikheyl.

December 11th.—Major Collett, A.Q.M.G., and Colonel Waterfield, Political Officer, went to the village of Alikheyl to examine a house which belonged to the late Deputy Governor of the place, in which it was proposed to accommodate a company of Native Infantry for the winter.

This house was in such a bad military position that the idea of occupying it was given up, and another house which domi-

nated the village was selected. Suitable quarters having been obtained, a company of the 29th Punjab Native Infantry was ordered up from the Peiwar command to occupy them, as it was not considered desirable for political reasons that the British Government should be unrepresented at Alikheyl.

The 2nd and 5th Punjab Infantry and the four guns of F/A Royal Horse Artillery marched to-day for Kurram.

The cold was still severe, the thermometer being 5° at night; the continuance of this dry cold was trying to the exposed portions of the body, everyone getting their faces and hands chapped in an unpleasant way.

*Extra Issue of Rations prohibited.*

D. O. No. 831.—“The commissariat supplies being calculated to provide rations for the troops and followers on the scale authorized by Government, no extra issue of food on payment or otherwise is to be ordered, unless the express sanction of the Major-General Commanding has been obtained.”

A notification was also published in orders informing the force that the Postal Department had made arrangements to run two bullock-train carts between Kohat and Thull. Each cart was to carry thirty-five maunds, and they were only to travel during the day.

This arrangement was of great convenience to the force, as it established a forwarding agency at Kohat, which was much required. The Postal Department would not undertake to forward any bullock-train packages beyond Thull, so consignees had to make their own arrangements for getting stores pushed up.

The Government had ordered that all the camp-followers during the Cabul expedition should be armed with a sword, but still many regiments pushing on to the front, had never been so supplied. An order was published this day directing regiments to send in a return showing the number of swords or tulwars

they had in possession, as the ordnance officer at Kurram was then in a position to meet demands.

December 12th.—The Major-General had decided to return to Kurram by the southern route, and to explore the country between the Harriab and the Kurram valleys. As seen from Kurram, the upper part of the Kurram valley appeared to be open, and though from the Harriab the road did not appear to be easy, yet as there was only one range to be crossed, and the distance was not excessive, there was no reason for remaining in ignorance of a road by which the Peiwar could be turned. It is true that the Afghans had not used this route, and it was said that they had not been allowed to do so by the Mongols who lived in the vicinity, but the track itself passed through an uninhabited country, and if the march were made rapidly, the difficult part of it would be passed before any force could be collected to oppose it. There never had been any cause for the Afghans using the road, so that the reasons which may have kept them from so doing, had no weight as regards a British force.

The force detailed for the march through the Sappri defile was composed of the

5th Goorkhas.

Wing 72nd Highlanders.

23rd Pioneers.

No. 1 Mountain Battery.

It marched at 9 A.M. The baggage of four regiments, even on the reduced scale, made a tolerably long column, and the commissariat camels added somewhat to the length to be protected.

The village of Sappri was reached about mid-day, the distance being about seven miles. The road lay down the Hurriab river, till the Kurram was reached, and continued on the right bank of the river, passing the two villages of Kermana, after

which, recrossing the river-bed again, three miles from the camp, it turned up a narrow glen for about two miles, through a forest of pines, deodars, and oaks, till an open upland plateau was reached, at the further end of which was the village of Sappri.

The Maliks of the larger village of Kermana had reported that the Mangals intended defending a defile and kotal, which overhung the plateau at a distance of about two miles beyond the village; the 23rd Pioneers were therefore pushed on at 4 P.M. to occupy the pass and bivouac there.

The remainder of the troops camped near the village. No signs of any enemy were seen either by the 23rd Pioneers, or in the vicinity of the camp. The troops were, however, ordered to march at 3 A.M., in the following order:—

Advance Guard, 2 companies 23rd Pioneers.

Escort for the baggage, 4 companies.

Baggage.

No. 1 Mountain Battery.

Wing 72nd Highlanders.

5th Goorkhas, who formed the rear-guard.

Though in the Hurriab, the pass was called after the name of the nearest village, yet the defile on the further side was known as that of Manjiar, and as this represented the longest part of the road, the whole route became subsequently known as the Manjiar pass.

December 13th.—The tents were struck at 1 A.M., the night being bitterly cold and dark. The track up the kotal was excessively steep and very difficult for the camels, and instead of the baggage having crossed the kotal by daybreak, as had been intended, the rear guard did not begin the descent till past 8 o'clock. In places where water had crossed the road, there were slippery surfaces of ice, which hindered the camels considerably, and thus delayed the march of the baggage. Eventually, however, the kotal was crossed.

From a commanding position overlooking the defile and surrounding waste of rugged and bare mountains, not an enemy could be seen, and it was hoped that either the report of the intended attack was a false one, or that by the early march that had been made they had been avoided, as the road up the hill was commanded on both sides, and could not have been forced for some time if it had been held by the enemy.

After a small level space at the top, the path descended very rapidly into a narrow gorge. The ascent had been troublesome to the camels, but the descent was infinitely more so, and it was with difficulty that these animals could be made to go down the abrupt and slippery road.

The gorge at the foot of the hill extended for five miles ; the track for the first part ran through a deep ravine with perpendicular walls, which narrowed in places to but a few yards, overhanging the path till they seemed to meet, and make a gateway or tunnel through which the road passed.

It would have been difficult to crown the heights on each side, as these in their turn were commanded by successive ridges or spurs running parallel to the ravine, on all of which it would have been necessary to place troops. The path was excessively rough and stony, as might have been expected from its being a watercourse, and even on the level was almost unfit for camels.

Here and there side ravines broke into the road, in any one of which an ambush might have been conveniently laid, but we had got the start of the enemy, and it was not till all the real difficulties of the road had been passed that any inhabitants of the country were seen perched up high on the sides of the mountains, looking at the line of march defiling below.

It was believed that these few men were shepherds herding their flocks, and so no further notice was taken of them or of their movements, but as the more open valley had now been reached, the troops, with the exception of the 5th Goorkhas, were allowed to push ahead of the baggage and to make their

way to the camp, which was to be pitched at a village called Keraiah.

Before the tail of the column had extricated itself from the ravine, more of the people of the country had collected, but still in small detached parties, and at some distance from the column, but by degrees they closed in as they advanced, and soon were within fifty yards of the convoy.

Captain F. Goad, transport officer, was in charge of the baggage, and was walking close to a part of the small baggage guard of the 72nd Highlanders, when suddenly a volley was fired at the party. Captain Goad fell wounded, his thigh-bone being broken by a bullet which passed through his other leg—the bullet going through his sword and scabbard. A sergeant of the 72nd\* with three privates of the regiment, who were close by, picked him up, and having placed him under cover of a rock, turned their attention to the enemy. They were only four men against a large number, but they would not desert a wounded officer as long as they could defend him, and by careful and steady firing, picking off their men, they kept the enemy back. All this while the column was advancing steadily, and the rear-guard, which was under command of Captain Powell, 5th Goorkhas, was continually attacked by the more daring of the enemy, who swooped down in parties as the ground allowed them, while the rest kept up a fire from above.

In one of these attacks Captain Powell was wounded twice,† but by this time the difficult ground was nearly over, and the Mangals saw their prize escape before their eyes without having succeeded in carrying off a single camel. Our loss in this engagement was one killed, two officers and eight men wounded, besides three camp-followers. The head-quarters of the regiment

\* Sergeant William Greer subsequently received a commission in the 72nd Highlanders as a reward for his distinguished conduct on this occasion.

† Captain Powell, unfortunately, died soon afterwards of the wounds he received on this occasion.

had reached the camp at the head of the baggage column when the news of the attack came in, but by the time they arrived to the assistance of the rear-guard the affair was over, and the enemy, seeing their approach, retired up into the mountains.

An incident in this fight is worth recording; a sick soldier of the 72nd, who was being carried along in a doolie, fired away all his ammunition (62 rounds) at the enemy, and as he was a good marksman, he never fired without getting a fair shot. Among the wounded camp-followers was the Bazar Chaudry of the 23rd Pioneers; his life was almost despaired of, as he had received many knife-cuts all over his body. He eventually, however, recovered.

If the difficulty of the road had been known beforehand, this Manjiar or Sappri defile would not have been tried, and if it had been known, there would have been no occasion for exploring it; but, the exploration decided on, it could only be done by a body of troops sufficiently large to protect themselves, and not so great as to require a large baggage convoy.

December 14th.—The Major-General ordered the troops to remain in camp at Kernaiah, proceeding himself with his staff to Kurram. The distance was 21 miles, the track being excessively rough, owing to the boulders and conglomerate through which it passes. It lay along the bank of the Kurram river, well away from the hills, and was practicable for troops, but not for wheeled carriages.

Mr. Archibald Christie, B.C.S., Assistant Commissioner, was sent over to Kernaiah to make inquiries regarding the possibility of punishing the Mangals who made the attack in the Sappri defile.

Captain Kennedy, D.A.Q.M.G., was ordered to reconnoitre for some miles up the river, and try and discover whether the Mangals possessed any large villages which might be destroyed, if they were in sufficiently accessible places.

The result of these inquiries was that the Mangal villages

were all scattered hamlets of a few houses only, and that the only one of any size was the chief village of the Laggi glen, which was situated in very difficult country. It was also ascertained that the marauders who attacked the convoy were not all of the Mangal tribe, but consisted of parties from the Mangals, Jajis, and Chukmunnies, with some of the Amir's soldiers who had been beaten at the Peiwar, and had stopped in the vicinity instead of returning to Cabul.

The object of the attack was said to be merely to plunder the baggage, and therefore it had no political significance. Under these circumstances the necessity of adopting any retaliatory measures was reduced so much that the intention was abandoned.

*Issue of Warm Clothing to Reserve Troops sanctioned.*

The following G. G. O., dated 4th December 1878, is published for information:—

“With reference to Foreign Department proclamation dated 21st November 1878, it is hereby announced that His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General is pleased to sanction, as a special case, the free issue of warm clothing, according to the authorised scale, to the fighting men and followers detached to form the forces in reserve, in order that they may at all times be prepared to take part in active operations beyond the frontier.”

*Movements.—Convoy of Sick and Wounded to Kohat.*

December 15th.—D. O. 347.—“The following movements are ordered:—

“1. When the Deputy Surgeon-General reports that arrangements are complete for the transport of the sick and wounded from Kurram, they will be moved to Kohat under escort of the 5th Punjab Infantry.

“2. The Commissary of Ordnance will also despatch the captured ordnance, &c. to Kohat under escort of the 5th Punjab Infantry.



"3. The 29th Punjab Native Infantry will be held in readiness to march to Thull when ordered; on arrival there they will make over their camp equipage to the left wing 72nd Highlanders.

"4. The wing 72nd Highlanders now at Kohat have been ordered to Hazir Pir; to halt *en route* at Thull until they receive light camp equipage from the 29th Punjab Native Infantry, to which regiment they will make over their European pattern tents.

"5. When the 29th Punjab Native Infantry arrive at Thull, the 28th Punjab Native Infantry and the two guns of No. 2 Mountain Battery now there will move to Hazir Pir.

"6. The wing of the 8th Foot now at Kurram Fort will be held in readiness to march to Hazir Pir when ordered.

"7 No. 1 Mountain Battery, when it arrives at Kurram Fort, will be held in readiness to march to Hazir Pir with Lieutenant-Colonel Cochrane's detachment.

"8. The 2nd Punjab Infantry will remain in their present quarters under the Peiwar Kotal till further orders."

The excitement which had been caused by the Peiwar Kotal victory had died away in the Kurram and Hurriab valleys, but the agitation then spread had not ceased among the inhabitants of the neighbouring valley of Khost. Nor was the lower part of the Kurram, at the bend of the river about Budesh Kheyl, which had not been visited as yet by our troops, entirely free from the hostile feeling, due to the admixture of a number of hillmen in the valley at this point, which showed itself by the nightly cutting of the telegraph wire, which was laid along the river route, instead of being taken through the Darwaza defile. A mullah at Saddar was inciting the villagers of that place and the neighbouring villages to resist, while from the Khost country similar reports were received; and accounts were brought of threatened attacks on our convoys. These attacks, however, never came off, though but a fortnight before some of the village cattle near Hazir Pir had been carried off into the Khost

country, showing that there was some disturbed feeling in these parts.

In order to strengthen the line of communication, two guns of No. 2 Mountain Battery and the wing of the 5th Punjab Cavalry at Thull, and the 21st Punjab Native Infantry, had already been sent to Hazir Pir.

It was necessary, however, that the Khost valley should be thoroughly explored, so that there should be an end put to the disturbing influences which seemed to be coming to a head in that part of the world ; but, except the native reports that were brought in, no real information existed as to what was going on. The country had never been visited by any European, its extent and capabilities were quite unknown, its place on the map being shown by an open white space, through which ranges and rivers only were dotted down in a general way.

The movements of troops detailed in the above orders all had reference to the proposed exploration of the Khost valley, which it was necessary should be carried out as soon as possible.

The troops who were at Keraiah under command of Colonel Drew, remained halted at that place. The company of the 29th Punjab Native Infantry, which had been ordered to Alikheyl, was now withdrawn, the Khan who had been sent with it not liking the prospect of wintering at that place.

The 29th Punjab Native Infantry were to be halted at Kurram Fort, *en route* to Thull, in order that a general court-martial might be assembled for the trial of the men of this regiment, who misbehaved before the enemy in the action of the 2nd December.

The 2nd Punjab Infantry occupied the camp at the foot of the Peiwar Kotal when it was vacated by the 29th Punjab Native Infantry.

D. O. No. 349.—“ Major-General Roberts desires to place on record his appreciation of the 5th Goorkhas, when attacked in the Sappri valley on the 13th December.

"The regiment was on rear-guard, and was charged with the protection of a long baggage column, when passing through the most difficult defile the Major-General has ever seen.

"3. This duty was performed with great gallantry and steadiness, and the 5th Goorkhas have given an example to the whole column, by the successful execution of one of the most trying tasks soldiers can be called on to perform.

"4. The Major-General congratulates Major FitzHugh and the officers of the 5th Goorkhas on this further proof of the high state of efficiency of the regiment."

December 16th.—Captain Goad, Assistant Superintendent Transport, who had died of the wounds received on December 13th, was buried to-day with the usual honours, his body having been brought in from Keraiah for that purpose.

The troops who were at Keraiah, the 5th Goorkhas, wing 72nd Highlanders, 23rd Pioneers, and No. 1 Mountain Battery, were ordered to proceed to Kurram in two marches.

As the telegraph wire had been frequently cut of late between Kurram and Thull, two companies of the 21st Punjab Native Infantry from Hazir Pir were ordered to the village of Saddar, and one company of the 28th Punjab Native Infantry from Thull was posted at Ahmed-i-Shama, to protect the wire by day.

Arrangements were made with the headmen of the villages to look after the protection of the wire, the line being patrolled in sections by the nearest villages, who supplied armed men for the purpose.

This arrangement worked satisfactorily, as the wire was but seldom cut afterwards.

At the Peiwar Kotal the 2/8th King's had been exerting themselves to good purpose in the construction of huts, and clearing the forest from the hill-sides, where the enemy might be expected. Three redoubts and block-houses for the troops were commenced as well, on the summit of the commanding

points ; the 2nd Punjab Infantry were moved up to the Kotal and assisted in these labours, while as many of the villagers who would work voluntarily at cutting down trees were employed, though not many came forward. In addition to the erection of the huts, the sappers and miners were employed in improving the ascent up the Kotal, as next in importance to the provision of shelter for the garrison, it was urgent that a practicable road for laden animals should be made, so that when the snow, which had luckily kept off since the place was taken, should fall, there should be no difficulty in keeping up communication with the garrison.

In order to protect the troops at the Peiwar Kotal from any sudden surprise or attack from the direction of the Hurriab, the village of Zabbardast Killa was to be garrisoned by 100 sabres of the 12th Bengal Cavalry, and a detachment from the 2nd Punjab Infantry. When the snow had fallen sufficiently to block the Shutargardan this post was to be given up, and the cavalry were to rejoin the head-quarters of their regiment, which was to be stationed at Habib Killa, the Afghan cantonment in the Kurram valley.

As all the labour at the Peiwar Kotal had been fully employed as detailed above, there had been no opportunity of getting working parties to take down the remaining captured ordnance and carriages, which had been left there when the more portable ordnance and stores had been removed to Kurram. The elephants which were attached to the Horse Artillery Battery were therefore sent to the Kotal to bring down the guns, which had now to be despatched to Kohat. It was a long and difficult undertaking to load up the elephants, as the cradles intended for our own ordnance were not adapted for the Afghan carriages. Some of the elephants were only partially broken, and gave great trouble, suddenly rising when the weight of the gun or carriage began to make itself felt, and thus upsetting everything and causing delay, not to speak of the chance of

accidents to the gunners of G/3 Royal Artillery, who were employed in the operation.

The laden elephants did not reach Habib Killa till past 8 o'clock, when it was quite dark, and were unloaded rapidly by the loads being thrown off the animals' backs. One elephant, however, refused to be unladen; nothing would induce him to kneel down, and so the poor beast had to stay all night out in the cold with his load on.

A detachment of the Horse Artillery gunners was sent out under Lieutenant Atchison, R.H.A., to mount the carriages on their wheels, and to adapt them to bullock draught; and when this was done the ordnance was draughted into the fort at Kurram. The elephant that refused to be unladen had to march in with his load, when he allowed himself to be unladen by his own mahout.

The Afghan cantonment of Habib Killa was laid out in a rough fashion on the left bank of the Peiwar ravine or river, and was placed on a slope at the foot of the bounding hills of the Kurram valley. A hill stream descending from a gorge in the range supplied water to the place, which was surrounded on all sides by the stony moraine, which, beginning at the entrance of the Peiwar ravine into the valley, stretched out like a large fan, melting away in the gradual descent of the Kurram valley.

The original plan of the cantonment was an open square with huts round it, and on the east and west sides there was a further collection of huts, disposed without any attempt at order, with winding paths between. On the north side the line of huts finished with a certain degree of regularity, and here were placed the quarters for the officers, as in a camp, the subalterns' smallest and nearest the men's huts, then the superior officers', while the commanding officer had a bungalow of a somewhat English model, with a broad-pillared verandah to the south. All these quarters seemed to be of comparatively late construction; the walls were freshly plastered, and there was not much

sign of smoke about, for though some of them had fire-places and chimneys, yet the latter were not adapted to carry off the smoke. The native huts did not differ much from the same class of building all over India, the doorway affording the means of light and ventilation, and taking the place of the chimney.

There was one point in which the Afghans gave us a lesson, which was not taken, however, and that was the care they took of their drinking-water after it had been brought to the house. Attached to most of the quarters, and to some of the men's huts, were other huts, with the floors neatly shingled so as to avoid mud; round the sides of the room large water-jars were placed, on a raised step also covered with shingle. The water-jars were kept in their places by big stones supporting them.

The water in these jars would have been delightfully cool in the hot summer months, and it would have been desirable to retain this system of water-supply; but when the cantonments were ordered to be cleared out and made habitable for the 72nd Highlanders, who were to be in garrison there for the winter, all these water-rooms were removed with the rest of the dirt and filth, of which there was no slight amount.

The cantonment of Habib Killa was defended on the north side by two or three block-houses built of stone and mud, with a parapet roof. One of these was used as a laboratory building, as it was littered by shaped cartridge-papers. There was no protection on any of the other sides. The situation of the cantonment was judiciously selected, as it had a southerly aspect and got the first rays of the morning sun, which were very pleasant after the cold of the nights.

#### *Stages from Thull to Kurram.*

D. O. No. 350.—“The distance from Thull to Kurram Fort will be divided into the following stages for Commissariat convoys:—

	Miles.
" 1. Thull to Kapiyang . . . . .	2
" 2. To Ahmed-i-Shama . . . . .	7
" 3. To Julloomai . . . . .	7½
" 4. To Hazir Pir . . . . .	8½
" 5. South end of Darwaza Pass . . . . .	10
" 6. Kot Mangi on right bank of Kurram River	10
" 7. Kurram Fort . . . . .	2

"Transport officers, or other officers in charge, will be careful to make the convoy encamp on the ground set apart for the purpose at each stage, and that the camels, &c. do not defile the whole encamping ground.

"Troops marching on this route will not necessarily halt at each of the above stages. The halting-places for troops are left to the discretion of commanding officers."

This order was published to prevent camels being overworked and starved on the long march from Ahmed-i-Shama to Hazir Pir, which was now divided into two; and for the same reason the passage of the Kurram river, at the beginning and end of the road, was made a separate day's march. The necessity for husbanding the transport became apparent, as the camels were beginning to die. The position of the camp at Kurram, though it may have been good for a fort to overawe the valley from a central position, was not suited to keeping the camels in a healthy condition. The distance of the nearest ranges of hills where brushwood, which would do for their food, was found, was about seven miles, and the camels had thus to walk over fourteen miles there and back to their feeding ground daily; the cold, added to the change of diet, was trying to their constitutions, and the damage which was done in the few weeks at the commencement of the campaign from these causes, which were evident, as well as from others which may not have been so clear, materially affected the movements of the force later on, as the camels which did not succumb at the time became so

enfeebled, that no amount of rest and food in the subsequent summer months enabled them to recover their lost stamina.

*Reports on Entrenching Tools called for.*

D. O. No. 358.—“ Officers commanding regiments and batteries will report, as soon as possible, for the information of the Major-General, what entrenching tools, in addition to or in lieu of the sanctioned establishments, they consider necessary, in view of the duties likely to be required from the troops during the winter, and from the nature of the country in which they are serving.”

D. O. No. 360.—“ The following movement is ordered:— The troops under command of Colonel Drew, now at Keraiah, to move to Kurram Fort.”

*Scale of Rations and Warm Clothing.*

D. O. No. 362.—“ The following scale of rations as laid down in Government letter No. K901 of 19.11.78, are published for general information ; they apply only to troops across the frontier.

“ A. For British Troops—

“ Meat, exclusive of bone, 1 lb , or with bone, 1½ lbs.

“ Bread, 1½ lbs.

“ Biscuit in lieu of bread.

“ Rice or flour, 4 oz.


“ Sugar, 3 oz.

“ Tea, ¾ oz.

“ Salt, ⅔ oz.

“ Potatoes, 10 oz.

“ Green vegetables, when procurable, 6 oz. When green vegetables are not procurable, 4 oz. of dhall and 2 oz. of potatoes will be issued in lieu.





“ B. For Native Troops, free—

“ Wheat flour or rice, 1 seer.

“ Dhall, 2 chittacks.

“ Glue, 1 „

“ Salt,  $\frac{1}{3}$  „

“ C. For permanent and extra temporary establishments, free; and for authorised private followers, on payment—

“ Wheat flour,  $\frac{3}{4}$  seer.

“ Dhall, 2 chittacks.

“ Glue,  $\frac{1}{2}$  „

“ Salt,  $\frac{1}{3}$  „

“ The following revised scale of warm clothing for troops and followers are published. Indents of articles not yet issued will be submitted without delay to the Commissariat Department by all regiments in the command, whether beyond the frontier or in British territory.

“ A. For British Troops—

“ 1 jersey.

“ 2 pairs of warm socks.

“ 1 pair of mittens.

“ 1 extra blanket.

“ 1 waterproof sheet, English, for each non-commissioned officer and man, with posteens at 15 per cent. of strength.

“ B. For Native Troops—

“ 1 jersey.

“ 2 pairs of warm socks.

“ 1 pair of mittens.

“ 1 blanket.

“ 1 waterproof sheet, Cawnpore, for each native officer and man, with posteens for 15 per cent. of strength.

“ C. For each public follower—

“ 1 good blanket.

“ 1 pair Cashmere putties.

“ 1 posteen or mirzai.

“ 1 pair of warm pyjamas.

“ 1 pair of native shoes.

“ 1 waterproof sheet.

“ Warm clothing (scale C) will be issued to all followers paid by the State, and also to troop, company, battery cooks and dhobies, and to mule and camel drivers, when supplied by the Commissariat Department.”

A report was received that the cavalry post at Ibrahimzai was fired into last night and a horse killed, also that the villagers told the duffadar of the post that a number of men of the Mam-moozai section of the Orakzai tribe were assembling in the hills with the intention of attacking the post. Fifteen sabres of the 12th Bengal Cavalry, and a company of the 21st Punjab Native Infantry, who happened to be at Kurram Fort on escort duty were at once despatched to reinforce the Ibrahimzai post.

The men of the 8th Foot at Kurram, about 170, were also ordered to march there on the 18th, the whole of the troops at Ibrahimzai being placed under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Cochrane, 8th King's. A troop of the 12th Bengal Cavalry was ordered to march to morrow from Habib Killa to Fort Kurram.

18th December.—The General and staff rode to Ibrahimzai, to see the post which had been fired into. The inquiry into the affair on the spot terminated in a visit being paid to the house of a mullah who lived at Saddar, a large village about three miles and a half on; the mullah, however, had flown, and his house was destroyed. This man had been using his influence to stir up the people against the British Government.

*Transport Casualties to be Reported.*

18th December.—D. O. 365.—“All casualties among carriage animals supplied by the Commissariat Department should be at once reported to the Superintendent of Transport.”

*Safety of Camp-followers.*

D. O. 374.—“It has been brought to the notice of the Major-General that followers have been sent from one post to another without escort, and that when marching with their regiments they have been permitted to straggle beyond reach of the baggage guards; the particular attention of commanding officers and heads of departments is called to the order providing for the safety of camp-followers, and they will be personally responsible for any neglect or breach of these orders by men under their command.”

There had not been any murderous attacks as yet on the camp-followers in the Kurram valley, but at Thull they had not been so fortunate; three of the camp-followers of the 5th Punjab Cavalry had been set on and murdered.

The Darwaza pass, between Kurram and Hazir Pir, was infested at this time by a band of marauders, chiefly of the Mangal clan, and as the convoys had to take this road in going and coming, there was always some risk of their attacking followers who were unarmed.

A robbery occurred in the Kurram Fort, where the treasure in the care of the Commissariat Officer was stored, under charge of a guard of the 29th Punjab Native Infantry. All the notes, which were placed inside an ordinary mule-box, were missed, and no evidence could be procured to show how they were abstracted. The boxes containing treasure were under the charge of double sentries, according to the usual custom; but owing to the want of room available in the Fort, these boxes were placed in an open verandah where the guard itself lived

and slept, and where the whole of the Commissariat work was carried on.

It was impossible under these circumstances for the court of inquiry, which assembled, to arrive at any definite conclusion regarding the robbery; but the first result was to have more suitable arrangements for storing the boxes containing treasure, and by railing off the verandah, to prevent all traffic in the immediate neighbourhood of the sentries and boxes. The second and more important result was the removal of the treasure-chest from the custody of the Commissariat Department, and placing it under the charge of a Treasury Officer.

The duties of the Commissariat Officers are so varied and extensive, that to add those of a disbursing paymaster in addition must be liable to cause mistakes in either one or the other of the branches.

Lieutenant D. Waterfield, Royal Horse Artillery, was appointed in the first instance as the Treasury Officer of the Kurram Field Force: but before this officer joined, Major Moriarty, who had been holding the appointment of Superintendent of Transport, was transferred to the post of Field Treasury Officer, and Major Palmer, 9th Bengal Cavalry, took over the duties of Superintendent of Transport, which he held till the abolition of the appointment. The theft of the notes was subsequently traced, after an interval of several months, to the native non-commissioned officer in charge of the guard of the 29th Punjab Native Infantry, by the notes, whose numbers were known, being presented for payment in India.

The boxes in which the treasure was packed, though adapted for carriage by wheeled transport, were much too slight for pack carriage; and, in fact, the carriage of treasure in the field was a subject that had never been considered, of late years at least, till this campaign.

December 23rd.—D. O. No. 384.—“ Proceedings of a General Court-Martial assembled at Camp Kurram, on Friday,

the 20th day of December 1878, by order of Major-General Roberts, C.B., V.C., commanding Kurram Field Force.

“No. 1590 Sepoy Hazrat Shah, No. 1790 Sepoy Mira Baz, of the 29th regiment Punjab Native Infantry, were arraigned on the following charges:—

“1st charge.—Having on the 2nd December, 1878, when the regiment was marching towards the enemy's position near the Spingawi Kotal, Afghanistan, unlawfully loaded their rifles and discharged the same, with intent to communicate intelligence to the enemy.

“2nd charge.—Conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline, in having, on the 2nd December 1878, when their regiment was marching towards the enemy's position, unlawfully loaded their rifles and discharged the same, thereby causing risk of disclosing to the enemy the position of the column, and producing alarm and confusion in the same.

“Finding.—No. 1590 Sepoy Hazrat Shah, 29th Punjab Native Infantry, guilty of both charges. No. 1790 Sepoy Mira Baz, not guilty of 1st charge, guilty of 2nd charge.

“Sentence.—The Court sentences the prisoner No. 1590 Sepoy Hazrat Shah, 29th Punjab Native Infantry, to suffer death, by being hanged by the neck until he be dead. The prisoner No. 1790 Sepoy Mira Baz, 29th Punjab Native Infantry, to be imprisoned with hard labour for 730 (seven hundred and thirty) days.

“Orders by the confirming officer:—

“The sentence of death passed upon the prisoner Sepoy Hazrat Shah, 29th regiment Punjab Native Infantry, is approved and confirmed by me.

“The sentence of death passed upon the prisoner Sepoy Hazrat Shah will be carried into effect, under instructions which will be communicated to the officer commanding 1st Infantry Brigade, to whom a warrant is hereby issued, authorising

him to cause the prisoner to be executed in accordance with the sentence.

“The sentence on No. 1790 Sepoy Mira Baz, 29th regiment Punjab Native Infantry, is approved and confirmed by me.

“The prisoner will be made over, with the usual warrants of commitment, to the officer in charge of the civil jail at Kohat; and he will be paid up and dismissed, and his name struck off the rolls of the 29th regiment Punjab Native Infantry from this date.

“Signed F. ROBERTS, M.G.,

“Commanding Kurram Column.

“Camp Kurram, 23rd December 1878.

“Before the same General Court-Martial at Kurram, on Saturday, the 21st December 1878, Jemadar Razan Shah, 29th regiment Punjab Native Infantry, was charged as follows:—

“1st charge.—Having on the 2nd December 1878, when his regiment was marching towards the enemy's position near the Spingawi Kotal, Afghanistan, after becoming aware that No. 1590 Sepoy Hazrat Shah, of his company, had unlawfully fired his rifle, with intent to communicate intelligence to the enemy, omitted to disclose the same to his commanding or other superior officer, and not having reported any of the circumstances of the case until the 5th December 1878.

“2nd charge.—Gross neglect of duty to the prejudice of good order and military discipline, in having, on the 2nd December 1878, after having become aware that No. 1590 Sepoy Hazrat Shah, of his company, had unlawfully fired his rifle, the regiment being at that time advancing upon the enemy's position near the Spingawi Kotal, Afghanistan, failed to report the same to his commanding or other superior officer, until the 5th December 1878.

“Finding.—Jemadar Razan Shah, 29th regiment Punjab Native Infantry, is guilty of both charges.

“ Sentence.—Jemadar Razan Shah, 29th regiment Punjab Native Infantry, to be transported for 7 (seven) years.

“ Orders by the confirming officer, approved and confirmed—

“ The offender, Jemadar Razan Shah, 29th regiment Punjab Native Infantry, will be transferred to the civil jail at Kohat, with the prescribed warrants of commitment.

“ Signed F. ROBERTS, M.G.,

“ Commanding Kurram Column.

“ Camp Kurram, 23rd December 1878.

“ Before the same General Court Martial at Kurram, on Saturday, the 21st day of December 1878, the following prisoners of the 29th regiment Punjab Native Infantry—

“ No. 1706 Naib Abdool Rahman		
„	1009 Sepoy	Mahomed Shah
„	1815	„ Fuzl Khan
„	1772	„ Rahmat Shah
„	1870	„ Nuzzur Ali
„	1304	„ Jan Mir Khan
„	1749	„ Akbar Khan
„	290	„ Noor Khan
„	1769	„ Gairam Khan
„	1078	„ Golab Shah
„	1613	„ Fakir Mahomed
„	1760	„ Kooshal Khan
„	1825	„ Golam
„	1694	„ Mira Khan
„	1789	„ Amir Khan
„	1782	„ Imam Sadin
„	1841	„ Abdoola

were charged as follows:—

“ Charge.—Having, in time of war, on the 2nd December 1878, whilst the regiment was engaged with the enemy near the Spingawi Kotal, Afghanistan, quitted their regiment without

leave and returned to camp, and having thus remained in camp without authority until the return of the regiment on the following day.

“Finding.—The Court finds the whole of the prisoners guilty of the charge.

“Sentence.—The Court sentences the prisoners No. 1706 Naib Abdul Rahman, No. 1708 Sepoy Golam Shah, No. 1009 Sepoy Mahomed Shah, No. 1613 Sepoy Fakir Mahomed, No. 1304 Sepoy Jan Mir Khan, of the 29th Punjab Native Infantry, to be transported for 14 (fourteen) years. No. 1815 Sepoy Fuzl Khan, No. 1760 Sepoy Kooshal Khan, No. 1772 Sepoy Rahmat Shah, No. 1825 Sepoy Goolam, No. 1870 Sepoy Nuzzur Ali, No. 1769 Sepoy Bairam Khan, No. 1789 Sepoy Ameen Khan, No. 1782 Sepoy Imam Sadin, of the 29th Punjab Native Infantry, to be transported for 10 (ten) years. No. 1841 Sepoy Abdulla, of the 29th regiment Punjab Native Infantry, to be transported for 7 (seven) years. No. 235 Sepoy Kooshal Khan, of the 29th regiment Punjab Native Infantry, to be imprisoned with hard labour for 730 (seven hundred and thirty) days. And No. 290 Sepoy Noor Khan, of the 29th regiment Punjab Native Infantry, to be imprisoned with hard labour for 365 (three hundred and sixty-five) days.

“Signed at Kurram on Monday, the 23rd day of December 1878.

“ (Signed)      WM. STIRLING, Bt.-Col. R.H.A.,  
President,

and six members.

“Orders by the confirming officer, approved and confirmed:—

“The prisoners—

“No. 1706 Naick Abdool Rahman  
 „ 1009 Sepoy Golab Shah  
 „ 1613 „ Fakir Mahomed  
 „ 1760 „ Kooshal Khan



No. 1825 Sepoy Golam			
„	1304	„	Jan Mir Khan
„	1749	„	Akbar Khan
„	1789	„	Amir Khan
„	1841	„	Abdulla
„	1078	„	Golab Shah
„	1009	„	Mahomed Shah
„	1815	„	Fuzl Khan
„	1772	„	Rahmat Shah
„	1870	„	Nuzzur Ali
„	1694	„	Noor Khan
„	1769	„	Bairam Khan
„	1782	„	Imam Sadin

will be transferred to the civil jail at Kohat, with the prescribed warrants of commitment.

“ No. 235 Sepoy Kooshal Khan and No. 290 Sepoy Noor Khan will be made over, with the usual warrants of commitment, to the officer of the civil jail at Kohat, and they will be paid up and dismissed, and their names struck off the rolls of the 29th regiment Punjab Native Infantry, from this date.

“ Signed F. ROBERTS, M.G.,

“ Commanding Kurram Column.

“ Camp Kurram, 23rd December, 1878.”

*Remarks by Major-General Roberts on the General Court-Martial.*

D. O. No. 392.—“ With reference to D. O. No. 384 of this date, the following remarks by the Major-General commanding are to be read, on the first convenient occasion, at the head of each native regiment in Urdu, and also in Pushtu where necessary.

“ Major-General Roberts cannot confirm the several sentences awarded by a General Court-Martial to the prisoners of the 29th regiment Punjab Native Infantry, without expressing his

deep regret that circumstances necessitate his having to perform this painful duty.

“The Major-General feels deeply for the stain reflected on a gallant and distinguished regiment by the misconduct of some few of its members, and he is certain that the officers and men of the 29th Punjab Native Infantry will sympathise with him in having to carry out the sentence which the Court-Martial has found it necessary to award.

“Sentence of death has been passed on Sepoy Hazrat Shah, who stands convicted of an act of gross treachery, and which, had it succeeded, would in all probability have involved not only his own regiment, but the rest of the force associated with it, in one common disaster.

“In the case of Sepoy Mira Baz, who fired the second shot, the treacherous motive is not so distinctly proved.

“For Jemadar Razan Shah there is no excuse. He not only failed at the time to report the sepoy who was guilty of the treacherous act, but there is every reason to believe he would have screened it altogether, had he not become aware that a wounded sepoy had given evidence which inculpated him. His crime has been rightly punished by a sentence of seven years’ transportation, carrying with it, as it does, degradation from the position of a commissioned officer to that of a felon.

“The eighteen men who deserted the field of battle have been sentenced to punishments varying from one year’s imprisonment to fourteen years’ transportation. These sentences the Major-General sees no reason to modify; they are severe, but not more than the crime required: indeed, the Court-Martial would have been justified in sentencing one and all of the prisoners to death.

“The sentence of death passed on Hazrat Shah will be carried out to-morrow morning before all the troops present at Kurram; and the Major-General trusts that his fate, and the heavy punishments in store for the other prisoners, will serve as

a warning, and that all native soldiers who enlist in the service of Her Majesty the Queen of England and Empress of India will clearly understand that, while in that service, they must loyally and faithfully carry out all and every duty they may be called upon to perform."

D. O. No. 380.—"The sick and wounded, captured ordnance, &c. under escort of the 5th Punjab Infantry, to cross the river to Khote, *en route* to Kohat, on afternoon of Tuesday, 24th instant."

The Afghan carriages were in such a dilapidated condition that it seemed doubtful if they could be dragged along the difficult and bad roads that were before them as far as Thull; but by placing the guns on elephants there was no great strain on the carriages.

The captured 7-pounder ordnance were also placed on the elephants, the guns and carriages being easily carried inside the framework of the cradles.

In order that there should be no difficulty on the road, a company of the 5th Punjab Infantry, under Lieutenant Sparling, was previously instructed in the method of mounting and dismounting the ordnance, and soon became as skilful in the drill as the gunners themselves.

#### *Supply of Firewood for boiling Barley.*

D. O. No. 381.—"The Commissariat is authorised to supply firewood, for the purpose of boiling the barley issued to the bullocks of F/A R H.A. and G/3 R.A., which bullocks have been found by a Committee to be in a low and debilitated condition."

The Commissariat Department supplied only barley for all the animals in the force, in an unground state.

Each of the batteries carried with them a grain-crushing machine, so that the drawback of giving unbroken barley to the animals was thus avoided. But even this was not sufficient to

keep up the condition of the ordnance bullocks, which in peace time are fed on grain—a very much more fattening food than barley—and so, when these bullocks came to experience what hard work on a less nutritious food was, they suffered in consequence.

The effect of boiling the barley, added to the rest they received during the winter months, restored the bullocks to a fair working condition in the spring; but the question of the supply and maintenance of ordnance bullocks during peace time is one that requires consideration.

To allow bullocks to eat too much, while they are not being taught to be of use in draught, is a waste of resources. And this is what is going on all over India. The siege train and bullocks for the 2nd line of waggons are kept up at various stations, but, with the exception of a few, are all out of work, and thus not accustomed to draught. As compared with the little country bullocks who are used in the Government Bullock-train carts, one pair of these is equal to three pair of ordnance bullocks, in bad ground.

The remedy would seem to lie in providing work for the ordnance bullocks in peace time.

#### *Movements.*

D. O. No. 391.—“The following movements are ordered:—

“1. Head-quarters, 1st Brigade, squadron 10th Hussars, and F/A Royal Horse Artillery, to march on Friday the 27th inst., by the Darwaza route for Hazir Pir. Three guns, F/A Royal Horse Artillery, and a company of the 8th Foot will leave Hazir Pir for Thull, on Monday, 30th inst., arriving there on Wednesday, 1st January 1879.

“2. Head-quarters, and three companies of the 72nd Highlanders, with the drivers and horses of G/3 Royal Artillery, to march on Friday, the 27th, to the Peiwar Cantonment.

“3. Field Force, Head-quarters and Wing 12th Bengal Cavalry, to march on Friday, the 27th, *via* Ibrahimzai, for

Hazir Pir, the 12th Bengal Cavalry to leave a post of two duffadars and eight sowars at Ibrahimzai.

“ 4. The detachment of the 8th Foot, and 21st Punjab Native Infantry, at Ibrahimzai and Saddar, to march to Hazir Pir, on Sunday, the 29th inst., the whole moving together under command of Lieut.-Colonel Cochrane, 8th Foot. .

“ 5. The 5th Goorkhas and one company of the 72nd to move to Kurram Fort on Thursday, the 26th. The troops at Kurram to be under the command of Major Fitzhugh.

“ 6. No. 1 Mountain Battery, and 29th Punjab Native Infantry, to march on Thursday, the 26th, *viâ* the Darwaza pass; the mountain battery, and a wing of the 29th, to halt at Hazir Pir on arrival there. The head-quarter wing of the 29th Punjab Native Infantry to march to Thull, arriving there on Sunday, the 29th inst.

“ 7. The wing of the 72nd Highlanders now *en route* from Kohat, will march to Hazir Pir, and halt there.

“ 8. Two guns No. 2 Mountain Battery, two troops 5th Punjab Cavalry, and 28th Native Infantry, now at Thull, to march from thence under command of the senior officer, on Monday, 30th inst., arriving at Hazir Pir on Tuesday, 31st. The 28th Punjab Native Infantry will pick up, *en route*, their detachments at Ahmed-i-Shama and Tullamai.

“ 9. The 2nd Punjab Infantry will march for Peiwar Kotal on Thursday, the 26th inst.

“ 10. When the above movements have been carried out, the disposition of the troops will be as follows :—

*“ Disposition of Kurram Field Force.*

“ December 23rd.—

Three guns F/A Royal Horse Artillery	} At Thull.
1 troop 5th Punjab Cavalry	
1 company 8th Foot	
Wing 29th Punjab Native Infantry	

Three guns F/A Royal Horse Artillery	}	At Hazir Pir.
1 company 8th Foot		
Wing 12th Bengal Cavalry		
Wing 29th Punjab Native Infantry		
Squadron 10th Hussars	}	With Head-quarters. 1st Brigade at Hazir Pir for Khost column.
No. 1 Mountain Battery		
No. 2 Mountain Battery		
3 troops 5th Punjab Cavalry		
Wing 72nd Highlanders		
21st Punjab Native Infantry		
28th Punjab Native Infantry	}	At Fort Kurram.
1 company 72nd Highlanders.		
$\frac{1}{2}$ troop 12th Bengal Cavalry		
5th Goorkhas		
3 Companies 72nd Highlanders.	}	At Peiwar Kotal, and its vicinity.
Wing 8th Foot.		
Three guns G/3 Royal Artillery		
A squadron 12th Bengal Cavalry		
2nd Punjab Infantry		
Sapper company		

“When the snow falls, the squadron 12th Bengal Cavalry, and the 2nd Punjab Infantry, will be all sent to the Peiwar Cantonment.”

The 23rd Pioneers were not detached in these orders for any specific garrison or field duty; but they were ordered to leave on the 24th, after the general parade of the troops, to proceed to the Darwaza pass to make a good road, and they remained till this was finished, after which they rejoined the troops in camp at Hazir Pir.

December 24th.—The whole of the Kurram Field Force paraded at 11 o'clock A.M. to witness the execution of the

sepooy of the 29th Punjab Native Infantry, Hazrat Shah, who was condemned to be hanged.

The troops were formed up in a hollow square, the infantry in front, the artillery in their rear, while the cavalry was on the flanks right and left.

In the middle of the square was the gallows, which was merely a beam supported on trestles, with a rude platform beneath.

The prisoner was led up to the scaffold by some Sikhs of his own regiment, and met his fate with the usual calmness of a Mussulman. Beyond remarking that he would have preferred to have died in his own country, he made no statement regarding the justice or otherwise of his fate. After having had his puggree removed, and a cap drawn over his face, the platform, on which he stood, was drawn from under his feet by four European soldiers with ropes. He fell heavily, and soon died.

The execution, no doubt, produced a salutary effect on the minds of those of the native soldiers who might have been tempted, by the action of the Amir's agents and mullahs, to forget their duty to the State, in obedience to their religion. As a rule, however, the latter cause has but seldom interfered with the former in the ranks, otherwise the mass of the frontier regiments would have been untrustworthy. Among the property left behind at the Peiwar Kotal in the captured Afghan camp, were documents which showed that the Amir had been trying to stir up a religious war, or jehad, for the past two months.

In one of the papers, the Amir's mullahs promise to make every man fight against the English infidels. Another proclamation stated, that the English were only invading Afghanistan, to revenge themselves for their previous defeats by the brave Afghans.

These and similar appeals to the only point in common

which binds together the separate nationalities of Afghanistan, produced some effect on the minds of the southern tribes. The mullahs in Khost were inciting the people to attack our communications; the next valley to the south of Khost, that of Dour, was being stirred up by a local mullah of great repute; and the wave of religious excitement had gone still further south, till it broke beyond the Waziri border, against our frontier town of Tonk, which was raided and effectually destroyed by a party of Mahsud Waziri and Paoindeahs, with some Bithunnies. This state of affairs would undoubtedly have continued and increased, as the resistance to our power showed the people their strength; but the news of the Amir's flight, which was received in camp this day, deprived the national party, if it existed, of a head.

December 21th.—The 5th Punjab Infantry, with the convey of sick and wounded, started off to-day, taking with them all the court-martial prisoners of the 29th Punjab Native Infantry. To ensure their security, these prisoners were fastened in batches, their hands being secured to some of the Afghan artillery traces by telegraph wire, as there were no handcuffs or leg-irons available for so many men. With their departure began the first movement of troops into winter quarters. From the information that had been obtained as to the movements of the Afghan army, it was evident that no attack would be made from Cabul on our positions by any of their regular troops. In the Kurram valley itself there was no enemy to contend with, the mass of the people being only too glad to see our troops in place of the Afghan regiments, who had brutally ill-used them for a long series of years. It was necessary, however, to keep a garrison at the Kurram fort, where the ammunition was stored, and the commissariat were collecting their supplies, so the wing of the 72nd and the 5th Goorkhas were detailed for this purpose. The barrack accommodation at Kurram in the two forts was insufficient to house the whole of the men, so it became necessary to



quarter three companies of the 72nd at the Peiwar Cantonment.

This was the Afghan station for troops, which had been known by the name of the nearest village, Habib Killa.

Another advantage from this arrangement was that in this position the 72nd Highlanders could act, if necessary, as a support to the Peiwar Kotal garrison.

The hardly-won Peiwar Kotal had to be retained at all costs during the winter months, to prevent its falling into the hands of any inimical tribe, which might oblige us to retake it; its garrison of four companies of the 2/8th King's, with three guns, G/3 Royal Artillery, was sufficient, with the 2nd Punjab Infantry and the Sappers, to hold it against any first attack; by this time the log barracks were in a fair state of completion, and the guns, placed in commanding situations, with block-houses barring the approaches, made the place as defensible as such a position, buried in deep woods, could be.

The troops which had been employed in the first advance were, as detailed in the order already given, to rest during the winter months to recruit; while those regiments which had formed the reserve during the time that the others had been actively employed, were now detached to form the column that was to explore the Khost country, and ascertain its capabilities of offence. No. 1 Mountain Battery, however, could not be spared, and it, as well as No. 2 Mountain Battery, formed the artillery of the Khost column.

The time previous to the breaking-up of the camp at Kurram was employed in committees to investigate the claims of certain native officers and men of regiments who had distinguished themselves in the operations at the Peiwar Kotal on the 2nd December, and several men of the 5th Goorkhas, 29th Punjab Native Infantry, and No. 1 Mountain Battery, were recommended for various grades of the orders of merit. A subsequent order directed officers commanding native regi-

ments to submit the names of any soldiers killed in the gallant performance of their duty, who, had they survived, would have been recommended, with a view to the claims of their widows to the provisions of the order being taken into consideration.

Before starting to explore the condition of the Khost valley, it was necessary to leave a representative of the British Government in the Hurriab valley, who would be able to supply information as to the temper and actions of the Jaji, Ghilzai, and Mangal tribes. The native official who had been deputed to Alikheyl had been withdrawn at his own request, as he had not liked the prospect of being snowed up for the winter in a Jaji village; but as it was important that this place should be filled, a British officer, Captain R. H. E. Rennick, 29th P.N.I., was selected for this difficult and dangerous duty. In addition to a great knowledge of native character, Captain Rennick possessed a perfect acquaintance with the Persian language, and was thus enabled, by freely mixing with the people amongst whom he was thrown, to win their confidence, and to obtain all the information that was required.

A small escort of infantry was supplied to Captain Rennick for his protection, but a small body like this would have been useless, unless Captain Rennick had been able to keep his position by force of character instead of force of arms, and that he was able to do this is in itself sufficient praise. The Jaji tribe was hostile to us, they had fought against us at the Peiwar Kotal, and though overawed by the defeat of the Afghans, they had remained sullenly passive; it required talents and courage of no mean order, for one who was suddenly thrown among a hostile population of this kind, not only to conquer their prejudices, but to convert their hate into personal friendship.

The weather at this time continued cold, though the health of the troops did not appear to suffer, but the bitter winds that

blew across the Kurram valley from the summit of Sika Ram, made the prospect of leaving the valley for the warmer situation of Hazir Pir a pleasing change for those who were lucky enough to get it.

No snow was as yet seen on any of the higher mountains; indeed, had not the usual fall been most fortunately postponed, the operations in the Kurram and Hurriab valleys would have been brought to a standstill much earlier than actually occurred. On the other hand, a fall of snow on the Shutargardan and neighbouring passes would have prevented the flight of the Afghan force, which would have probably all fallen into our hands.

December 26th-27th.—The movements detailed were carried out as ordered. The head-quarters marched to Ibrahimzai, distance about 15 miles; the track turned off at the ford where the road to the Darwaza pass crossed the river, so that up to this point, about two miles from the fort, the same road was used. Luckily none of the baggage went astray, but there was every possibility of its doing so, as both the troops who were going by the Darwaza pass and the cavalry escort for the head-quarters started at the same time, and the road, which was only about 18 feet wide, was completely blocked with baggage. The troops, 10th Hussars, F/A Royal Horse Artillery, 29th Punjab Native Infantry, and No. 1 Mountain Battery, passed through the Darwaza defile without more difficulty than the loss of some camp-followers, and an accident to the store waggon of the battery, which was upset down a steep bank, luckily without injury to the horses or drivers, but, the perch being broken, the waggon had to be left till it could be recovered. A working party of the 23rd Pioneers was near the spot when the camp-followers were attacked, and succeeded in capturing three of the marauders, who were sent in to the camp at Hazir Pir.

A party of Kahars, who had been invalided, and who would

have been forwarded to Hazir Pir under the usual convoy escort, being in a hurry to make their way back to India, set off without leave to cross this defile. Being unarmed, and starting late in the afternoon, they fell into the hands of the marauders, who cut up two or three of them.

This band, which numbered about sixty to eighty men, lived like beasts of prey, among the rocks on the hill-sides which formed the pass; requiring no houses or shelter, and but little food more than the dead and dying camels, which were on the road, supplied, they could readily pounce down on an unwary straggler, and kill him, taking to flight on the first appearance of danger.

December 27th.—The march to Ibrahimzai was a pleasant one; the road passed along the banks of the Kurram river, and then in its dry and stony bed, till the stream which drained the Kermanah valley, and which is known by the same name, was crossed, at its juncture with the Kurram river.

At this time the Kermanah river had dwindled down to a single stream of a few inches in depth, but the width of its bed and the size of the boulders in it, showed that the melting snows of the Kermanah valley must come down in a large volume of water. After crossing this, the road takes to the left bank again, and is chiefly taken along the upper edge of the cultivation which lines the river-side, and which varies in width from half a mile to a whole one.

About six miles from Kurram a fort known as Wali Dad's fort is passed. Beyond being on a little larger scale than the villages in its neighbourhood, there is nothing to distinguish it from any of the walled enclosed hamlets in the valley. Its tower was more massive and better built, but from the road this could not be perceived. The slopes of the mountains came down in spurs to the left of the road, forming here and there bays, which were terraced and cultivated like the rest of the level ground, but at this time of the year the fields were dry and bare,

and the track sometimes lay straight across them instead of following the curved outline of firm ground at the foot of the slope.

At the end of one of these projecting spurs, in a position of great natural strength, a village was situated. The spur was built of conglomerate boulders, and rose like a wall above the track; high up in it were caverns, which were used by the villagers as storehouses, and, on the top of the terraced level surface, the walls of the houses rose up in line with the natural scarp base. Apparently only one road led into the village, so that if held, it could offer a very respectable defence to anyone unprovided with artillery. On this occasion, however, the walls were lined with women and children, while the men, collected on the bank below, saluted the General as he passed. A similar reception was given at each of the other villages passed on the road, and ultimately about 2 P.M. the village of Ibrahimzai was reached. Here the camp was pitched on the dry terraces close to the village, which was the only available ground free from stones; this village was built at the edge of the slope overlooking the level cultivation in the river-bed. The water-supply was provided from an irrigation canal at the foot of the slope. The village was divided into two parts, as it were; the lower part near the level was in a half-ruined condition, while the upper part was in good repair. There were some fine chunar trees in and about this village, which was situated about a mile above the bend of the Kurram river to the south. The landscapes all about this part of the valley were very fine; to the east lay the Zymukht country, which partly bounded the valley in this direction, rising up into a fine range of rugged mountains, which, bending away to the south, determined the course of the river in that direction.

To the north the country was rugged, but not quite so bare. The lower bounding range of the Sufaid Koh, which enclosed the Kermanah valley, rose up, covered with vegetation and

timber in its higher parts; while beyond this was the Sufaid Koh itself, which, still free from snow, looked dreary without any peaks to mark its outline. Between the 'spurs of the Sufaid Koh to the north and those of the Zymukht range to the south, lay a broad open valley, which rose with a gentle slope from the bed of the river till it attained a considerable elevation where it cut the sky-line.

This valley, though level in appearance, was seamed by water-courses and ravines. A large mountain torrent, which must have taken most of the drainage, fell into the Kurram about three miles distant from Ibrahimzai, close to the village of Saddar. This stream is also known as the Kermanah river, as it drains a part of the Kermanah valley.

The inhabitants of these ranges, the Musazais, Mammoozais, and other sections of the Orakzai clans, determined to keep aloof from us, and would not send in any of their tribal elders to see the General. They showed no open hostility, however, and no shots were fired into any of the camps at night at this time.

December 28th.—The head-quarters and wing 12th Bengal Cavalry marched to Hazir Pir, distance about sixteen miles, the road going through or along cultivation the whole way, except when some of the drainage ravines, from the mountains to the left, had to be crossed.

At Saddar a halt was made. The company of the 21st Punjab Native Infantry who were quartered here were employed in making a road across the fields towards Hazir Pir, which was much needed, as the native track by which we had marched only allowed the cavalry to file along. The march had been on the left bank of the Kurram river, which had to be forded to reach Hazir Pir. At that time of the year there was no difficulty in doing this; the river was crossed about a mile above Hazir Pir, at the usual ford, which lay in the track between the villages on the banks.

December 28th and 29th.—The camp at Hazir Pir was

pitched on a terraced slope at the angle formed by the confluence of a stream which drained the valley leading to Khost. The stream flowed below the camp at a distance of a quarter of a mile, and afforded a good supply of water, though, as it was open and shallow, sentries had to be placed to prevent its pollution above the point selected for drinking-purposes. The 21st Punjab Native Infantry, No. 2 Mountain Battery, and 5th Punjab Cavalry were already camped on this site, which, sheltered from the north by a low range of hills, had a southerly, warm aspect. The Horse Artillery, wing of the 29th, and subsequently the detachment of the 8th Foot, were camped at the further side across the Khost stream, about half a mile off, on the ground where the Afghan winter quarters used to be; but on the departure of the Khost column all the troops were camped for the winter on the first-named site, which, owing to its position, formed as perfect a camping-ground for the purpose as could be obtained anywhere.

An irrigation watercourse ran as usual at the top of the terraced fields, and gave a further supply of muddy water, suitable for animals, and for all purposes except drinking.

The capture of the three marauders in the Darwaza pass stirred up the band to retaliatory measures, and the camp was liable to be disturbed by these robbers, who prowled in the vicinity, where a thick growth of dwarf palm jungle favoured their operations.

A bheestie going after dark to the stream to fetch water was set upon and wounded close to the line of sentries, and some of the camel-men out grazing were also attacked, but made good their escape. The three marauders captured were sentenced to be hanged for murder, after their guilt was clearly established.

*Posts established between Kurram and Hazir Pir.*

December 29th.—D. O. No. 417.—“ Military posts, each consisting of two duffadars and eight sowars, one havildar, two

naicks and fifteen sepoy, from the 12th Bengal Cavalry, and 29th Punjab Native Infantry at Hazir Pir, will be established at Wali Dad Khan's fort and at Badesh Kheyl. The former lies between Fort Kurram and Ibrahimzai, about five miles from the latter place. Badesh Kheyl is about two miles on the Hazir Pir side of Ibrahimzai. Supplies for the above posts will be sent out from Hazir Pir.

“The cavalry posts having already taken up their positions, the infantry will march to-morrow.

“One or two Pushtu-speaking men should, if possible, be detailed with each detachment.”

#### *Post-Office Arrangements.*

An order was also published this day, detailing the arrangements to be made for the post at places where no office existed. Officers commanding at such places were responsible for the receipt and despatch of the post, and for registered letter receipts. An officer might be appointed by the commanding officers to superintend the postal arrangements.

Mr. Walsh, the Field Postmaster, was directed to remain at Hazir Pir for the present.

#### *Movements.*

D O. No. 423.—“A wing of the 2nd Native Infantry, Queen's Own Light Infantry, will move from Kohat to Thull on the arrival of the 5th Punjab Infantry at the former station.

“The head-quarters of the 2nd Queen's Own Light Infantry to remain at Kohat for the present.”

#### *Transfer of Tents.*

December 30th.—D. O. No. 429.—“The under-mentioned corps will make over tents, as follows, to officer commanding wing 72nd Highlanders :



F/A R.H.A., four sepoy tents of two pals each ;  
29th Punjab Native Infantry, eight sepoy tents ;  
8th Regiment, seven bell-tents ;  
and the officer commanding 72nd Highlanders will make over,  
in exchange, tents as follows :

F/A R.H.A., six European private tents ;  
29th Punjab Native Infantry, four European private tents  
and three staff-sergeants' tents ;  
8th Foot, five European private tents.

The above exchanges to be carried out to-morrow."

This order was necessitated from the left wing 72nd Highlanders having been obliged to proceed on field service with the heavy Indian tents.

The Ordnance Department in India kept up a reserve stock of heavy camp equipage for the European regiments, and also a reserve for the native regiments. On the declaration of war, it was decided that all troops crossing the frontier should be equipped with the lighter native pattern tent, but the reserve stocks of these were not sufficient to meet the demand, and a certain amount of time was required for their manufacture. Another circumstance delayed their supply, and this was the epidemic of fever that spread over the north-west and Punjab at that time, which stopped work of every description for several months.

The reserve stocks of light tents from Madras and Bombay were sent up to meet the deficiency as far as possible ; but even when all these had been distributed, some regiments were still unsupplied. A delay of two or three months occurred before the Field Force was complete in the light camp equipage. The transfer of the heavy tents to the regiments and battery that were to pass the winter in a standing camp was therefore a ready way of obviating the difficulty as regards the 72nd Regiment, who were thus provided with light tentage at once for service, without having to wait till it could be supplied.

*Six Days' Rations for Khost Column.*

December 30th.—D. O. No. 430.—“Officers commanding native troops forming the Khost column will draw rations to-morrow up to and for the 4th January 1879.”

*Re-arrangement of Hospital for Sick and Wounded.*

D. O. No. 431.—“Previous to the departure of the Khost column, the following arrangements for the sick are directed. The sick of the 10th Hussars will be located in the hospital of F/A Royal Horse Artillery, those of the 72nd Highlanders in the hospital of the 2/8th Foot.

“Medical officers in charge of the squadron 10th Hussars and wing 72nd Highlanders must leave behind the requisite supply of medicines and a portion of their hospital establishment sufficient for the wants of their sick, and also hospital tents if required.

“The sick of the native portion of the column will be made over to the medical charge of Surgeon-Major Constant, of the 12th Bengal Cavalry, who will form a general hospital for this purpose.

“Medical officers are directed to leave portion of their hospital establishment and a sufficient supply of medicine, with tents sufficient to accommodate the number of sick they leave behind.

“The medical officer in charge 28th Punjab Native Infantry will detail one of his hospital assistants to do duty in the general hospital under Dr. Constant.”

The abolition of the purely regimental medical system, and the introduction of a system of hospitals, adapted for time of war as well as peace, would obviate the necessity of an order like the one just quoted, which breaks up the regimental system as soon as the necessities of a campaign separate the men unable to move, from their regiments,

The 28th Punjab Native Infantry and the two guns of No. 2 Mountain Battery marched in from Thull this day, and their arrival completed the Khost column—which was now ready to start.

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## CHAPTER VI.

EXPEDITION TO THE KHOST VALLEY, AND EVENTS IN  
JANUARY 1879.

JANUARY 2nd, 1879.—The object of the Khost expedition was, as already stated, to investigate the resources of the Khost country in men and supplies, and to ascertain to what extent the combination of the inhabitants of the country against us could affect our line of communications.

There were secondary advantages to be gained from making this reconnoissance in force, but these had no influence on the expedition apart from the original idea.

The force at the disposal of General Roberts did not amount to a sufficient number to undertake the conquest of a hostile population, and, therefore, no idea of the annexation of the Khost valley formed part of the programme, till it was formally made over to the General by the Afghan governor. The secondary advantages to be gained were, that from the Khost valley it might be possible, when necessary, to despatch a force for the conquest of the Waziri tribes, whose chief town, Kanigoram, was not far distant; also there might be a chance of exploring

the road to Ghazni, which was known to cross the Mangal mountains at the west end of the valley.

Some theoretical strategists have assumed that the Khost expedition was undertaken solely with the object of placing the Kurram force in relation with the Candahar one, which at that time was advancing on and had not reached Candahar, and that the withdrawal of the force from the Khost valley implied that the plan was a failure; whereas the mere fact that the expedition started with only fifteen days' supplies should have been sufficient to convince anyone that no further operations than those indicated were in contemplation, and that the withdrawal of the force, though it was postponed for a fortnight beyond the original intention by the circumstances of the case, was yet only in accordance with the original plan.

The disturbances on the southern Waziri border, which occurred about this time, being easily settled by the frontier troops in that direction, there was no necessity for any expedition on a large scale being organised against that tribe.

It is very probable, moreover, that the presence of the force in the Khost country, almost within striking distance, may have had its due effect on the tribe as a whole, and may have prevented any general rising, which the people had been urged to undertake by the letters and direct influence of the Amir, as well as by the pressure brought to bear on them by the preaching of their mullahs.

As regards the exploration of the road to Ghazni, it would have formed a very desirable termination to the Khost expedition, but to carry it out would have required a much larger force than was available. The level of the Khost valley above the sea is 3,500 feet, and that of Ghazni is known to be 7,800 feet. At the west end of the Khost valley the road towards Ghazni ran in an open level valley as far as could be seen for about fifteen to twenty miles, when it appeared to be blocked by the range occupied by the Mangal tribe.

The distance to Ghazni from this point might be about eighty miles, but to get there two ranges had to be crossed, in a difficult and hostile country, and the difference in elevation showed that the road must for the greater part be an ascent.

It would, doubtless, have been satisfactory to have ascertained all the particulars about the route, but in the time and with the means at hand it would not have been practicable.

If ever the Khost valley should come again under our domination, it will be time to explore this and the Ghazni end of the Gomal road, through the Waziri country, though this last has been traversed by Ferrier, and is therefore known.

The Khost country had till this time been represented on the map by a blank space; the streams which ran into the Kurram river at Hazir Pir were just marked at their embouchure as the roads by which the Amir's sirdars went to collect the revenue. Beyond this fact nothing was known, except that the Afghan governor, after the flight of Shere Ali, had expressed his willingness to make over the charge of the country to us. This of course implied that the expedition would be a quiet walk through the country, which expectation was very nearly realised. The first march and to a little distance beyond had been reconnoitred by Captain Carr, D.A.Q.M.G., who had reported the country open and accessible for cavalry, so far as he had seen from the summit of the Dhanni Kotal, a distance of about fifteen miles from Hazir Pir.

The camp was struck at 8 A.M. and the march began at 9 A.M., preceded by the squadron of the 10th Hussars, and with flanking parties of the 5th Punjab Cavalry.

This day's march was to Jaji Maidan, a collection of villages at the head of the valley up which the march was made. This valley was on an average about three miles wide, increasing, however, to about five miles, at the point where the Darwaza pass road came into it on the north side.

The ranges bounding it on the south were of no great eleva-



tion. The road taken was along the southernmost of the two streams that drained the valley, and went very nearly due west, avoiding the windings of the river, which it crossed twice on the way.

The country was quite uncultivated, and only one small village was seen in the direction of the Darwaza pass; the soil, however, looked fertile, and there seemed fewer stones on the surface than in the Kurram valley. The dwarf palm grew in profusion in every direction, and gave cover to black partridges, which were heard calling, but few could be seen.

There is no doubt but that the whole of this fine valley is fertile, and that it should be so little cultivated is accounted for by the fact that it is debateable ground, but the scarcity of population in these parts is due more likely to the effect of the Afghan rule. Under the Afghan military occupation of the Kurram valley the population could not be expected to increase. As the rulers set the example of violence, there was not likely to be any redress against the plundering habits of the hill tribes, who, living above this valley, would have soon made an end of anyone occupying it without their leave.

The villages at Jaji Maidan were situated at the west end of the valley, which line terminated at the range of mountains, the main chain of which, starting from the Peiwar Kotal, ran nearly due south. The valley ended, as it were, in a cul de-sac, but there was an outlet to the south to the Dhanni pass.

The chief village, near which the camp was placed, occupied a central position at the end of a ridge, on both sides of which the ground sank rapidly to the level of the cultivated and irrigated ground.

There was but little space for the camp, which had to be pitched along the ridge in two parts, where the ground admitted. The head-quarter camp was down below, just above the cultivation.

With a convoy of over 1,000 camels for the supplies, the

baggage was not up till 4.30 P.M., having taken thus six hours to do the distance of ten miles.

The inhabitants of the villages belong to the Jaji tribe, though they are quite detached from the main body of the tribe, which occupies the Hurriab and mountain portion of the Kurram valley. They were moderately civil and brought supplies, but, like all the savages in these parts, had no idea of the value of money, asking a rupee for everything.

Colonel Waterfield, the Political Officer with the force, inquired from the villagers who were assembled how it was that the village headmen or maliks were not represented by the old men of the tribe, and was informed that when old age prevented anyone from taking his position as a fighting man, he lost his influence in the tribe, even if he were not expelled altogether.

Living thus in a state of chronic warfare with their neighbours, the chance of anyone living to an old age must be exceptional.

With such neighbours, it is a wonder that the night passed over without more attempts at robbery. Only one thief tried to steal in among the mules in the head-quarter camp, but made his escape, without being hit by the sentry who fired on him.

The other villages or hamlets were situated on the slope of the range which blocked the valley. A better and more compact camping-ground would have been obtained by crossing the ravine at the end of the ridge and going there, but it would have lengthened the march by nearly a mile, and the shortening winter day did not allow of much time for selecting and marking out ground.

January 3rd.—The camp was struck at 8 A.M., and the troops moved off at 9 A.M. in the following order:—

Squadron 10th Hussars.

5th Punjab Cavalry.

28th Punjab Native Infantry.

No. 2 Mountain Battery.

Wing 72nd Highlanders.

Then the baggage; the mules leading, followed by the camels.

No. 1 Mountain Battery.

21st Punjab Native Infantry.

The road from the camp across the ravine below the ridge had not been specially reconstructed till just before the march took place, when it was found that the descent through terraced fields to the side of the ravine, and then down its rocky bank, was more difficult than had been anticipated. A working party was at once sent out to ramp down the terraces and make a passable road, but this was hardly finished when the column was formed up and the animals laden for the march.

To defile a convoy over a difficult piece of ground, where even the cavalry had to go in single file, naturally made a great delay in starting, and it was not till close upon 12 o'clock that the rear-guard moved out of the camp. After crossing this difficult ravine the road went to the south, leading up a fairly open valley, with a gradual ascent, drained by a main watercourse, into which numerous feeders carried the rainfall.

No notice would have been taken of these watercourses by a single man riding along, who could easily go down and up, but these narrow and worn passages were not so well adapted to laden animals whose loads projected on each side, and where any water was left at the bottom the passage of the leading animals soon made the opposite bank into a slippery street of mud, up which it was difficult to take them.

As the road continued up the valley, the cultivation depending on the village of Dhanni was passed. The villagers, as usual, sat in lines on the terraced banks, and one volunteered the information that some Mangals had been seen the previous evening in the neighbourhood. About a mile beyond the village the summit of the pass was reached. The view down the further side only extended into a long valley wooded with small

trees and brushwood, in which a river-bed shone at intervals; the valley to the left was shut in by a spur descending from the pass, while to the right it was more open, but the ground rose from the river-bed on the right or western side till the summit of the range was reached, in the valley beyond which, at a distance of about six miles, the Mangals were supposed to live.

The descent was not difficult; it was about a quarter of a mile long, and well worn in a number of tracks, showing that it formed one of the principal roads into the country.

At the end of the valley, about six miles distant, the plain of the Khoist country could be distinguished, with a distant blue line of mountains blocking the horizon to the south, in front of which several smaller ranges appeared.

When the General reached the summit of the pass, about noon, it was evident, from the delay that had occurred on the road, that the convoy could not expect to reach the proposed camp at the end of the valley before dark; he therefore ordered it to be halted at this point, where the ground was open and suitable, with a satisfactory water-supply in the neighbourhood, and the mules with the baggage of the troops who were to go on, were only allowed to proceed. The 21st Punjab Native Infantry and No. 1 Mountain Battery were to halt to protect the convoy, and to bring it on the next day.

The road from the pass, after the descent, led through the valley, keeping close to the foot of the hill on the left through a jungly tract, which would have afforded cover to an enemy had there been any, and at a distance of three miles, reached the stony bed of the river, which it followed for about half a mile; then it was taken on to the left bank for another mile. To prevent straggling on the part of the baggage, it was all collected in the river-bed previous to the ascent of the bank. The road then recrossed the river-bed, which was about half a mile wide at this point, with three streams in it, and, mounting the right

bank, proceeded along an irrigation watercourse to the village of Bakh, a small hamlet pleasantly situated in the open valley, and about half a mile from the foot of the hills. The camp was pitched to the south of the village, at the extremity of the cultivated land and close to a wide tract covered with dwarf palm; an irrigation surface canal supplied it with water, though of bad quality; good drinking-water could, however, be obtained from a karez, or underground watercourse, in the neighbourhood of the village.

The head men of the village were not very desirous of paying their respects to the General, but came on being sent for. They were cautioned as to their behaviour, and told that no injury would be done them if they behaved well. The prices to be charged for supplies were settled with them, so that there should be no disagreements on this score.

The climate of this valley was a pleasant change after the cold of Kurram, the thermometer only just reaching freezing point in the night.

January 4th.—The force halted to allow the convoy and rear-guard to come up, which they did in the forenoon, after which the camels were sent to feed on the slopes of the hills, about a couple of miles from camp.

The open valley, or plain, of Bakh was about six miles long and four broad; it seemed to be bounded on the south by a low swell, which separated it from the next plain. There were also three isolated wooded hills to the east, which stood up out of the plain and gave it a character of its own, relieving the monotony of the level surfaces. The survey party, under Captain Woodthorpe, R.E., ascended the highest hill of the range to the north-west, and then commenced the survey of the country, which was continued in every direction till the whole of the valley was mapped down.

An order was published this day calling attention to the careless way in which camels were loaded, and directing regi-

mental officers to see to the loading, and inspect each load before starting.

By careful attention to this point much delay would often be avoided, as an ill-adjusted load, which requires to be put to rights on the march, will delay the whole baggage column in its rear for some time, while the portion of the column in front proceeds on its way, thus making a break and increasing the length of the convoy unnecessarily.

At this camp, before leaving on the morning of the 5th, a havildar of the 28th Punjab Native Infantry was murdered.

The man had gone out in the dark of the early morning at about 5 o'clock, when he was cut down within fifty yards of the sentries of the regimental guard. Though his cries brought the guard at once to the spot, the search for the murderer was ineffectual, the ground being covered with the dwarf palm jungle, in which any number of men could have been concealed without observation.

The murderer was supposed to be a man of the Jaji tribe, who had been flogged at Hazir Pir and his arms taken away from him, when, on the occasion of the three men being hung who had murdered the followers in the Darwaza pass, he had threatened to avenge their deaths. The man had been reported as having been seen at the last camping-ground, and as in all probability he was the murderer, no steps were taken against the maliks of the village of Bakh, who protested their innocence and their ignorance of the crime.

January 5th.—The march was resumed at 9 A.M. this morning. As the country was all open, the baggage was ordered to proceed in two columns, under charge of the 28th Punjab Native Infantry, the camels in one, and the mules in another, and as there was nothing to hinder it, the front of each column was made as wide as possible. By this means, the march of six miles was finished by 1 o'clock.

After leaving Bakh, the track led alongside of cultivated

land, which was interspersed with patches of dwarf palm, for about four miles, till the low swelling ground which marked the end of this part of the valley was reached. At about three miles a large walled serai or fortified enclosure, the sign of the Afghan occupation, was passed, and at four miles a village perched on a high bank above the road marked the watershed between the plain which had just been passed and the next one, which was similar to it, but of smaller extent, and apparently not so much cultivated. Two miles across the plain a river was reached, which flowed through the alluvial soil at a depth of about twenty feet below the level of the plain, where the road crossed it. The ground, on approaching this river, became marshy and waterlogged, and one of the cavalry advance guard, who was preceding the column at a distance of half a mile to the right, got bogged in the marsh. Major Stewart, of the 5th Punjab Cavalry, who was riding on the left of the road, also stuck in the mud, but both he and the sowar were rescued after some trouble. The river is known lower down as the Kam Khost, or Little Khost river, and its course here was from west to east. At this season it was only about a foot deep and ten yards wide, but when in flood it would be impassable. The water was muddy and dirty.

The village of Kubie, or Yakubi, is situated on the southern bank of the river, at the further side of the ford. It is a dirty, straggling village, with no trees about it, and might contain a population of 1,000 souls.

The camp was pitched on dry fields to the east of the village, parallel to the river.

One of the inhabitants of this village had been in our service as a sepoy in the 5th Punjab Infantry, and having served his time had taken his discharge. He was naturally pleased to see the British troops again, and would have been more pleased if the country had been annexed altogether, as his life, owing to his having served under the British Government, was not made

too pleasant for him by the Afghans. This man had no great idea of the Mangals as a fighting tribe, and he was of opinion that a force of 2,000 men would keep the whole tribe in check, and prevent their harrying the Khostiwal.

The commencement of the morrow's march was visible from the camp, the road going across a triangular plain, till it hit off a pass in the surrounding hills at its apex, at a distance of about three miles. The whole of this land was under occasional cultivation; but as there were no irrigation watercourses in this direction, the cultivation must have depended on the rainfall.

The General and staff proceeded at once on arrival to reconnoitre the pass through the range ahead, but having ridden for two miles, a party of horsemen was observed coming towards them.

Concluding that this must be the Afghan governor of Matun, coming over to pay his respects, the General returned to camp, avoiding a meeting on the road, which might have appeared as if the General had done him the honour of going out to meet him.

The Governor of Matun, Akram Khan, and his brother, who was employed under him, with a miscellaneous retinue of armed attendants, were received by the General at 3 o'clock in the afternoon.

The visit was not a long one, but the Governor promised to make over the fort, and all the records of the valley, when the General should reach Matun.

This man had not long been governor of the Khost valley, having previously served for seven years in the Kurram valley as deputy-governor, under Sirdar Wali Mahomed.

He had no regular Afghan troops under him in the fort, but some local militia, or matchlock men. The inhabitants of the district, according to his report, were not directly opposed to the British Government, and he thought that there would be no trouble as regards their behaviour.

The interview, which took place in the durbar tent, having



terminated, Divine Service was performed in it by the chaplain, the Rev. J. Adams, who accompanied the force.

January 6th.—The order of march this day was directed, as follows, by the officer commanding 1st Brigade, Colonel Barry Drew :—

Squadron 10th Hussars.

28th Punjab Native Infantry.

No. 2 Mountain Battery.

Mules, grass-cutters, ponies, and camels, in three columns, escorted by the 28th Punjab Native Infantry, and 5th Punjab Cavalry.

21st Punjab Native Infantry.

No. 1 Mountain Battery.

72nd Highlanders.

The baggage column got on well enough till the entrance to the kotal was reached, when, as there was not room on the track for the three columns, some delay occurred in making them file through. The pass itself was not difficult in any sense of the word, but the track naturally became narrow as it wound through the valleys, whose sloping stony sides prevented any laden animals from attempting to leave the beaten path.

Flanking parties of the 28th Punjab Native Infantry and 5th Punjab Cavalry crowned the heights on both sides, while the convoy proceeded through the winding valley for about two miles.

Lieutenant Spratt, R.E., with a company of the 28th and a gang of labourers from the village, had been ordered to precede the column and improve the road where necessary; but the local labourers were so tardy in coming in the morning, that the head of the column reached the working party before anything had been done to the road. The only place where there might have been some trouble, was where a stream with deep vertical banks crossed the road, but the passage down and up had been worn away sufficiently to allow the convoy to cross without assistance.

On clearing the range of these low hills, the road descended an open valley, with an easy slope towards the plain of the Matun valley.

As the advanced guard of the 10th Hussars had halted on the brow of the slope overlooking the plain, the Governor of Matun, and his escort, rode up; and the General and staff arriving shortly after, he proceeded with the Governor, and escorted by the squadron of the 10th Hussars, to Matun, which was distant about three miles, the rest of the column following close behind.

On arriving within half a mile of the Fort of Matun, the squadron of the 10th Hussars was halted on the open ground, on which the camp was subsequently pitched, and the General merely taking a few files as escort, to avoid any show of intimidation, rode on with the Governor, the staff accompanying.

The Fort of Matun is a square-walled enclosure, with circular corner bastions, the length of the side being about 100 yards. In the centre was the keep, a smaller square enclosure, with round towers at two of the angles. The interior of the fort was occupied by huts along the outer walls, which were used as barracks and stables. These were in a very ruinous, dirty, and dilapidated condition, while the inside space between them and the keep was chiefly a series of excavations filled with litter, filth, and stagnant water.

Over the gateway leading into the fort, which was reached by a road crossing the exterior ditch, which was also full of stagnant water and reeds on this side, was a set of rooms, which were inhabited by the Governor's brother, while he himself occupied a better style of accommodation in the keep.

As the fort was approached, its garrison, which consisted of about 100 local militia, who were collected in a mass near the open mosque, a mud building just outside the fort, formed up into two lines facing inwards, with red silk triangular banners at the ends of the lines. A vigorous salute on their tomtoms

greeted the General, while each matchlock-man saluted by raising his hand to his forehead as he passed along, and rode through the gateway into the fort to the door of the inner fort, or keep.

Dismounting at the entrance to the latter, the party was conducted to a room on the ground floor, raised about three feet above the level of the garden, which occupied the centre of the enclosure. This room was open to the garden, the window spaces being filled up with sliding shutters when necessary. The floor was covered with a coarse felt cloth, above which on three sides of the room were placed strips of white Candahar felt, ornamented with an intricate blue pattern, which set off the room and gave it a habitable look, though, as regards the British officers, the arrangement, which was meant for visitors to sit cross-legged on, was useless.

The General remained in conversation with the Governor, Akram Khan, for about half an hour, during which tea was served in the Afghan manner, without milk.

Akram Khan was an elderly man, of about forty-five to fifty years of age. His face was unpleasant, not marked by any special Afghan characteristics, such as the heavy brow and Jewish nose, with a heavy sensual mouth, which distinguished some of the followers, but the face was not one which gave any confidence in its owner.

The water-supply of the fort appeared to be derived from the surface irrigation canal, which passed close by it, and which was diverted into a covered-in tank, opposite the mosque, close to the gate. An attempt had been made to dig a well inside the fort, which had been excavated to a depth of about sixty feet, through the alluvial soil of the valley, without any sign of water being reached. This well, after its excavation, had been stopped, and had been utilized as a reservoir for water, and a roof had been placed over it, to keep the water cool during the summer heats; but like the rest of the fort, it had been allowed to fall to decay, and the roof had fallen to the bottom of the

excavation, which now added another and more dangerous hole to the pitfalls already existing in the enclosure.

This scanty water-supply was sufficient to condemn the fort as a military post, as the irrigation canal could at any time be diverted at the point where it started from the Matun river. The covered in tank, if it had been cleared out, would have held a fair supply ; but it now only held a couple of feet of water, the bottom being silted up with mud. The nearest permanent water-supply was the Matun river, which ran about half a mile to the south of the fort, too far off to be of use in case of an attack.

Outside the fort, to the east, was a walled-in orchard, and between the orchard and the fort there was a road leading to the villages on the south side of the valley. Beyond the orchard, to the east, at about a quarter of a mile's distance, there were the remains of a standing cavalry camp, or cantonment, where a regiment had been quartered previously, but of this there were only a few ruined walls and mud mangers to mark the site. Between this site and the camp, which was pitched on the north-east side of the fort, ran a drainage watercourse, which carried off the superfluous water after irrigation, and at the same time carried the water from the Shamil river to the fields of more distant villages at a lower level of the valley. This watercourse, which varied from twenty to ten feet deep, with more or less precipitous sides, formed the southern boundary of the camp, and at the same time its water-supply. The water was, of course, dirty and muddy.

The camp was all pitched by 2 P.M., the head-quarters tent in the centre, the squadron 10th Hussars on the right, then the 72nd and 21st facing the east, the 5th Punjab Cavalry to the south ; to the left of the head-quarter camp the two mountain batteries of artillery, and then the 28th Punjab Native Infantry facing the west. The convoy of camels was collected between the Punjab Cavalry and 21st, and the 5th Punjab Cavalry. By

this arrangement the camp was pitched as compactly as possible, and no rear-guards were required, as the camps all faced outwards. Information was brought in about 7 o'clock that the Mangals, who had till then been invisible, had come down into the valley, and were occupying the villages in the neighbourhood. The Political Officer, Colonel Waterfield, was requested to send "parwanas" \* to the maliks of the nearest villages to warn them that if they allowed any hostile tribes to be harboured, without giving notice of their occupation, their villages would be destroyed.

The enemy, however, thought better of making a night attack, and though the pickets had been strengthened in anticipation of their advance, and half the force had been detailed as an inlying picket to sleep accoutred, the night passed off without any disturbance.

January 7th.—In the morning the Mangals and other tribesmen began to swarm out of the villages in which they had passed the night, but at 8 o'clock none of them had come in to any of the nearest villages to the north-west, which were situated about a mile from the camp, and a mile and a half to two miles from the line of hills to the north of the valley.

Some servants who had gone to these villages for supplies were, however, warned by their occupants not to go beyond them, as the other neighbouring villages had been occupied, and were still full of armed men.

The nearest villages to the east of camp were about half a mile distant, and to the south-west there was a small village about three-quarters of a mile distant, and another about half a mile further in this direction, on the bank of the Matun river, across which to the south, within a radius of two miles, were several other hamlets.

The enemy could be observed assembling, chiefly to the

\* Written orders.

north-west, and as they seemed disposed to make an attack at that time, the troops fell in about 9 A.M., but were soon dismissed again, as the intentions of the enemy became more evident, which were to make a simultaneous attack on the camp in every direction as soon as the forces which were scattered through the valley could be got in hand. In the nearest villages to the north-east no enemy had been observed in the morning, or up to 12 o'clock, when a sudden rush of the camp followers, grass-cutters, and camel-men, who had gone thither to purchase fodder for their animals, showed that the surrounding movement was completed.

A reconnaissance of a troop of the 5th Punjab Cavalry had been sent out in the north-west direction, with Captain Carr, D.A.Q.M.G., about 9.30 A.M., and returned, having been fired upon, about noon, with the information that the enemy was occupying the villages nearest the hills, and had also taken up a position along the lowest slopes, which, indeed, could be seen from the camp.

The return of this reconnoitring party, and the attack of the enemy on the east, where, besides killing a camel-man, they had captured some few camels that had been in his charge, showed that the time for action had come.

It was a little before 1 o'clock when the troops were ordered to fall in again, and the cavalry were sent out against the enemy in the north-west direction, to be followed by the 28th Punjab Native Infantry under Lieutenant-Colonel Hudson, and No. 2 Mountain Battery under Captain Swinley. The arrival of the cavalry under Colonel Gough, C.B., V.C., frightened the remaining occupants of the villages in the plains, who withdrew as quickly to the foot of the hills as they could, followed by the cavalry, who, however, were too late to catch any of the men in the open. The squadron of the 10th Hussars was dismounted, and was ordered to skirmish up a small knoll to the west, out of which they drove the enemy, who placed themselves on

another spur of the hill, on which they were gathered in a mass. A squadron of the 5th Punjab Cavalry was sent up this spur, the ascent of which, though at first stony and rough, was not impracticable. Charging as far as they could, the enemy retreating before them, they, too, dismounted and opened a brisk fire. The enemy, who had the advantage of ground, retired before this attack, and the troopers 5th Punjab Cavalry pressing on, very nearly captured a red standard which marked the position of one of the leaders of the Mangals. The exchange of fire had been going on for about half an hour, when the arrival of the 28th Punjab Native Infantry under Colonel Hudson brought a more effective fire on the ridge where the enemy were now collected. The 7-pounder guns came into action below and pitched three shells, with precision, on to the sky-line of the ridge, where the enemy showed in force. Unaccustomed to artillery fire, they gradually disappeared over the reverse side, though still a number of men round a white flag on the highest point of the ridge kept their position for some time, disappearing behind the crest when the puff of smoke showed that the shell was coming, and then, after the explosion, continuing their war-dances and brandishing their knives on the sky-line. The fall of the standard bearer caused the flight of his companions; and out of the swarm of at least 2,000 Mangals who had occupied this portion of the valley, all had fled beyond the reach of pursuit, which, however, was not attempted, as nothing would have been gained by following the enemy into the recesses of the mountains.

The General, in view of the proposed attack, had made the following disposition of the troops which were to remain after the despatch of the 28th and two guns to the attack of the enemy, as stated.

The defence of the camp was entrusted to Brigadier-General Barry Drew, commanding 1st Brigade, who had under his orders the 21st Punjab Native Infantry, the wing of the 72nd Highlanders, and No. 1 Mountain Battery.

The 21st Punjab Native Infantry were disposed in wing: the right wing under Major Collis, commanding the regiment, at the north-east front; the left wing under Captain Carruthers, at the south-east corner; fifty of the 72nd under Captain Spens\* were detailed to the south side, where two guns under Lieutenant Jervis, No. 1 Mountain Battery, were also stationed. The other two guns of this battery, under Captain Morgan, were employed by General Drew with the right wing of the 21st.

The remainder of the 72nd under Lieutenant-Colonel Clarke,† were in reserve in the camp, Major Stockwell and Captain Kelsey being posted with fifty men on the west front, to protect that flank.

The General and staff started soon after 1 o'clock to watch the progress of the attack under Colonel Gough, C.B., V.C., already described, but as it appeared that, through some mistake, the twenty-five men of the 5th Punjab Cavalry who should have remained in camp under the orders of Brigadier General Drew, had proceeded with their regiment, he directed his personal escort of eight sowars to be placed under General Drew's orders, and went on across the plain without any escort but his staff.

Immediately after the Major-General had left the camp, the enemy who occupied the villages in the north-east direction began to show themselves, spreading out from each side of the nearest village. Captain Morgan's two guns were brought into action, and threw several shells into the mass of men who were here collected. The effect of this fire was marvellous, the enemy could not face the bursting of the shells, and began streaming off towards the villages in their rear and to the south.

Captain Kennedy, D.A.Q.M.G., was ordered with the few sowars who were available to try and cut off the men who were moving towards the south, but on galloping out about half a mile, the party was pulled up by the watercourse which ran along the south front of the camp, which was quite impassable

\* Killed in action in Cabul.

† Since deceased on his return from Cabul invalided.



at this point, and he returned to camp without having achieved anything at this time.

Had there been any more cavalry available, the string of camels which had been seized in this village and which were being led away to the north, might have been recovered, as they were visible on the plain about three miles distant; but it would not have been possible, with the mass of men still hanging about the second and third villages in this direction, to attempt their recapture without running the risk of their being cut off on their return, besides which there were no orders for any of the troops to leave the camp.

As soon as the guns had opened fire in front, a general fusilade in the rear to the south showed that the enemy had intended to close in, in this direction, where the cover afforded by the old Afghan cavalry lines allowed them to approach within half a mile of the camp without being perceived. They occupied also the walled village about three-quarters of a mile distant on this side.

The left wing of the 21st, aligned behind the remains of a mud wall, opened fire on the cavalry lines, while the two guns of No. 1. Mountain Battery, supported by the party of Highlanders under Captain Spens, commenced shelling the village, with an occasional shot in the direction of the lines. As on the other flank, the effect of the artillery fire surpassed our expectations: the enemy could not stand the shells, and soon began to clear out, retreating to the next village about a quarter of a mile further on, which was just without the range of the guns, and hidden by the nearer one.

The fort did not appear to be occupied by the enemy, though the retainers of the Governor, who still lived in his quarters, had collected on the roof, watching the progress of affairs in the valley all round, when if matters had gone against us, they would doubtless have made common cause with the swarms who had come down from the hills.

It was reported that the previous night signals had been flashed from the roof of the buildings in the fort, as if small quantities of powder had been thrown on charcoal; and it was quite possible, that the Governor, or his retainers, had a private code of signals with the leaders of the enemy.

The General returned to camp about 2.30 P.M., to find the attack driven off in every direction, and he ordered the wings of the 21st Punjab Native Infantry and the 72nd on their flank to follow up the enemy to the east and south-east, with the mountain guns, and to burn the villages which had harboured the enemy. Brigadier-General Drew led the detachment of the Highlanders, under Lieut-Colonel Clarke, and the right wing of the 21st Punjab Native Infantry, for about three miles, setting alight to five villages in this direction; one man of the 21st being killed during the operation at the second village, but practically there was no defence, and the enemy fled. The villages had all been deserted and were quite empty in this direction, as also in the south-east, where the 21st, under Captain Carruthers, occupied the first village without any loss. The two mountain guns then proceeded to shell the second village, in which the enemy seemed disposed to make a stand. When the first village had been occupied and set alight, the camp-followers, who had been on the watch for plunder, swooped down on them and carried off whatever was portable, though there was nothing left in any of them to speak of, except a few fowls and a charpoy or two.

The second village was occupied by the 21st and set alight, and then a third village about half a mile off was visited, to find it equally deserted. On crossing the Matun river at the second village, on the way to the third one, the plain to the south was observed covered with the fugitives, and the guns hastened their flight by several well-directed shells, driving them away to the spurs of the ranges which closed the valley to the south.

When the General left the troops under Colonel Gough,

C.B., V.C., to return to the camp, he ordered a party of the 5th Punjab Cavalry to follow him, so that there should be some cavalry at his disposal for offensive action.

Major J. C. Stewart with forty sowars was detailed for this duty, and following at an easy pace, he reached the General on the south side of the camp just after the wing of the 21st had commenced their advance in this direction.

Reporting his arrival to the General, he was ordered to charge and disperse the enemy, who could be seen to the number of about 400 running across the plain on the further side of the river.

Before starting, he was informed in reply to his inquiry as to whether he should take any prisoners, that he should confine his attention to dispersing the enemy.

Crossing the river-bed, at this place about half a mile wide, he soon caught up the fugitives, and charging among them, about thirty were killed, with the loss on our side of one duffadar.

The ground where the enemy was reached happened to be the stony bed of a broad nullah, where owing to large boulders it was difficult for horses to move very quickly, and from this cause more of the enemy got away than otherwise would have happened, or if the 5th Punjab Cavalry had been a lancer regiment, as many escaped by throwing themselves flat when the pursuer was near, and were out of reach of the tulwar. Following up the enemy for about half a mile on this ground, the open stony bed became commanded by a high bank, which was lined by matchlock-men, who thus covered the retreat of their comrades into the village behind them on the bank, from which a fire was opened.

Major Stewart drew his men out, and fell back out of fire.

A reinforcement of infantry was now approaching, on seeing which the defenders of the village began to evacuate it on the

further side, out of sight, and make their way to the next village across another ravine.

When it was found that they were again on the move, it was decided to intercept their retreat, which was accordingly done, and about eighty to ninety men were thus cut off, who ran back into the village they had quitted. After some parley these men surrendered, and they were ordered to come unarmed out of the village, which after a time they did, and the place was searched to find if any more of the enemy were concealed in it.

Only a few wounded men were found, who were left alone, and the remainder were about to be liberated, when it was discovered by Colonel Waterfield, the Political Officer of the column, that most of these men belonged to the Garbaz Waziri tribe. It was then decided to take them all back to camp for the orders of the General, which was accordingly done, and the General ordered them to be kept and placed under charge of the 21st Punjab Native Infantry. It was too late to examine any of them then, as it was just beginning to get dark, so they were all tied up for the night. As these men had come out of their way to attack us, the General resolved that they should be kept till their friends should pay for their release at the rate of fifty rupees per man, which would inflict a good fine on the tribe for their conduct, as they were quite unconnected with the inhabitants of the Khost country.

The defeat of the enemy was so thorough in every direction, that not a man turned on the small handful of troops who were thus carrying fire and sword into their villages.

The fact of these latter being deserted proved that the inhabitants of those that were destroyed fully felt that they had incurred the punishment that was to be carried out on them. The nearest villages to the west were not touched, as they had acted up to their engagement and warned the camp-followers not to proceed beyond their protection, and those that lay beyond them which had allowed the Mangals to pass the

night in them, though they might like the others have been destroyed, were spared, sufficient punishment having been inflicted on the offenders to allow some mercy to be shown.

The combination of tribes brought against the camp this day was estimated at about 6,000 men, of whom over 2,000, chiefly Mangals, fought on the north-west. The Jadrans and Garbaz Waziris fought on the south and east sides, together with those of the Khostiwals, who had leagued themselves with them. The chief fighting that occurred took place on the hill-side, where the Mangals had collected, and where they were well attacked and kept in hand by the 10th Hussars and 5th Punjab Cavalry, till the arrival of the 28th and the mountain guns completed their discomfiture. Their loss in killed and wounded in this affair was about 20, including the malik, whose standard had been nearly captured. The 5th Cavalry lost 1 killed and 3 wounded here, another man killed and 1 wounded in their charge in the bed of the river.

The 21st lost 1 man killed; thus our total loss was 3 killed and 4 wounded, while that of the enemy amounted to about 80 killed and wounded and 80 prisoners.

The several pursuing parties were brought back to camp before 5 o'clock, so as to have none out after dusk, but neither then nor during the night was there any attempt on the part of the enemy to resume hostilities; they had been taught a lesson on that day which lasted during the rest of the time the force remained in Khost. The Mangals once appeared in force again, but the recollection of the effect of artillery fire kept them from attack, on the day when Khost was evacuated.

The news of the threatened attack by another party of Mangals and Jajis on the position at the Peiwar Kotal reached the camp this day; but judging from our experience of them in Khost, there was no cause for alarm for the safety of the Peiwar.

January 8th.—The day passed without any occurrence of

note. There were no signs of any enemy in the neighbourhood, but the precaution of detailing extra pickets, with a strong inlying picket at night, was not relaxed.

The General ordered that the prisoners taken should be detained till the fines to be levied on them were paid up, and that they were to be supplied with food, and that twenty at a time should be freed, to cook and to take exercise.

In the evening, however, soon after dark, at 7 P.M., and before the moon had risen, the camp was alarmed by a shot from the south-east flank, followed by another, then the picket on the south-west flank fired several shots; and subsequently more firing took place where the first shots had been heard.

The troops fell in and took up the positions ordered in case of a night attack, and in less than five minutes after the first alarm, every one was at his post.

The star-light was sufficiently bright to show objects indistinctly at a little distance, but beyond about fifty yards nothing could be seen clearly. This led to imaginary enemies being seen, and some unnecessary firing at them was the result. This was not continuous, nor in any one spot, but when the effect of imagination had converted a black mark in the plain into an enemy advancing, it was difficult to check this fire. It soon was stopped, however, and in about a quarter of an hour the rising moon, showing objects more plainly, allowed the troops to return to their tents, and an inquiry to be made into the cause of the firing.

It appeared that there was an organised attempt to rescue the prisoners captured the previous day, who were under a strong guard of the 21st Punjab Native Infantry, commanded by a subadar, Makkan Singh. This guard was not far from the drainage watercourse on the south-east of the camp, with an outlying picket about 150 yards further in this direction.

One of the prisoners had managed to escape from the guard, but was shot, fired at by the picket near which he passed. The

result of this shot was that a shot was fired from the bank of the water-course in return, and on hearing this, the whole of the prisoners, who were secured by their hands being tied to ropes which were picketted down to tent-poles, rose as one man and began to try to free themselves, crying out "Now is the time to run." Those that succeeded in freeing their hands closed on the sentries, and endeavoured to wrest their rifles from them. One attempted to take his sword from the native officer, but was shot by one of the guard. The native officer of the guard called out in Pushtu that unless they sat down quietly again they would be fired into, but still their efforts continued, and the subadar gave the order to the guard to fire.

The effect of six men falling dead in their bonds, while thirteen more were wounded, induced the survivors to throw themselves flat down, and thus an attempt to escape was frustrated ; a result which would have been arrived at without any loss of life had the prisoners listened to the instructions of the native officer.

For a few minutes, till the alarm in the camp had subsided and the troops were dismissed, the mass of the prisoners lay on the ground ; but Major Collis on his return to the spot ordered the dead and wounded to be separated at once from the living, an operation in which the officers of the regiment assisted, and which took some little time to effect, as the ropes had got so entangled that it was not easy to see where to cut them. Some of the prisoners when thus liberated were very abusive and violent, and one man rushed at the sepoy who had just liberated him, and it required three men to secure him.

When all had been separated and examined, it was found that 1 prisoner had escaped ; 5 were mortally, 1 severely, and 7 slightly wounded ; 9 were killed, including the 3 who were shot when clear of the rest. One of these was fifteen yards and another five yards distant from the spot where the rest were tied ; the third was shot by the outlying picket ; 63 were untouched.

The wounded were attended to at once by Surgeon Griffiths,

21st P.N.I., and Surgeon Cotton, 72nd Highlanders, and the hospital assistant of the 21st Punjab Native Infantry, Chunder Ram. Those mortally wounded were attended to first, and anodynes given to deaden their pain; their wounds were chiefly bayonet ones. It took these officers till nearly 2 A.M. before they had finished their careful attention to their patients.

The prisoners who were untouched were ordered by the General to be separated in three parties and placed under separate guards, so as to diminish the chance of another outbreak. The guard of the 21st which was placed over the prisoners in the first instance was amply strong enough to deal with eighty-five unarmed and securely fastened men. There were ten sentries over the prisoners, and the rest of the guard were quite close, and available to suppress any disturbance.

The firing on the south-west flank of the camp, which occurred at the same time, arose from a party of horsemen riding along their front, just within sight, and not replying to the challenge.

This was a very unfortunate occurrence, as the leader of the party was a friendly malik, returning home with his followers after having been in our camp. He had been passed out on the south side, but had turned round to ride along the south-west point.

The malik was wounded in the shoulder.

The accident might or might not have occurred by the sentry on the south-west flank being excited by the firing on the opposite side, but otherwise both the firing at this point and at the 21st camp was fully warranted by the circumstances, though it was unfortunate that the two occurrences happened at one and the same time.

The firing which took place after was due to the excited imagination of the soldiers. The word was gradually passed round the camp that a party of horsemen had attempted to ride into the camp, and this band of imaginary enemies was often



seen when there was none in sight, but the firing was neither continuous nor hurried. The men were drawn up in open skirmishing order all round the camp, and a shot here and there along the front, as a man imagined that he saw something moving, served to keep up the excitement for a few minutes.

To make certain that there were no men still in the vicinity of the camp, the cavalry, who were all ready to turn out almost immediately the alarm had sounded, were ordered to scour the country round, after the infantry had been dismissed to their tents. No enemy of any kind was, however, found within a radius of three-quarters of a mile, and with the exception of the officers and men attending on the wounded prisoners, there was nothing to be done but to turn in.

January 9th.—The inhabitants of the nearest villages which were partly burnt on the 7th, not having returned to their homes, and showing no disposition to do so, the General ordered out two foraging parties, at 1 A.M., to proceed to the nearest villages on the east and south of the camp, to take possession of the grain which was still left in them, and which had not been burnt.

Captain Colquhoun, R.A., with two companies 21st under Captain Dyer, and twenty sowars 5th Punjab Cavalry under Lieutenant Pycroft, was sent to the eastern villages; while Major Hill, 28th Punjab Native Infantry, and two companies of his regiment with some cavalry, were sent in the southern direction.

The orders were for both parties to be back in camp by 4 30 P.M.

The two villages to the east furnished 106 camel loads and 166 mule loads of grain, or, roughly, about 700 maunds of unhusked rice. Without pulling down any of the houses for their timber, about ten loads of firewood was brought back into camp besides, and had more carriage been available, about eighty more camel-loads of grain could have been taken.

Comparatively little damage had been done by the fire which

had been lit in these villages. Except bhoosa (chopped straw) and some small straw stacks outside the villages, there was not much inflammable material in these places. The roofs are protected by mud, and it requires a very big fire inside the houses to make them burn. Grain, when stored in rooms of this kind, will only smoulder, but the heap will not burn readily.

These villages were not altogether walled in, but only partially so. Each house was, however, built in its own court-yard, with a door leading into the winding lane that traversed the place: but on the outskirts only a low wall about five feet high barred access from the country into these enclosures.

This morning, on the low ranges of hills to the north, where the road from Yakubi comes into the plain, a large collection of men were seen perched on the sides of the hill, and down as far as the plain itself.

They appeared to be armed, but their hesitation in coming down into the valley showed that they were in no hurry to attack, and they were left alone till their intentions were discovered. It appeared that the news of the defeat and dispersion of the Mangals and other tribes had, by the time it reached Yakubi, been transformed into a glorious victory for the followers of the Prophet, and it was said that our camp was being plundered, after the total annihilation of the whole force.

This exciting news stirred up the war party of Yakubi to action, and after some delay, in which the fate of our post of sowars was being settled, they started off to join in the plunder. Great was their astonishment, on arriving at the end of the pass overlooking the plain, to find our tents standing and the camp perfectly quiet. Naturally they stopped to consider. They had not come to fight, but merely to plunder, and their calculations were quite upset by the sight before them. Gradually they disappeared home, where on their return they considered it a prudent act to liberate the sowars whom they had made prisoners before starting.

The maliks of Yakubi had undertaken the protection of this cavalry post, and, as the sowars left there were all Mahommedans, it was thought that there was no chance of their being disturbed in any way.

The post, which was placed there for carrying the mail towards and from Hazir Pir, consisted of eight men. When the collection of armed men about the village showed that the inhabitants meant mischief, the sowars shut themselves up in a small "gurki" or tower, and prepared to make a fight of it. The maliks came up, however, with the Koran on their heads in assurance that no harm was intended them, and thus thrown off their guard they consented to open the door to allow an old woman to bring them food. As soon as the door was opened a band of at least 500 men, who had been concealed near, rushed in and overpowered them, and before any resistance could be attempted, the sowars were stripped of their arms and accoutrements. Even the clothes on them were taken off, and thus, naked and unarmed, they were exposed to the jeers of the people. Their horses, of course, were taken as well. One of the grass-cutters belonging to the sowars was badly wounded, but none of the sowars themselves were touched.

When the maliks found out the real state of affairs, and that instead of having acted up to their promises and oaths, they had treacherously broken them, and allowed the men committed to their care to be ill-treated, as far as one Mahommedan can ill-treat another short of killing him, they became rather alarmêd. Vengeance had fallen on the villages nearest the camp for misconduct, and their consciences told them that their behaviour would doubtless be soon followed up by punishment of some kind. They tried to rectify their fault, and collecting all the property of the sowars, horses, arms, accoutrements, and clothes, they made them over to their lawful owners.

The sowars, however, turned the tables on them when they got back their arms, and loading their carbines, they threatened

to shoot the maliks, then and there, unless they accompanied them straight to camp, which thus they were obliged to do, the villagers, who had previously been excited, and urged by them to make common cause against the English, not daring now to lift a finger in their defence.

With the two maliks, who were then brought into camp, came a third. This man had done his best to induce the others to act up to their obligations, and had assisted and protected the post as far as lay in his power.

A careful investigation was made into the circumstances of the case by Mr. Archibald Christie, C.S., Assistant Political Officer, who had been ordered to do so by Colonel Waterfield, and the evidence obtained against the two maliks, was sufficient to authorize their being dealt with in a summary way, but as no lives had been lost, the extreme penalty of the law was not resorted to.

It took several days to obtain and record all the necessary evidence, during which time these maliks were kept with the other prisoners in the camp.

January 10th.—The Fort of Matun had as yet been unoccupied, but as there was a building in it which contained two good rooms, it was decided to utilise the place as a hospital. Captain Colquhoun, R.A., was ordered to go to the fort, and take over any ammunition and material that belonged to the Afghans. There was not much of this, however. About 600 lbs. of coarse gunpowder, some bullets, flints, and lead, with a miscellaneous stock of iron, wrought into horse-shoes, ladles, and vessels of different sizes, were all that was obtained. The horse-shoes were made over to the 5th Punjab Cavalry, as they could be utilised by them, being adapted for small horses; they were of the ordinary Afghan pattern, covering nearly the whole of the foot with an iron plate, with the exception of the frog.

The iron was of particularly good quality, soft, and of good fibre. It appeared that all this iron-work formed part of the

taxes levied by the Afghans from the country. There is no iron of any kind to be obtained in Khost, but the whole of this was imported from the Waziri country by one of the tribes bordering the valley, the Thunnies, who in lieu of paying their taxes in grain, like the rest of the inhabitants of the country, had to supply it in iron.

The tax in grain did not appear to be brought into Matun, except as required, as it was all left stored in the villages, from whence, under the information supplied by the Governor, Akram Khan, it was subsequently collected and stored in the fort when the occupation of the country was decided on.

Three out of the four red silk triangular flags with green edges, which had adorned the ends of the lines of the Afghan militia, which had welcomed the General, were also made over at this time; the fourth flag had been carried off by the levies, who had been disbanded at once on our arrival.

At this time there were only about a dozen of the matchlockmen in the fort, and these with the Governor and officials, got notice to vacate, as the fort was now to be occupied by us.

The Governor was accommodated in a tent in the camp with his attendants, where they stayed till he was sent to Kohat. As soon as the fort was vacated by its late occupants, a company of the 21st Punjab Native Infantry, under Subadar Makkan Singh, was moved in.

Its condition was so filthy, that no accommodation could be found for the sepoy, and consequently tents had to be pitched for them at first. The task of clearing and cleaning the place was at once taken in hand, labour being obtained from the neighbouring villages; but many mule and bullock loads of litter and filth were removed to the outside of the fort, and burnt there, before the place became at all habitable. Then the holes and excavations had to be filled up, and even by the time the fort was evacuated, there was still a good deal to be done in this direction.

January 11th.—The General decided on making a reconnaissance towards the west end of the valley, and an order was issued for the troops who were to take part in this, as well as those remaining behind at Matun, to indent for rations up to and for the 16th; extra carriage, which was now available, as the supplies brought into Khost had diminished, was also to be indented for.

The field treasure-chest in Khost was under charge of one of the Commissariat officers, Lieutenant G. Eliot, and the General sanctioned an advance of 2000 rupees from it, for the collection of supplies by purchase for the troops who were to remain, according to the arrangements which were at first decided on, in the Khost valley, after the withdrawal of the force.

January 12th.—All the sick men, Europeans and natives, were moved into the fort this day, and accommodated in tents, and in the building already mentioned, which had by this time been made somewhat habitable. All the prisoners who were still to be liberated on payment of fifty rupees per man (some having already been allowed to go, after the amounts had been paid in for them) were also removed to the fort.

Major Collis, 21st Punjab Native Infantry, was placed in charge as Commandant, and Mr. Archibald Christie, C.S., was to be left with him as Political Officer.

The garrison of the place was, during the absence of the rest of the force, to be the 21st Punjab Native Infantry, and a troop of the 5th Punjab Cavalry, under Captain Vousden.

Lieutenant Eliot, Sub-Assistant Commissary-General, was left as Commissariat Officer, to arrange for the collection of supplies.

January 13th.—The camp was struck at 8 A.M. and the force detailed marched to Dehgan, a village six miles to the west, in the following order:—

Squadron 10th Hussars.

Wing 28th Punjab Native Infantry.

No. 1 Mountain Battery.

Baggage, with one troop 5th Punjab Cavalry on each flank.

No. 2 Mountain Battery.

Left wing 72nd Highlanders.

Wing 28th Punjab Native Infantry.

Troop 5th Punjab Cavalry.

The road passed to the south of the fort, and soon crossed the stony bed of the Matun river, which ran close on the west, about a quarter of a mile from the fort. The river-bed is about a quarter of a mile wide here, the banks being about eight to ten feet above its level. On the further side the road or track continues due west for two miles, crossing a terraced cultivated country. The terraces were low, not more than six inches high, and as this was the winter season, the fields and the track were, except where irrigation watercourses crossed the road, perfectly dry. Two low detached hills marked the turn of the road, which now skirted their flank, leading north-west for two miles further, through similar open country. A rather deep irrigation water-course crossed the road at this point, but the path presented no difficulties to the baggage, as the banks had been worn down. On either side of this crossing-place it was impassable for laden animals and difficult for cavalry, the banks being steep and the ditch about 10 to 12 feet wide.

A village was situated about a mile from the road to the east and at the point where it turned due west again, about half a mile beyond the ditch. Another collection of houses nearer the road showed where the owners of the cultivation lived. Soon after this the path crossed a broad nullah, which comes down from the mountains bordering the valley to the north; the foot of which was here about two to three miles distant. On reaching this nullah a halt was made; such a large number of people appeared in the neighbourhood of the village of Dehgan, at which we were to camp, that it became necessary to find out their intentions previous to advancing.

Mahomed Hyat Khan, C.S.I., Assistant Political Officer, was accordingly despatched to ascertain the meaning of this unusual crowd; for though the inhabitants of most villages generally turned out to see us, yet the number on this occasion was beyond precedent. He soon returned with the information that the gathering was merely a peaceable one of villagers, who had come, partly on their own account, and partly to sell their supplies of fowls, eggs, and milk, to the camp.

The prices here ranged the same as in Matun. Fowls, four annas each; eggs, four for an anna; sheep four to five shillings each. Grass and firewood were expensive, as both were scarce, having to be brought from the hills at some distance.

The ex-Governor of Khost accompanied the reconnaissance.

The camp was pitched on an open, triangular plain, to the south-east of the village of Dehgan. The river Shamil ran about half a mile to the south, while a watercourse, running south-east on the north side of the camp, fell into the nullah that had been crossed just before coming to the spot. A broad irrigation watercourse ran on three sides of the camp, about 200 yards distant, and below this and towards the river, whose course was due east nearly, there were dry terraced fields. To the south, on the further side of the river, the valley opened out into a broad semi-circular plain, with a slight rise towards the hills which enclosed it. Due west, beyond Dehgan, there was a large cluster of villages and cultivation, while to the north the country seemed open and uncultivated to the foot of the hills, about five miles off.

January 14th.—Halted at Dehgan. The General and staff, escorted by a troop of the 10th Hussars and one of the 5th Punjab Cavalry, rode to a village, Durgui, belonging to the Thunnies, at the southern end of the valley. There was no road, but the plain being open and uncultivated to within a mile of the village, offered no hindrance. There were only one or two slight watercourses met with on the way. The plain was as



usual covered with stones, but they were of small size, and did not prevent a growth of small plants and grass, which, though dried and withered at this time of the year, must make the country look green and pleasant in the spring.

The climate was now perfect, the days warm and bright, and the nights, though somewhat cold, were warmer than at Kurram, from the absence of the bitter wind.

The Thunnies are a small clan occupying some six or seven villages at this end of the valley; but there is another section of the tribe who occupy the mountain ranges between the Waziri country and the Khost valley.

The General rode into the centre of the first village, and halting at an open spot, was received by the male population generally.

One of the headmen bore a scar across the face, showing he had been wounded in some border fight.

Addressing the headmen, the General, speaking in English, which was translated sentence by sentence by Mahomed Hyat Khan, warned them that they had nothing to fear as long as they behaved well and committed no overt act against us; at the same time that he held them responsible for the actions of their brethren in the hills, as these could not descend into the plain without their knowledge.

The chiefs presented the General with a sheep, to show that they were not ill-disposed towards the British rule; and after some further conversation the General rode through the village with the staff and a small party, and passing round it, was joined by the cavalry escort, which had remained halted at the edge of the terraced cultivation of the village.

The next village to be visited was one towards the west end of the valley, about four miles from Dehgan. A track led across the open plain between the two villages, running in a north-western direction. Keeping on this, the village was reached about 1 P.M., after crossing a broad and deep nullah, with steep

banks of clay worn into ravines and miniature mountains, and another halt was made here while the General addressed the headmen to the same effect as before; and then riding on through cultivated land, by watercourses over which there were shaky bridges, and through walled paths, a third village was reached, where, after talking to the headmen, who presented the usual sheep, a halt for an hour was made to feed the horses. From this point to the camp, with the exception of crossing one river-bed, the road lay through a succession of villages set in the midst of thin fields, which were irrigated by watercourses, on the banks of which the track generally was taken; but at this time of the year the dry fields formed a pleasanter riding-road, diversified with jumps across the ditches of varying size and depth. The villages were surrounded by orchards, and willows grew all along the streams. There were a few "chunar" trees, but not so many as near Matun.

On reaching camp about 4 P.M., after a pleasant ride through, to all appearance, a peaceful country, it was provoking to be greeted with the news that the Mangals were coming to disturb our rest. It was reported that 2,000 of them had sworn an oath on the Koran to attack the camp. Suitable arrangements to receive them were made, shelter trenches being thrown up in front of the pickets, but, as usual, the Mangals thought better of it, and we were left alone.

Captain Woodthorpe, R.E., had gone out to the range to the north-west of camp, escorted by two companies of the 28th, in the very direction that the Mangals would have come down, but he was not interfered with in any way in his surveying operations.

January 15th.—The Mangals not having attacked in the night, the camp was struck at 7 A.M., and march ordered at 9 A.M., returning to Matun in the same order as on coming to this place. There had been a little difficulty at some of the small irrigation surface watercourses mentioned, which

were just too wide for the baggage mules to step across. To remedy this, the mules belonging to the two mountain batteries, which carried entrenching tools, were ordered to proceed with the Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General and the advance-guard, so as to rectify any small difficulties which might cause some delay to the baggage convoy. Matun was reached at 12 o'clock, and the camp, which was now pitched nearer the fort, was protected on its north side by the watercourse that had guarded the south. It was arranged in the same way as before, the regiments facing outwards, and was made a little more compact than it had previously been.

January 15th.—An inspection of all the baggage animals in the column took place. All the mules in private employ, as well as those in use with regiments, were paraded and examined by the transport officer, Lieutenant G. Money.

The supply of fifteen days' provisions brought with the column had nearly run out; some supplies had, indeed, been purchased, and the store of grain belonging to the Afghan Government was being brought in daily to the fort, where it was kept for the use of the garrison that would be left in the valley. This was originally to consist of the 21st Punjab Native Infantry, two guns of No. 1 Mountain Battery, and a troop of the 5th Punjab Cavalry. The arrangements regarding the disposal of the troops and the occupation of the valley had not, however, been concluded, and till they were, the departure of the column had to be postponed. This involved another convoy being sent out, and orders had been sent to Hazir Pir for fifteen days' supply, which should reach camp before the 18th.

January 16th.—There was no forage to speak of for the camels in the bare open plain of Matun, and but little on the hills where they could go and feed, so the General decided to send back some 400 of them, whose loads had now been eaten, to Hazir Pir.

There were no troops available in the force to escort a large

convoy like this, so arrangements were made with the Turis of the Kurram valley to send over an armed party of men, or "badragga," to take the camels back. This was accordingly done, and the Turi escort, marching by the eastern road out of Khost, met with no difficulty.

January 17th.—A general court-martial was ordered to assemble for the trial of the two maliks of the village of Yakubi, who incited the population at that place to attack and plunder the post of sowars of the 5th Punjab Cavalry, as already stated. Colonel Gough, C.B., V.C., was president, and all the senior officers of the force were members.

The offence of these men was a purely military one, against the military law established by our presence; and in the absence of any civil government, could only be tried by a military court or commission. They were sentenced to seven years' transportation.

January 18th.—The ration of atta (flour) for the troops daily was 1 seer (2 lbs.) for every fighting-man, and  $\frac{3}{4}$  seer, or  $1\frac{1}{2}$  lbs. for every follower. It was found, however, that this amount was in reality in excess of the requirements. Nearly every native had his own store of flour, which he either hoarded or sold, the accumulation of the unexpended portion of his ration. By collecting it, the weight of baggage to be carried by the regimental mules became increased, without a corresponding increase in the number of animals, who were thus apt to be overloaded.

The General decided on putting a stop to this system, and ordered the ration of atta to be reduced to three-quarters of a seer per man, till the troops should advance in the spring. Compensation was, however, to be paid to the soldiers, and others entitled to it, for the difference in the amount of ration.

January 18th.—The convoy from Hazir Pir, escorted by the 23rd Pioneers and a party of the 5th Goorkhas under Captain Cook, reached camp this day. A draft of recruits for the 72nd Highlanders, with several young officers, also came in with the

convoy. All the banghy parcels which had been collecting at Hazir Pir arrived at the same time, and many creature-comforts were the result of this long-wished-for supply.

January 19th.—The detachment of Goorkhas under Captain Cook marched this morning, escorting the remainder of the camels whose loads had been disposed of.

To carry on the survey operations it was necessary that the highest mountain in the southern range should be ascended. This mountain, as well as the surrounding country, lay in the Waziri territory; and it was deemed best to obtain the permission of the owners to enter their country in a peaceful manner.

To effect this, the chief of this section of the Waziris, the Atakheyls, was invited into camp to settle the arrangements which were to be made; and during the day he rode in, accompanied by some of his men.

The Waziris are one of the finest races, physically, that are on the borders, and this chief, who stood about 6 feet 6 inches high without his turban, was a particularly good specimen of his tribe. With his large blue turban on, he towered as a giant, his loose blue coat and wide baggy trousers adding to the breadth of his figure.

His hair, which, like that of the southern frontier tribes, was worn long, hung down in black curls below his beard. The face was in keeping with the rest of his appearance as a professional bandit, the eyes being small and cruel, the rest of the face puffy and bloated. He rode a particularly well shaped and strong Waziri horse, which, however, looked small beneath him. None of his followers were as well dressed or mounted as himself, but with their long lances and active thin horses, they formed a suitable escort to their chief.

This chief, Keeput by name, was quite agreeable to the visit of the survey party, and only made the stipulation that they were not to go beyond his territory, where he would be powerless to protect them.

January 19th.—The survey party, Captain Woodthorpe, R.E., Lieutenant Manners Smith, 3rd Sikhs, Captain Wynne, superintendent of army signalling with the force, and Lieutenant Spratt, R.E., assistant engineer, left at 8 A.M., accompanied by Keeput and his followers, and an escort of the 28th Punjab Native Infantry. Captain Wynne went with the party with a view to signalling how they were getting on, and also to open communications with Bannu. He had previously arranged for a telegram to be sent to that station to be on the look-out for his signal, but his message was delayed and had not reached Bannu when his flash was observed. In the afternoon he heliographed that they had got on very well during the day, and had reached a ridge about half-way up the hill, near which they were to pass the night.

January 20th.—The cavalry were paraded for the General's inspection this morning, under Colonel Gough, and the ground being well adapted for their movements, the review was a very satisfactory one.

This afternoon was devoted to soldiers' games on the plain about half a mile from the camp. Several races, horse and foot, with the usual "tug of war," wrestling, and single-stick, completed the programme.

The Government telegram to the General reported that large stocks of ammunition and supplies had been taken by the troops who had captured Candahar, and that one of the influential chiefs on the Khyber side had come into Sir Samuel Brown's camp, which pieces of favourable intelligence were followed by the news that the Waziris were threatening the Derajat.

A royal salute was ordered by the General to be fired in honour of the capture of Candahar.

January 21st.—The 23rd Pioneers left the camp this morning to return to Hazir Pir by the eastern road out of the valley, which the regiment was to improve and make where necessary.

This route was nearly unknown, except that the Turis had

taken the convoy of camels by it, and the second detachment of unladen camels had followed them. With this convoy, Colonel Perkins, commanding Royal Engineers, had gone to inspect the road, and had not found it difficult in any way.

Major B. Williams, commanding 5th Punjab Cavalry, proceeded with the 23rd Pioneers on his return to India on remount duty.

The signals from the mountain, Lazam Peak, in the south were eagerly looked for, and at last the welcome flash showed that the party had gained the wished-for point; and during the rest of the day a heliographic conversation was kept up with the signallers, who soon opened a communication with Bannu.

It was purely accidental that the flash from this peak was observed at that station, and that there was an officer capable of reading and replying to the signals. Colonel Noel Money, commanding 3rd Sikhs, was the only officer instructed in army-signalling at the place, and he soon put himself in communication with the party. Colonel Godby, who commanded the Punjab Frontier Force, happened to be at Bannu at that time, and he sent a message to the General that the Mahsud Wazirjs had raided and burnt Tank.

The camp in Khost was thus by means of an intermediate station able to communicate directly with India, the distance between the two places being over fifty miles, the distance of the flash visible to the naked eye being twenty miles in a direct line from Lazam peak to Khost, and thirty miles or more to Bannu. A telegram was sent by the General to the Viceroy in Calcutta, by means of this signal party, and the message reached him in two hours.

The nights began to get colder, the thermometer falling to 17°; the cold and indifferent water-supply rather affected the health of the troops, and some intermittent fever, pneumonia, and dysentery began to show itself. The pneumonia was

excessively fatal, and nearly every native regiment lost some men from this cause.

Captain Arthur Conolly, B.S.C., Meywar Bheel Corps, had been appointed to the Transport Department of the force, and had joined on the 19th January in Khost. This officer was now selected to command and raise a body of Khost levies, 200 horsemen and 200 footmen, who were to replace the garrison which had been at first detailed to occupy the Khost valley. There was not a great rush of the inhabitants to take up this duty; the temper of the Mangals, which had already been shown, had not improved by their defeat on the 7th, and the local militia service which it would have been easy to raise if the people knew that there was a British force to fall back on, was, owing to the fear of the Mangals, at a discount.

By degrees, however, the necessary numbers were nearly collected, and though not many of the Khostiwals would take service, the ranks were filled by Turis, who had not the fear of the Mangals before their eyes.

January 22nd.—The General and staff, escorted by a detachment of the 10th Hussars, rode toward the east end of the valley to a collection of villages known as Lakkan Bazar.

These villages were the largest and most populous of any yet seen in Khost, and the whole traffic of the valley is centred in them. All the grain which had as yet been purchased, had come from this part of the country.

The headmen of the villages were interviewed, and the usual instructions given them by the General, who returned to camp at 4 P.M., after having ridden over twenty miles.

The survey party continued their work on the Lazam peak and its vicinity, and more signalling was carried on with Bannu.

Captain Badcock, Principal Commissariat Officer, who had proceeded with Major Palmer, Superintendent of Transport, to Thull, when the column marched into Khost, rejoined the head-quarters to-day, and with them came Shahzada Sultan Jan,



an extra Assistant-Commissioner, who had been employed at Kohat in the Punjab Commission. This native nobleman was of Afghan descent, belonging to the ex-royal family of Cabul; but he, as well as they, preferred absenting themselves from their native country to serving at the risk of their lives under the opposite faction. Of quiet manners and distinguished appearance, no better possible selection could have been made by the Government to carry on the temporary charge of Khost till the conclusion of the war should show in whose hands it was to be left.

January 23rd.—The General received information early this morning that a large number of Mangals were collecting about twelve miles off, for the purpose of attacking the camp at night. In case the threat should have more reality in it than the previous ones, the General decided upon throwing up an intrenchment round the camp, which should have the effect of breaking the force of any sudden attempt to charge into our midst. In the absence of Colonel Perkins, C.R.E., and Lieutenant Spratt, R.E., Captain Colquhoun, R.A., was ordered to make this intrenchment all round the camp at about 100 yards distance, the work to be completed before dusk.

There was a scarcity of intrenching tools. The 28th Punjab Native Infantry had its full complement, but the 21st Punjab Native Infantry was deficient, owing to its supply having miscarried; the 72nd had their complement, and the two mountain batteries had a small amount of tools. There were no baskets, or means of carrying the earth from the excavation to any distance. In all there were about 140 pickaxes, 90 shovels, and 50 mammooties; the estimated perimeter of the line to be protected was about 700 yards. It was impossible with the means at hand to execute such a length of intrenchment in the given time. The tools were divided between the 21st and 28th, and the general trace of the work was marked out all round the camp, in accordance with the instructions received. The fort

and the walled garden formed the southern line of defence ; the drainage watercourse, which ran due east and west at this point, was impassable, except at two places on the left front, the banks being vertical and twenty feet high ; but, the ground sloping to the east, the banks were of no depth and of easy slope opposite the right front of the camp ; so the line of intrenchment was drawn from the deep bank of the nullah to a picket-shelter trench already existing, about 100 yards beyond the camp ; this front was about 300 yards, and the task of completing it was assigned to the 28th Punjab Native Infantry, who had fifty picks and fifty shovels to do it with. The 72nd worked from the north-east angle along the southern face for 120 yards, and then the 21st Punjab Native Infantry had about 300 yards to complete the eastern front. No. 2 Mountain Battery was set to work to join the east front to the garden wall, and No. 1 Mountain Battery to continue the defence from near the fort on the south-west side of camp towards the west, about fifty yards

Thus the whole of the available tools were distributed along the intrenchment, which it was thought advisable to throw up on the most open side of the camp, where there was but little to hinder a large force collecting in the dark quietly, and swooping down with a rush.

The west side was equally open, but the ground was not so convenient, being terraced, with a drop of a foot and more between the fields, which would prevent any quick movement in the dark. It was, however, necessary to fill up the gap on the western face of the camp before dark, and there was no means of doing so except by utilising the camel-saddles belonging to the force. There were about 1,200 camels in camp, and their saddles, placed three high, would form a temporary breastwork of 400 yards long, which would just fill the gap.

This arrangement was accordingly carried out, and all the camels' saddles were brought by the camel-men and placed one above the other, and then picketted down by ropes and tent-pins

to prevent their being thrown over. Before dark the wall was complete, the passages over the deep part of the nullah barricaded, as also the road past the fort, and an earthen bank three feet six inches high and three feet six inches wide thrown up, with a ditch four feet wide and two feet deep, finished the line of defence within the time ordered.

To have attempted more would have caused gaps in the line, and the parapet though weak was sufficient for the purpose for which it was put up, namely, to break and hinder any organized attempt to rush into the camp at night.

By bringing the line of defence in closer, the perimeter would have been much less, and a better profile could have been designed; but the object of throwing it 100 yards from the camp, was to prevent anyone from taking up a position so near the tents that they could be fired into at 100 yards distance from the parapet. Very few matchlocks would carry sufficiently well to reach the occupants of the camp at this distance.

The cavalry, under Colonel Gough, were despatched on a reconnaissance towards the direction in which the Mangals were reported to be collecting, and riding for six miles beyond the village of Dehgan, failed to discover any large number of the enemy; but the hostile attitude of some of the occupants of the villages skirting the north range of this end of the valley, showed that they were hidden there. No shots were fired, but some of the inhabitants danced war-dances, and brandished their knives at the cavalry as it passed.

The survey party came back to camp in the afternoon, having completed the survey of the Khost ranges, and connected their work with the triangulation of the trigonometrical survey of India. The Waziri chief had acted well towards them, and brought them back without any adventure. The place where they stayed for the night consisted of two houses only, and these belonged to the chief; the rest of the population did not require any shelter.

While all these arrangements were being made for the reception of the hostile Mangals, a party of this tribe who had settled in the Kurram valley came to see the General, and to obtain some of the rupees and turbans that were distributed to those who showed themselves friendly to the British rule. The leader of this Jirga was dressed in a dark green frock-coat, made after the Afghan cut, of good broad cloth, with very full skirts, plaited at the waist. He was the only well dressed individual of the clan, the remainder appearing in the usual unwashed and dirty blue cotton clothes. These Mangals came from the Keraiah end of the Kurram valley.

An express message was sent after Colonel Currie to recall the 28rd Pioneers to the camp, which, though intrenched, would require a larger number of men to garrison it, in the case of a determined and continued attack, than the column could afford.

In order to show the Mangals, or other enemies, how we were prepared to deal with them if they should attack in the dark, a few star shell were fired after 8 o'clock to try the effect. No one in the force had had any practical experience in their use, or could say what amount of light they would throw.

The result was very good, though the stars did not all ignite. Out of thirteen not more than nine were lit; but the light from these as they descended to the ground was sufficient to illuminate a strip of ground about 800 yards wide by 400 broad, at a distance varying from 400 to 600 yards off, and if there had been any collection of men in that neighbourhood they must have been visible. The 7-pounder guns were fixed at an elevation of  $35^{\circ}$ , with twelve-tenths of fuze.

January 24th.—The night passed off quietly; the Mangals, hearing of the intrenchment, and possibly seeing the stars of the star-shells burning high in the air, thought better of making an attack, and information was brought in that they were dispersing.

The task of completing the defences, and of making them stronger, was, however, continued by Lieutenant Spratt, R.E.,

who improved the trace of the western front, replacing the breastwork of camel-saddles by an earthen parapet.

The ditches on the other fronts were also taken in hand and deepened, the parapets being thickened in proportion.

A royal salute of twenty-one guns was fired in camp this day in honour of the fall of Candahar.

As there was no immediate necessity for the 23rd Pioneers to rejoin the camp, their march was countermanded, and they remained at Hazir Pir, which place they had reached before the recall was sent.

January 25th (thermometer minimum 30°).—Morning slightly cloudy, but it cleared by 9 A.M. Lieutenant Spratt, R.E., continued the defences, making a new bastion at the south-east corner; trous-de-loup near the exits in front of the bastions; a fougasse and abbattis in front of the south-east bastion; and filling the ditches with water from the irrigation surface canal that supplied the fort. These arrangements completed the defence of the camp.

The headmen of the Khost valley, with the village councils, were ordered to assemble this day to be addressed by the General; and at the same time invitations had been sent to all the Mangals, Jadrans, and Makhbals, who chose to do so, to come in and pay us a visit.

All the morning parties were seen crossing the valley and collecting in the village to the north-west of camp. At 3 o'clock in the afternoon they were sent for.

The durbar tent was pitched, and the visitors from the Khost valley were made to sit down on three sides of a square, in front of the tent.

The Mangals, Makhbals, and other tribesmen were not admitted to this interview with the Khostiwal, but were made to sit down in rows some distance off. All these arrangements were made by Mahomed Hyat Khan, who was resplendent in his political uniform, much embroidered with gold. He must have

formed a striking object to the savages who beheld him, if not with awe, at least with envy. To the more educated minds among them the sight of a native official under the British Government, who, judging by his clothes, had arrived at a position of so much honour and wealth, must have been a lesson that was worth much.

The General entered the durbar tent at 4 P.M., and addressed the Khostiwal in a speech which was translated by Mahomed Hyat Khan sentence by sentence as spoken. He told them that they had been called together to hear the arrangements which were to be made on the departure of the British troops from the Khost valley. He reminded them that the present quarrel had only been with Shere Ali, who had been so ill-advised as to throw himself into the hands of the Russians, by whom he had been buoyed up with hopes of men, arms, and money, but that Russia, with an empty treasury after the Turkish war, was not in a position to help anyone. Unless Shere Ali agreed to the British terms he could not return to Cabul, and if Yakub Khan persisted in fighting, he would have to follow his father.

After alluding to the defeat everywhere of the Afghan troops, he said that it had been intended at first to have a British garrison in Khost, but that it was now arranged to leave the Shahzada Sultan Jan, a man of good family, to govern Khost temporarily, till it were settled what arrangements should be made; but whatever these might be, as long as the British rule existed they would be certain of protection, and their interests would be looked after, and everything would be done to make their country prosperous, which, owing to its fertility, only required peace and security to develop its resources. It would depend on the people themselves; if they would combine in a common cause, and, by supporting the Shahzada, guard their own country from the invasions of the neighbouring hill-tribes, they should be able to do so without the assistance of British

troops, though those at Hazir Pir would always be within reach to quell disturbances, if necessary.

After the conclusion of the speech, Colonel Waterfield, the Political Officer, entered into a conversation with the headmen, and bestowed rewards of money and clothes on those who had deserved some recognition of their services. The General went on to the group of hillmen, and addressing them in a good-humoured way, through Mahomed Hyat Khan, told them that if they wanted to fight, we were always ready for them, and that he advised them not to try. However, we did not want to hurt them in any way if they would only keep the peace.

He ordered twenty sheep to be killed and divided among the representatives of the various tribes, so that they should have a dinner before returning home, and a few rupees were also distributed to pay for their expenses.

The specimens of the tribes who were thus feasted hardly differed in appearance from the ordinary Pathan, or hillman, on the frontier. They were dressed and armed in the same way, their clothes dirty and in rags, and their fine-drawn condition marked a difference between them and the Khostiwals and other dwellers in the open valley.\* Their unkempt and savage appearance was heightened by the wild look in their eyes, which was comparable to nothing but the restless glance of a wild animal, who is always on the watch for prey or enemies.

Some of these gentry were induced to sell their arms, but the wily Mangal took care not to part with any weapon that he valued, and only the worst arms, either matchlocks or knives, were transferred for hard cash, and these, except as curiosities, were not worth the money paid for them.

The band of the 21st Punjab Native Infantry was ordered to play, to see if music would have any effect on their savage minds, but they did not appear to care much for this kind of entertainment, and gradually walked away to the outlying

villages, those that remained behind being turned out of camp at dusk, in case any had been disposed to do mischief.

January 26th (temperature minimum 24°).—The time had now come to leave Khoist: the Shahzada having been installed as Governor after yesterday's durbar, the column could retire.

All the powder in the fort was made over to Sultan Jan, who also took down, with the assistance of his deputy, a ressalidar of the 5th Punjab Cavalry, and a man of known and proved merit, a list of such of the provisions which had been accumulated for the garrison, that had been allowed to remain for his benefit, and there only remained the transfer of the native levies. These men, however, finding that they were to be left by themselves, began to lose their courage, or saw their opportunity for demanding higher pay to meet the increased risk they ran, and virtually struck till the problem was solved, which took all day to do, as it was not settled till dark.

The orders for the march in the morning were published, and another order, which directed that whenever the pickets were ordered to throw up breastworks for their protection, camel saddles were to be made use of.

The camp-followers discovered a grievance which, if it could have been seen from their point of view, was a serious one. The Commissariat Department, to utilise the Indian corn that had been taken as belonging to the Afghan Government, issued it when ground into flour to the camp-followers. There was nothing against it as flour, but it was not wheat; so the recipients objected and grumbled, without any result, as they had to take it.

To utilise the stock of unhusked rice that was obtained here, it was issued to all the baggage animals for whom rations were demanded; each animal got a seer (two pounds) daily, and thus the barley rations which were carried for the cavalry horses were economised.



News of Sirdar Wali Mahomed reached the General to-day. He had made his escape from Cabul, and by liberal payments to the Logarries and the Ghilzais had, with the assistance of the latter, crossed the Shutargardan in the snow, a task of no little difficulty, and had reached Rokian, six miles from Alikheyl, from whence he had written to the General, as also to Captain Rennick, the Political Officer at Alikheyl. Instructions were sent at once to this officer to receive the Sirdar in a suitable manner, and to escort him to Hazir Pir to meet the General.

Sirdar Wali Mahomed is a half-brother of the late Amir Shere Ali, being a son of Dost Mahomed, by a woman of the Turi tribe from the Shaluzan village in the Kurram valley. The fact of his coming over was an important political event, as it showed the presence of a party opposed to war, and led by one of the highest of the Afghan chiefs.

January 27th (temperature minimum 22°).—The march was ordered to Sabbri, distance twelve miles.

Advance party :

One troop 10th Hussars.

One squadron 5th Punjab Cavalry.

One wing 28th Punjab Native Infantry.

No. 2 Mountain Battery.

Baggage flanked by one troop 5th Punjab Cavalry on either flank, and escorted by wing 28th Punjab Native Infantry.

Main body :

21st Punjab Native Infantry.

Wing 72nd Highlanders.

No. 1 Mountain Battery.

One squadron 5th Punjab Cavalry.

One troop 10th Hussars.

The baggage filed out of camp at 8.30 A.M. There was some delay in getting it out of the intrenchment, and then across the nullah in front of the camp, though three crossing-places had

been partly prepared, but the tread of many feet soon made the bed of the stream in a slippery, muddy condition, and difficult to cross. A little brushwood would have been invaluable in a case like this, but there was none to be had.

The road lay across dry cultivated land, passing to the north of the villages burnt in this direction on the 7th, and gradually crossing the plain, it reached the skirt of the range rising up out of the valley.

The force halted at about four miles from Matun, close to the village of Madhi Kheyl. Near this village were three detached hills, up to which point the enemy had been driven on the 7th. The centre hill appeared to have been fortified at some period, and the remains of a field-work that surrounded its crest were said to have been made by Timur, in one of his invasions of India. The position would be a very strong one if water were available on the summit.

The march was continued along the skirt of the range, and as it lay across the drainage of the country, there were several ravines and irrigation water-courses to be crossed, before entering into a gorge about seven miles from Matun, which led in a north-north-east direction, with a slight rise and descent into the next small valley. The pass was not defensible, but the mountains on both sides were very rugged. The whole of the southern side of the range that had been passed on the march was perfectly bare; the colour of the rocks was very light yellow, almost white in places, but the stratification was most extraordinary. It would be impossible to give any idea of the turns and twists that the strata had assumed; sometimes they were quite vertical; the dip of the more horizontal ones appeared to be towards the south. The ascent of the pass for half a mile followed the dip and was easy enough, though stony; on the further side it dropped steeply for a short distance, and then descended gradually past a small village, Zowakhi, which was inhabited, and another one a little higher up which seemed to

have been abandoned, to the banks of the Kam Khost river, where half a mile on, after crossing the dry fields on the level bank of the stream, the river had to be forded. It was not more than twenty yards wide, but the stream was strong and about two feet deep at this time of the year. Regaining the further bank and crossing a rather difficult watercourse, the usual accompaniment to the bank of every river in Afghanistan, the road lay still north-east, and towards a gorge somewhat similar to that already passed through, but less steep and stony. About half-way through this gorge, and one mile from the Kam Khost river, a glen leads out on the right, through which a road was reported to lead to Thull in a south-east direction. About a mile beyond this point the Sabbri valley is entered. The village lies on the banks of a stream which runs into the Kam Khost river. It is on the left bank of the stream, which is about thirty feet below the level of the banks, which have the usual deep watercourses on their slopes. The water was low, but quite clear; there were any number of fish in the various pools. The road did not cross the stream here, but following up its right bank reached an open grassy plain about half a mile to the west of the village.

With the exception of Sabbri, which was on its western face, there were no villages in sight in this valley, which trended away in a northerly direction for five or six miles with a very gentle ascent. The ground sloped upwards from the camp towards the west, where the valley was bounded at about a mile distance by some low ranges. Beyond them in this direction was another village, Ali Shahr. The ranges through which the march had been, bounded the plain to the south, rising to a height of over 1,500 feet above the level of this valley, which was somewhat lower than that of Khost.

In such a desert place as this, it was not surprising that the villagers, without any competition, should ask exorbitant prices for their produce.

The General ordered eight annas to be given for a camel-load of firewood, or of grass; but the demand for the latter was so great, that in one case two rupees was given for a load by some of the sowars. The inhabitants were only acquainted with rupees, and were ignorant of any smaller coin, one of the villagers being doubtful if two four-anna-bits really represented eight annas.

The day had been cloudy, and, owing to the absence of sun, had in the morning been bitterly cold; the sun came out a little in the middle of the day, but it clouded over again at 4 P.M.

The Sufaid Koh range, which since the column had left the Kurram valley had become a beautiful mass of snow mountains, and showed strikingly at a distance of some forty miles in a direct line from the camp at Matun, should have been visible from this place; but the range was covered with clouds, which foreboded more snow for the occupants of the Peiwar Kotal.

The 23rd Pioneers had marched along the road traversed, with the object of preparing it for the column, but apparently nothing had been done on the line taken by the force to improve any of the passages across the various watercourses met with in the march, so that some delay occurred in bringing along the convoy, and though it had started about 9 A.M. the baggage was not all in till 4 P.M., distance eleven miles. A good number of fish were caught in the shallow pools by driving them into a blanket or cloth.

On the road to Sabbri, the General was met by a kasid or messenger from Cabul, bringing the latest news from that part of the world.

January 25th (temperature minimum 24°).—Halt, at Sabbri. Arrangements had been made with Colonel Gordon, commanding 29th Punjab Native Infantry, at Thull, to send out a reconnaissance from thence to meet a party which would ride in that direction from this camp.

The General and staff, with the cavalry, rode along the road passed in yesterday's march, but failed to come across the

party from Thull, who, however, had gone by another road to a point whence they could overlook the Khost valley.

Both parties had to return so as to be back before dark, but the results of these excursions proved that the Khost valley could be entered from Thull without any great difficulty.

The survey party ascended the hill to the north-east of camp and about four miles distant, with an escort, as this range of hills was not particularly safe. Some thieves attempted to carry off some of the camels which were feeding on the lower slopes, but the guard coming up, the animals were recovered.

From the top of the hill neither Thull nor Hazir Pir could be seen, nor were any of the signallers from the latter place observed on the highest intervening ridge, where they had been ordered to station themselves.

The halt at Sabbri was, as stated, for purely reconnoitring and surveying purposes, and had been arranged several days previously, but, as it turned out, it had a second and greater advantage, and that was that it kept the column within easy distance of Matun.

At 10 o'clock at night an express reached the General from that place to the effect that the news of the departure of the force had excited the Mangals, who had resolved to come down and attack the fort and destroy our governor and the garrison.

The General then decided to relieve the Matun garrison and to leave the Khost country to the care of the inhabitants, or of the Mangals, whose preserve it was.

Half the force was ordered to return in the early morning, and half was to stay in camp, to be ready to bring it on when ordered.

This consideration obliged the first idea to be given up, of mounting 300 infantry-men on mules, so as to enable them to keep up with the cavalry, for if the necessities of the case should have obliged the camp to return to Matun, all the carriage would have been required at Sabbri.

29th January.—At 6.15 A.M., just as it was getting light, the General started with the staff, a party of the 72nd Highlanders under Lieutenant-Colonel Clarke, the squadron 10th Hussars, the 3rd Punjab Cavalry, the 28th Punjab Native Infantry, and No. 2 Mountain Battery.

Brigadier-General Drew was left in command of the troops at Sabbri, with instructions to place the camp in a state of defence. The troops at his disposal were 200 men (including the sick) of the 72nd Highlanders, the 21st Punjab Native Infantry, and No. 1 Mountain Battery.

The gathering of the Mangals was evidently a serious one, and if they had meant to do more than seize the fort at Matun it would have been very easy for them to detach two or three thousand men to attack the camp. This camp, which was pitched in the same way as that at Matun, but with wider streets, occupied a rectangle of 500 yards by 250 approximately, or of a perimeter 1,500 yards, to be defended by about 1,000 men.

The first care was to send two cavalry vedettes out to the west, to be posted on the low hills, about a mile off, so that they could give notice of the approach of the enemy, who must come from that direction; the second business was to reduce the size of the camp to more defensible proportions. This could only be done by striking half of it, and, accordingly, the tents of the troops who remained behind were struck, leaving those that belonged to the force under General Roberts standing, as far as possible.

Another reason for striking this half of the camp was that some broken ground on the banks of a small ravine, which carried off the drainage of the southern range, obliged a post of observation to be placed by which it could be overlooked, and thus, as there was not a sufficiency of men to occupy outposts, the line of defence was necessarily taken in this direction.

The General, on leaving, had ordered Captain Colquhoun,

R.A., and Lieutenant Spratt, R.E., Assistant Engineer, to stay behind to carry out the defence of the position. This was begun at 7 A.M. and was completed by 11 A.M. In this time the whole of the standing camp was surrounded with a breast-work of about three to four feet high, made of every available object which required to be stowed away. Tents rolled up and piled one on the other, men's kits and officers' baggage arranged along the line in a continuous heap, camel-saddles placed as in the Matun entrenchment, and commissariat flour-bags built into a wall three feet six inches high, formed the various means of shelter employed.

The diameter of the enclosure being roughly over 233 yards, each face of the octagon was about eighty yards long. A space of ten feet wide was kept clear all round the inside of the work. When all the camels and other animals were brought into the enclosure, there was rather a squeeze in the middle road, where all the mules and horses were picketed. Each camp covered a space that included its baggage animals, so that room for those belonging to the troops who were away had to be provided.

Captain Wynne, with a party of signallers, ascended the southern range. From the peak of one of the hills he was able to overlook the Matun fort and plain, and he signalled about 12 o'clock that the whole valley was black with the crowds of Mangals that had come down. Subsequently he reported that the force was returning, and he came back to camp. Shortly after 2 o'clock the General sent a message to the same effect, and as the troops who were on the way would require their tents and baggage, the enclosure was ordered to be dismantled. Beginning about 2 o'clock, the camp resumed its ordinary appearance by 3 P.M.; and when the General arrived shortly after, everything with the exception of the camel-saddles and grain-bags was back in its place. These were left standing.

The General, starting at 6.15 A.M., had reached Matun by

9.30 A M, and proceeding at once into the deserted intrenchment had allowed the troops to rest for an hour.

The Mangals were observed at the skirt of the hill where they had been previously defeated, but at this time none had ventured into the plain

The early march of the force had disarranged their plans, and they were not prepared to face British troops, when they had expected only to put an end to the levies, amounting to about 300 men, that had been left behind

The movements of the enemy were watched by a party of the cavalry, while the troops within the enclosure had their breakfast.

The only thing to be done, as far as the fort of Matun was concerned, was to empty the place of all the powder and grain that had been left.

As many camels as could be spared had been taken to carry off the grain, but there were not many unladen camels in the force, so that the whole could not be removed. When the animals were laden up, the convoy was started off, escorted by the Turi levy, whose lives had thus been saved by the timely action of the General.

The powder was taken out of the fort and poured into the wet ditch, the flints and bullets were pocketed by the men of the levy, and so, with the exception of the grain that could not be carried off, and which was set alight, there was nothing for the Mangals to wreak their vengeance upon. The task being thus over, there remained only two alternatives—either to fight the host of Mangals or to retire. The latter course was decided on; the enemy were in great force, and even if they had been driven back to the hills, nothing would have been gained, as they could not have been pursued. Our men had marched twelve miles, and had the prospect of marching back the same distance or else of bivouacking in the plain; if an engagement, which could hardly have been decisive, had been entered upon,



it would have taken them several miles further from the camp, thus making the return journey longer.

While the work of clearing the fort as far as it could be done was being carried on under the cover of the entrenchments, the Mangals, emboldened by our seeming inactivity, had ventured out into the plain, and had gradually formed a line about a mile long, stretching from the foot of the hills towards the second and third villages to the west of Matun.

They were still about two miles off, but their numbers, which were estimated at a guess at about 6,000 men, were sufficient to show the necessity of action. Had only the whole force been available in the intrenchments, or had the men been fresh to go out and do battle against these savages, the result, if, as might have been expected, we had been victorious, would have done more to the pacification of the Afghan independent tribes than any patched-up money-bought peace.

As long as there are border tribes like the Mangals and Ghilzais, savage and unconquered, who can boast of their freedom and offer refuge to all discontented and necessitous Mahometans, the idea of peace in any lasting sense of the word can hardly be entertained.

Had there only been a few more regiments a blow might have been struck on that day which would have liberated the oppressed inhabitants of Khost, and put an end to the power of the Mangals for harm, but unless the victory could have been followed up by the occupation of their country and its exploration, no good would have resulted, and the opportunity of breaking down one of the barriers to civilisation in these parts had to be postponed till a more convenient season.

A little before 12 o'clock the retirement began, while the enemy were still at a distance, and waiting to begin the attack.

The 28th Punjab Native Infantry and the Mountain Battery moved off, while the cavalry trotted out and took up a position about a mile from the enemy.

The squadron of the 10th Hussars, under Captain Bulkeley, was thrown forward in skirmishing order, about 600 yards in front of the 5th Punjab Cavalry, and a few of the marksmen were dismounted, to try the effect of the Martini-Henry carbines on the mass of the enemy.

When the Mangals saw this slight screen of cavalry in their front they began to skirmish forward in regular order, obeying the directions of their leaders, some of whom were mounted, and as they advanced into the range of the carbine fire, they were greeted with a few shots. One of these was lucky enough to knock over one of the mounted leaders, who had made himself conspicuous on his white horse against the dark background of men. Every bullet must have told, aimed at the dense mass of the enemy, and, had the firing been continuous, and the whole squadron on foot, their loss would have been much greater.

The fall of the Mangal chief arrested the forward movement, and great was their astonishment, when they recovered from their surprise, to see the cavalry skirmishers turn about and trot off.

This movement was interpreted by the leaders into a wish on our part to entice them into the open country, where our cavalry might ride through them, and they were not willing to face this prospect, so their temporary halt became a longer one, while they tried to fathom our tactics.

These were simple enough, but in their very simplicity they were too deep for the Mangals.

The infantry and artillery, marching off about noon, had by half-past 12 increased their distance from the enemy to over three miles and a half.

With this start, and the probability that the Mangals would not follow very far into the open valley, there was no object in keeping the cavalry too far detached, so, soon after the hussars had got the range of their opponents, they were ordered to cease firing and retire.

This movement was effected by alternate squadrons, as on a parade, and gradually the distance between the halted Mangals and the cavalry increased.

At last the enemy made up their minds that we did not intend to fight, and, as the retiring squadrons were vanishing out of sight, with one accord they swarmed into the empty intrenchment and fort.

The rescuers, with the rescued, reached camp about 5 o'clock, having done a good day's work, and marched over twenty four miles.

To show his appreciation of the men, who had had a good deal of fatigue to undergo, the General ordered a free ration of rum for the Europeans and natives who drank it, or of tea and native sugar for those who did not take spirits.

There was still the chance that the Mangals might have changed their minds, and followed up the force under cover of darkness to attack us; so, after the camp was re-pitched, all the camel-saddles that were available were taken to form a series of picket defences round it, which would have formed convenient posts for rallying on in case of a night attack.

These precautions turned out to be needless, as the enemy did not follow up the retirement, but they were necessary as long as his plans were unknown.

The Turi levies were accommodated in the village of Sabbri, where they were apparently comfortable, as in the morning they were in no hurry to turn out.

January 30th (temperature minimum 31°).—The march was ordered at 8 A.M., the distance being twelve miles, to a place called Zerkoma, about half-way to Hazir Pir.

The General and some of the staff, starting at 9 A.M., and escorted by a troop of the 5th Punjab Cavalry, reached Hazir Pir by 1 o'clock, their baggage and mules reaching that place by 5 P.M. The troops under General Drew reached Zerkoma about 2 P.M., but the water at this place was so shallow and stagnant

that it was decided to move on to the Kurram valley, which was reached at about 4 o'clock, the camp being pitched near a village called Baghzai.

The road from the camp at Sabbri led north-east for nearly three miles and a half, across an almost level plain. The soil was of fine quality, but for some reason, which could hardly have been want of water, the whole of this fine valley was uninhabited and uncultivated. One small ruined hut was passed, but scarcely any fields showed near it. After ascending the gentle slope of this triangular valley till its apex is reached, the road turned into a gorge through the hills that fill up the whole of the country intervening between the Kurram and Khost valleys.

The track passed through this open defile, the sides of the hills being covered with a brushwood growth, while the bed of the valley was filled with thorny bushes and small trees, mixed up with the inevitable dwarf palm. A little water was found here in the pools. After getting through two small valleys, at a distance of about four miles a slight kotal or pass is reached, which takes the road into a broad and open plain which runs very nearly straight from this point north-north-east to the Kurram river, into which it discharges its drainage water.

About four miles and a half down this open and uncultivated valley, the road following the course of the stream, the village of Zerkoma is reached. The actual village is out of sight, though there was a collection of straw and grass huts, which marked the temporary residence of some shepherds near the water. The direct road to Hazir Pir, by which the General had gone on ahead, struck up a ravine to the left, and, if this route had been practicable for the camels, the attempt might have been made to follow him, when it was found that the water-supply at this camping ground was bad.

The only alternative was to go on down the valley to Baghzai, which was reached by the head of the column at 4.30 P.M., the baggage not being all in till 8.30 P.M.—after dark.

Most of the camels were, however, up in time for the camp to be pitched before dark.

There was no actual difficulty on the road, and only in one place, at the junction of the ravines at Zerkoma, was anything required to be done to the track, and here the soft alluvial perpendicular bank had to be ramped down to make several paths for the baggage animals to get out of the nullah; but beyond this point the route presented no obstacle, though the numerous side ravines with steep banks, across which it was taken, delayed the march of the camels, though not of the mules. Descending thus gradually the whole way, the stony river bed, which at this point was perfectly dry, was at last reached, any water that was in it being below the surface. This river-bed had to be crossed here and recrossed again a mile lower down, where it had opened out to a width of nearly half a mile, and then, just before its waters, when there are any, reach the Kurram, the track comes into the road leading along the right bank of this river.

The camp was pitched on dry terraced rice-fields along the left bank of the side valley, as the available ground in the Kurram valley, between the foot of the hills and the village of Baghzai, was too small to allow it to be placed there.

The ground was quite commanded by the sloping side of the spurs enclosing the Kurram valley.

The village of Baghzai, about 400 yards away from the end of the spur, was remarkable only for an isolated hill, round which it was built.

The column marched next morning at 9.30 A.M., and Hazir Pir, distant four miles and a half, was reached at 11 o'clock, the road which had been taken in hand close to that place being the native track along the upper edge of the cultivation, and following as a rule the bends of the spurs; but occasionally it went straight across the fields, which as usual were dry.

The view of the Sufaid Koh, blocking up the end of the

valley, was very grand; the covering of snow on the higher range had quite changed the colour of the landscape.

A passing allusion was made, a few pages back, to the report from Brigadier-General Thelwall, C.B., as to the expected attack of the Mangals on the Peiwar Kotal, and though, in order not to break the thread of the previous narrative, the subject was not again touched on, it will be desirable to record at the close of this chapter the events connected with this attack.

The Mangal tribe can furnish about 20,000 fighting men, armed like their neighbours with matchlocks of varying excellence, and the usual knives. The tribe, being off any of the roads travelled by Afghan troops, did not come much into contact with the Afghan Government, and considered itself virtually independent, though acknowledging in a way the supremacy of Cabul, as long as its obedience was not tested by a demand for tribute or taxes.

The substitution of one form of government for another should, under these circumstances, have been a matter of indifference to these people; but egged on by the fanaticism of the "mullahs" and their own vanity, they threw in their lot with the Afghans rather than with the English, as the latter, they knew, would not put up with their particular weakness of helping themselves to the property of others.

The expedition to Khoist was a chance that they could hardly expect to get again. The English troops were broken up into detachments, too far separated to be able to support each other quickly, while they could, with the assistance of the intervening tribes, collect, as far as numbers went, forces very considerably larger than those of the enemy they wished to annihilate. Had the Mangals, however, trusted more to their numbers than to their bravery, the result might have been different: but they divided their forces, and so brought defeat on themselves.

The discomfiture of the Mangals who attacked at Matun has been described; the failure of the proposed assault on the Peiwar Kotal has now to be recorded.

The garrison of the Peiwar Kotal at this time consisted of four companies of the 2/8th King's, under Major Tanner; three guns G/3 Royal Artillery, under Major Parry; the 2nd Punjab Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Tyndall; a party of the 12th Bengal Cavalry and the company of Sappers and Miners—in all about 1,000 men. 4,000 of the Mangals, aided by 2,000 of the Hasan Kheyl section of the Jajis, or about 6,000 men, determined to attack this post almost simultaneously with the attempt on Matun. Their plans were well laid, and the secret was well kept, as it was only at midnight on the 4th that an express reached General Thelwall from Alikheyl, to the effect that the tribes were advancing in force to retake the Peiwar Kotal, and that they might soon be expected to arrive.

The report received was not quite explicit as to the time the Mangals meant to attack. They had come down into the Harriab valley by the glen nearly opposite the village of Byan Kheyl, and some had turned off to seek shelter and food in the villages to the west of this point, and had got as far as Alikheyl. Captain Rennick, with his small escort, was posted here as representative of the British Government. His position was not a pleasant one; the few men with him might at any time previously have been overpowered by the inhabitants of the village itself; but such had been his tact in dealing with these hostile people, that when the time of trial came, and they were pressed and urged to join the cause of their brethren in ridding the village of the presence of the infidels, they not only held back but refused to join the coalition. There was no doubt in Captain Rennick's mind but that his death would be amply avenged if it occurred, and this sentiment had its due effect on the minds of his friends. Had there been any wavering on his part, or had he subsequently left the post, which he might have

done in obedience to instructions received from General Thelwall, without any blame being attached to him directly or indirectly, the Mangals, and the faction who were on their side, would have claimed a victory, and their elation might have led them to attack the position at the Peiwar Kotal; but it can easily be conceived that the resolute attitude of this officer had the effect of strengthening his position at Alikheyl, by drawing the villagers who were favourable to our cause into closer connection with him, and at the same time this alliance had a corresponding effect on the Mangals and Hassan Kheyls. If one Englishman posted in a native house with twenty soldiers was able to induce the villagers of Alikheyl to side with him, what chance was there of the tribes being able to make any impression on the British garrison of the Peiwar Kotal? This was a question that caused much difference in the councils of the Mangals, so much so that it put an end to their campaign.

However, when the cavalry videttes in the neighbourhood of Byan Kheyl reported the advance of the Mangals into the Hurriab valley, the garrison of the Peiwar Kotal prepared to meet them if they came on, as they were expected to do at once.

The posts to be defended had all been previously prepared, and so when the alarm was given everyone knew where he had to go, and what to do. The plans of the enemy were not decided at first, and it was doubtful whether they meant to attack at once or not, but they were watched.

When the report reached General Thelwall in the middle of the night that the tribes were within four miles of the Peiwar Kotal, and that they had every intention of attacking, the troops were at once turned out so as to be in readiness, and took up the positions that had been settled by General Thelwall in concert with the commanding officers.

The position of the Peiwar Kotal would under some circumstances have been an easy one to hold, but these circumstances involved a larger garrison and less cover for the assailants.



Neither of these favourable conditions existed when the prospect of having to fight for its occupation turned out the defenders on a cold winter night, with the thermometer several degrees below zero.

The main defences at the Kotal consisted of block-houses on three points, all within rifle-range of each other, forming the three angles of an isosceles triangle, with sides about 500 yards long; the base about 650 yards.

The block-houses were each protected by a parapet of fallen trees, forming an outer line of defence, and enclosing a space for the garrison, which was larger than the houses could hold. The work at the apex of the triangle contained General Thelwall's head-quarters, and also two of the three guns of G/3 Royal Artillery, which could bring a fire on either of the outlying block-houses which barred the access to the Kotal on the north and south sides, or on the only remaining means of approach, the western gorge leading to Zabbardast Killa. The third gun of G/3 was placed in the southern block-house, where a company of the 8th was stationed in wooden huts just below the block-house itself. The gun commanded the approach on this side, which could only be made in force along the ridge leading to the position.

The garrison was divided between these three points, leaving a strong detachment of the 2nd Punjab Infantry under Colonel Tyndall to occupy the slopes of the western gorge, in case the enemy took this, the easiest, road to advance to the attack.

To face an enemy in the day, when the means of attack and defence are evident to all, is a simple matter compared to undertaking the same duty in the dark, when ample cover in the pine woods surrounding the position prevents his approach from being seen. The garrison of the Peiwar Kotal had to undertake this difficult duty, and to keep alert hour after hour all through the night, waiting and wishing for the attack, which never came off.

They were fairly clothed, for the most part, so as to be able to resist the Arctic weather that they had to contend with, but the exposure on this and the subsequent nights told hardly on the weaker men, especially on the natives.

It speaks well for the discipline of the garrison, that, with many causes to create excitement, there should have been no false alarms during the night. The troops had been for some time at the Kotal, and were acquainted with the ordinary sights and nocturnal noises of the forest; but allowing for this experience, it shows that the suddenness of the order turning the soldiers out into the cold and dark, had not over-excited the men. After weary watching the dawn came, and with the day more certain news as to the movements and plans of the enemy.

January 5th.—General Thelwall, finding that he had not been attacked on the night of the 4th January, and that the assault had been postponed, determined to utilise the time at his command by sending to the Peiwar cantonment at Habib Killa and to the Kurram garrison for reinforcements, as the numbers of the enemy opposed to him were sufficiently large to make the odds against him very great, the position being more-over an extended one.

In obedience to his order 150 men of the 72nd Highlanders came up under Captain Guinness, while later from Kurram 200 Goorkhas under Captain Cook arrived, having done their march of over nineteen miles, with the steep Peiwar hill to climb at the end, in six hours.

As soon as these reinforcements, which were all that were available, reached, they were placed in position with the other troops.

The day had been passed in keeping a good look-out for the enemy, and in strengthening the position of the north block-house by throwing out towards the south a parapet for 150 yards along the crest of the ridge, made of the stems of the

trees cut down in its front and rear, piled one on the top of the other. The parapet thus formed more fully secured the western side, where on the slope of the hill, away from the central position, the valley could not be searched.

When all these additional precautions had been taken, the garrison, now reinforced, were ready for the attack, and again a night of expectation was passed; the crack of falling trees, which sounded like distant musketry, being the only cause of disturbance. The intense cold was, however, a greater enemy than the Mangal, and the exposure was very trying, as well as the want of rest.

January 6th.—The morning broke upon a pleasanter prospect: the enemy had feared to make the attack in the night; a party of them had come up to within a short distance of the southern block-house, but after reconnoitring it had withdrawn, not liking to cross the cleared ground in front of the gun. Now, however, it seemed as if they really meant to try conclusions with us.

They swarmed into the Harriab valley, and in a black dense mass began to advance towards the Peiwar Kotal. At 10 A.M. the advance patrol of the 12th Bengal Cavalry had sent in reports of their approach, and everything was in readiness for them. After a time their advance was stopped, and the plan of attack apparently became the subject of discussion among the leaders of the Mangal and Hassan Kheyl Jajis, and as the question could not be settled, the tribes began to disperse again, and gradually melted away. It was known, however, that a portion of the enemy, to the number of 1,500 men, were on the mountain to the left of the southern block-house, and it was from this band that the reconnoitring party had come which had explored the approach to the position. A number of them, no doubt, had joined the swarm in the valley, but some were still in the neighbourhood.

The headmen of the Turi villages in the Kurram valley had

proffered their services when the news of the Mangal invasion had arrived, and the offer was accepted.

In every way they were equal to the enemy, and, at any rate, they looked upon him with contempt and hate, and the presence of three or four hundred of these men was useful, as, while adding to the numbers defending the Kotal, it showed the spirit that animated the Turis; the only drawback was, that if these Turis had been let loose on the Mangals, it would have been very hard to distinguish friend from foe; the latter under ordinary circumstances bore such a strong family resemblance to the former, that it required a very good judge to pick out one from the other.

To obviate the chance of any unpleasant accident from this cause, General Thelwall took the precaution of placing his allies out of danger, on the eastern side of the Peiwar Kotal, where, if they could do no good in case of an attack, they were, at least, out of harm's way and unlikely to be taken for enemies.

There was no opportunity, however, of testing the fighting qualities of our allies, as the Mangals had retired into their native fastnesses, not even having attempted to force the friendly Jajis of Alikheyl to give up Captain Rennick to their tender mercies; not but what the Sniders of the small escort of the 28th Punjab Native Infantry may have had something to say to their not proceeding to extremities, but beyond a crowd of several hundreds clamouring for his head and thus bringing moral persuasion to bear on the Alikheyl maliks, they did not attempt to use any violence. The headmen of Alikheyl, moreover, were true to their engagements, and turned a deaf ear to all the pressure that was brought on them, and Captain Rennick, who had placed his life in their hands as it were, had no cause to regret the confidence he had reposed in these rude hillmen.

The enemy having disappeared, the reinforcements no longer required returned to their garrisons, after an experience of as

severe campaigning as had as yet been the lot of any of our troops.

Luckily the snow had not fallen at this time, but this additional evil only was required to make this three days' expedition as unpleasant, as regards exposure and want of fighting, as any service in the field could be.

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## CHAPTER VII.

## PREPARATIONS FOR THE ADVANCE TO CABUL.

**F**EBRUARY 1st (minimum 34°).—The chief event of this day was the arrival of Sirdar Wali Mahommed at the camp at Hazir Pir. Under instructions from the General he had been accompanied from Alikheyl by Captain Rennick and a suitable escort, and as he neared the camp Captain Arthur Conolly, B.S.C., who was acting as Political Officer, was ordered to ride out with Lieutenant Neville Chamberlain, aide-de-camp to the General, to welcome the distinguished stranger, in accordance with the customs of Oriental etiquette, and when the Sirdar was thus brought to the camp at noon he was met at the end of the head-quarter street by the General and staff, and conducted to the General's tent, where there was a guard of honour of the 21st Punjab Native Infantry and their band, to complete the ceremony of reception.

There was thus nothing done which could have either hurt his feelings or shown the light in which his arrival was viewed. It would have been as easy for the Sirdar to have proceeded to

the head-quarters of the Khyber column, and probably he would have gone there had he known that he would have been sent on to Jellalabad, but after having placed himself in communication with Captain Rennick, who was the nearest English officer with whom he could treat, he preferred to come in to General Roberts by the Shutargardan road. Up to the present time this road had, owing to the extraordinary mildness of the season, been comparatively free from snow, and if only this contingency could have been foreseen, it might have altered the course of the campaign. The victory of the Peiwar Kotal might have been pushed home by following the retreating 'Afghans to Cabul, and there dictating the terms on which peace would be made; but the risk of placing the impenetrable barrier of the Shutargardan in rear of the Kurram column, with the prospect of its long convoy of baggage and ammunition being caught in a snowstorm, was enough to prevent this plan from being carried out at the beginning of the war.

To return to Sirdar Wali Mahommed. In appearance he was a tall man of good proportions, dressed in a grey cloth coat, with the usual high black lambskin Afghan cap. His face was not a striking one in any way, except that it was of a lighter complexion than that of most of his countrymen, and that his beard was of a brownish red tinge, instead of the usual black or grey. He rode a fine chesnut Turkestan horse. Among the followers who accompanied him were several of the maliks of the Logar valley, who had assisted his escape. The presence of these men might be looked on as a better omen of success than that of Wali Mahommed, for on the inhabitants of the Logar valley depended the success of our march into Cabul, when it should occur, while the Sirdar, who had by coming in cut himself off from the national party in Cabul, was powerless to assist us with more than advice. His object was doubtless to obtain some benefit for himself. Report said that he wished to occupy the position of Amir, now that the situation







3 Colgate

was vacant, the report of Shere Ali's death having been telegraphed by General Thelwall from the Peiwar Kotal, but as yet there was no confirmation of this news. Had the Sirdar been recognised as belonging to the real reigning family, there might have been a chance in his favour; but being only a half-brother of Shere Ali, and not a man of any marked ability, he had no following in Cabul to sustain his pretensions.

However, his arrival was a matter of some political importance, as giving a clue to the feelings of the various Afghan parties, and so it was considered by the Government, who ordered that he should proceed with all convenient despatch to Jellalabad, where Major Cavagnari, the Political Officer in Sir Samuel Brown's force, was, so that he could discuss the political situation with him.

To do further honour to the man who had shown his confidence in the British, General Roberts invited the Sirdar to dinner as a conclusion to the civilities with which he had been treated on arrival. The compliment was one of mere form, as the guest would not eat anything except plain bread and water, his Mahomedan prejudices not allowing him to partake of any food with unbelievers.

Almost immediately after the Sirdar and his party had crossed the Shutargardan, the long-expected winter snow fell, blocking the road. Had he postponed his journey for only a couple of days, he would not have been able to come by this route, and it is quite possible that he would have been unable to come by any other.

The garrison of the Peiwar Kotal now began to feel the comfort of having log huts, with fire-places in them, instead of tents, as six inches of snow fell there this day.

February 2nd (minimum 34°).—Colonel Macbean, Deputy Commissary-General, arrived in camp on a tour of inspection of his department. Captain Badcock, Principal Commissariat Officer, who had gone to Thull to receive him, accompanied

him, as also Captain E. Marriott, Executive Commissariat Officer at Thull.

Colonel Macbean had previously visited the Khyber force, and was able to compare the relative positions of the two as regards the means of keeping up supplies, which depended altogether on the condition of the roads.

The route from Kohat to Thull had gradually been made available for wheeled traffic, but was not in a very satisfactory condition. The road onward from Thull on the right bank was much in the same state as when the force had passed up in November, and though there was no actual difficulty for the camels, it was narrow in most places, and not suitable for convoys passing each other. It was ordered to be at once widened and improved between Hazir Pir and Thull, and working parties were sent to put it in order while it was still used as the only means of communication; but from the commencement of the campaign it had been foreseen that the permanent road would have to be made on the left bank of the river, and thus the necessity of having to cross the Kurram river twice would be avoided.

The 23rd Pioneers, after their return from Khost,\* had been directed to cross the river at Hazir Pir, and commence operations on this new road, and they had, with the assistance of the Engineer officers, with working parties of local labour, already made several miles of it.

February 3rd (minimum 23°).—The General and staff rode to Ahmed-i-Shama, returning by another route through the hills, to see if the line of road could be improved by leaving the river-bank, but this was not found to be the case.

The wing of the 29th Punjab Native Infantry, who had been in camp at Hazir Pir during the absence of the Khost column, being no longer required for the protection of that place, marched to-day for Thull to rejoin their head-quarters, and the squadron of the 10th Hussars, which had been ordered to rejoin the

regiment in the Khyber column, also left, much to the regret of everyone.

The detachments of the 12th Bengal Cavalry, which had been posted in the Kurram valley between Hazir Pir and Kurram Fort, had been relieved by two companies of the 21st Punjab Native Infantry, under Captain Carruthers, and they were picked up by the regiment, which marched in to-day to be quartered at Hazir Pir, where grass and forage were plentiful compared with that part of the Kurram valley about the Peiwar Kotal and Habib Killa.

Another company of the 21st Punjab Native Infantry, under Lieutenant Young, was detached to Tullamai on the right bank, to commence improving the road towards Thull from this point.

February 4th. — The weather became uncertain in the lower valleys, now that snow had begun to whiten the mountains, and though as yet no rain had fallen, it was very cloudy and hazy when the camp at Hazir Pir was broken up by the departure of the General, with the escort of the 28th Punjab Native Infantry, and No. 2 Mountain Battery, for Kurram and the Peiwar Kotal.

The troops who were to remain till further orders at Hazir Pir were three guns F/A Royal Horse Artillery, left wing 72nd Highlanders, wing 21st Punjab Native Infantry, 12th Bengal Cavalry, and wing 5th Punjab Cavalry.

Sirdar Wali Mahommed, who had been ordered to proceed to Jellalabad, also started this day, accompanied by Captain Conolly, B.S.C., who had been nominated for this duty, as Assistant Political Officer. Every attention was shown the Sirdar on his arrival at Thull, Kohat, and Peshawur, and with the exception that not much time was lost on the road, he was made as comfortable as he could have desired, but it was advisable to get him to Jellalabad as early as possible, as Yakoo Khan was reported to be preparing to follow his uncle's step, and to be coming in to Sir Sam Browne.

The General's escort marched at 9 A.M., and kept to the road on the right bank of the Kurram, till it reached an impassable spur of rock, when it was necessary to take to the river-bed. The bank at this place was perpendicular, with a drop of about ten feet into an irrigation stream about fifteen feet wide. It had been slightly prepared for the passage of the troops, but not very satisfactorily, and some delay was experienced in getting down the baggage animals. The main channel of the river was about fifty yards wide, with a strong current running in it, the water being about three feet deep in the middle. The ford was not quite in a direct line, but skirted the edge of a shallow rapid, where the stones and boulders were of a large size. Above the ford and the rapid the water was about four feet deep.

There was no great difficulty in fording the current, but it was necessary to have a fatigue party from the 28th Punjab Native Infantry and the mountain battery to help the baggage animals across, and to keep them on the right track, so as to prevent them either getting on to the broken bed of the rapid, or into the deep water, when the loads would, in the case of the mules, have been wetted all through.

It was not a pleasant duty to have to wade into the icy stream up to the waist, but it was done well and cheerfully, and very few mishaps occurred. Two men were taken off their legs and carried down. One had tried to cross higher up the stream, and was rescued by the native officer of the mountain battery, and the other by Lieutenant Dennis, 28th P.N.I., who was in charge of the rear-guard, and who had to ride some way down the river before he was able to get below him and stop him. Rain began to fall while the passage of the ford was being made, and continued all through the day, getting heavier towards the afternoon till about 5 P.M., when it cleared a little and showed the mountains covered with snow all round; but the rain soon recommenced and continued till 10 P.M. The General stopped

on the way at the village of Saddur and was interviewed by the head-men, who prayed for a remission of the fine that had been imposed on the village, but this was not granted, as they had not shown a friendly spirit at the commencement, having listened to the voice of their mullah, and refused to assist in the construction of the telegraph line.

The camp was pitched to the south of the village of Ibrahimzai, on the same ground as on the previous occasion, but it was not a good situation, being too small for the troops and the convoy that was marching with them.

February 5th.—The morning was fine, and the view of the snow-clad hills all round against a bright blue sky was lovely. The tents began soon to dry in the warm sun, and the march was resumed at 10 A.M. to Kurram, which was reached about 3 P.M. The General visited Wali Dad's Fort on the road, and was met shortly after by the commandant of the Kurram garrison, Major Fitz Hugh, 5th Goorkhas, who had ridden out to meet him. As the open part of the Kurram valley was reached, the view, which had been shut in by the low ridges and spurs coming down close to the road, opened out in all its grandeur.

The mountain Sikaram and the Sufaid Koh range generally seemed quite altered in form by the covering of snow that had fallen on them. The grey, cold, savage grandeur of the range, which had till now darkened the landscape, had disappeared. All was now bright, and the valley, lit up by the warm sun, bore a reflection, as it were, from the snowy mass of mountains that bordered it. The origin of the name of the Sufaid Koh was evident. The white mountains were there, prominent to a degree that must have stamped their name on the minds of the unlettered Afghans, and they well deserved that name. There was, however, one drawback; as the sun sank behind the range, the cold wind, which had been tempered by the bright sun during the day, came down with increased

strength. Nothing seemed capable of keeping it out, and, to add to the discomfort, there was no firewood available. No notice had been given of the expected arrival of any troops with the General, so that arrangements had not been made beforehand for any quantity to be brought in from the neighbouring villages, and it was not till late in the evening that the deficiency was made good.

February 6th.—The General inspected the upper and lower forts at Kurram.

The interior of the lower fort had been all levelled and cleared, and presented a very different appearance to what had been the case six weeks previously. A convenient row of sheds had been erected round two sides, in which the commissariat supplies were stored.

The field-hospitals were also completed and occupied inside this fort.

As yet, however, the inner keep, where the ordnance stores were, had not been touched, as the whole of the efforts of the Engineers had been directed towards the completion of the above-mentioned works.

In the upper fort but little had been done; a mess-house for the officers, and sheds for the company of the 72nd in the garrison, marked the progress that had been made. Most of the Goorkhas were, however, camped inside it, where the walls helped to keep off the cold mountain wind.

The 7th company of Sappers and Miners, under Lieutenant Bagot, R.E., marched into Kurram *en route* towards Thull, for road-making purposes near Ahmed-i-Shama, where their services could be better utilised than at the Peiwar Kotal, where the snow-fall had stopped their work.

February 7th.—The General, No. 2 Mountain Battery, and 28th Punjab Native Infantry, marched for Peiwar Kotal and Habib Killa at 10 A.M.

Brigadier-General Cobbe, who had remained at Kurram, had

now sufficiently recovered from his wound to be able to travel, and he took advantage of the escort of the 7th company of the Sappers to proceed towards Thull on sick leave.

A small convoy of sick men in doolies and unladen camels accompanied the Sappers, as did several other officers proceeding on duty.

The detachment was ordered to march *viâ* the Darwaza pass, to Hazir Pir, but at the last moment it was told to proceed by the left bank of the Kurram to Ibrahimzai, as there was some chance that the Mangals might venture to attack a small party with a convoy large in proportion to the escort.

With the inspection of the Peiwar Kotal the first part of the history of the Kurram Force comes to an end. The troops were all disposed in their winter quarters, and there was but little chance of any organised attack being made on any of the posts. The Peiwar Kotal was virtually secure; while the snow was on the ground, the Kurram garrison had no enemy except the cold wind; the camp at Hazir Pir was not within striking distance of the Mangals or other hostile tribe, and the only place where any trouble from marauders was to be expected was at Thull, where, though in our own old border, the camp was likely to be disturbed by thieves at night. The Waziris could hardly be expected to forego the chance of lifting a camel occasionally or slaughtering any unarmed follower they could find at a distance from camp; while the continuous stream of stores passing along the Miranzai valley between Kohat and Thull offered a perpetual temptation to the Zymukht tribes, who had on several occasions made small raids into our territory, and as no notice had been taken of these, beyond ascertaining who the offenders in each case were, it might be expected that the difficulties would increase rather than diminish when the tribes concerned found that attacks could be made with impunity.

The construction of the road on the left bank of the river between Hazir Pir and Thull offered additional facilities to these



robbers to continue their predatory habits; hitherto they had been at some distance from the line of traffic in this direction, but now it was to be brought to the foot of their hills. The 23rd Pioneers were employed at this time in making the road on this bank across the difficult portion about ten miles from Thull. As yet they had not been interfered with in any way, but they they were quite capable of taking care of themselves and their work.

Every arrangement having been made for the troops in their winter quarters, General Roberts proceeded to visit Thull and the base of operations at Kohat.

The camp at Thull had been moved at the outset of the campaign to a small plateau overlooking the cultivated bed of the river, so as to be able to protect the bridge over the Kurram. The time that had lapsed since then had been employed in putting the place into a state of defence, by building a stone wall on the river edge of the plateau, and by clearing the spur of the hill that commanded the camp to the north, and making a hedge of brushwood round the crest, within which the outlying pickets were posted.

The plateau had been cleared of all the loose stones, with which roads were lined out, and houses and walls built. The Commissariat Department was enclosed in a thick hedge of briars. The Ordnance Park was also protected in a similar way. A small bazaar had sprung up, and the place was beginning to assume quite a civilised appearance.

The small garrison that had held it, however, was quite inadequate to the extent of ground to be protected, and occasionally the outlying pickets were unable to be relieved from sheer want of men, when any large demand for escorts for commissariat convoys, which were of frequent occurrence, had reduced the number of available effectives.

The garrison at this time consisted of the 29th Regiment Punjab Native Infantry, and a wing of the 14th Bengal Lancers,

which had taken the place of the wing of the 5th Punjab Cavalry, which had been stationed here, and which had now returned to Kohat.

Till the return of the left wing of the 29th Punjab Native Infantry, a wing of the 2nd Native Infantry (Queen's Own) had for a time formed part of the garrison, but this wing had also returned to Kohat. The left half-battery of F/A Royal Horse Artillery were also in the camp.

Though the thorn-hedges inside the camp served effectually as barriers to enclose the ground allotted for different purposes, yet they were not without their drawbacks, as was discovered when the telegraph-tent was burned down.

This tent and an adjoining hut of grass were burnt one night by a drunken signaller, who lost his life. They were situated in a space about 50 yards wide, between the Commissariat and Ordnance Park tents, which were enclosed by hedges, as already stated. Luckily, there was no wind on this occasion, or else the tents which contained rum on the one hand, and those with ordnance stores and powder on the other, must have suffered. After this, these hedges were moved and replaced by walls.

The road to Kohat was still being made in places, though for most of the distance it had been lined out as a thirty-feet road.

Its construction was not at this time very satisfactory; a ditch had been cut at each side of the road, and the earth thrown into the centre but as there had been no rain, the soft soil had become fine dust. In order to give some solidity to this, a track of ten feet had been overlaid with loose shingle, but the result was no better, as the traffic which should have worn this down into a hardened mass carefully avoided the road, and wandered either inside along the soft edge, or found more desirable firmer ground to the sides. To improve matters, a layer of dwarf palm leaves was strewn along the top of the shingle, and again sprinkled with earth to keep the fronds down; and thus

it was hoped the difficulty was overcome, but even this did not tempt the drivers of the postal mail-cart or of the hackeries to venture upon it if it could be avoided. Notwithstanding these difficulties, the mail-cart generally managed to accomplish the distance of sixty-three miles to Kohat in seven hours, which was a very fair rate of speed, especially as the continuous stream of hackeries going and coming, which were sure to have halted or broken down in some narrow part of the road, often made unnecessary delays.

It was hoped that when the rain should come the road would improve, but this expectation was not realised, as that which fell at last on the 1st March only turned the loose dust into mud, and the soft soil of the fields through which the track was taken, into a hopeless morass, effectually stopping traffic while it continued, and for some time after, till it had begun to dry up again.

Walled serais, for the protection of the hackeries at night and for the convenience of travellers, were in course of construction at the various encamping-grounds, and police were entertained and stationed in watch-towers at intervals along the road, to protect it and the telegraph-line from injury. The telegraph-wires were never cut in this part of the line, after these precautionary measures had been adopted, though in other respects the road-police were unable to do anything as regards the prevention of raids and thefts.

It was evident, however, that if the communications of the Kurram force were to be kept up in a satisfactory manner, more troops than those now available would be required, and the timely diversion of the Punjab chiefs' contingent from the Khyber line, on which they were to have been stationed, to the Kurram force, relieved any anxiety on this score, and set free for field operations troops that would otherwise have been kept in the rear.

The loyal co-operation of the Punjab chiefs, in placing their

states and troops at the disposal of the British Government, furnished most opportunely the men that were required for this particular duty. It was not, perhaps, one that they would have selected, as the Sikhs would have preferred to have been put into the fighting-line, and had a chance of renewing their enmity with their national foe; but as they had undertaken to be of use, they performed willingly and cheerfully what fell to them in the way of duty.

The Punjab Chiefs' Contingent arrived at Kohat on the 9th February, and half was sent to Bannu on the 13th February, in order to strengthen the force there in case the Waziris should feel disposed to give any further trouble.

The detailed account of the work done by this Contingent, which has been kindly prepared for me by Major W. Anderson, Assistant Adjutant-General of the force, is given in original in Chapter XI., and is most interesting, as forming a record of the loyalty of the various Punjab chiefs, which deserves to be handed down to posterity. The command of the force had been given to Colonel Watson, C.B., V.C., commanding Central Indian Horse, with the rank of Brigadier-General.

His staff consisted of Major Anderson, Assistant Adjutant-General; Captain V. Revay, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General; Captain Pearson, R.A., in charge of the artillery of the Contingent. Captain Massey was the Political Officer, and Surgeon-Major Deane the Medical Officer.

The troops composing the Contingent had been armed with Enfield rifles from the Ferozpur arsenal, while the artillery were furnished with S. B. bronze guns of various calibres from thence and from the Peshawar arsenal.

The troops of the Contingent detailed for the Kurram valley marched for Thull on the 14th, and reached that place on the 19th, in time to be inspected by General Roberts, who arrived at Kohat on the 20th February.

*Redistribution of Troops in Brigades.*

D. O. No. 591.—February 19th.—“The following dispositions will take place from the date of the receipt of this order, which will be communicated to officers commanding posts by brigade-majors and station staff-officers.

“The 2nd Brigade will consist of troops in advance of Kurram from Habib Killa to Alikheyl.

“All other troops across the frontier, at Kurram, Hazir Pir, and on the road from Kurram to Thull, will belong to the 1st Brigade. Head-quarters at Hazir Pir. The troops of the Kurram Valley Force in British territory at Thull and Kohat, will be under the command of Brigadier-General Watson, C.B., and V.C.”

*Conservancy Dead Animals.*

D. O. No. 595.—“The Major-General directs the attention of officers commanding posts and stations to the necessity for seeing that dead camels, or other baggage animals, are buried or otherwise satisfactorily disposed of. It is the duty of transport officers to see this done, but it is equally the duty of commanding officers to see that it is done, and the Major-General will hold them responsible in the matter.”

*Transport Cavalry Details.*

D. O. 599.—February 21st.—“The officer commanding 14th Bengal Lancers will detail one duffadar, one lance-duffadar, and nine sowars for duty with the Transport Train.

“These men to report themselves to the Superintendent of Transport at Thull.

“Pending further orders, the men will consider themselves permanently attached to the Transport Train.

“The sowars at Ahmed-i-Shama and Jallamai will return to regimental head-quarters on being relieved by the cavalry of the Punjab Chiefs' Contingent.”

The Kohat garrison at this time consisted of the 5th Punjab Infantry, squadron 9th Lancers, left wing 2/8th King's, left half battery G/3 Royal Artillery, and the head-quarter wing of the 14th Bengal Lancers—all of which troops belonged to the Kurram Field Force—and also of H.M.'s 92nd Gordon Highlanders, and the 2nd Native Infantry, Queen's Own Light Infantry. These latter regiments had not been detailed as yet to join the Field Force, and remained under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, but the 92nd Highlanders were only waiting their orders for field service, which they shortly after received, and then the regiment came under the orders of General Roberts, who inspected it and the various troops of his command during his stay at Kohat.

The command of the station of Kohat, which usually devolved on the senior officer present of the regiments of the Punjab Frontier Force at that place, was now given to Colonel Osborne Wilkinson, commanding 3rd regiment Bengal Cavalry.

The remaining days in February passed without any events worthy of record. Every department was working to get matters ready for the looked-for advance in the spring, and though the troops were resting in their winter quarters, the supply branches of the force were taking advantage of the cessation of the movements of men, to utilise as far as possible the whole of the available transport in getting a two months' supply to the forward base at Kurram. Every effort was made to add to the number of country carts employed between Kohat and Thull. About 2,000 of these were now running; but in fair weather it took nearly a fortnight for the journey there and back, and in rainy weather the time of transit was considerably increased. The roads being heavy it was not possible to load the carts beyond the minimum weight of twenty maunds (16 cwt.) for four bullocks, and even then at some of the nullahs additional bullocks were required to take the carts up the banks.

The camels of the force were utilised as far as possible on

the road between Thull and Kurram, and this necessary employment helped to diminish their numbers. To replace losses, camels were purchased by the civil authorities in the Bannu district, but a large percentage of these were found unfitted for the work, and soon died off when used. In addition to hired carts, the Commissariat made arrangements with owners of local transport for the conveyance of stores, as also with the Cabul Povindiahs, but not many of the latter were employed. The majority of the animals thus engaged belonged to the Jowaki section of the Afridis, a tribe whom it had been necessary to punish severely the previous winter, and who now were recouping themselves for their losses by honest labour.

The arrangement made with the local transport owners was for the carriage at two rupees a maund of stores between Kohat and Thull, and it was curious to observe their animals, laden with double the load prescribed for Government camels, going along without any difficulty, while the deserted and dead camels on the roads showed that the work was too much for those employed by Government. The whole secret lay in the fact that these animals were used to the climate and food of the country, also that the private owners of camels knew how much each could do, and in addition to the unfettered liberty of the beast, who was allowed to roam along the road at his own pace, they halted at frequent intervals, and where forage was scarce they supplemented it with liberal food. The Government camels were tied in a string, head to the tail of the preceding one, and thus all had to go along at the same pace, whether they were equal to it or not, and being tied, could not stop to pick up a bit of food by the wayside. They had to perform the regular march without the loads being eased, and on arrival in camp were only allowed, if their owners chose to pay for it, two pounds of barley per camel, much too small a ration when the size of the animal is considered. It must be remembered, however, that barley was not a part of their customary food, and

a larger ration of it, if it could have been given, would have most likely been as fatal to them as the want of suitable diet. The most fatal disease they suffered from was inflammation of the lungs, induced no doubt by the cold; but enteric disease in the way of diarrhœa, also carried off a good number. Others broke down without any perceptible disease.

Though the want of food may in some cases have killed off the camels, yet it could not have altogether been from this cause that the chief mortality occurred; as in the Punjab Chiefs' Contingent, in which no expense was spared to feed the baggage animals, the mortality was as great. The explanation must be therefore looked for in more general natural causes, and the severity of the weather, much felt by animals bred in the warmer plains of the Punjab, would, most likely, joined to the change of diet, be sufficient to account for it. In some cases the cold affected the lungs, and in others the stomach, the camels having to sit all night on the cold frozen ground. Their warm clothing, though it protected their flanks, could not possibly prevent the cold striking up into the lower portion of their stomachs, and thus causing internal injury of a more or less serious nature.

When a camel once loses his condition it requires a whole year's rest and nourishment to bring him round. As this treatment cannot be pursued in the field, the animal has to work until he can do so no longer, and when his mind is made up on this point, he sits down and refuses to move on any pretence whatever. The camel-men can tell at a glance when this stage has arrived, and taking off the load and saddle, leave the animal to his fate. Sometimes after having remained seated for two or three days, the poor beast will muster up energy enough to get on his legs and look for food, when he is probably driven off by the nearest villagers, either to be taken care of, or generally to be killed and eaten; but the usual fate in store for him is to die where he has succumbed, leaving his carcase to taint the air,



till even the vultures, surfeited with *toujours chameau*, refuse to do their accustomed work.

The weather had remained perfectly fine during the month of February, too much so in fact, as the failure of the usual winter rain in the Punjab had prevented agricultural operations and threatened future scarcity, owing to which the prices of food supplies were raised to famine rates, involving much hardship to the people, and affecting the Commissariat Department. This state of affairs was relieved somewhat by the welcome arrival of the rain, which came on the 1st of March, at a time when military movements were all suspended. The rain in the lower valleys, and, in fact, all over the Punjab, fell as snow on the Peiwar Kotal, and in the upper part of the Kurram valley; but coming late as it did, it did not remain on the ground at Kurram or Habib Killa, and soon melted off. At the Peiwar Kotal of course it did not melt, and gradually increased till there was about three feet of snow in the sheltered parts, and more where it had drifted, till it had overtopped the line of breastwork made to keep out the Mangals. The cold was of course most severe in this Arctic weather, but now that the night duties were reduced to the ordinary routine the garrison did not suffer to any great extent; in fact, the health of the British troops improved in the bracing air.

The rain lasted at Kohat for nearly three days, with heavy thunderstorms at intervals, and when it cleared off, on the 3rd of March, it took with it the last of the winter, and the spring weather set in, which had been looked forward to for the renewal of active operations, from the date when the passes should be free from snow.

On the night of the 2nd March, a raid was made by some men of the Alisherzais and Mamuzais, sections of the Orakzai Afridis, on the serai which had been built as a protection for the transport carriages and animals at Gandiour, about nine miles from Thull.

The wall enclosing the space where the carts were collected had been built, but as yet no gates had been put up, so that there was nothing except a small guard in the serai itself, which had a round bastion or tower overlooking the cart enclosure at one end, to prevent anyone from going in.

A party of about 150 men came down about 8 o'clock P.M., when there was a half-moon to give light, and going into the enclosure commenced killing and wounding right and left.

The guard in the serai was not strong enough to venture out to the assistance of the unarmed followers and mule-men who were being slaughtered, and they remained inactive inside their post, which had a gate. After killing four commissariat servants and one police constable, and wounding seven mule-men, the raiders retired, carrying off with them twenty-nine mules, and escaped without any loss, the guard not venturing to pursue them.

After this experience this post was strengthened by half a troop of cavalry of the Sikh Contingent, and it was unmolested for the future.

March 4th.—In view of the expected spring operations it was necessary that the various detachments which had been separated for road-making and other purposes should be collected again. The 15th of March was the date originally fixed for the reassembly of the force at Kurram, and in advance of that place, and the following orders were published giving effect to this arrangement.

#### *Movements.*

D. O. No. 613.—“Camp Kurram, 4th March.

“The following movements are ordered:—

“1. Wing 29th Punjab Native Infantry from Thull to Chapri or other convenient site, when carriage is available. To work on road towards Manduri. Head-quarters to remain at Thull.

"2. Half F/A Royal Horse Artillery from Thull to the camp of the 23rd Pioneers (at Manduri) on the 8th instant.

"3. Half F/A Royal Horse Artillery, 23rd Pioneers, and 7th company Sappers and Miners, to reach Shinnak (opposite Hazir Pir) on Sunday 9th instant, Ibrahimzai on 10th, and Kurram on the 11th; not to march before 9 A.M. on the 11th instant.

"4. 21st Punjab Native Infantry to cross the river from Hazir Pir to Shinnak as soon as carriage is available, and work on the road towards Alizai. When the services of this regiment are no longer required on the road, it will march to Kurram.

"5. Head-quarters 1st Brigade, half F/A Royal Horse Artillery, No. 1 Mountain Battery, and wing of 72nd Highlanders, to march from Hazir Pir, reaching Badesh Kheyl on Sunday 9th, Wali Dad's Fort Monday 10th, and Kurram on Tuesday 11th instant, not later than 8 A.M.

"6. Wing of 72nd Highlanders to proceed to Habib Killa on 12th instant.

"7. 12th Bengal Cavalry and the company 5th Punjab Infantry now at Hazir Pir, to remain there till the commissariat stores have all been removed from that place, then the troops will march to Kurram.

"8. The squadron 9th Lancers and 5th Punjab Infantry will march from Kohat on the 6th, and on arrival at Manduri will halt there for further orders. To arrive at Manduri on 12th instant."

#### *Stages on Thull-Kurram Road.*

D. O. No. 614.—"The following stages for camel-convoys for the new road along the left bank of the river are published for information.

	Miles.
1. Thull to Chapri . . . .	7
2. Chapri to Alizai . . . .	12
3. Alizai to Shinnak . . . .	6
4. Shinnak to Badesh Kheyl . .	9
5. Badesh Kheyl to Wali Mahomed Fort . . . . .	7
6. Wali Mahomed Fort to Kurram .	10
	—
	51 miles."

*Escorts—Officers'.*

D. O. No. 617.—“The following instructions regarding escorts for officers travelling are published for general information.

“The officers commanding at Badesh Kheyl and Wali Mahommed's Fort will see that they are duly observed.

“1. Officers travelling on duty or on pass must be properly armed, and will be allowed an escort of one sowar from post to post.

“2. No separate escort will be allowed for baggage; it must either accompany the owners or be sent with a commissariat convoy.

“3. Except in case of urgent necessity, no escort should leave a post so late in the day that it cannot return before dusk.

“4. Travelling after dark is forbidden, except when required by the public service.”

*Staff Officers not to act as Press Correspondents.*

D. O. No. 620.—“Under instructions from His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India, staff-officers serving with troops in the field are prohibited from undertaking the duties of newspaper correspondents. This order applies to all staff-

officers, whether general, personal, or belonging to the civil departments of the army."

D. O. No. 626.—March 7th.—"Brigadier-General A. H. Cobbe resumed command of the 1st Brigade on the 2nd March, 1879."

*Transport—Private Carriage Charges.*

D. O. No. 628.—March 8th.—"It is notified, in accordance with Commissary-General's letter No. 1241, dated Lahore, 18th February 1879, that private carriage must be paid for by officers and others at the rates at which it has been engaged. When not required by the officers it may be used for Government purposes, and paid for by the State."

*Officers to be armed.*

D. O. No. 629.—March 8th.—"The Major-General directs that officers are invariably to be armed whenever they leave the precincts of their camps. He has lately observed that some officers do not consider it necessary to put on their revolvers when walking or riding."

*Conservancy Camping-grounds.*

D. O. No. 630.—"Officers commanding posts are required to see that the camping-grounds are kept clean, and clear of dung and litter. If necessary, they are authorised to hire local labour for the purpose, the cost being recovered by contingent bills on the Field Treasure-chest, which are to be submitted through the Assistant Quartermaster-General of the force.

March 8th.—The three guns, F/A Royal Horse Artillery, under Captain Harvey, marched this day to Manduri, as ordered. The road crossed a steep ascent to the west of Thull, over one of the spurs of the Kadi Mukh mountain, which ran down to the edge of the river, and finished there in a precipitous front, along which it would have been difficult at the outset to make

the road. The ascent was known as the Kafir Kotal, and it began shortly after leaving Thull to wind up an open valley, till it reached the pass at its head, at a distance of about five miles. The descent on the further side down to the river-bank was about half a mile, and rather steep, several sharp zigzags having to be made on the side of the ravine in which it was taken, to keep the road in the ravine. The guns crossed this path with some difficulty, the horses being rather out of condition, as forage had been very scarce at Thull, and some of the waggon trains were much tried during the rest of the march, which continued along the bank of the river at varying elevations, and especially towards the end, where at a mile and a half before reaching Manduri, another steep ascent cut in the face of an almost perpendicular pudding-stone cliff, required several halts before it was surmounted. The road was not more than ten feet wide along the face of the cliff, and it had to be taken high up to avoid the labour of cutting down large masses of the hard rock, of which they consisted. The camp of the wing 29th Punjab Native Infantry was passed at Chapri, at seven miles from Thull, and the escort of the 14th Bengal Lancers, which had accompanied the guns, returned from this point, the dangerous part of the road having been got over.

There was no village, or anything in particular, to fix the locality of Chapri, which was represented only by the camp of the wing of the 29th Punjab Native Infantry, who had been employed in making the Kafir Kotal road. The name is a common one, and is applied to any collection of temporary huts, known as chappurs. Subsequently a serai and fortified post was built with the same name, about a mile from the spot on which the 29th had camped.

The camp of the 23rd Pioneers at Manduri was pitched on a low plateau, in the open gorge of a valley leading into the Zymukht country, not far from the village, which was merely a collection of a dozen huts, from which the name of the camp was

taken. It was a trial to the tired horses to have to drag the carriages up the stony bank of the plateau, but some of the 23rd Pioneers were turned out to assist, and the half battery were all in camp by 3 P.M. There had been some showers on the march, and later, when the tents were pitched, the rain came on heavily and lasted till the middle of the night.

Colonel Lindsay, R.H.A., commanding the artillery, and his adjutant, Lieutenant Osborne, who were returning from inspection duty at Kohat, accompanied the half battery.

The Pioneers had been employed in making the new road along the face of the cliff already referred to, and also in the difficult parts of the next day's march, where a good quantity of blasting had been required.

March 9th.—The rain having stopped in the middle of the night, the march was resumed at 10 A.M. The 7th company Sappers and Miners led the way, then the Artillery, to be followed by the 23rd Pioneers and the baggage.

A difficult ascent and descent just at the village of Manduri, outside the camp, over a projecting ridge of rocks, delayed the guns somewhat, and several others, in which additional leaders required to be hooked on, still further kept them back; so the Pioneers were allowed to pass by them at the first place where, the road not being finished, along an overhanging cliff, obliged the guns to take to the bed of the river. A party of the 21st Punjab Infantry were at work here.

The rest of the route, with the exception of another somewhat similar place, was along the alluvial bank of the river, and consequently presented no difficulty. There were signs of cultivation in terraced fields occasionally, but no houses or villages were passed, till the village of Alizai, about seven miles from Manduri, was reached. A serai was in course of construction here, being built by local labour. The workmen were cheered at their work by the pleasing sounds of a drum and a surinai or reed pipe, on which the musicians played vigorously,

the workmen occasionally responding at the telling passages by a vigorous cheer, which seemed to lighten their labour.

The track, which had followed the river, was now turned in a northerly direction, still keeping on the bank, but the cultivation had increased in proportion with the width of the alluvial bank, and several villages in a more or less ruinous condition were passed. There was no difficulty of any kind on the road, which as a rule kept along the top of the cultivated land at the foot of the stony slopes and spurs, though occasionally, it was necessary to take it across the fields to avoid too long détours. Towards the end of the march it left the river, and was taken up a side ravine which brought the drainage of the Zymukht hills into the Kurram, and crossing this, which was nearly dry, turned again towards the river along the side of an elevated plateau, on the summit of which, nearly opposite the camp at Hazir Pir, was the camp of the 21st Punjab Native Infantry at Shinnak. This was a long march, the distance being about sixteen miles, and though the road, with the exception of the ascents, was fairly good, the march occupied from 10 A.M. till 4 P.M. The baggage, however, was not up till nearly 6 P.M., nor the rear-guard, owing to the camels breaking down, till 8 P.M. To add to the discomfort of those whose tents had remained behind, rain began at 6 P.M., and continued all night.

•      *Grain for Regimental Mules.*

D. O. No. 631.—March 9th.—“The Executive Commissariat Officer is authorised to issue three seers of dhal daily for each of the regimental mules of the 5th Goorkhas.”

The allowance for the ration of transport mules was only one seer a day, but the mules of the 5th Goorkhas, as of the regiments of the Punjab Frontier Force, were of a larger description, and required more food in the absence of grass at Kurram than the smaller transport animals.



March 10th.—The camp at Shinnak was on a fine open plateau, about 150 yards wide and a mile and a half long, raised about 100 feet above the level of the alluvial bank of the Kurram, which it overlooked on the west, the plateau being north and south. On the eastern side was the valley in which the road lay, which gradually ascended further on to the level of the plateau. This was composed of pudding-stone, but overgrown with grass and small plants, while the sides, which were at an angle of  $45^{\circ}$ , were well clothed with larger bushes. As an open site for a camp it could not be surpassed, and the view from it looking up the Kurram valley north to the Safaid Koh was very lovely, when the clouds and rain clearing away, showed the line of the high range glistening in the light. The air full of moisture softened the distant colouring of the mountains, which, instead of being bare and light-coloured, with dark patches where the pines grew, now appeared in varying hues of blue and purple. The old native track ran along the foot of the western slope, and by it ran a watercourse which supplied the camp with water. The village of Shinnak lay nestled here in a grove of mulberry and other trees, which were just beginning to come into leaf. The tents had been too much wetted to think of marching to-day, and the morning had not been bright enough to dry them before the rain came on again at 2 P.M. and continued till 8 P.M., when it stopped.

March 11th.—The 23rd Pioneers and the three guns F/A continued their march towards Kurram. The 21st Punjab Native Infantry marched to Alizai to work at the road-making in that neighbourhood, and the 7th company of Sappers was ordered to return to Manduri, to complete some blasting operations which were beyond the power of the working party of the 21st on that section of the road.

The Major-General and staff arrived at Shinnak at 2 P.M., from Manduri.

*The Nabha Contingent ordered to Badesh Kheyl.*

D. O. No. 635.—March 11th.—“ Brigadier-General Watson, C.B., V.C., is requested to make the necessary arrangements for the Nabha Contingent to move to Badesh Kheyl by the following stages :—

“ To Chapri, Sunday the 16th instant.

„ Alizai, the 17th instant.

„ Badesh Kheyl, the 18th instant.

“ The Contingent to halt at Badesh Kheyl till further orders.

*“ Movements of Troops.*

“ The 5th Punjab Infantry and squadron 9th Lancers will march to Kurram by the following stages :—To Chapri, Saturday 15th instant ; Alizai, 16th ; Badesh Kheyl, 17th ; Wali Mahomed's Fort, 18th ; Kurram, 19th.”

The wing of the 29th Punjab Native Infantry at Chapri was ordered to Manduri to prepare a site for the camp of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, who was shortly to arrive at Kurram on a tour of inspection, and the head-quarter wing of the 21st were also ordered to return to Shinnak for a similar purpose, while the left wing of this regiment was to proceed from Badesh Kheyl under Captain Carruthers, who was stationed there with two companies, to Ibrahimzai, partly to keep the road in repair, as also to clear the site for the Commander-in-Chief's camp. The wings of the 21st Punjab Native Infantry were to remain at Shinnak and Ibrahimzai until further orders.

Under these arrangements strong bodies of troops were echeloned along the new road, so as to afford protection and security to the march of the Commander-in-Chief.

At the camp at Hazir Pir, on the opposite side of the river, there was only the 12th Bengal Cavalry and a small quantity of commissariat stores under Lieutenant Spence, Sub-Assistant Commissary-General, awaiting removal on the arrival of unladen camels from Kurram.

The troops which had been there had marched for Kurram, but were now detained at Badesh Kheyl, owing to the rain having made the road impassable.

Brigadier-General Watson, who had been paying a flying visit to the Kurram valley and the Peiwar Kotal, met General Roberts at Shinnak, and, as the Commander-in-Chief was expected shortly at Thull, the two generals returned to that place.

Colonel Lindsay, R.H.A., commanding the artillery, did not, however, accompany the Major-General, but was ordered to await his arrival at Kurram.

The road from Shinnak to Badesh Kheyl passed over somewhat similar country to the last march, but the cultivated land being of greater extent, the path had to be taken more often across it. For four miles at first it was very good, then for two miles it led through the fields, passing at some distance from most of the villages, which were situated on the river-bank about three-quarters of a mile distant.

The road was then, as usual, taken along the upper edge of the rice-fields, along the side of the stony bank, for two miles. There was more wood here than in any other part, mixed with large-grown dwarf palms. The rice-fields had again to be crossed for a mile before the village of Saddur was reached. Here the road, which had been fairly dry up to this point, became very soft, and the guns were only able to get along it by means of a track of brushwood, which prevented the wheels from sinking in too far. The road passed outside the village, and soon after crossed the Kermanah river, where some labourers were employed in paving the ramp leading down to the ford.

The troops from Hazir Pir had been camped before the rain set in, on the terraced rice-fields on the other side of this river, which, when dry, had afforded a good place for a camp, but the banked fields became ponds when the rain fell on the 9th, and

the soft soil retaining the water soon became a spongy mud, which was not pleasant to live in. Till the rain stopped the tents could not be shifted, but as soon as possible more suitable hard and stony ground was selected, half a mile further on, where, though the rain fell continuously from the night of the 12th for thirty hours, the troops suffered no inconvenience. The camp-followers and mule-men were not so well off, and their spare blankets, which were pitched as shelter-tents, gave but little protection from the rain, while the want of the blanket made the cold more intense, as the surrounding mountains were covered with snow. The rain continued for six hours on the night of the 14th, but the day being tolerably fine the 12th Bengal Cavalry brought in the convoy of the commissariat stores from Hazir Pir, and went on to camp at Ibrahimzai, two miles beyond Badesh Kheyl. The 23rd Pioneers had been camped half-way between these places, but they marched on the morning of the 15th, and halted four miles short of Kurram to improve the road at that point. The troops in the Badesh Kheyl camp marched on the same day to Wali Mahommed's Fort, and camped on a stony drainage surface, cut up into channels covered with long grass, about 400 yards from the fort.

This place, previously known as Wali Dad's Fort, was less defensible than most similar ones, being merely a square mud building, with faces of about sixty yards, and a wall of fifteen feet high. There was even no protection to the gateway, nor were there any loop-holes or platform of any kind to stand on to fire over the wall. In the centre of the fort, as previously mentioned, was a tall well-built square tower, which commanded a good view all round, and gave an appearance of strength to the fort.

The gateway led into a walled passage, which divided the fort into two parts. These were sub-divided into two smaller squares on the one side and three on the other, opening on to

the central passage with doorways. There were some habitable rooms in a small building at the right-hand of the gateway, with coloured glass windows, and in the squares there were huts along the walls for the garrison. This plan of building walls across the interior of forts had the advantage of breaking the force of the winter wind, and so keeping the place warmer than it could otherwise have been.

On the 16th March, Brigadier-General Cobbe, with F/A, No. 1 Mountain Battery, the wing of the 72nd, the 5th Punjab Cavalry, and the 12th Bengal Cavalry, marched into Kurram. The road from Wali Mahommed's Fort avoided the river-bed, and was taken in a direct line across the open undulating country which sloped down from the Kermanah range, crossing the Kermanah nullah about two miles from Kurram, at some distance from its junction with the Kurram river. The camp at Kurram was pitched about a mile from the fort, on an open level between two drainage dry watercourses. The tents of the 12th Bengal Cavalry were, however, pitched on the bank of the stream about half a mile from the fort, where the force had been encamped in December. The wing of the 72nd did not remain at Kurram, but marched on the 17th March to rejoin their regimental head-quarters at Habib Killa, their place in the camp being taken by the 23rd Pioneers.

#### *Charges for Commissariat Supplies.*

D. O. No. 641.—March 13th.—Extract from Controller Military Accounts Circular No. 442, dated 2nd January 1879.—“Charges for rations issued to native troops to be supported by the receipts of commanding officers, which should contain a certificate that the rations drawn are for the *bonâ fide* consumption of the men for whom free rations are authorised, if the details usually afforded in indents cannot be conveniently given.

“When extra rations are indented for, the quantities supplied should be specified in the commanding officer's certificate, which

should also contain a note of the month's general state, in which the value of the supplies will be credited. A similar course should be followed when extra supplies are made to officers and individuals.

“In respect to the value of supplies for which payment has to be made, and the hire of private carriage, it is desirable, in the case of officers, individuals, and troops who are in account with the Pay Department, that credit should be afforded in ‘General States and Pay Bills.’

“Recoveries on account of extra supplies, rations, &c. for officers and followers should be made at the rates given in Commissary-General's Circular No. 11, which will be sent to the regiments.

“Private carriage will be charged for as follows :—

“Each camel, 15 Rs. per mensem.

„ mule, 13 „ „

*Detail of Troops for advance on Cabul*

D. O. No. 642.—March 16th.—“Camp Thull

“Under instructions from army head-quarters, the following troops will form the column detailed in view to an advance on Cabul :—

	F/A Royal Horse Artillery.
Artillery	G/3 Royal Artillery.
	No. 2 Mountain Battery.
	Squadron 9th Lancers.
“Cavalry	12th Bengal Cavalry.
	( 14th Bengal Lancers.
“Infantry,	72nd Highlanders.
1st Brigade	5th Goorkhas.
	28th Punjab Native Infantry.
“Infantry,	92nd Highlanders.
2nd Brigade	5th Punjab Infantry.
	21st Punjab Native Infantry.

“Infantry, { 23rd Pioneers.  
2nd Brigade { 7th company Sappers.

*“Scale of Sick Transport.”*

“The above will take with them doolies and dandies on the following scale :—

5 doolies	}	per cent of strength of
2 dandies		British troops.
5 dandies	}	per cent of strength of
2 doolies		Native troops.

“The Kahars are to be selected under the orders of the Deputy Surgeon General, and are all to be in every respect fit for active service.

“The Deputy Surgeon-General will be good enough to issue the necessary orders to have corps completed with sick transport on the above scale.”

*Reserve of Doolie-Bearers.*

D. O. No. 646.—March 18th.—“On the recommendation of the Deputy Surgeon-General, the principal commissariat officer is requested to take a reserve of ten per cent. ~~on~~ the total number of doolie-bearers directed to accompany the corps detailed for the advancing column.”

*Command of Posts.*

D. O. No. 647.—“Officers passing through a post, though of superior rank to the officer in permanent command, are forbidden to interfere with his local arrangements and orders, except in case of an attack or threatened attack, when the senior officer present will at once take command of all the troops available.

“Transport officers will exercise their right of command in such a case, although they are attached to the civil department of the army.”

March 22nd.—The Commander-in-Chief, Sir Frederick Paul

Haines, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., C.I.E., reached Kurram with the Army Head-quarter Staff, consisting of Major-General Lumsden, C.B., C.S.I., Adjutant-General, Colonel T. Gordon, C.S.I., Deputy Adjutant-General, Colonel Preston, Military Secretary, Major-General C. Johnson, C.B., Quartermaster-General, Colonel Macgregor, C.B., C.S.I., C.I.E., Assistant Quartermaster-General, Surgeon-General Ker Innes, C.B. Dr. Bradshaw. Aides-de-camp—Captain McCall, Captain Grant, and Captain Haines.

General Roberts and the staff of the Kurram Field Force accompanied the Commander-in-Chief from Thull. On nearing Kurram the Commander-in-Chief was met by Brigadier-General Cobbe and the Brigade staff. The troops were ordered to parade for the inspection of the Commander-in-Chief at 3 P.M., on a piece of ground about a mile to the north of the Kurram Fort.

This ground had been prepared, to a certain extent, by having some of the surface stones cleared off from the marching-past line, but no amount of labour could have turned it into a parade-ground, the ground being seamed with water-channels old and new. The banks of some of these were smoothed down to allow the cavalry and artillery to move past more easily, but nothing more was attempted.

The troops were drawn up in two lines, the infantry consisting of one company 72nd Highlanders, 5th Punjab Infantry, 23rd Pioneers, and 5th Goorkhas in the first line, under Brigadier-General Cobbe; while in the second line, under Colonel H. Gough, were F/A Royal Horse Artillery, the squadron 9th Lancers, the 12th Bengal Cavalry, the wing 3rd Punjab Cavalry, and No. 1 Mountain Battery.

The troops all turned out as smart as possible, the Horse Artillery, 72nd Highlanders, and the squadron 9th Lancers as neat and clean as on parade in India, while the native troops were in no way behind them. The 5th Punjab Infantry turned out in their posteens, which, adding to the size of the men, gave



them the appearance of being physically bigger than the 23rd Pioneers, but these left nothing to be desired in their appearance.

After the usual parade movements commanding officers were called to the front, and the Commander-in-Chief, addressing General Roberts, complimented him on the appearance of the troops, and expressed his satisfaction at meeting them in sight of the Peiwar Kotal, where their gallant action was fought. The troops who had formed part of the attacking force, but who were not on parade, were not omitted as regards their share of the praise bestowed.

The Commander-in-Chief alluded to the remarkable good conduct of the Kurram Field Force, not an instance of any complaint as regards the behaviour of the men having been brought to his notice. At the same time he said that the other columns of the Cabul force had behaved equally well, and that though they had not had the good luck which had fallen to the Kurram Force, yet they merited as much praise, as in no way was their conduct behind that of the Kurram troops.

The appearance of the 23rd Pioneers was then referred to, and Colonel Currie was complimented on the excellent way in which his regiment had marched past, as if they had never been off the drill-ground, though instead of this they had done excellent service in road-making.

The troops were then dismissed, and the Chief inspected the fort and the ordnance depôt, taking a look on the way at Captain Woodthorpe's map of the Kurram and Khost valleys. The Native Field Hospital, which was located in the fort, was then visited, bringing the day's proceedings to a close. Next morning, Sunday the 23rd, the hospitals of all the troops in camp were inspected, after which the Commander-in-Chief and General Roberts, with their respective staffs, marched to Habib Killa, escorted by the 5th Punjab Infantry, the 23rd Pioneers, and a detachment of the 11th Native Infantry, which had come from Kohat as escort to the Commander-in-Chief's camp.

The day was very hot, and the march very trying to the camels, many of whom gave up by the way. The head-quarter and General Roberts' camps were pitched on the stony slope below the cantonment, side by side; those of the escort near them wherever the ground admitted of tents being pitched, but this was not an easy matter. After 3 p.m. the clouds, which had been gathering and falling in rain and snow on the hills all the morning, spread over the valley, but the rain did not begin to fall till 10 p.m.

March 24th.—It rained all night heavily, but this did not affect the ground in camp, as the water soon ran off the stones. About 10 a.m. it faired somewhat, but soon after the rain came on again and continued more or less all day. Six inches of snow fell on the Peiwar Kotāḍ this morning, and the road was reported to be too bad for His Excellency to attempt it. Colonel Baker, the Military Secretary to the Viceroy, and a party of officers, however, went up to see the place, though the day was very much against sight-seeing. Captain Rennick, Political Officer at Alikheyl, came into camp to see General Roberts. He reported the snow to be only two feet deep on the Shutargardan road, and melting rapidly. There had been no frost at Alikheyl for the last four nights. The greatest difficulty in regard to an early advance was the want of forage for the horses, but Captain Rennick expected to get enough of this to last for the time the troops would take to march from Alikheyl to the Logar valley, but if the advance took place at an early date there would be no fodder for the baggage animals.

The huts at Habib Killa, like all flat mud-roof ones, leaked very much after the previous dry weather, and the troops in them were not as well off as those in tents. The cantonment had been protected, after the threatened Mangal attack, by throwing up walls of stones on the southern side, and blocking all the open exits by the same kind of defence, so that the place was more secure against attack than previously. At the same

time, loose stone walls offer no great security, as they can as readily be demolished as they are put together.

March 25th.—The rain cleared off during the night, leaving the mountains standing out in an unbroken line of snow, dotted here and there by the outcropping rocks above, and the distant pine and other woods, which showed slight spots of shade beneath their white covering. As the sun rose the mass of Sikaram, which first received its rays, was lighted up, while its projecting spurs and buttresses threw bright blue shadows across the face of the mountain, forming a striking picture not likely to be forgotten by those who saw it.

The cold was, however, severe at this time of the morning; the wind blowing straight from the snow had not had time to lose its coldness, though later in the day the heat of the sun soon reduced it to a pleasant temperature. In the morning the Commander-in-Chief inspected the garrison of Habib Killa, formed by the 72nd, 2nd Punjab Infantry, and No. 2 Mountain Battery. He was particularly pleased with the 72nd Highlanders, and complimented Lieutenant-Colonel Brownlow on having such a fine regiment.

The 2nd Punjab Infantry were also praised, as also Captain Swinley's mountain battery.

When the inspection was over the Commander-in-Chief rode to the Peiwar Kotal, and inspected the wing of the 2/8th King's and the half battery of G/3 Royal Artillery.

His Excellency repeated some of the complimentary remarks about the Kurram Force; when addressing Colonel Drew after the inspection of the wing of his regiment, he praised the behaviour of his men, who had done their share towards the capture of the position they now held, and had kept it under circumstances of great hardship and discomfort. Colonel Drew asked to be allowed to return thanks for himself and his officers and men, for the honour that had been done the regiment by being thus addressed by their honorary colonel.

Notwithstanding that the snow was lying six inches deep and more everywhere—except on the paths, where it had been trodden into a muddy slush—the Commander-in-Chief visited one of the block-houses, and from it was able to take a bird's-eye view of the position, which was explained to him by General Thelwall. Shortly after this the party returned to Habib Killa, the descent of the steep road, which had been trodden into sticky mud about a foot deep, being rather worse than the ascent.

March 26th.—The inspection of the troops of the Kurram Field Force having now been concluded, the Commander-in-Chief began his return journey to India. In going to Kurram, however, instead of following the direct road across the valley, he was taken through Shaluzan, a collection of several detached villages on the bank of a torrent which debouched into the valley about half a mile above the village nearest to the foot of the hills. After riding across a bare desert stony plain, it was pleasant to come into a cultivated district, with fruit-trees of various kinds coming into blossom all round the houses. Most of the large trees were walnut, mulberry, and the “amlok.” The latter produces a small purple plum-like fruit, which is dried and shrivels up like a small indifferent prune, but the fruit has two or three seeds instead of a stone inside. The smaller trees were apricots and plums, white with blossom.

The Turi inhabitants of Shaluzan were well pleased to see the party riding through this place, and were civil to the best of their ability. After leaving this place the track led all along through thin cultivation at the side of a babbling stream, which gradually diminished in size till, at about three miles off, it had shrunk down to a shallow ditch about one foot wide and two inches deep, whereas the watercourse on leaving the village was about five feet wide and two feet deep. Some of the water had of course been diverted into side channels, which had thus reduced its volume, but as it was taken over stony shingly ground

further on, there must have been a great loss of water from percolation. A few spring flowers were beginning to show themselves among the stones that covered the plain, and the late rain had enabled the young grass to come up sufficiently to alter the colour of the ground at a distance, which began now to lose its bare and desolate appearance. A ride across the Kurram valley on a bright day in the spring was as pleasant a journey as one could wish for.

The 2nd Punjab Infantry, who had suffered much from exposure in the beginning of the campaign, were now ordered to be withdrawn from the Kurram Force, and their place was to be taken by the 11th Native Infantry. A detachment of this regiment had come up as escort to the Commander-in-Chief's camp, and this was now ordered to remain at Habib Killa, while their place was taken for the return march by two companies of the 2nd Punjab Infantry, to be followed later by the remainder of the regiment to Kohat.

General Roberts accompanied the Commander-in-Chief on his return journey as far as Shinnak, whence he returned, but Major Collett, Assistant Quartermaster-General, was ordered to remain at Peiwar, as the cantonment of Habib Killa was now ordered to be called, to prospect for sites in its neighbourhood where a permanent cantonment should be built.

March 27th.—The Commander-in-Chief marched for Badesh Kheyl at 6.30 A.M. During the night a party of Musazais came down to steal what they could from his camp, but finding it too well protected they went on a mile further and tried to attack the village of Saddur. The villagers turned out, sounding the alarm on their big kettle-drum, but they were able to drive off their assailants without any assistance from the camp. They wounded one man and captured another unhurt, both of whom were sent into Kurram in the afternoon. The Commander-in-Chief was so pleased with their conduct that he presented the village with 100 rupees, to be spent in rejoicings. The Mullah

Oomrao, whose house had been burnt by us, was in the village, but he had made his peace with General Roberts, and was acting as much now in our interests as he had been formerly opposed to them.

March 29th.—General Roberts returned from Shinnak, riding straight back to Kurram. It rained all day and night, making the road in a bad condition for riding, for where the road was taken across the cultivated fields the ground was like a bog, and elsewhere it was slippery.

Captain Rennick wrote that all was quiet at Alikheyl, and that the people there were anxious to assist in making the road for the advance. The orders for the commencement of the road had been published on the 24th instant, when the 23rd Pioneers were ordered to proceed to a village, Gobazan, beyond Zabbar-dast Killa, to remain there until the road to Alikheyl was reported fit for camels.

#### *Movements.*

D. O. No. 660.—March 24th.—“On the arrival of the 1st Bengal Cavalry at Kohat, the head-quarter wing 14th Bengal Lancers will march to Thull.”

#### *Movements.*

D. O. No. 661.—“Half C/4 Royal Artillery, with the 67th regiment, will march for Kurram as soon as possible after the arrival of the latter at Kohat.”

#### *Movements.*

D. O. No. 662.—“On the arrival of the 2nd Punjab Infantry at Thull—probable date 2nd April—two companies 2/8th King's will march from Kohat for Kurram. The remaining two companies 2/8th will remain at Kohat.”

#### *Transport—Carriage of extra Clothing and Blankets.*

D. O. No. 663.—“The Commissariat Department is authorised to supply two camels per cent. of strength of native troops,

for the carriage of extra blankets and warm clothing recently issued.

"The weight of each kit, including articles of extra clothing, should not exceed thirty-two pounds, and no camel is to be laden with more than ten such kits."

*Movements.*

D. O. No. 664.—"The 28th Punjab Native Infantry will march to Alikheyl by detachments, as carriage can be procured."

*Movements.*

D. O. No. 673.—March 26th.—"The 23rd Pioneers will move to Alikheyl by wings on Friday and Saturday next.

"The 72nd Highlanders will march to Alikheyl on Monday next, under instructions from the Assistant Quartermaster-General."

*Volunteering for Native Artillery.*

D. O. No. 676.—"The 2nd Punjab Infantry will halt to-morrow, for the purpose of giving volunteers to Nos. 1 and 2 Mountain Batteries."

*Captured Arms to be returned into Store.*

D. O. No. 691.—March 27th.—"The Major-General having been informed that some regiments have in their possession Enfield rifles captured from the enemy, officers commanding corps are directed to cause all such arms to be collected and returned into store to the ordnance depôts at Kohat, Thull, and Kurram."

The regiments returning these arms were compensated by payment for each repairable rifle.

*Information regarding Invalids, &c. to be sent to Kohat.*

D. O. No. 692.—"Whenever invalids or others are sent from the front to Kohat, officers commanding corps will see that the officer or non-commissioned officer in charge of such party

is furnished with documents showing the cause of their despatch and ultimate destination. Duplicate copies to be sent by post to the station staff-officer, for the information of the officer commanding."

*Movements.*

D. O. No. 693.—"Camp Kurram, 27th March.

"The following movements are ordered:—

"1. The 5th Goorkhas to Habib Killa (Peiwar) on Tuesday (April 1st), under orders which will be issued hereafter.

"2. The 21st Punjab Native Infantry to Kurram as soon as carriage can be supplied."

*Diminished Ration.*

D. O. No. 699.—"The ration for native troops will be continued at three-quarters of a seer only. Sanction is expected for a special rate of compensation for the quarter seer short issued. This rate will shortly be notified to the troops."

March 29th.—The movements which have been referred to in the foregoing orders had been caused by the necessity of occupying Alikheyl in force before the whole of the snow on the Shutargardan pass had been melted off, which might have allowed the enemy, had they been so disposed, to come down and occupy it. The first regiment pushed forward, the 28th Punjab Native Infantry, had to begin its march in the snow, which had not all melted off from the Peiwar Kotal glen; but in descending the Hurriab valley it was soon left behind.

The 23rd Pioneers followed to improve the road, as already stated, and subsequently the 72nd moved on, and assisted in making the road in the neighbourhood of their camp beyond Zabbardast Killa, but not so far as the Pioneers were stationed.

As the troops were withdrawn from the Kurram valley, the regiments in the rear were pushed on to take their place. Thus the 67th, with C/4 Royal Artillery and the head-quarter wing



14th Bengal Lancers, were brought forward, and the regiments in the Kurram valley itself which were to form part of the advancing force, the 5th Goorkhas, and the 21st Punjab Native Infantry, were each moved up nearer their destination.

The mountain batteries of Native Artillery had had up to this time only four effective guns, but under the orders of Government these batteries were to be equipped on the six gun scale. Each battery had maintained its two spare guns, with all the necessary equipment and ammunition pertaining to it, at its depôt, but the men and mules required to work them were wanting. To remedy this deficiency as regards men, volunteers were called for from the 2nd Punjab Infantry, to supplement the number of recruits who had been left with the battery depôts, while arrangements had been made previously to obtain the requisite number of mules by sending an experienced officer, Lieutenant Shirres, R.A., No. 1 Mountain Battery, to purchase as many mules as were required.

The depôt of No. 1 Mountain Battery was at Kohat, that of No. 2 at Abbottabad further distant; but in due course each battery became completed as its equipment reached Kurram.

There was very little difference between the total number of rounds between the four and the six gun scale, and the number of mules required to complete the batteries was not very great, which was fortunate, as otherwise it would have been impossible, owing to the scarcity of suitable mules, to have obtained a larger number, even at the long prices good mules fetched. As it was, some of the best mules in the transport were transferred to one of the batteries to complete it, the full number required not being obtainable in India.

Before the orders were issued to move on the troops to Alikheyl, the Commissariat Department had taken the precaution to push forward supplies by local transport from Kurram to Habib Killa, and to Alikheyl itself. The Jajis generally undertook the latter part of the carriage, while the Turis carried

the stores from Kurram to the Habib Killa cantonment, where a depôt was formed.

To keep pushing on stores to the front while the troops in and about the valley were consuming large quantities of the provisions brought up was no easy task, and it could only be effected by making use of every camel and mule that was not required during the time that the troops were in winter quarters. When, therefore, the movements for the advance were ordered, there was some difficulty in finding the requisite carriage, when all the camels and nearly all the mules were employed between Kurram and Thull. Hence there was some slight delay in pushing on these troops, which could only be done in detachments.

March 30th.—When the transport was thus wholly required by the Commissariat Department, there was none available for the supply of the Ordnance Field Park, but it was as necessary that this should be moved forward as the supplies themselves. When the transport animals became available for this duty, which might be expected to be only just previous to the advance, the 780 camels which were required for the Ordnance Field Park might be supplied, but in the meantime other arrangements had to be made. Local transport was out of the question if it could have been used, but it was a different thing entrusting a box of ammunition to a stranger to carry than letting him convey a sack of flour. General Roberts ordered the artillery horses and mules to be made use of, to replace the transport animals which were otherwise employed. Between Kurram and Alikheyl there was the Peiwar Kotal to be surmounted, and the task of carrying about 200 tons of ammunition up this hill would have been so exhausting to the transport animals, that it was decided to spare them this journey as much as possible, so that they should be fresh for the advance.

The arrangements ordered were for the artillery to convey the reserve ammunition to the foot of the Peiwar Kotal, where it was

to be stored under a strong guard, and that it should be gradually taken up the Kotal hill by Kahars, and placed under the guard of the artillery, who were quartered there close to the road, from which place it would be moved on, as carriage was available, to Alikheyl.

The horses of the half battery G/3 Royal Artillery had been stationed at Habib Killa all the winter, while the guns and gunners had been at the Kotal itself; and No. 2 Mountain Battery was also in the garrison there. The distance from Habib Killa (Peiwar) to the foot of the Peiwar Kotal was six miles, while the distance to Kurram was twelve miles. At Kurram the Horse Artillery Battery and No. 1 Mountain Battery were stationed. These dispositions facilitated the use of the battery animals for transport service.

March 31st.—Arrangements were made by Colonel Lindsay, commanding Royal Artillery, for six waggons F/A Royal Horse Artillery without boxes, to take twenty boxes each of ammunition along the road to within three miles of Peiwar, where they would be met by the teams of G/3 Royal Artillery, who would take the waggons on at once to Peiwar, and drive them the next day to Turrai, the village at the foot of the Kotal.

The mule batteries were to do the same, taking 180 boxes on ninety mules.

The waggons and mules were to start on the 1st, 3rd, 5th, and every alternate day till about the 22nd, when it was calculated the whole of the reserve ammunition and stores would have been moved; the empty waggons commencing to return from the 3rd, and being brought back by the teams of F/A.

In addition to this arrangement, the second line of bullock-waggons were utilised; but as all the bullocks were at Kurram, these waggons made the journey to Turrai and came back unladen.

It would have been possible by lading the waggon-frames and the mules more heavily, to have taken out the ammunition more

quickly, but it was evident that the advance could not be made from Ali Kheyl before the 1st May, so that there was no necessity for overworking the animals, especially as the latter part of the road to Turrai was a steep ascent, while the rest of the road was all uphill against the collar.

Captain Hall, of the 5th Punjab Infantry, was sent out from Peiwar to Turrai with two companies of his regiment to protect the ammunition depôt, and pitched his tents near the village itself on narrow-terraced ground; but as it would not have been possible for the artillery waggons to have approached his camp, it was decided to unload the waggons, when they should arrive, on an open piece of ground near the road, where though the ground had been terraced, the fields were sufficiently wide to allow the waggons to drive on and off them without difficulty.

The left wing 21st Punjab Native Infantry marched on to Kurram.

April 1st.—Brigadier-General Cobbe left Kurram to take command of his brigade, which was now beyond that place.

The command of the 2nd Brigade was vacant at this time, as Brigadier-General Thelwall had proceeded to India on sick-leave on the 29th March.

April 2nd.—The 21st head-quarter wing, under Major Collis, marched into Kurram. The left wing of the 72nd Highlanders marched from Peiwar.

April 2nd.—D. O. No. 711.—“Camp Byan Kheyl.

#### *“Movements.*

“1. The 5th Goorkhas from Peiwar to Turrai on the 6th inst., Alikheyl 7th.

“2. Company of the 72nd Highlanders from Kurram to regimental head-quarters, on relief by 92nd Highlanders.

“3. 92nd Highlanders to continue their march to Peiwar, leaving one company at Kurram. This company to rejoin

regimental head-quarters on arrival of the 67th Regiment at Kurram."

*Followers to be effective.*

D. O. No. 712.—"The Major-General desires that officers commanding regiments and batteries, under orders for the advance on Cabul, will take particular care that none but men thoroughly fit for active service are taken as doolie-bearers, or other regimental followers.

"Commanding officers are also requested to see that baggage in advance of Alikheyl is rigidly restricted to the scale authorised in Quartermaster-General's circular 5949, dated November 8th, 1879."

April 3rd.—The Field Force head-quarters were established on the 1st April at Byan Kheyl, where the General had gone to inspect the road-making.

The Pioneers were working in both directions, the 72nd meeting them and working back to the parties of the 2/8th King's, who were making the road through the Kotal glen.

There had been some difficulty in getting local labour to assist in this road-making, for though the Alikheyl Jajis had expressed their willingness to work, they rather repented of their agreement when they found they only received payment at the rate of three annas a day, whereas the labourers who had been employed by Brigadier-General Thelwall, had been paid at the rate of four annas each. The General on his way to Byan Kheyl, got some of these villagers collected, and told them that if they did not work for the recognised rate of three annas a day, they would have to work for nothing at all. He told them also, that it was by a mistake that men had been paid at the rate of four annas a day.

The villages in the Hurriab had been almost deserted by their inhabitants, owing to the oppression of the Afghan rule;

but now that this had been removed, the people were beginning to return to their old homes. Five families returned, after an absence of some years, to the village of Byan Kheyl; this showed that there was some confidence in our rule, though they might not altogether like us. Their dislike did not often take an active form, though the previous night some men fired two shots into Lieutenant Spence's tent at Alikheyl.

The tent was pitched outside a house on the edge of the village, and the scoundrels coming up along the edge of the next detached house, fired from within fifteen yards into the tent, luckily without wounding the occupant, though the bullet went through his jacket, which was hanging on the pole.

The weather was very fine in the Hurriab at this season, though below in the Kurram, it was beginning to get warm. The snow had nearly all disappeared from the valley and the lower ranges, the sun for the last few days having caused it to disappear rapidly; but the passes over the higher ranges were still blocked.

Reports came into camp of the Amir's troops having been sent to Kushi, at the foot of the Shutargardan, to oppose our advance.

#### *Movements.*

April 3rd.—D. O. No. 714.—“The wing 29th Punjab Native Infantry, under Major Channer, V.C., will march to Shinnak for the protection of camels grazing there.”

#### *Field Engineers.*

D. O. No. 715.—“The following appointments are made, subject to confirmation: To be Assistant-Field Engineers—Lieutenant Burn Murdoch, R.E., March 2nd, 1879; Lieutenant Longe, R.E., February 24th, 1879.”

*Superintendent of Signalling.*

D. O. No. 716.—“ Captain J. Barstow, 72nd Highlanders, will officiate as Superintendent of Signallers, until the arrival of Captain Straton, 22nd Regiment, vice Captain E. Wynne.”

51st King's Own Light Infantry proceeded on sick-leave.

*Free Rations at Thull.*

D. O. No. 724.—“ It is notified that the Government of India is pleased to sanction the grant of free rations to the native troops and followers at Thull.”

April 4th.—The camp of the 23rd Pioneers was fired into last night; a man crept up close in the shadow of some bushes to one of the sentries and fired at him, the bullet passing through his puggree; it was not wonderful that after this escape, he missed his assailant, though he fired two shots at him in the moonlight before he disappeared.

April 5th.—There was a thunder-storm at Kurram after an oppressively hot morning; the rain continued all through the next day in showers.

April 6th.—General Roberts returned to Kurram from Ali-kheyl.

The condition of the transport animals, especially the camels, was beginning to cause some anxiety; it was evident that the continuous and severe work during the winter and early spring had told on them, so that the force, if it were to advance, must do so with even a smaller scale of baggage, and less reserve ammunition than had been at first arranged.

In order to give the camels a rest previous to the expected advance, so that they should be in good condition for the work required of them, all that could possibly be spared were turned out to graze in the lower Kurram valley, some at Badesh Kheyl, where they were looked after by the Sikh Contingent, and others at Shinnak, where the wing of the 29th Punjab Native Infantry was protecting them.

This month's rest coming at the right time of the year, was of undoubted benefit to the animals whose constitutions had not been too much enfeebled, but it was not long enough to bring round those that were weakly, and these continued to die, though there was everything in their favour. The weather was not cold, the spring had brought out the young leaves and plants on which they could subsist; they were fed and doctored when necessary, but the mortality continued, and instead of having 6,000 camels available to go on with the force, not more than 4,000 could be counted on.

The result was that only 100 rounds of infantry ammunition per man, and fifty rounds per cavalry soldier could be taken. The artillery ammunition was not reduced to any great extent, as the importance of this branch necessitated the carriage of nearly its full reserve to complete the number of rounds taken into the field to 500.

The Commissariat Column was to be reduced to fifteen days' supply; but at this time, the arrangements that had been made with the maliks of the Logar valley, who had promised the necessary supplies after entering their country, warranted some diminution in regard to the bulky articles of food which could be obtained in the country.

The continual references and orders between the various depôts and the base at Kohat relative to the advance, had thrown so much work on the telegraph offices, that much inconvenience resulted both to the senders whose messages were delayed, and to the telegraph signallers, who were overworked.

A divisional order was published, directing officers to make their telegrams as concise as possible, and that no telegrams were to be sent unless the interest of the service required that delay should be avoided.

In addition to the telegraph line that was laid as far as the Peiwar Kotal, and was being continued to Ali Kheyl, the army signallers were at work regularly with their heliographs between



Kurram and the Peiwar Kotal, and thence onwards to the various camps.

The messages thus sent served to relieve the pressure on the telegraph; but it was not possible to signal from the Peiwar Kotal to Thull, as the distance was too great, so the electric wire only could be employed in this direction.

### *Movements.*

April 8th.—D. O. No. 736.—“Half G/3 Royal Artillery will halt at Kurram till further orders.

“The draft 72nd Highlanders, and the company from the fort, will march to-morrow for Alikheyl, under command of Major J. M. Tingcombe.”

April 9th.—The half-battery G/3 Royal Artillery, under command of Captain Bell, R.A., marched into Kurram this morning with H. M.'s 92nd Gordon Highlanders.

The battery horses were in very good condition, and though there had been one or two accidents on the road from the carriages going down banks, the only damage done was that one of the waggon-perches was slightly twisted.

With the battery were brought up on elephants the cases containing two small Gatling guns, and eighteen boxes of ammunition. On unpacking them it was found that only one drum had been sent from England with each Gatling, so that the weapon was only partially effective. No implements either, of any kind, or spare components, were sent with the guns, so as to remedy any trifling defect or loss in the field.

The Gatlings were of a small size, adapted for mule carriage. The carriage was somewhat similar to that of the 7-pounder mountain gun, but lighter in every respect. To work these new weapons a small detachment of gunners under Lieutenant Adye, R.A., had left Kohat on the 27th March, and during this interval the time had been occupied in purchasing ponies and

arranging their equipment and gear. The Afghan mountain battery equipment that was taken at the Peiwar Kotal was partially made use of with great advantage, as only the saddles for the Gatling guns and carriages were sent up, and none for the ammunition-boxes.

It was evident, soon after the battery was formed, that drivers of some kind or other would be required to look after the ponies, both in action and on the line of march, and under General Roberts' orders eight volunteers, from the 72nd and 92nd Highlanders respectively, were attached to the battery for this purpose. Lieutenant Adye's detachment did not arrive till the 12th, and till they arrived, the battery, though fairly complete, was not in working order. The ponies had all been put in training for carrying loads, under the superintendence of Colonel Lindsay, R.H.A., commanding the artillery, and nearly all were broken in and steady by the time they were handed over.

April 9th.—In the afternoon the General rode out with Colonels Gough and Lindsay to pay a visit to one of the leading head-men of the Kurram valley, Noor Mahommed, a Turi chief, who lived about six miles from Kurram, in a walled-in village or fort near the mouth of the Kermanah glen. The chief happened to be absent, but the hospitality of the place was offered to the General, and a fine rug or carpet was presented him; this was refused with thanks.

April 10th.—Noor Mahommed returned the visit in state on the following day. He was dressed in a red cloth frock coat, with wide and loose skirts, plentifully embroidered across the breast with gold. But for his brilliant clothes he would not have been distinguished from any of his ragged followers, who attended him on horseback and on foot.

There had been a case of small-pox among the 11th Native Infantry, who were now on their way up to the Kurram valley; so this regiment was ordered to halt at Shinnak, and the wing of the 29th, who were at that place, were ordered to move on to

Kurram, where they were required to relieve the 21st<sup>st</sup> from the duties of that garrison. The 14th Bengal Lancers were also ordered up to Kurram.

*Movements.*

D. O. No. 738.—“Half G/3 Royal Artillery will march from Kurram to Peiwar cantonment on the 11th inst., and the whole of G/3 Royal Artillery to be at Alikheyl on the 17th inst.

“F/A Royal Horse Artillery will march from Kurram under the orders of the officer commanding Royal Artillery, so as to reach Alikheyl on the 15th inst. Colonel Lindsay will see that both F/A Royal Horse Artillery and G/3 Royal Artillery arrive at Alikheyl with baggage on the scale allowed for the advance, except as regards tents.”

Doctor Aitchison, Indian Medical Department, lately in medical charge 29th Punjab Native Infantry, joined the force as botanist. His fame and skill as a medical man enabled him to visit all the outlying parts of the Kurram and Hurriab valleys, attended by only a slight escort for the protection of his tents and stores, and in no instance was he molested in any way, though he was often alone, and always away from the neighbourhood of troops. The result of his appointment was the complete knowledge of the plants and trees of the Kurram and neighbouring valleys, which but for him would have remained unrecorded.

April 12th.—Heavy dust-storm in the afternoon, rain till 5 P.M. A large number of Ghilzais, returning to Cabul with their flocks, passed through the camp this day. They were not very willing to sell their sheep, but a few were sold at four rupees and four rupees eight annas each. Their camps were pitched on both sides of the Kurram, some right in the centre of the valley, and in the evening General Roberts paid one of these camps a visit, where he was hospitably received. The 92nd Highlanders and half G/3 Royal Artillery marched to-day for Peiwar cantonment.

The proposals that had been discussed by the Major-General with all the commanding officers as regards the diminution of baggage were definitely settled, and the results published in a Divisional Order this day.

There had been a general agreement as to the necessity for taking camp-equipage if it could possibly be done, and so the scale laid down included tents, though the numbers of men they were to contain were nearly doubled.

### *Reduced Scale of Baggage.*

D. O. No. 748.—“Followers, baggage, and camp-equipage will be allowed to the troops of the advancing force on the following scale, which must on no account be exceeded. Commanding officers will see that all baggage is weighed, and that no animal carries more than the authorised load.

#### “Camp-Equipage.

“Officers, native doctors, medical subordinates. { One half of the weights allowed to each in Quartermaster-General’s Circular, No. 5949, dated 8th November 1878.

“British troops: 40 men to one Sepoy’s tent of two pals.

20 „ „ Lascar pal.

16 „ „ Bell tent.

“Native troops: 50 „ „ Sepoy’s tent of two pals.

24 „ „ Lascar pal.

20 „ „ Bell tent.

“Native cavalry, according to instructions, which will be issued by Colonel H. Gough, C.B., V.C

“Hospitals, British and Native guards. { The full amount sanctioned by Quartermaster-General’s Circular, No. 5949.

“No camp-equipage will be allowed for followers or messes.

“Entrenching tools as per regulation.

"All officers, medical subordinates, and native doctors. { Two-thirds of the weight allowed in the Quartermaster-General's Circular.

"British troops, non-commissioned officers, and

privates . . . . . 25 lbs. each

"Native troops . . . . . 20 " "

"Cooking utensils, quartermaster's stores, veterinary stores, stable gear offices, armourers' tools, signalling implements, arms of sick, mess stores, followers' baggage, according to regulation.

"Medical stores according to special orders issued by Assistant Quartermaster-General.

"Commanding officers will take care that the doolie-bearers and other followers get transport for the allowance of baggage to which they are entitled.

#### "Followers.

"The following numbers do not include doolie-bearers, hospital establishments, or mule and camel men, but they show all others for whom rations will be issued.

" F/A Royal Horse Artillery . . . . .	45
G/3 Royal Artillery . . . . .	45
No. 2 Mountain Battery . . . . .	60
Gatling gun . . . . .	14
9th Lancers . . . . .	42
Each Bengal Infantry Regiment . . . . .	175
" Native Cavalry Regiment . . . . .	200
" Native Infantry Regiment . . . . .	120
" company Sappers . . . . .	30
" Engineer Park . . . . .	150
" Ordnance Park . . . . .	30

"Staff officers and others not included in the above list may take the number of servants to which they are entitled by

the regulation, but the Major-General desires that any decrease that is possible may be made.

"At and beyond Alikheyl rations for horses will only be issued for the authorised number of charges, which is as follows :

"General Officers, discretionary.	
Assistant Adjutant-General . . . .	2
„ Quartermaster-General . . . .	2
Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General .	2
Brigade Major . . . . .	2
Aide-De-Camps and Orderly Officers .	2
Field Engineer . . . . .	2
Commissary of Ordnance . . . . .	2
Deputy Assistant Commissary-General .	2
Other Commissariat Officers . . . .	1
Officer commanding Royal Artillery .	4
Officer commanding Royal Engineers .	4
Transport Officer . . . . .	2

"Officers, Artillery and Cavalry, as per regulation. All others, including mounted officers of British and Native Infantry and Sappers, one each.

"All baggage becoming surplus under this order will be stored at Kurram, and no regiments will proceed beyond that station until they have reduced their servants, baggage, and camp-equipage in accordance with the above scale.

"A similar reduction will be made at once by regiments at Alikheyl, and at Peiwar Cantonment ; surplus followers, baggage, and camp-equipage being sent back to Kurram under a small guard of sick and weakly men."

#### *Movements.*

D. O. No. 751.—"1. The 92nd Highlanders to march to Turrai on 14th, to Alikheyl on 15th.

"2. F/A Royal Horse Artillery to Peiwar on 14th, and to Alikheyl under orders from Colonel Lindsay.

"3. Half G/3 Royal Artillery to Peiwar on 15th and onwards under orders from Colonel Lindsay.

"4. 21st Punjab Native Infantry to Peiwar on 15th. This regiment to escort treasure to be despatched by officer in charge Field Treasure Chest.

"5. 67th Foot and No. 1 Mountain Battery to Peiwar on the 15th, Turrai 16th, Bhan Kheyl on 17th. These corps to march from Kurram with the reduced scale of baggage, as laid down for the troops of the advancing force."

This last order was changed, and the march of the 67th and No. 1 Mountain Battery was postponed by one day, these troops not arriving at Bhan Kheyl till the 18th inst.

April 12th.—The 67th Regiment, under Colonel Knowles, marched in this morning to Kurram. This regiment had been brought from the Madras Presidency for field service, having been taken by rail to Jhelum, and thence onward by route march. All the doolie-bearers that accompanied the regiment were Madrassesees, and its tents and cooking utensils were also of the Madras pattern, different from those in use in Bengal. The latter were particularly heavy and solid, the vessels being of a square shape, but fitting into each other; the tents had only one door, with a projecting flap to keep out the sun and rain.

The half of C/4 Royal Artillery, Major Auchinleck, R.A., accompanied this regiment, and brought up with them thirty-seven elephants, with equipment, for carrying the 9-pounder guns over the mountains. These elephants were intended to bring up Gatling ammunition as well, but on their arrival, out of thirty boxes brought up only eight turned out to be Gatling, the remainder being Martini-Henry.

Before the General went out to meet the 67th Regiment, he inspected the squadron 9th Lancers, with a view of ascertaining what progress the regiment had made in dismounted drill with

their carbines. All the lancer regiments on the outbreak of hostilities were armed with Martini-Henry carbines, but not much time since then had been available to give them instruction in the use of their weapons.

As the syce of a commissariat conductor was returning with his master and some doolie-bearers from Alikheyl to the Peiwar Kotal, he was set on by a band of eight Mangals, who hacked him to pieces with their long knives not above a quarter of a mile down the Kotal glen. The alarm was given at once, and the guard turning out, ran down to the place; but the murderers had taken refuge in the hills and pine-woods, and it seemed hopeless to pursue them. Luckily there had been a fall of snow, which had not melted off, so the tracks of the party were followed for two hours by Lieutenant-Adjutant Whalley, 2/8th King's, and eight men of the regiment, when just as they were about to give up the pursuit as it was getting late in the afternoon, on crossing a spur they found some men sitting in the hollow. If there had been any doubts as to the party being the murderers, it was set at rest by their all rising to commence their flight, one firing a matchlock. The men of the 2/8th fired a volley at them before they were hidden again in the pine-wood a few steps on, and shot three men, besides wounding some of the others, one of whom, the leader it was ascertained, died afterwards at his village, so that just punishment was inflicted for the loss of the man they had so wantonly killed.

The lesson was not thrown away on the Mangals and Jajis, as there were no more cases of attack on the road, though the facilities for doing so were greater than in the winter, as it would be hopeless to attempt to track on hard rock in pine-woods.

• *Movements.*

D. O. No. 755.—April 13th.—“The 67th Foot will reduce their doolies to five per cent. on strength with bearers in



proportion, surplus doolies and bearers being returned to the commissariat at Kurram.

"No. 2 Mountain Battery will march to Turrai on the 15th, and to Alikheyl on the 16th inst."

The weather still continued unsettled, but owing to the rain, which fell in April showers, the temperature was reduced, and the climate was very pleasant.

The movement of the artillery from the Kurram valley to Alikheyl put a stop to their employment as transport, but not before they had conveyed to the depôt at Turrai the greater part of the ammunition on the reduced scale, so that their assistance in this matter was very great; the remainder of the ordnance stores had been despatched on camels to Peiwar, *en route* to the Turrai depôt, on the 12th inst.'

April 14th.—F/A Royal Horse Artillery marched at 7 A.M., reaching Peiwar at 10 A.M. On the arrival of the ammunition convoy at Peiwar on the 12th, it was found that the camels were needed for the 92nd, which had been delayed in its march owing to the want of transport.

In place of camels 260 mules, including those of the 5th Goorkhas and 5th Punjab Infantry, were finally allotted to take on the ammunition and ordnance stores; but this arrangement necessitated breaking up all the camel-loads, and gave an infinity of trouble, as it had to be done in a hurry and by unskilled men. Even then there were some twenty bulky loads which, as they could not be subdivided, had to be left at Peiwar till camels were supplied several days later.

The Kahars who were to carry the ordnance park up the Peiwar Kotal, happened to be at Peiwar, and these men were utilised to carry part of the ammunition, leaving the remainder for the mules as far as they were available; but some of the mules had to be allotted for the carriage of the kits and tents of these men who were to remain in camp at Turrai till the whole of

the ammunition had been taken up the hill. The 92nd camped at Turrai, about a quarter of a mile from the Ordnance Depôt. This had been enclosed with a loose stone breastwork, making a square, whose side was fifty yards.

The top of Sikaram was visible over a gorge in the descending spur on the north side of the valley at this place; and during the night the cold wind rushed down with such force from the snows, that the tents of the 5th Punjab Infantry guard were blown down.

This wind blew every night at this point, with more or less violence at this season, but seldom so strongly as to blow down the tents.

April 15th.—F/A Royal Horse Artillery reached Turrai in the morning, loaded their guns and carriages on the elephants which had been sent to await their arrival the night before, and proceeded with but little delay to the Peiwar Kotal, where the carriages were packed for the night, the battery remaining in camp at Turrai with the horses.

As the other battery, G/3 Royal Artillery, was to make a halt of a day at the top of the Peiwar Kotal, instead of passing through it, their elephants carried up all the hay that was required for the horses, and then returned to wait for the guns.

The Kahars commenced taking the ammunition up the hill, two men carrying a box on a doolie-pole; the distance was not much more than a mile, but as they took three hours generally to get to the top, and delayed then and on the way down, it was difficult, in the absence of much supervision, to get more than one turn out of them each day, as about two hours had to be allowed them for their cooking arrangements.

April 16th.—The 67th and half C/4 Royal Artillery marched to Peiwar this morning.

During the night ten camels were stolen from the camel lines at Kurram, which were placed for protection close by the upper

fort. After this experience a wall four feet high was ordered to be built, to prevent their being taken away so readily.

The same party of thieves came across three horses of the 12th Bengal Cavalry, which had been picketed outside their camp at a little distance, as they were supposed to be infectiously diseased with glanders.

The loss was reported at once, and at 2 o'clock in the night Mahommed Hyat Khan, C.S.I., Extra-Assistant Commandant, sent word out to the villages on the further side of the Kurram river, to stop all the passes leading into the Makhbal hills, which was the most probable direction that the thieves would take.

This speedy action was successful, as when the robbers were about to enter their country they found the way barred, and making their escape they left seven camels and three horses behind them; the other three camels were reported to have been taken to a village about six miles out on the right bank of the river, and when this news came into camp at 1 P.M. with the recovered animals, a squadron of the 12th Bengal Cavalry, under Captain Green, was ordered out to look for them in this direction, and a squadron of the 5th Punjab Cavalry was sent to scour the foot of the hills on the north side of the valley, in case the camels might have been taken that way.

The village to which the 12th Bengal Cavalry were taken turned out to be sixteen miles off instead of six, and well away from the bank of the river, concealed between the spurs that sloped down from the Makhbal ranges. After surrounding the village, the head-men were made prisoners, as they could not account for the missing camels, and they were brought back into camp about 10 P.M.

The General ordered out a party of the 29th Punjab Native Infantry to proceed in support of the cavalry, when no signs of their return was perceived at sunset. The 5th Punjab Cavalry came back about dusk.

*Horse Rations not free at Thull.*

D. O. No. 778.—“The free ration at Thull notified in D. O. No. 724, does not include grain for horses of the Native Cavalry.”

*Transport Carriage of Pansori Stores.*

D. O. No. 780.—“The Commissariat Department will supply camels as authorised to regiments of the advancing force, for the carriage of ‘Pansori’ stores (*i.e.* spices, opium, &c.), if commanding officers require them.”

*Parched Grain for Troops.*

“2. The Commissariat Department has been ordered to take such a supply as is available of ‘Channa Chabena’ (*i.e.* parched Indian corn and peas), and ‘goor’ (course sugar), for the use of the native troops for the few days they may be unable to cook their food.”

April 17th.—The Gatlings were worked in the presence of the General, but proved a failure, the mechanism working so stiffly as to jar the barrels and alter the elevation; every bullet missed the target, consequently, at 500 yards and 1,000 yards range. Most of the Kurram garrison had turned out to see the new guns, and the failure was as disappointing as the expectation of the result had been great.

Dr. Townsend, Deputy Surgeon-General, arrived in camp, and took over charge of the office of Principal Medical Officer; and Brigadier-General Forbes, Commandant Bhopal Battalion, who had been nominated to the command of a brigade in the Kurram Force, also arrived and was posted to the command of the 2nd Brigade, from the date of his arrival at Thull.

*Grain Rations for Horses, Mules, and Ponies.*

D. O. No. 788.—“In consequence of the limited supply of barley with the force, the Commissariat Department will, when necessary, issue grain for horses on the following scale.

	Barley.	Dhall.
" Royal Artillery and British Cavalry (Walers only) .	3 seers.	2 seers.
All other horses entitled to grain . . . . .	3 „	1 „
Battery and regimental mules and ponies (Ordnance) .	2 „	1 „
Ditto (Baggage) . . .	2 „	2 „
All other mules and ponies entitled to grain . . .	—	1 „ "

The advance portion of the Punjab Chiefs' Contingent with General Watson, C.B., V.C., and his staff, reached Kurram this day.

These troops, consisting of the three arms commanded by their own officers, were excellently equipped for the campaign, and with the exception of their arms the men were equal, if not superior to, physically, the same classes that were in our service.

The 11th Native Infantry marched into Kurram, under Lieut.-Colonel Harris.

April 18th.—The 11th Native Infantry halted this day so as to dispose of their surplus tents, &c. before marching on. The native armourer-master of this regiment was sent for in the absence of any other trained workman, to put some of the locks of the Gatling guns to rights, which had got out of order. Though the man had never seen any kind of lock, except that of a Snider rifle, he was able without any instruction to remedy the defect.

The intelligence of some of the native artificers as regards mechanical contrivances is very great; and when it is considered that they are never at a loss for a tool, inventing or adapting any tool they may require, it may be imagined that they form a most useful class of workmen, especially on field service.

The necessity of having an armourer to overhaul the Gatlings

was becoming evident, and as small repairs and alterations were constantly being required, the armourer-sergeant of the 72nd Regiment was ordered to come back from Alikheyl to try his hand upon them. Though he had never seen any Gatlings before, he was able when he came, by a little judicious filing and smoothing, to reduce the stiffness of the working of these guns.

Though the artillery had all moved on to Alikheyl, there was but little forage to be had for the horses, so only two gun-teams of each battery were retained in case of the guns having to be used at different points; but all the rest of the battery-horses were ordered back to Peiwar, where they were to remain till actually required for the advance.

The tribes near Ali Kheyl, the Ahmed Kheyl and Hassan Kheyl Jajis, were reported to be collecting, and threatening an attack on Ali Kheyl.

There was a certain amount of desultory firing in the dark at the camp, but no harm was ever done by it, nor was any notice taken of it, and gradually the practice was given up.

#### *Baggage and Details at Kurram Fort.*

April 18th.—D. O. No. 791.—“Camp Kurram. Officers commanding corps are directed to send to the officer commanding Kurram Fort, an accurate list of all property deposited therein; rolls of the several parties left in charge, and of all followers and animals requiring rations or forage, should also be furnished.

“The pay of soldiers and followers detached to Kurram to be arranged for regimentally.

“Attention is called to Divisional Order, No. 326, dated December 7th, 1878 (Last Ration Certificate).”

#### *Command at Kurram.*

D. O. No. 791.—“Major G. N. Channer, V.C., 29th Punjab Native Infantry, is appointed to the command of the forts at Kurram.”

*Superintendent Army Signalling.*

D. O. No. 794.—“ Captain E. Straton,\* 22nd Regiment, is appointed Superintendent of Army Signalling with the Kurram Force, and will take over charge from Captain T. A. Barstow, 72nd Highlanders.

*Distribution of Troops, Kurram Field Force.*

April 19th —D. O. No. 800.—“ Camp Kurram. The following distribution of the troops of the Kurram Field Force is notified :

## “ Column for the Advance.

- “ Royal Artillery Division, under command of Lieut.-Colonel G. H. Lindsay, R.H.A.
- F/A Royal Horse Artillery.
- G/3 Royal Artillery.
- No. 2 Mountain Battery.
- Cavalry Brigade, under command of Colonel H. H. Gough, C.B., V.C.
- Squadron 9th Lancers.
- 12th Bengal Cavalry.
- 14th Bengal Lancers.

## “ Infantry.

- “ 1st Brigade, under command of Brigadier-General Cobbe.
- 72nd Highlanders.
- 5th Goorkhas.
- 28th Punjab Native Infantry.
- 23rd Pioneers . . . . .
- 7th company Sappers and Miners } Attached temporarily
- 2nd Brigade, under command of Brigadier-General H. Forbes. } for discipline & orders.
- 92nd Highlanders.
- 5th Punjab Native Infantry.
- 21st Punjab Native Infantry.

\* Subsequently killed during the battle of Kandahar.

“Until further orders, the troops of the Kurram Valley Reserve, are attached for discipline and correspondence, as follows :

“Half C/4 Royal Artillery	. } To Artillery Division.
No 1 Mountain Battery	
5th Punjab Cavalry . . .	To Cavalry Brigade.
2/8th King's . . . . .	. } To 1st Infantry Brigade.
11th Native Infantry	
67th Regiment . . . . .	. } To 2nd Infantry Brigade.”
29th Punjab Native Infantry	

*Green Forage for Artillery Horses.*

D. O. No. 802.—“The Commissariat Department is authorised to supply a ration of green barley daily to each of the horses of the detachments of F/A Royal Horse Artillery and G/3 Royal Artillery at Kurram, in lieu of one seer of dhal, on account of their low condition.”

April 20th.—The General, accompanied by Colonel Colley, Private Secretary to the Viceroy, who had arrived the previous day to make a flying tour in the Kurram valley, started at 5 A.M. to ride to Rokian, in the defile beyond Alikheyl. They returned the same day to the Peiwar Kotal, where they stopped for the night, having thus ridden over seventy miles; the road, which was in good order up to this point, having been made beyond Alikheyl by Captain Rennie and the Jajis, allowed quick riding, there being no obstacle except the Peiwar Kotal to check the pace.

The morning was very cold, and later in the day a heavy gale and dust-storm came on, which lasted for some time.

As the last preparation for the advance, Field Hospitals were ordered at Alikheyl, Peiwar, and Kurram.

*Lieutenant-Colonel Heathcote.*

D. O. No. 804.—“Lieutenant-Colonel Mark Heathcote, Assistant Quartermaster-General, having reported his arrival



at Kohat on the 12th inst., assumed charge of his duties, and is attached to the Kurram Field Force from that date."

*Postings, Staff Officers.*

D. O. No. 805.—"Lieutenant-Colonel Heathcote will join Brigadier General Watson's staff, under the provisions of 990 No. 243 of 1869. Captain C. D. Branson, 29th P.N.I., is appointed Station Staff Officer at Kurram, in addition to his other duties, with effect from the 21st April 1879, the date of the departure of the head-quarters 2nd Brigade, subject to confirmation."

April 21st.—The General and party returned to Kurram from the Peiwar Kotal by the Spingawi route, revisiting it for the first time since the action. A road had been cut along the top of the Afghan Hill, and most of the trees cleared away from it, thus altering the aspect of the place; but this road enabled a better view to be got of Sikaram, which towered up high above the tall pine-trees, making a beautiful picture. Patches of snow were still lying about, but wherever it had melted, the paper cartridge-cases of the ammunition that had been used by the Afghans in the fight still remained to show the various positions held.

The trees on both sides of the ravine in front of Afghan Hill had been carefully searched for the bullets that were embedded in them, and most had been carefully cut out, the places where the bark had been peeled off to allow this to be done, showing bare, in some cases, as high as twenty feet from the ground.

There was another dust-storm in the Kurram valley, and the usual strong wind, but this time it came from the east. The day was cloudy and very cold, owing to the rain, which fell in showers all around in the valley, but in snow on the Peiwar Kotal and the upper ranges.\*

April 22nd.—The bad weather continued to-day with a

heavy fall of snow on the Kotal and the hills all round, reaching as far as the valley.

The Kotal road was very slippery and moist from the melting snow, and as the Ghilzais, who were returning to the Logar valley by this road, were marching in large numbers this day, they had great difficulty in the ascent. The clay surface of the road, which was good for dry weather, was like a sheet of glass, so their camels could hardly crawl up; had the track remained as it used to be, covered with stones, the ascent, though steeper, would have been less troublesome.

The 11th Native Infantry marched through the Peiwar Kotal from Turrai for Byan Kheyl, but they started before the Ghilzais, and reached the top of the ascent at about 10 A.M. The snow was just beginning to fall, and the temperature was low—more so than was pleasant to the feelings of most of the men of this regiment, who, being pure Hindoos from the lower part of India, were unacquainted with snow except from hearsay.

April 22nd.—The elephants which had been stationed at Peiwar began to suffer from foot-and-mouth disease. One of them died: this was a serious loss, as there were only just enough to carry the guns and carriages over the Shutargardan, if they were able to do so, when the time came.

April 22nd.—The General, accompanied by Brigadier-General Watson, rode to Badesh Kheyl to inspect the camels that were grazing at that station. A committee of experienced officers, with Major Macqueen, commanding 5th Punjab Infantry, as President, had been carefully examining every camel brought before it by the transport officers, to decide whether their condition warranted their being taken on. Out of 2,700 camels looked at, only 1,900 were passed as fit to carry loads and in fairly good condition, and the remainder were practically useless.

No officer in the force had the special knowledge of Major Macqueen as regards camels, and his knowledge was of course

inferior to that of the camel-chowdrees, who were accustomed to deal in these animals. It requires a keen eye to know whether the deterioration of a camel has proceeded to the limit at which he is unfit for work, as the points from which this can be judged are not very evident, and do not always depend on his external appearance or low condition.

### *Movements.*

April 23rd.—D. O. No. 818.—“One company of the 2/8th Regiment will march to Peiwar on the 24th and to the Kotal on the 25th, to be relieved by a company from regimental head-quarters, which will move to Peiwar on the 25th and Kurram on the 26th. On its arrival the relief of the second company now at Kurram will be similarly carried out.”

April 24th.—The Gatling guns were tried again at Kurram before being taken on to Alikheyl, the result being still unsatisfactory. One gun worked fairly well with the exception of one lock, which jammed, and in the other four locks refused to fire the cartridges.

There were no dummy cartridges sent with the guns, so that it was only possible to test their condition by firing the service ammunition, which was not of any great extent, only 15,000 rounds per gun, so it was not desirable to fire off too many of these in getting the guns into working order.

April 25th.—It had been decided, in the event of an advance, that the second line of waggons of the artillery should not be taken, but that their ammunition should be carried on camels.

Boxes for this purpose had been used with the Khyber columns, but it would have involved much delay had they been demanded for the Kurram batteries. The drawback of a box to hold ammunition for a pack-animal, is that its strength must be great to stand the wear and tear of loading and unloading, and this strength means increased weight, owing to thickness of wood and iron fastenings, &c.

In lieu of these boxes General Roberts sanctioned the use of slings for the carriage of the shells of the batteries. These slings were open bags, in which two boxes of infantry ammunition were meant to be placed, so that it would form a load for a mule or bullock, one box being on each side. They were made of a coarse packing material known as tat, or double gunny. The slings were adapted for the carriage of the shells by being sewn along one side, and then in three longitudinal seams across, so as to make four pockets, each to contain three shells, or twelve on each side.

After the shells were placed in the bags the open ends were sewn up; a supply of needles and twine being given out with the slings enabled this to be done when necessary, but the ammunition being only occasionally wanted, the sewing did not require to be frequently touched.

The cartridges were packed in boxes, which held two cartouches or thirty-six cartridges, with the fuzes in their ten cylinders.

A small box contained the gun-cotton primers for each division.

The waggons of these batteries, together with their store and forge waggons, were thus left at Kurram, and it was determined to utilise them for the protection of the artillery horses of both batteries, which had been sent back from Alikheyl.

Orders were issued, therefore, to "laager" these waggons round on three sides of the horse-lines and drivers' camp, which was placed resting under the wall of the upper fort. As there were not sufficient waggons to go all round this space, a stone breastwork, with a ditch in front, was built up to replace them on the south side.

The gunners of both batteries were at Alikheyl, and the duty of defending the horse-lines and camp fell on the unarmed drivers. These men were accordingly armed from the Ordnance

Depôt, partly with Snider carbines, which had been returned into store there on receipt of Martini-Henry carbines by the batteries, and partly with the Enfield rifles that had been captured.

The European garrison at Kurram was so small compared with the importance of the place and the extent of ground to be defended, that every precaution was necessary which might diminish risk of loss and surprise. With this view Generals Roberts and Watson had inspected the defences of both the forts, and where these were faulty—as, for instance, the parapets at the tops of the walls, which were too high to fire over—the necessary orders were given for their improvement. The remains of an outer wall at the edge of the ditch of the lower fort were also ordered to be removed, and that there should be no delay in carrying out these necessary alterations, fatigue parties from the Sikh Contingent were turned out to work daily, under the orders of Captain Pearson, R.A., till the defences were completed. The European detachments were also employed in like manner on the upper fort, but there was less work to be done in this one, as the walls were not so high, nor was the communication continuous round the roof of the sheds built against part of the wall. The commencement of a bazaar was undertaken close to the upper fort, so that the camp-followers should be all together, and more under protection.

#### *Escorts.*

D. O. No. 825.—“Commissariat and other stores *en route* from Peiwar to Alikheyl will be escorted by guards furnished by posts on the road.

“The 5th Punjab Infantry will give the escorts between Peiwar and the Kotal, the 8th Foot between the Kotal and half-way to Byan Kheyl, the 67th and 11th Native Infantry from that point to Byan Kheyl, and the Alikheyl troops from Byan Kheyl to Alikheyl.

“The escorts will always return to their stations for the

night. Due notice to all concerned will be given by the officers commanding at the several posts to ensure the punctual relief of escorts.

“Cavalry escorts from Peiwar are not to be given, except in case of urgency.”

April 26th.—A man, supposed to be a madman, prowling about Brigadier-General Watson's camp, was shot by one of the sentries in the night. Nothing could be ascertained about him, except that he had been noticed in the bazaar by his conduct, which was eccentric.

Some of the elephants suffering from foot-and-mouth disease were brought back to Kurram for treatment.

There were thirty-four sound elephants at Peiwar, and eight sick ones who were unable to travel; but all of them were getting round, under the care of Veterinary Surgeon Gillespie, R.H.A. The disease was attributed to the animals being fed on rice-straw.

#### *Cessation of Rum Issue to Native Troops.*

April 27th.—D. O. No. 843.—“In consequence of the increasing mildness of the weather, the bi-weekly issue of rum to native troops is discontinued. In future rum will only be issued on the recommendation of the Deputy Surgeon-General, and on special occasions when authorised by the Major-General.”

April 28th.—By this time all arrangements had been made as regards the onward movement of the troops beyond Alikheyl.

The advancing force, with the exception of the cavalry and most of the artillery horses and the Gatling guns, was in camp at that place. The horses of the artillery and the cavalry brigade were, however, ready to come on whenever called for, or when the spring allowed the grass to grow in these high latitudes. As yet there were but few signs of its approach; the tree-buds on the willows were beginning to form, but otherwise

in the Hurriab valley no start had been made, and beyond this, towards the Shutargardan, the winter was hardly over.

In the village of Alikheyl itself were stored the provisions for the advance. Preserved stores, including tinned meat, soups of various descriptions, "army food"—a kind of pea-soup—and biscuits, were all ready to accompany the force through the desert mountain passes, as also the grain rations for the horses. Everything was ready with the exception of forage for the camels, and grass for the horses and mules, and this hindrance would have been overcome had the order to advance been received.

The Ordnance and Engineer Parks were complete. The Field Treasury was fully furnished with the money required to pay the troops, and to purchase the necessary commissariat supplies. The field hospitals were prepared at the various stations, as ordered, to facilitate the passage of the sick to the rear. The regimental hospitals were equipped according to the scale ordered, and nothing remained to be done except to move on.

The Jaji population about Alikheyl and the Hurriab valley were friendly. They were perfectly willing<sup>\*</sup> to work for us and our money, of which they must have earned more than they had ever seen before, or were likely to see hereafter. The Ahmed Kheyl and Hassan Kheyl sections were still opposed to us, as were their further neighbours the Mangals; but their country was beyond our present line of action, and they could not do us much harm.

In the Kurram valley, the presence of the Punjab Chiefs' Contingent fully restrained any desire the Zymukht tribes might have felt to interfere with our communications at this time, and there was no reason to anticipate any great change in their demeanour, so that on this side also there was nothing to cause any hindrance to the advance on Cabul. The people of the Kurram valley proper were getting more accustomed to us

and our ways, and showed no signs of changing their friendly attitude, even when their own especial customs did not quite agree with our more civilised practice. An instance occurred about this time which marked this very completely.

The 5th Punjab Infantry were still in the Peiwar cantonment. As this was placed in an utterly barren plain, it was necessary to get forage from the nearest village of Shaluzan. A havildar with a small escort detailed for this duty, on nearing the village, saw a crowd of the inhabitants close by, in a field.

On inquiring the cause of the disturbance it was ascertained that they were about to put to death an unfortunate woman.

The havildar, accustomed to judge more from an English than a Pathan point of view, remonstrated at first, and finally took charge of the woman, brought her away to Peiwar, and reported the matter. The woman was subsequently returned to her friends by Colonel Waterfield, Political Officer, and the havildar was rewarded for saving her life by a present of 100 rupees, while each of the sepoys got twenty.

This was a case in which, had the temper of the people been in any way opposed to us, this interference with their established customs and laws might have led to unpleasant consequences, especially for the havildar, who stood between the woman and her judges; but no complaint was made against the action of the non-commissioned officer, and it was only from his own report that the matter was known.

The presence of the General in the neighbourhood may have been used with good effect by the havildar as a shield to protect himself from the knives of the angry Turis, but it was a brave action on his part, as he and his men had only their side-arms, and were at the mercy of the armed and raging mob.



## CHAPTER VIII.

## CONCLUDING EVENTS.

**A**PRIL 29th.—The General arrived at Alikheyl, and his camp was pitched on the same plateau as that occupied by the 1st Infantry Brigade.

The 2nd Brigade was encamped with the Artillery on another plateau at about 600 yards distance, and separated from it by a deep nullah—one of those that drained the foot of the mountain Matungi.

Each camp was surrounded by a breastwork of loose stone walls, and picket towers were placed on commanding sites, which still further protected the approaches along the open parts of the plateaus; and after these precautions were taken, the amusement of firing long shots at the camp by night was given up.

These defences formed only a portion of what had been done, since the arrival of the troops, in the way of fortifications. The spur from Matungi, that intervened between the plateaus and the village of Alikheyl, had been crowned with a series of works on each rising point of the ridge. The highest of these, towards the north, consisted of picket towers protected by ditches, stakes,

scarps, &c., every means being taken of making the approach difficult. The most important work was a redoubt that commanded C plateau, with emplacements for field guns, and with a parapet on each side for infantry.

Other positions on the slope of the hill were occupied, which commanded a ravine that ran at right angles with the main one, at the northern end of the camp of the 1st Brigade. Altogether the positions of the camps were in themselves strong, but that on B plateau was somewhat removed from the shelter afforded by the commanding ridge.

The northern camp on B plateau was terminated by a stone wall, which cut it off from the rest of the nearly flat space on this side, which extended for about half a mile, till it came to an end at another ravine, on the further side of which was the third plateau, A, unoccupied for the present.

The General inspected all these positions and the fortifications on the 30th April, finishing up with the commissariat store at the village of Alikheyl, which was placed in some native houses at the foot of a detached occupied hill, in the centre of the cultivated and terraced bay between the first-mentioned ridge and the next one to it.

The position at Alikheyl was one of great strength, but its weak point was the water-supply.

The Hazardarakht stream flowed at a distance of about half a mile from both plateaus, and but little water was found in the ravines.

Water was brought into the 2nd Brigade camp by means of a surface irrigation cut, and stored in two tanks formed by damming up a hollow; but this was not fit for drinking-purposes. Subsequently water was brought along the ridge for about two miles from a spring hidden at the head of the ravine leading to the Alikheyl village, till it was taken through C plateau. Though this arrangement was very good for peace time, yet it was liable to damage in case of disturbance, when

the river supply would have been almost the only source. There were some small springs in the ravine to the north of the camp, but the water trickled into them so slowly as to be next to useless.

An attempt was made to sink a well not far from there, in the main nullah, but after going down through alluvial clay and boulders for about ten feet, the Pioneers gave up the task as hopeless.

The presence of the camps in the Hurriab valley, far from disturbing the Jajis, added much to their sense of security.

Though the spring had hardly set in, the villagers everywhere had commenced ploughing up their lands, and flooding those intended for rice-cultivation, and more land was brought into use than had been tilled for many years.

May 1st.—The General and General Watson rode up the Hazardarakht defile as far as Drekulla, along the road that had been made to this place in the bed of the stream by native labour. This kind of road-making consisted simply of tracing two lines in the required direction and clearing away the larger boulders and stones, leaving a more or less defined track.

A party of officers of the 92nd were allowed to proceed in the same direction up the defile, but turning off at Rokian, they tried to ascend a high sugar-loaf peak which overlooked the Ghilzai country to the north of Matungi. Clouds having come over the summit, they had to give up the idea of reaching the top, which they had nearly gained, and they returned to camp without any accident or adventure.

The survey party were also out on a reconnoitring expedition up to the Lakkerai Kotal, a pass over the western range of the Sufaid Koh, across which is the best road between the Hurriab valley and Gandamak, through Jagdalak. The highest point of this pass is 10,600 feet. There was, as far as was known, no obstruction beyond the summit of the pass on the other side, and the ascent on the Hurriab valley side presented no greater difficulty than is met with in mountainous countries where roads

do not exist. The track started from the village of Belut, and proceeded up the Laridar stream for eight miles, after which, leaving the stream, it was taken up one spur after another, through forests of pines with snow lying thick on the ground, till the summit was reached, and they began to descend the northern side, where the snow was very much deeper. The guides told them that it reached a depth of over six feet in the winter. After proceeding for a mile and a half down to get a look at the valley of the Sarkh-ab river, which runs into the Cabul river, and the villages in this valley, which are inhabited by Mangals, the guides asked them to return, as the neighbourhood was not safe. Nor had the southern slope a much better reputation, for in the bed of the Laridar nullah, when they wanted to halt at a place where there were several springs of pure water, the guides objected, as the spot, though a beautiful and pleasant one for a halt, was generally for this reason occupied by marauders. However, as the escort was thirty Goorkhas, in addition to the armed "badragga" of Jajis, there was not much fear of being attacked, though one shot had been fired at the party near this place on the way up.

The Gatling battery was at Peiwar, and before it was allowed to proceed to join the force it had to be reported as serviceable by a Committee, of which Colonel Lindsay, commanding the Artillery, was President. By degrees all the various defects that were discovered in the working of the guns had been eliminated. They were now tested for rapidity of fire, at a short range, in which trial they came out as satisfactorily as any machines that depend on manual labour and intelligence could do.

The cylinder or drum which held the cartridges required to be turned round by hand so carefully that there never should be any want of cartridges in the hopper or receiver below it. If it were moved too slowly, the cartridge dropping from the column above the hopper was apt to fall crookedly, or if too quickly, the hopper got overcrowded; in either case the result was a

stoppage. These defects, inherent in the weapon, could only be overcome by continued practice of the men employed, and even then it might be expected that in the excitement of action some little hurry on the part of the gunners would throw it out of gear.

May 2nd.—The next day the practice was resumed with the Gatlings at a long range of 1,100 yards with satisfactory results, all the bullets striking the target when necessary, or spreading on each side when the horizontal movement of the barrels was brought into play. Under these circumstances the committee reported the battery as fairly serviceable, and likely to improve by practice in the weapon.

The gun-teams of the two batteries marched from Peiwar to Alikheyl, where they were required to take part in a grand parade, which was to be held chiefly with the object of impressing the surrounding tribes by an exhibition of the force that was in their midst.

It had been for some time the wish of army medical reformers to do away with a great deal of the regimental hospital system, which was not altogether adapted for field service. The establishment of European and Native Field Hospitals, when organised, deprives the regimental hospital of much of its value, and as a necessary sequence, the regimental sick transport, in the way of doolies and dandies, would be disestablished if the hospitals were unnecessary. As by the introduction of this system there would be some economy of transport and other collateral advantages, the Major-General ordered the formation of a corps of doolie-bearers, as the field hospitals were already in existence, and Surgeon-Major Bourke, A.M.D., was appointed to the charge of it. The doolie-bearers were to be encamped at Peiwar, and trained to carry their doolies, a duty which but few of the men entertained for the purpose were really competent to perform.

Another great advantage of the systematic training of these

men was, that by this means, they would acquire some sense of discipline, and that all the weak and useless men would be discovered, and got rid of before it was too late.

While the Commissariat Department kept the control of the Kahars in its own hands altogether, the majority of these men were employed as labourers for handling and carrying stores, and if there were any sudden demand for manual labour in any department, or for making roads and cleaning up the camps, Kahars were always asked for and generally obtained.

By this means, however, the original purpose of their entertainment was forgotten, and the men, however strong and able they might be, got out of the habit of carrying doolies, their shoulders becoming soft and unfitted for the purpose.

The improvement of the transport department came also under the notice of the Major-General, and twenty more native soldiers were to be detailed from the force, to serve under the orders of the transport officers, in addition to the detachment of the 7th Bengal Cavalry, which had been employed on this duty from the commencement of the campaign.

May 3rd.—The troops were drawn up at 10 A.M. for the inspection of the General, but the effect of the parade was greatly marred by a heavy thunder-storm, with rain and hail, which came down as they were marching past. The troops from Bhan Kheyl marched over to take part in the parade, and after it was over they returned to their camp thoroughly drenched.

The native population of Alikheyl and the neighbourhood generally came in to see the review, and crowded in lines in rear of the marching-past ground, their ardour for the sight not being damped by the wet.

In the afternoon the rain, which had stopped when the parade was over, came on again, and it was pouring heavily at 3 P.M. when a durbar was held by the General, to which all the leading natives of the Hurriab had been summoned. The

darbar tent was only a small shamiana, or flat-roofed tent, supported on poles, with cloth sides to it. One side had not been fixed, and before it were seated, on three sides of a square, all the chiefs and some of their followers, who crowded thickly behind them. In appearance there was nothing to choose between the leaders and their men; all had the same expression, and were clothed in the same way.

About half-past 3 o'clock the General, accompanied by the two brigadiers and the political officers, Colonel T. Gordon, C.S.I., Captain Rennick, and the staff, entered the tent, and sat down, while various presents and rewards for good conduct, in the shape of turbans and dresses of honour, were bestowed on those who had merited them. Mahommed Hyat Khan, C.S.I., Assistant Political Officer, ushered up the recipients, and translated the General's remarks to each as he came forward to get a token of the good-will of the British Government.

When all the presents had been bestowed, the General made a speech, which was translated into Pushtu sentence by sentence by Mahommed Hyat Khan for the benefit of the listeners.

The chief object of the darbar was to announce to the tribes the intention of the British Government to annex the Kurram and Hurriab valleys. The Jajis were warned that as before this declaration they had shown themselves loyal to the Cabul rule, paying attention to the orders of Yakub Khan, they were now to show the same spirit of obedience to the British rule, in return for which their religion would not be interfered with, and their mullahs might come and go as they pleased, as long as they did not preach sedition and stir up the people to rebel against us; all the men of the tribe who had been imprisoned by us would be liberated on the conclusion of peace. The Hassan Kheyl leaders were spoken to, and through them, as it were, a message was sent to the Ahmed Kheyls, who still kept aloof, "that if in a short time they did not come to pay us a

visit, we should have to pay them one, and perhaps in a way they would not like." In conclusion the Jajis were recommended to pay attention to agriculture and trade, by which they would increase their means, and in return for their disposing of their produce to the English, they would obtain protection for life and property, such as they had not before experienced.

At the conclusion of the speech, the head-men having got an inch proceeded to ask for an ell, and petitioned for the immediate release of ten of their men who were prisoners, and were not very well satisfied when they were informed that this could not be done.

May 4th.—Judging by the telegram that was received from Government and circulated in camp for general information, they would not have long to wait, as the first signs of the termination of hostilities became apparent this day, when the news came that Yakub Khan had decided to pay Sir Samuel Browne a visit at Gandamuk, at which place he was to arrive on the 8th instant.

The weather was still rainy and showery, but the camp was in such a good site that the rain soon disappeared, and the stony ground dried up rapidly.

As there was some probability of the troops remaining in camp at Alikheyl for some time, officers commanding regiments were allowed to bring up the surplus camp-equipage for the men and mess tents for the officers, which had been left behind at Kurram, when the reduced scale of tentage for the advance was ordered.

May 5th.—All the horses and drivers of the batteries, except two gun-teams, as before, returned to Peiwar; and all the Kahars, except the few retained by each regiment, proceeded to the same place, to be worked into shape as doolie-bearers. An interesting conversation occurred this day between the General and a Ghilzai, which, if it could be relied on as giving more than an individual expression of opinion, would form a very satisfactory



basis in helping to have a clear understanding as to the method of dealing with the tribes.

This man said that the Ghilzais had been waiting for us on the Shutargardan, but that they had all dispersed now and gone to their homes. He quite acknowledged that the tribe could not do us much harm unless they were backed up by regulars. His next assertion was important, showing that even among the great fighting tribes of the Ghilzais there existed a strong party who were not inimical to us. He said that the old people of the tribe would welcome us, but that it was the young men alone who wanted to fight.

This showed that the feeling against us was not general, and there is no doubt that the chief of the Ghilzais, Padshah Khan, was at this time in our favour as well as the other old men.

It was natural for the young men to wish to fight, as this is a part of the occupation of their lives, but beyond that it was not probably caused either by public feeling, or by any higher motive than the hope of plunder.

The survey party started again for another excursion to the Shutargardan, and with them went the Political Officers, Colonel Gordon and Captain Rennick, Captain Carr, D.A.Q.M.G., Lieutenant Spratt, R.E., and Dr. Duke. These officers went to explore some of the side roads to the Shutargardan plateau, which might be of use in order to turn the position if it were held against us.

The telegraph line was being pushed on up the Hazardarakht defile. The wire was laid as far as Rokian, and above this the posts were erected along the hill-side as far as Jaji Thanna. The Jajis objected to work beyond their boundary, which comes to an end about that place.

May 6th.—The survey party and the others returned from the Shutargardan at 2 P.M., having started from Kasim Kheyl Thanna at 7 A.M. Lieutenant Spratt and Dr. Duke returned by the Thabai pass, which enters the Hazardarakht defile at Jaji Thanna.

This road was reported as impracticable for laden camels and mules, being merely the narrow and steep rocky bed of a mountain torrent full of large boulders. The rest of the party came back by the Gogizah road, which entered the defile at Drekulla. This was a fairly good road most of the way, but a part of the valley it passes through was steep and narrow, not being more than thirty to fifty yards wide, with precipitous cliffs on each side for about 2,000 yards; but as long as the Hazardarakht defile was open to us, there was no object in trying another route. The road up this latter defile was completed by this to beyond Jaji Thanna, and there was but little of the pass in the Ghilzai country which remained to be done when the advance should take place.

With the reconnoitring party two Afghan soldiers arrived from Cabul. These men had deserted from a cavalry regiment and ridden off on their horses, starting after dark the previous night; they brought a boy with them also. They had ridden their horses over seventy miles, and neither seemed to be any the worse for the journey. One of the men was an Usbeg, and wore an immense brown fur cap, about the size of a Grenadier's bear-skin. His uniform was a red cloth tunic, but over this he wore a choga, which concealed it.

The other man, who had originally been one of the trading Afghans of the Hindu religion, but was a convert to Mahommedanism, was not distinguished by any peculiarity of dress, but both had carried away their arms with them.

Their object in coming in to us was not very clear; there could be no reason why two such dissimilar men should unite to desert together unless they had carried off the boy. According to their own account they deserted because they had not been paid; but as this was the chronic state of the Afghan soldiery, the reason did not seem a valid one. They did not impart very much information, but their idea was that the Cabul garrison would show fight.

May 7th.—The spring was now beginning to make itself seen in the growth of all the plants and shrubs that found subsistence on the stony plateaus, and on the bare alluvial ridges that came down to them from the surrounding mountains.

Though during the winter the ground seemed to produce nothing but stones, yet now it was covered with every variety of wild herb : mint, sage, thyme, peppermint, and wormwood scented the air as they were pressed under foot ; the latter especially grew in large quantities, and filled the breeze with an aromatic odour, almost too strong for some refined tastes. The slopes were covered with a yellow briar rose, but otherwise there were not many flowers, except some small common English wild ones, such as the scarlet pimpernel, forget me-not, yellow crowsfoot, wild liquorice, and a pretty broom ; the young grass, too, began to shoot, and made the place look green.

Among the stony hill sides there was a kind of wild leek, or bulbous plant, which was brought in by the villagers and sold as a vegetable. It made a capital spinach, and no doubt contributed largely to the health of the camp. Small wild onions grew in abundance, and dandelions added to the stock of vegetables, making a capital salad. At Kurram there had been a plentiful supply of watercress, but these had all been consumed, and with the exception of dandelions, there was not much in the way of vegetables to be had. At Alikheyl, however, the troops were better off in this respect, and later on quantities of wild rhubarb were brought down from the higher ranges, where it grew in abundance.

From the surrounding forests an edible fungus, about the size of a large turnip, was sometimes brought in ; these were particularly good. The root of the arum is also eaten by the villagers, but no one tried this as a change. Supplies were tolerably plentiful. There was at first a dearth of fowls till the spring chickens began to fill out, and sheep were scarce. It was

possible, however, to buy a young small-sized cow to supplement the ration meat when necessary, and the streams on each side of the camp afforded a plentiful supply of fish.

Fodder was still the scarcest article, and all the dried grass that was brought in by the villagers was stored in one place under a guard, and retailed by a sergeant in small quantities, just enough for the rations of one horse.

The trees that flourished on the sides of the plateaus and ridges at Alikheyl were chiefly a kind of arbor vitæ, which grew to a good size, the edible pine, and some juniper mixed with a few oaks, and scrubby prickly thorns; but the aspect of these spurs being chiefly to the south, there was not sufficient moisture on them for any forest growth. On all the other faces of the surrounding mountains there was a forest growth of pines, deodars, and hill oaks, while the ground below them was covered with wild strawberries and anemones.

At this time there was regular April weather, showery and fine alternately. Sometimes it was more than this, however, and on the 8th the hill-tops all round were whitened with snow, which did not stay long.

A case of small-pox occurred in the 28th Punjab Native Infantry's camp on C plateau. The man being isolated at once, the infection did not spread.

May 9th.—The news of Yakub Khan's telegram to the Viceroy on his arrival at Gandamak reached the force this day.

Whatever bearing this news may have had on the probable advance of the force to Cabul, it had none on the prospect of the troops who were to remain in the Kurram valley; and as it was necessary that the site for the cantonment in the valley should be decided on, the General, with Major Collett, A.Q.M.G., Colonel Villiers, Lord Melgund, and Captain Pretymann, A.D.C., rode to Shaluzan for the purpose of visiting some of the sites that had been selected by Major Collett.

May 10th.—The survey party started at 5 A.M. to carry their

## WITH THE KURRAM FIELD FORCE.

plane-tables to the top of a peak on the southern range, a little to the right of the Manjiar pass.

They were escorted by a few of the Goorkhas, and a badragga of villagers. A signalling party went with them. At 10 A.M. their flash from the top showed that they were at work in the desired position. Captain Martin, after having got in his sights, thought it advisable to go down a spur about a mile away from the rest of the party, so as to be able to fill in some ground that could not be observed. About 1 o'clock, however, the party were alarmed by seeing a crowd of armed men coming up to their position, which was a strong one on a peak, and tolerably clear of brushwood and trees. Luckily, Captain Martin had rejoined his party by this time, or else he might have been cut off.

A warning had previously been sent to them to be on the look-out, as there was a band of 800 Mangals in their neighbourhood.

This was ascertained purely by accident. A party of Kahars had been sent on to the southern slopes of the valley to gather firewood, about a mile from the end of the camp across the Hurriab stream. They had a small guard with them. The Mangals, finding a few unarmed men, could not resist the temptation of firing on them, and the fire was returned by the escort, and also by some of the 92nd, who were fishing in the river, and had their rifles with them. These men at once went to the assistance of the Kahars when they ran down the hill, and the Mangals, seeing that they were attacked, retired. The noise of the firing so close at hand startled the camp, and on receiving precise information of what had occurred, General Cobbe, who was in command, at once ordered out a wing of the Goorkhas to go up the road taken by the Mangals, and to bring back the survey party.

These, of course, had not heard the firing, nor could they for a long time see the Mangals, who on their side were ignorant

of the survey party being close to their line of retreat; but when they saw them standing out against the sky-line, they determined to exchange some shots, which they did. Skirmishing up behind the forest trees, they did not offer much of a mark, but their bullets came flying about the hill-top.

Their fire was of course returned, and with interest, for several were wounded; and the fight would have gone on for some time longer, had not the sight of the Goorkhas down below, as they crossed the open land in the neighbourhood of the village of Sappri, warned them that they were being followed, on which they withdrew down the southern slopes of the range.

While this little skirmish had been going on, there was at the time a jirga of 300 Mangals in camp, who had come in to see Colonel Gordon, the Political Officer, so it was evident that this slight disturbance was, as it were, unconnected with any large movement against us.

After these men had been dismissed, another jirga came into camp in the opposite direction. This time it was the neighbouring Ghilzais, who had come in to show their liking for our money and turbans, the result of these visits being that nearly every man of importance walked out of camp with a head-dress more or less embroidered in gold, according to his rank and behaviour.

Some of these turbans, which were all made at Peshawur, cost as much as twenty-five rupees, but the majority were of cheaper manufacture, costing from five rupees upwards.

More rarely "chogas" were given as dresses of honour, but the number of turbans that were distributed in the Kurram and Hurriab valleys to show our good feeling, must have been large. That they were worn by the recipients shows that they were appreciated, and this was the case, as several men who thought that their merits had not been sufficiently rewarded, asked for this visible sign of our sentiments.

May 11th:—Sunday.—Divine Service was held at Byan

Kheyl at 7 A.M., at the Peiwar Kotal at 9.30 A.M., at Peiwar at 11 A.M., and at Alikheyl at 4.30 P.M. These arrangements, made by the Chaplain, the Rev. J. W. Adams, involved a ride for him of nearly forty miles, with four services, every Sunday while the camp was at Alikheyl.

May 12th.—Another reconnoitring expedition on a large scale started this morning to explore the range of hills to the south of the Hurriab valley, between the Manjiar pass and the Peiwar Kotal. Four parties of two companies each went out, while a fifth detachment stayed at Sappri in reserve.

The 92nd detachment, with Captain Martin as survey officer, started at 6 A.M., followed by the 72nd party at 8 A.M., who were kept in reserve, as stated, at Sappri, about four miles and a half from camp. The 5th Goorkhas companies, with Lieutenant Manners Smith, ascended a broad ravine about two miles from Alikheyl village, and reached the summit of the range at a place known as Drukuli Khud

Captain Woodthorpe, R.E., with the 28th Punjab Native Infantry detachment, had further to go in the same direction, ascending the range nearly opposite B<sup>y</sup>an Kheyl, to explore the "Jahtra" pass.

This party occasioned some anxiety by not returning to camp till long after dark, the delay being caused by Captain Woodthorpe's natural wish to stay as long as he could on the top of the range, and so to get in as much ground as possible on his map. The sepoys of the 28th Punjab Native Infantry were, however, done up by their long day out, and as they could not return in the time he allowed, they were benighted some way from camp. Their march was thus much hindered, and they did not come in till 9 P.M.

May 13th.—Colonel Gordon, Captain Rennick, and Lieutenant Spratt, R.E., rode out to Jaji Thanna, to line out the road above this point towards the boundary-line at Karatiga. The Jajis who were making this bit of road required

some assistance to line it out in places, as when the road was taken on to the hill-side some more skill was required than to clear off the stones from the river-bed.

May 14th.—The General returned to Alikheyl from the Kurram valley.

The monotony of the camp was broken a little by soldiers' games, in which the garrison of Buan Kheyl joined. No news from Gandamak, which would imply that the negotiations were proceeding satisfactorily.

May 15th.—More soldiers' games took place, varied by a show of all the horses that had been seen daily by the force.

A long order was published this day, giving the particulars of the system on which the Transport Department was in future to be worked. The system was not, however, to come into operation till the 1st June. This order being too long to enter into the body of this work, has been relegated to the Appendix, where it will be found.

No time was afforded before the conclusion of the campaign to test fairly the working of the system, which appeared to be an improvement on the previous arrangements, as it recognised more clearly the necessity for feeding transport animals, but its weak point was that it did not recognise sufficiently the fact of hired carriage, and not Government cattle, forming the basis of the transport, and that hired animals should not be separated from their owners.

May 16th.—The Gatling guns were tried again to-day at 1,200 and 1,400 yards. The result was fairly satisfactory, but the difficulty in managing the drums had not diminished, and there were a few stoppages. There was some improvement visible in other points, though as regards the stoppages, there had been fewer at the previous practice.

The 23rd Pioneers' artificers had constructed a drum out of the material at their disposal; but though this was excellently made it failed at this trial. The base-plate, being made of sheet



copper, would not stand the weight of the cartridges above it, and became bent, thus preventing its rotation.

The first sign of the close of the campaign occurred to-day, when Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon G. Villiers, who had been attached to the staff of the Kurram Field Force since its commencement, took his departure.

May 17th.—A reconnaissance started at 5 A.M. to explore the range to the south-west of Alikheyl, and to overlook the Ahmed Kheyl villages from the point. The result of this reconnaissance was satisfactory, as it enabled the survey officers to map down the course of the Hazardarakht stream after it had passed the camp, for a distance of about six miles, till it took a turn to the south, and for four miles down this part of its course, where a turn to the left occurring, showed that it flowed into the Kurram valley, and that the Hazardarakht stream was the source of the Kurram river.

The valley in which the Upper Kurram ran to the south was fairly cultivated along the banks, and in the distance the villages of the Lajji Mangals were seen.

The open valley to the west was also observed, up which lay the road to Ghazni. The stream which came down this valley was a small one, and fell into the Hazardarakht, or Upper Kurram, just above the bend to the south.

The country in the basin of this valley, occupied by the Hassan Kheyls, was very well cultivated, and the villages had orchards of fruit-trees round them.

In addition to the road to Ghazni, there is another from this valley to the Logar, and as the nomad Ghilzais take this road in preference to the Shutargardan one, it is evident that it must be generally easier, and that its elevation must be somewhat less, as the bounding hills of the ranges enclosing the valley do not attain so high an altitude as the mountain Saratiga (over 12,000 feet), to the west of Alikheyl, from which they are derived.

May 17th.—No opposition was offered to the reconnaissance by the Ahmed Kheyls or Hassan Kheyls, and it returned to camp at 5 P.M., after a good day's work.

*Payment for Commissariat Supplies.*

D. O. No. 915.—“With reference to D. O. No. 641, dated 15th March, staff-officers, heads of departments, and officers commanding corps, are directed to forward to the Chief Commissariat Officer, statements showing recoveries on account of commissariat supplies and carriage which have been credited, and the month or months in which such credits have been made in Pay Bills and General States.

“In future all recoveries due to the public are to be credited monthly in Pay Bills, and the detailed statement sent to the Chief Commissariat Officer.”

*Commands.*

D. O. No. 916.—“Brigadier-General J. Watson, C.B., V.C., Inspector-General of the lines of communication of the Kurram Field Force, will take charge of the road between Thull and Kurram, and of those two stations, the troops at which (except the 12th and 14th Bengal Cavalry) are placed at his disposal. This order does not affect returns, which will be addressed as usual.”

A telegram was received in camp, appointing Colonel Osborne Wilkinson, who was commanding at Kohat, to the command of the reserve brigade of the Kurram Field Force, which might be left in the Hurriab valley when the advance should take place.

To assist General Watson in the duties of his new office, two officers were nominated by the Commander-in-Chief. Captain Wolseley was to act as Assistant Adjutant General and Assistant Quartermaster-General, and Colonel Thackeray, V.C., R.E., was to be Commanding Engineer on his staff.

May 19th.—It had been decided that the road from the

Peiwar Kotal to Alikheyl, should be made of the same width as that of the remainder of the road to Kohat, viz. thirty feet, so as to allow ample room for a double string of camels, going and returning, laden. The first road, along the bank of the Hurriab river, could not in some places be made of this width, as it would have involved a great deal of labour in cutting down the bank, besides which this, in some precipitous places, was being undermined by the river.

It was only possible to get a road of the necessary width by leaving the river-bank at Zabbardast Killa, and striking across the centre of the Hurriab valley to the village "Belut," which was situated on the bank of the Laridar stream, which was here about 100 feet below the level of the plateau.

The 67th Regiment, which was camped at Byan Kheyl about one mile and a half from Belut, had been ordered to make this part of the road, and the General and staff rode out to see the work that had been done. The new bit of road struck up the Byan Kheyl stream with a zigzag along the bank, which was about 120 feet high, and then crossed the plateau to the north of the Byan Kheyl camps till it reached the Laridar stream, where it was taken down and up the banks to the village of Belut.

At the first stream below the camp, the road-making was particularly difficult, as numerous springs of beautiful water poured out of the hill-side, making the ground boggy. The difficulties were very well overcome, and a capital road made, with which the General was much pleased, the spring water being run into drains and collected in pools for drinking and other purposes.

The way in which information is passed along in these mountainous regions was strikingly exemplified by a communication from Padshah Khan, the head of the Ghilzais, in which he wrote to the Political Officer that he did not consider it right of us to have gone to the Shutargardan without asking

his leave. At the time (the 6th May) the survey party with Colonel Gordon went up, Padshah Khan was with Yakub Khan on his way to Gandamak, at the first march from Cabul—a place called Batkhan. This must have been about forty-five miles from the Shutargardan; but a messenger reached him the next day, informing him that a British force of several regiments was on the Shutargardan, preparatory to advancing on Cabul. He came back post haste to Dobandi, where, on the 8th, he ascertained the real facts of the case, but being put out by his unnecessary ride, he considered it a grievance, and wrote rather strongly on the subject of our taking advantage of his absence to spy out the land, &c.

As the party had gone up without any troops, but with merely an escort of villagers, the answer to his objections was not difficult.

*Notice for Escorts.*

D. O. No. 921.—“When escorts are required for the protection of officers travelling on duty, or of convoys, stores, or baggage, between Peiwar and Alikheyl and intermediate stations, notice must be given to brigade or station authorities the previous day, by 2 o'clock.”

*Transport of Private Stores.*

D. O. No. 924.—“It has been brought to the notice of the Major-General that the Transport Service is much burdened, by having to send to the front, for regiments and individual officers, packages which arrive at Thull by bullock-train; in future, officers who have parcels for transport must apply to the Assistant Quartermaster-General, through the usual channel, for the sanction of the Major-General, without which none will be forwarded by the Commissariat or Transport Department.

*“Weight of Packages.”*

“Some parcels having reached Thull open, it is further notified that none will be forwarded unless properly secured,

and no package can be taken if it exceeds one maund in weight."

May 20th.—The news of Yakub Khan's acceptance of the terms on which the treaty of peace was to be drawn out, reached the camp by telegram, thus virtually bringing the campaign to a conclusion.

The hostile section of the Jajis—the Ahmed Kheyls—who had till now stood aloof from all intercourse with us, changed their views, and decided to make their submission. Their excuse was that until they had received an intimation that they were no longer subjects of the Amir of Cabul, they did not think themselves bound to submit to the British in any way.

May 21st.—The Ahmed Kheyl "jirga" came into camp and made their submission in due form. It is not to be expected that these men, who have been independent robbers from time immemorial, and who live in an out-of-the-way corner of the world, will act up to their professions of good conduct.

May 22nd.—Another reconnaissance was made this day, again to the south-west of camp. The spot chosen was a peak about half way between those which had already been visited on this range on the 10th and 17th. The reconnoitring party consisted of four companies of the 72nd, two companies of the Goorkhas, with a reserve of two companies of the 92nd, two of the 21st Punjab Native Infantry, and two guns No. 1 Mountain Battery.

Some of our late enemies, the Ahmed Kheyls, were invited to join the party, as an escort, which was increased by some of the villagers of Sappri, which was the first point gained on the road. Here the reserves were halted, and spent a quiet day in the open terraces round this village, which is pleasantly situated in an open flat upland valley, whose elevation must be nearly 9,000 feet above the sea. The valley is naturally cut into plateaus by the various drainage water-courses which come down

its sides. All the tolerably level ground was terraced, though not much had as yet been cultivated.

The survey officers and the reconnoitring party, with the Major-General and staff, pushed on up the hill-side, the track, though very steep, being quite fit for horses, though in some places riding through the pines and other trees was not easy, owing to the branches which swept the road, and the dead timber which lay across it. The ascent through these pine-forests was pleasant, the sun being shaded by the foliage overhead. There was, however, but little water on the hill-sides; only in one place was a trickling stream found in one of the ravines. The soft porous soil soon absorbed the rainfall, while the precipitous mountain-sides carried it off at once to the bottom of the slopes. On reaching the top, an open stony ridge covered with wormwood, and with shady spots under the pine-trees, offered a capital place for a pic-nic, and water was soon obtained by melting snow, which was still found hidden in the ravines. Here the troops rested while the survey pushed on to the peak, which was about a mile on and rather higher, ending in a precipitous bluff to the north. The general characteristic of all this range was that it was well wooded on the northern slopes and completely bare on the southern ones. The want of vegetation on this side, allowed the rainfall to act on the surface and wash away the soil to a great extent, leaving the country bare and inhospitable. The view, however, from this elevation, 10,300 feet, was an extensive one to the south. To the west the course of the Kurram could be traced in its upper bend, till the intervening lower ranges shut it and the higher part of Kurram valley from view, but beyond this the Makhbal ranges, terminating in the east at Darwaza pass, were visible, beyond which again lay the hidden plains of Khost, and the blue distant mountains which marked the beginning of the Waziri country. The climate was perfection; a warm sun with a delightful breeze made this halting-place as pleasant a spot as

could be found anywhere. The reserve ammunition mules of the infantry were considerably tested on this occasion, and failed, being unable to carry their two boxes of ammunition up the hill, though, as mentioned before, there was no great difficulty in riding up the path. The weight of the ammunition, two maunds, was thus proved to be excessive for the small transport animals, though the large regimental mules of the frontier regiments had no difficulty in following the Goorkhas. The return journey began about half-past 2, and was made by the same track as on the ascent.

During the halt, signals were interchanged with the party that had been placed on the further side of the Sappri valley on the side of a wooded peak that overlooked the camp at Ali-kheyl and the Sappri village, and thus communication was kept up with the reserve and the camp, which were both completely out of sight. The attendant "badragga" of Ahmed Kheyls and Hassan Kheyls were much astonished at this exhibition of our powers.

There were not many wild flowers out at this time; two species of buttercups, anemones, a candytuft, and a few wild tulips were all that were observed; the wild strawberry plants that grew everywhere were not as yet in flower. The forests were composed of the usual trees, in these parts chiefly oaks and pines, with a small mixture of abies (*abies Webbiani*), arbor vitæ, juniper, and a few other trees.

May 23rd.—A camp-follower was murdered near Bhan Kheyl, and another wounded. These men were Kahars, and belonged to a party who had been sent out to bring in firewood, but having strayed away about two miles from the escort, a party of Aka Kheyl thieves fell upon them and killed them before any assistance could reach. These robbers were probably some of those against whom Captain Woodthorpe had been cautioned when ascending the Laridar river, but hitherto they had not shown themselves. The Kahars, by roaming about away from

the neighbourhood of the escort, had invited the attack of these villains, and after this attempt they became more careful of their lives.

The troops who were to form part of the Queen's birthday parade at Alikheyl moved up from Peiwar, the 12th and 14th Bengal Cavalry regiments halted close to the Byan Kheyl camp; the 5th Punjab Infantry squadron, 9th Lancers, and No. 2 Mountain Battery came on to Alikheyl, where they were camped on A plateau.

### *Result of Reconnaissances.*

May 23rd.—D. O. No. 938.—“The Major-General has much satisfaction in recording his sense of the excellent service which has been performed by the reconnoitring expeditions made by the troops at this camp on the 12th, 17th, and 22nd inst. The results obtained possess a political in addition to their topographical value, and the people of this country now understand that the paths over their precipitous mountains can be traversed by British troops as easily as by themselves.

“The Major-General also wishes to acknowledge the industry and ability displayed in the reconnaissance reports, and the sketches sent in by the officers who have been employed on this duty.

“Those executed by Lieutenant Kane, 72nd Highlanders, attached to the Quartermaster-General's department, and by Lieutenant Spratt, R.E., are deserving of special commendation.”

May 24th.—A grand parade of all the troops forming the Kurram Force was held to-day in honour of the Queen's birthday.

The weather was splendid; the dust having been laid by a storm of rain during the night of the 22nd, allowed the movements to be seen to the best advantage. The troops were drawn up in three lines, but the ground was too circumscribed to allow



the cavalry to form up behind the infantry, so that they were drawn up in rear of the marching-past line.

It was a fine sight to see the whole of the Kurram Field Force collected in one spot, every regiment turning out as smart as the small allowance of kit allowed. There were 5,500 infantry, fifteen field guns and twelve mountain and two Gatling guns with 1,200 cavalry, on the ground.

After the usual three cheers and the *feu de joie*, the Major-General rode to the 5th Goorkha Regiment, and dismounting, called Captain John Cook and the men of this regiment who were to be decorated to the front. Captain Cook received the Victoria Cross for distinguished conduct at the Peiwar Kotal on the 2nd December, and for saving Major Galbraith's life. A subadar, a jemadar, two havildars, one bugler, three privates, and the hospital assistant of the regiment received the third class order of merit for distinguished gallantry on the same occasion.

General Roberts, addressing Major FitzHugh, expressed his pleasure in making these rewards publicly, and that Major Galbraith, whose life had been saved by Captain Cook, and that Major FitzHugh himself, whose life was saved by Jemadar Prussao, Khattri, were both present to witness the presentation. Addressing Captain Cook, the General said that he had heard of him by reputation before he had made the acquaintance of the 5th Goorkhas, as one of the finest officers of the Punjab Frontier Force, which he had the honour to command, and that he was glad that he had had the opportunity of distinguishing himself. He was always glad that the 5th Goorkhas belonged to such a distinguished body as the Punjab Frontier Force, and he felt sure that their comrades would agree that the orders of merit received by this regiment were well earned.

"The behaviour of the regiment in the Manjiar pass, in which Captain Powell had splendidly protected the baggage of the column, had added to the distinction already gained."

After decorating each of the officers and men, the General proceeded to the saluting-point flag, and Captain Cook and the others fell in in front of the flag, while the troops marched past and returned to their camps.

The afternoon was taken up with a series of rifle matches, and the Jujis were encouraged to join in some of the short-range trials. The fire of their matchlocks was very wild and uncertain, as might have been expected.

The orders for the return of the troops to the Kurram valley were published. The 5th Punjab Infantry were to march on the 25th to Jadran, half-way to Peiwar, and to that place on the 26th, returning to their quarters at Peiwar, and furnishing two escorts of fifty men each for the two batteries which were ordered to that place on the 29th inst. It had been decided that the artillery should be kept in our camp in the Kurram valley pending the orders for the advance, which seemed now further off than ever. The advantage of keeping the batteries collected instead of being separated, with the horses and drivers in the Kurram valley while the guns and gunners were at Alikheyl, was so great, that as soon as the necessity for the separation had ceased, no time was lost in putting an end to it.

May 25th.—The 12th and 14th Bengal Cavalry marched to Turrai from Byan Kheyl.

May 26th.—The head-quarters marched to Shaluzan, the cavalry reaching Peiwar, where they camped on the terraced uncultivated fields below the cantonment.

The Punjab chiefs had, now that hostilities seemed at an end, determined to celebrate the employment of their troops by giving a feast, and invitations had been issued in their name by General Watson to all the officers of the Kurram Force to a picnic at Shaluzan, and on this day, at the hour fixed, the General and his staff, with about 100 officers of the different regiments, were most hospitably entertained at a repast which would have done credit to the donors in the midst of a civilised country;

but when the surrounding circumstances were considered, it was more than unexpected to be feasted on luxuries after the Spartan fare of the previous six months. To those who assisted at the pic-nic it will be undoubtedly marked as a red-letter day in their memories.

The tables were laid in the chequered shade of walnut-trees, while a mountain stream which ran close to the terrace made a pleasanter music than the well-meant efforts of the contingents' bands. Art, in the shape of coloured flags, assisted the colouring of nature, and contrasted well with the dark foliage and the shadows below. To ride suddenly from the bare and open valley into this shady retreat was under ordinary circumstances a pleasure, but on this occasion it was intensified by the kind welcome given by General Watson and his staff. After luncheon was over, General Roberts made a speech, thanking the Punjab chiefs for the assistance they had afforded to the Government, and this speech was translated into Hindustani for the benefit of the representative officers of the various states by Mahommed Hyat Khan, C.S.I., after which General Watson returned thanks, and proposed the health of General Roberts, which was drunk amid loud and enthusiastic cheers.

It is so seldom that officers in India are thrown into contact with the upper ranks of native society, that an occasion of this kind deserves to be specially mentioned, as affording an opportunity for at least an interchange of civilities, if nothing more.

During the day a telegram was received by the General that the peace of Gandamak had been signed, and thus the small hopes that still existed in the minds of a few of the ultimate advance of the Kurram Force to Cabul at this juncture were completely brought to an end.

May 27th.—The head quarters marched to Kurram with General Watson. The weather was getting warm in tents, and the flies were especially troublesome.

Captain Shafto, R.A.,\* who had been in charge of the Kohat Field Park since Captain L. H. S. James had been invalided, had been relieved of that appointment by Captain S. E. Pemberton, R.A. This officer had, in anticipation of the advance to Cabul, been posted as a Commissary of Ordnance to the Kurram Field Force, and by General Roberts' orders he was directed to take charge of the Kohat Field Park, while Captain Shafto took charge of the Kurram Ordnance. Depôt, which he did on this date.

May 28th.—The base hospitals at Kurram were inspected, both European and native. Surgeon-Major Costello of the 5th Punjab Cavalry was at the time in charge of the native base hospital at Kurram. The European hospital, which was under the general direction of Brigadier Surgeon Meane, was ordered, owing to the increase of temperature, to the Peiwar Kotal. In anticipation of the summer weather still finding the troops in the Kurram valley, the large Indian double-fly tents to accommodate sixteen soldiers had been ordered up from Kohat for the artillery, cavalry, and European base hospitals. The interior of the Kurram fort was piled up high with stacks of bags containing grain and flour, and all the godowns round the enclosure were quite filled by the efforts of the commissariat officers, so that had the advance been made at this time, there were ample supplies in store here, as well as at Alikheyl, for the move, if transport had been available.

May 30th.—The General, who had left Kurram the previous day, marched from Shaluzan to the Peiwar Kotal, inspecting the site which had been selected about half-way between the villages of Shaluzan and the Peiwar cantonment for the artillery camp.

This site was an open stony plain between two drainage nullahs; one contained a small flowing supply of waste irrigation water, and the other was quite dry. The nearest drinking-water

\* Since killed in Cabul by the explosion of the Balar Hissar magazine.

was about a mile and a half to the north, where springs at the base of the lower ranges afforded excellent water, but it was rather far off. With this exception it had the advantages of fine air and open space, and was as good a camping-ground as could be procured. The artillery were now in camp near the Peiwar cantonment, including the half battery of C/4, which had lately been withdrawn from the Peiwar Kotal, and after the General had approved of the selection of their standing camp site, they removed there under the orders of Colonel Stirling, who commanded F/A Royal Horse Artillery.

The Field Treasury, under the charge of Major Moriarty, B.S.C., and escorted by a wing of the 23rd Pioneers, reached Turrai *en route* for Kurram.

The day was warm and close at the Peiwar Kotal, and it was possible even at night to sleep in a hut with the door open, a great change from the previous month, when snow had fallen there.

The unpleasant news of cholera having appeared at Shinnak was telegraphed, which showed its gradual approach up towards Kurram. It had been raging all round Kohat, and the road works in the neighbourhood of Thull had been completely stopped from an outbreak among the Khuttuk coolies; but this news marked its advance up the valley.

#### *Native Followers—Rail Transport when Invalided.*

May 30th.—D. O. No. 970.—“It is notified by Military Department Letter No. 2403, dated 14th May, that free passages by rail to the stations at which they were engaged, will be granted to followers of the Kandahar and other forces who may be returned to India as unfit for further service on account of sickness.”

#### *Transport Reorganisation.*

D. O. No. 971.—“With reference to D. O. No. 902, camel transport will be handed over to regiments on the 1st June.

"The officers selected by paragraphs 5 and 6 of the above order will attend at the camel-lines near B plateau, for the purpose of receiving the camels from the Transport Department. Those of the 1st Brigade and 23rd Pioneers at 6 A.M.; of the 2nd Brigade, No. 2 Mountain Battery, and 7th company Sappers and Miners at 6.45 A.M.

"Receipts to be signed by officers commanding corps."

*Movements.*

D. O. No. 974.—"The following movements are ordered, in relief of the troops of the Punjab Chiefs' Contingent directed to return to India.

"To Thull, including posts of Sarozai, Gandiour, Chappri, and Manduri :—

1. Wing 5th Punjab Cavalry from Kurram, 1st June 1879.
2. Wing 11th Native Infantry from Byan Kheyl, 2nd June.
3. Wing 29th Punjab Native Infantry from Kurram, on relief by the 28th Punjab Native Infantry.
4. Two guns No. 1 Mountain Battery from Alikheyl, on 2nd June.

The 11th Native Infantry to furnish an escort of fifty rifles to accompany the battery from Badesh Kheyl to Thull.

"To Badesh Kheyl, including posts at Alizai, Shinnak, and Ibrahimzai :—

1. Wing 14th Bengal Lancers from Kurram, on 1st June 1879.
2. Four guns No. 1 Mountain Battery from Alikheyl, on Monday, 2nd June.
3. Wing 11th Native Infantry from Byan Kheyl on 2nd June.
4. 21st Punjab Native Infantry from Alikheyl, on 2nd June.

“ To Kurram :—

28th Punjab Native Infantry, on 3rd June.

“ To Shaluzan :—

23rd Pioneers, on 3rd June.

*“ Stages—Alikheyl to Thull.*

“ II.—The above troops will march by the following stages, making one stage a day and no halts :—

1. Alikheyl to Jadran.
2. Jadran (or Byan Kheyl) to Peiwar cantonment.
3. Peiwar cantonment to Kurram.
4. Kurram to Wali Mahommed's Fort.
5. Wali Mahommed's Fort to Badesh Kheyl.
6. Badesh Kheyl to Shinnak.
7. Shinnak to Alizai.
8. Alizai to Chappri.
9. Chappri to Thull.

“ III.—The following posts will be occupied by the troops detailed below :—

	Men.
1. Peiwar cantonment—	
12th Bengal Cavalry . . .	20
2. Wali Mahommed's Fort—	
14th Bengal Lancers . . .	12
28th Punjab Native Infantry . .	25
3. Ibrahimzai—	
14th Bengal Lancers . . .	12
11th Native Infantry . . .	25
4. Shinnak—	
14th Bengal Lancers . . .	12
21st Punjab Native Infantry . .	50
5. Alizai—	
14th Bengal Lancers . . .	12
21st Punjab Native Infantry . .	20

	Men.
6. Manduri—	
5th Punjab Cavalry . . .	12
11th Native Infantry . . .	50
7. Chappri—	
5th Punjab Cavalry . . .	6
29th Punjab Native Infantry . .	20
8. Gandiour—	
5th Punjab Cavalry . . .	12
29th Punjab Native Infantry . .	20
9. Sarozai—	
5th Punjab Cavalry . . .	12
29th Punjab Native Infantry . .	20
	<hr/>
Total . . .	340 men.

“The above posts will have their supplies sent to them under regimental arrangements by officers commanding corps.”

*Useless Kahurs to be discharged.*

“D. O. No. 975.—“All executive medical officers who have commissariat hired doolie-bearers under their control are directed to select the men whom they may think to be physically unfit for further service in these parts, and return them to the Commissariat Department, Kurram, with a view to their being paid-up, discharged, and sent back to their stations with the least possible delay.”

*Movements.*

D. O. No. 984 —“The movement of No. 1 Mountain Battery and the 28th Punjab Native Infantry is postponed until 5th June . . .”

The 7th company of Sappers and Miners will march for Chappri on the 5th June.”



The increasing heat of the weather, which, though pleasant and bearable out-of-doors at Alikheyl, was beginning to be felt in the tents, appeared to be affecting the troops in a way that seemed to point out the necessity of less crowding, and in consequence of several cases of erysipelas in the camp on C plateau, it was decided to shift some of its occupants on to A plateau, so as to allow more room for those who were left, till the march of the 28th Punjab Native Infantry and the company of Sappers should leave the plateau unoccupied. The 72nd Highlanders and the 5th Goorkhas, with a section of the field hospital, shifted their camp accordingly to A plateau. The regimental tents which had been left at Kurram had all been brought up, so that the overcrowding which had been necessary for the advance had been already reduced, and the tents only provided shelter for the proper number of men, but the effects showed themselves even when the numbers were reduced.

The 67th Regiment at Bhan Kheyl were also affected, and probably from the same cause; but in their case the regiment suffered more from a severe form of typhoid fever. The tents of this regiment were of the Madras pattern for natives. In this tent there was no ventilation possible in the upper part, as there was only one door, and even when the small side-walls of about one foot were raised clear of the ground, to allow a draught through, the upper air in the tent was hardly affected. Colonel Knowles, who commanded the regiment, consequently obtained sanction to cut down the circular end of the tent opposite the door, so as to admit a draught through, and this was accordingly done, and with good effect. It was, however, still considered desirable to detail some of the companies, so as to allow greater freedom for the remainder, and two companies were therefore ordered to be placed, on the 3rd June, in the camp which had been occupied by the 11th regiment Native Infantry, near Zabbardast Killa, to be employed there for road-making purposes under the Assistant Field Engineer.

The 11th Native Infantry had been making the road in this neighbourhood for some time past, and in order to protect their camp from a threatened attack by a small tribe who lived in the mountains to the north—the Babbar Kheyls—they had thrown up an entrenchment with a very good profile all round the camp in ten hours. When they vacated the post it was therefore available for the 67th.

May 31st.—The head-quarters returned to Alikheyl, taking the new thirty-foot road from Zabbardast Killa through Belut to Byan Kheyl. The 11th Native Infantry were at work near their camp, and near Belut there were working parties of the 67th. After leaving Byan Kheyl the road was being widened to Alikheyl, and more of the 67th were employed here, meeting a working-party of the 92nd and 21st Punjab Native Infantry nearer to Alikheyl. This road-making was an important feature of the Kurram campaign, and not only contributed to keep the men actively employed, but at the same time improved the communications, while it benefited the troops pecuniarily as well as bodily, as they got working pay.

June 1st.—The transport was divided according to the late orders this day, and each regiment and department was furnished with the numbers of camels allotted. After the distribution had taken place, an inspection of all the regimental camels was carried out by the special committee, of which Major Macqueen, 5th Punjab Infantry, was President, assisted by Captain Turner, 2nd Punjab Infantry, and Captain Winter, 33rd Foot, who were doing duty as transport officers.

The General and staff rode up the Lakkerai pass for about eighteen miles, with the object of meeting Captain C. Strahan, R.E., and Major Stewart, Guide Corps, who were coming across from Gandamak to report on the road. After waiting for some time without falling in with them, the General had to return to camp as it was getting late, and it afterwards was telegraphed that these officers had been unable to cross the pass, as their

baggage animals had been seized by the robbers who infested this road.

In Alikheyl itself a keen look-out was kept towards the top of Sikaram, where the flash of a mirror signal was expected from one of the survey party of the Khyber column, who had given notice that he expected to be there on this day. Mr. Scott succeeded in reaching the summit, but after great hardships and exertions was unable for some reason to communicate with the signallers below, though he had a birds-eye view, from his high position, of the Kurram and Hurriab valleys. There was not much snow left on the southern face of the Safaid Koh range, but on the northern slopes, which were not so precipitous, there was still a good deal.

Lieutenant Manners Smith, 3rd Sikhs, who had been attached to the Survey Department, left the force this day with a detachment of his regiment, which had been employed as orderlies to the various staff officers in the field, thus saving the withdrawal of soldiers from regiments for the purpose. These soldiers had been specially selected from the Pathans of the regiment, so that they could be of use as interpreters in a Pushtu-speaking country; but though they could talk their own language, their Hindustani was more than indifferent and hardly intelligible, but they were useful as foragers and helped as baggage escort.

*Valedictory orders, Punjab Chiefs' Contingent.*

June 2nd.—D. O. No. 998.—“The Punjab Chiefs' Contingent having been ordered to return to India, Major-General Roberts desires to record his high appreciation of the valuable services rendered by Brigadier-General Watson, C.B., V.C., and the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men under his command.

“The Contingent troops have formed part of the Kurram Field Force for more than three months, and during that time have been constantly engaged in escorting convoys and protecting the

lines of communication. These arduous duties have been carried out to the Major-General's entire satisfaction, and the loyalty and alacrity evinced in their performance have been equalled by the excellent behaviour of the men, both in camp and on the line of march.

"Their conduct, since joining the force, has not been the subject of a single complaint by the inhabitants of the country, and their steadiness and good discipline reflects honour on the chiefs whom they serve."

With this farewell order the history of the Kurram Force is ended, as its dissolution consequent on the signature of peace, had commenced.

After this date, however, it may be desirable to note a few of the occurrences during June and July, affecting the troops of the original Kurram Field Force who still remained in the occupation of the newly annexed country; for though the war with Cabul had been brought to a satisfactory end, as far as could be judged from the events that had passed, yet operations could not be considered concluded, so long as independent tribes remained on the line of communications, who could give an infinity of trouble, and yet hope to escape retribution, partly from political causes and partly from the difficult and inhospitable country they occupied.

As long as there was a prospect of fighting in the front, attention could not be directed to the Zymukhts, Orazais, Alisherzais, and other tribes cognate to the Afridis. These tribes had, however, luckily given us but little cause to inquire after them, though they had made a few raids; but this forbearance on their part could not be relied on to last, and till they had virtually made their submission, their hostility might be reckoned on.

The events that follow are not especially connected with them, but may help to describe the life of the first English occupants of the Kurram valley, and only for this reason are they worthy of

record. The chief events are necessarily centred in reconnaissances, for though the valley had been occupied for eight months, there had been no time to explore its neighbourhood till lately. Defences and road-making had absorbed the available labour of the troops. At this time, now that the sun was getting vertical, the English soldiers were only allowed to work from 5.30 A.M. to 8.30 A.M., as the mid-day sun, even in the Hurriab valley, was warmer than was pleasant; and as nearly all the road had been made, there was no object in working in the heat more than could be helped.

The laying out of the proposed new cantonment at Shaluzan, and its roads, was begun. The artillery division and squadron of the 9th Lancers were in camp about two miles from the cantonment site, and about half a mile from them were the 12th Bengal Lancers, in camp at the edge of the cultivation dependent on the Shaluzan villages. The English troops were comfortably housed in European privates' tents, and in fact were better off than their officers, who still had their small campaigning tents, which were uncomfortably close. By pitching a fly over them the heat was avoided to a certain extent, but still a tent of six or eight feet square was not very roomy on a hot day. The heat did not affect anyone in motion much, but it was trying to stand in the sun.

Peace having been declared, and the Ahmed Kheyl section of the Jajis having previously submitted to our rule, there was no objection to a visit being made to their country, which still remained, though visible from the ranges to the south of Alikheyl, unknown and unsurveyed.

A reconnaissance, led by the Major-General, started this morning to inspect their country, and to prospect, if possible, the road through it towards Ghazni and the Logar valley.

Marching down the Kurram river, the party, composed of two companies of the 92nd, four companies 5th Goorkhas, and two guns, No. 2 Mountain Battery, reached the bend of the

river to the south, and passing through a defile here and another a little way further, both narrow and difficult, the second one in fact only fifteen yards wide, the troops left the river-bed and camped for the night at a place called Dobozaï.

The villagers did not appear at all friendly, though they refrained from any hostilities, and their head-man, by name Zaib, showed no alacrity in coming to meet the General. So a polite message was sent to him by a Native Assistant Political Officer, to come in and pay his respects, on which he appeared in camp. The Political Officer, Colonel Gordon, C.S.I., met with an accident during the ride out, his horse falling with him, breaking his collar-bone. He was at once sent back into Alikheyl in a doolie.

June 3rd.—The General and staff, with a badragga, went to the top of a spur running south from Saratiga, the centre peak of a series of spurs which spread out like a fan from the neighbourhood of the Shutargardan.

The original idea was to proceed straight up the Hassan Kheyl valley till the Kotal on the Ghazni road was reached, but the head-man of the Hassan Kheyls, "Cassim," pointed out that part of this road lay through the Mangal territory, where opposition was likely to be met with. The idea was consequently abandoned, but as it was desirable to see as much of the road as possible, the party were taken up the spur to a point which overlooked it. Ghazni could not be seen, however, as it was on the further side of a low range of hills which bounded the view to the south-west. In front of this was another range of detached low hills, rising from high upland country like that in which Ghazni is situated. The Zarmat valley was visible to the west, and to the south lay the ranges which enclosed the Jadran country to the west of Khost. Not much time was allowed for making any observations, as when the Mangals in the valley below sighted the party on the ridge, their drums beat, alarm was given, and

they began to collect with the object of fighting. As there were only a few orderlies with the party in addition to the Badragga, whose temper could not be relied on, fighting was out of the question, and so the party returned to camp, passing through a couple of villages, whose inhabitants would doubtless have been ready to join the Mangals, had a shot been fired.

This reconnaissance having thus terminated rather sooner than was anticipated, there was no object in keeping the troops at Dobazai out for another night, and the whole party returned to Alikheyl, reaching camp at 7 P.M.

June 4th.—The difficulties occasioned by the desertion of hired camel-men, which have occurred in all Indian campaigns where hired carriage has been employed, were felt in the Kurram valley, and in nearly every case the deserters managed to get away, sometimes taking their own or other camels with them. The neighbourhood of Thull to the Waziri country enabled these desertions to be easily effected at that place, and it was but seldom that any men disappeared from the Kurram or Harriab valleys. Two camel-men, however, attempted to desert from Alikheyl by themselves, and naturally fell into the hands of the Ahmed Kheyls, who inquired if they had any papers to show that they had leave to go to Ghazni, which was the story they had made up. Not having any papers to corroborate their statement, they were seized, stripped, and their swords, which at once marked them as British camp-followers, were taken from them, as also their money, amounting to forty-four shillings, and they and their property were brought into camp at Alikheyl. The camel-men received two dozen lashes each and lost their money, which their captors were allowed to keep, which punishment, when made known to the rest, might have a salutary effect in checking desertion, but as long as hired men are employed in the transport department, desertions must occur, especially among the class of men who are merely the servants of the contractors who furnish camels. All the camels employed with the force were branded with

a large K on the neck so as to enable them to be recognised. One of these was found in the possession of Babri, the Jowaki chief against whom there had been an expedition the previous winter, and who now was trying to earn an honest living in the carrying trade. This camel was brought into Kurram laden with eight maunds of stores, and was, of course, recognised. Babri stated that he had purchased the animal for three shillings, it being one of those that had been left as broken-down by the way-side, and that, by careful attention, he had brought it into condition. The camel being a Government one was, however, taken from him, and inquiries were made as to how he explained the fact that this animal, which could not carry four maunds in our service, could take double this weight for him.

His answer was that by halting every two hours, where feeding was obtainable, and by liberal rations of grain and ghee where there was no feeding to be had, camels could be made to carry heavy loads, and that early marching, which enabled them to feed during the day, was absolutely necessary.

All these points being in striking opposition to our treatment of camels, account for the very different result in the way of the profitable use of the animal. As long as the owner of the camels is with them and food is available, the hired camel may work for a time, but, put in charge of a man who is merely detached to look after it, and who most probably appropriates any money that may be given to him to obtain food when it can be bought, the result in the way of mortality is certain.

Another point in which private transport had the advantage over Government camels, was that the owners of local carriage, whether Jowaki, Afridi, Turi, or Jaji, refused to carry anything in the shape of a box, packing-case, or hard substance. They always bargained for grain or flour bags, which were soft and yielding, and which rode comfortably on the saddle without injuring the animal. There was another indirect advantage to them in carrying these provision stores, which was the facility of



helping themselves to their contents; a small quantity out of every bag would never be missed in the weighment, or, when a large quantity was abstracted, a stone of equal weight brought the bags up to the tally-weight, and so the owners of the local transport found that they could save the whole of the hire paid them, three shillings a maund, and live on the plunder, with but little fear of detection; the only wonder is that more food-stores were not pilfered in this way.

6th June.—To complete the acquaintance with the mass of mountains to the south of the Hurriab valley, it was necessary to explore one more route, the Ishtiar pass, which, starting from Byan Kheyl, led across the range and came out in the upper Kurram valley. The General started with a small force, composed of two companies 28th Punjab Native Infantry and No. 1 Mountain Battery, as an escort to the staff and the survey officers, while, in order to check any hostile movement in his front, which might have been awkward with such a small force in the difficult country that might be expected, another detachment of troops, consisting of the 12th Bengal Cavalry and 300 men of the 5th Punjab Infantry, had been ordered on the 1st June to march from Peiwar to Keraiah in the upper Kurram valley, so as to be in a position to intercept any Mangals who might pass that way. In order to make sure of the baggage keeping up, the regimental mules of the 5th Goorkhas were borrowed to carry the baggage of the troops, and the transport mules were laden as lightly as possible, as a certain amount of provisions had to be taken. A badragga of Jajis were to accompany the force, and till the last moment the destination of the march was kept secret, and it was given out that the troops were to go through the Manjiar pass, so that if the Mangals thought of opposing the reconnaissance they would be on the wrong track.

No opposition of any kind was met with, nor was the pass as rugged or steep as the Manjiar defile. It entered the Kurram

valley in a broad open valley at the west of or behind the range that sloped down from the Peiwar Kotal. This valley was about a mile wide at its mouth, and advanced up with a gentle slope through deserted terraces, with a small amount of cultivation, for about six miles, till it reached the mountains of the main range itself.

The camp was pitched in this valley near a village, and in the neighbourhood of an excellent spring of water, which bubbled up into a round tank, flowing away in a stream to help in the cultivation of the land. The next day the march was resumed to Keraiah, about eight miles off, the track passing over boulder-strewn ridges, where, however, the signs of terrace cultivation showed that more land had been in use previously than now, and, passing close to the villages now existing, it led above their cultivation to the open valley at the mouth of the Manjiar pass, where the camp was pitched about half a mile from the village of Keraiah. The survey officers not having been in this part of the valley before, had a great deal of work to do in connecting their survey of the Kurram with that of the Khost country, which lay on the other side of the ranges of mountains to the south. Several reconnaissances were made among these hills across the Kurram river, which was fordable in most places, but with a strong current. The villages in this direction were pleasantly situated among their fields, now ripening with the first crop, and orchards, and the inhabitants were friendly enough, but while those at a distance did not object to our movements, the people of Keraiah, or some of them, did, as they used to creep up close and fire into the camp at night. On one occasion a regimental mule of the 5th Punjab Infantry was wounded, but otherwise no harm was done. The General, however, decided to put a stop to this annoyance, and calling the head-men into camp, ordered them to bring in thirty matchlocks as a punishment, and if another shot was fired, a larger number would be taken. These arms were merely impounded,

and were to be restored to their owners hereafter conditionally on their good behaviour. After this no more nocturnal disturbances took place.

The weather was rather warm, but a strong wind blowing up the valley during the day, and down at night, moderated the heat, at least to one's feelings.

On the 15th June the last reconnaissance was to be made, to enable the survey officers to map down the course of the Kurram river between Keraiah and the Ahmed Kheyl country. The head-man of the Hassan Kheyls, "Cassim," and of the Ahmed Kheyls, "Zaib," were both in camp, and were quite willing to protect the survey party, who were, according to the proposed arrangement, to sleep in one of their villages on the banks of the river, and to escort them safely the following day to Alikheyl.

A part of the road, however, in the valley from the borders of the Chumkunnis to those of the Ahmed Kheyls, did not belong to them, but to the Lajji Mangals. Arrangements were made with this tribe, who agreed to furnish ten hostages in our camp as security for the good behaviour of the remainder, and these men were placed under a guard while the reconnaissance started.

At the point where the Kurram river entered the valley, about a mile and a half from camp, the gorge through which it passed was not more than 100 yards across, with high rocky mountains all inaccessible, some with nearly perpendicular cliffs, others less steep but equally impracticable, prevented anyone unacquainted with the country from leaving the track, which, as a rule, kept to the bed of the stream, rising now and then to the cultivated bank, wherever a sufficient space of alluvial soil had allowed a village to be built in its neighbourhood. The Chumkunnis owned this part of the river-bed, and their territory extended for about four miles up; beyond their border they were not allowed to go. Just before reaching their last village one of

the badragga mentioned casually that the Mangals would make an objection to the advance of the party, which consisted of the General and the staff, the survey party, Major Macqueen, 5th Punjab Infantry, and some eight of his regiment, who were detailed as orderlies, and four mounted orderlies belonging to the General's escort. Up to this point there had been a detachment of the 12th Bengal Cavalry, No. 1 Mountain Battery, and 5th Punjab Infantry, who were to remain on guard at this place to act as a support if necessary.

The General decided to make further inquiry before committing himself to the defile, and the Assistant Political Officer, Mahommed Hyat Khan, was sent on to the first Mangal village, about two miles up the stream, to ascertain if there were any hitch in the programme.

In an hour this officer returned, reporting the road as clear, on which the Chumkunni badragga started off, some of them firing their matchlocks in the air and executing war-dances to relieve their spirits, and possibly to show their contempt for their neighbours. The first Mangal village was reached, about two miles on, and the head-men were interviewed. They offered the General some milk, and received a few rupees in return. They did not make any objection to the party proceeding on, and so, after a short halt, the road was resumed; this was similar to that already traversed, though now the hill-sides were more practicable and covered with brushwood, with spurs occasionally bending the straight course of the river, and commanding its bed. About three miles from the border line, the straight confining walls of mountains were broken to the left by a side glen, which came down in a stony watercourse to the bed of the river. At its mouth was a large shady plane-tree, and here a halt was called, to find out the intentions of some men, who were showing themselves along the sky-line, about 400 yards on the crest of a spur coming down to the side ravine.

There were not many visible, only about three or four, but their actions were hostile. Prolonged shouts of "Allah!" and occasional dances on the top of the rocks, showed that the opposition which was expected was to be met with here.

About three miles further up the Kurram, the Ahmed Kheyl villages, which were the goal of the expedition, were in sight, but while there was a chance of the return journey being cut off it was useless to go on. The malcontents on the hill-top were asked to come down and talk over the matter, but their reply was a shot, which fell close to the party. Two more shots were also fired without effect, and shortly after, a small number of men were observed crossing the glen and hiding themselves in the tree-growth on the right bank.

About an hour was passed in the fruitless endeavour to bring the Mangals to terms, but they steadily refused to listen, even to men of their own tribe.

When it was reported that the party of Mangals who had crossed the glen were probably coming to take us in rear, some of the Chumkunni villagers were ordered up the hill-side, to a peak about 100 yards distant, overlooking the glen and the plane-tree. At the foot of the slope of this hill there was a wall of rock about thirty feet high rising up from the glen, and this in all probability saved the lives of everyone, for suddenly, while the General was discussing matters with the head-men in the shade of the plane-tree, a volley was poured into the mass from the peak.

The wall of rock sheltered most of the party from this fire, while the thick stem of the tree gave protection to a few others; but both these positions were flanked by the ridge on which the men were first seen, who still occasionally wasted their ammunition in the attempt to reach us. Before matters had arrived at this crisis, the General had ordered Captain Woodthorpe to return with his survey party, and had at the same time sent an order to the supporting party to be ready to advance if necessary.

The fire of the enemy at this close range had been a little more effective, as one man, the nephew of the Hassan Kheyl chief, was severely wounded. The horse which was ridden by Lieutenant-Colonel Mark Heathcote, who had been allowed to join the party, having come over from Kurram the previous day on business, was wounded in the shoulder, Colonel Heathcote having a lucky escape. Major Collett had his crupper shot off, and one sepoy was wounded in the foot.

After allowing a sufficient time for the survey party to have got nearly back to the support, the General gave the order for the return. There were only twelve rifles at his disposal, and he ordered Major Macqueen to take command of these men, and to cover the retirement. As soon as the enemy on the peak observed the movement they swarmed down. Their numbers were difficult to be estimated, but there may have been about 100, who ran down the hill-sides and took up convenient positions, whence they could fire on the returning party. Major Macqueen and his few men, however, kept them from closing in, and gradually fell back, keeping up a fire, while the pursuers, skirmishing from rock to rock, and taking the advantage of commanding ground, returned the fire with interest. The badragga, who were supposed to act on our side, after letting off their matchlocks disappeared, and were no more seen. It is reported, and with some truth possibly, that they joined in the attack on us, but luckily they produced no effect.

The supports were reached in due course, but after having followed for about two miles the enemy gave up the pursuit.

The whole party returned to camp at Keraiah, reaching it about 4 p.m. The object of the expedition, though not fully carried out in the way proposed, was sufficiently so to enable the course of the Kurram to be mapped down with all the precision required; and as far as the survey officers were concerned, it was a matter of some satisfaction to them that their original plan of

sleeping in the Ahmed Kheyl villages had not been carried out, the temper of the Mangal neighbours having been shown to be more uncertain than was expected.

The Mangal hostages were made prisoners on the return to camp, and were sent to Kurram for detention till the fine of 1,000 rupees, which was ordered to be paid by the offending tribe who had broken their engagements, was paid up. The maliks of Keraiah, who had failed to warn the General of the tactics of the Mangals, were also arrested and sent to Kurram for a time.

A halt was made on the 16th at Keraiah, pending the investigation of these matters, but on the 17th June the camp was broken up, the General returning to Shaluzan, the 5th Punjab Infantry marching six miles to a village called Chappri, on the bank of the Kurram, while the rest of the detachment—No. 1 Mountain Battery and the two companies of the 28th—moved further along the road, about half-way to Kurram, which they reached on the following day. The 5th Punjab Infantry were camped about one mile from the head-quarter camp at Shaluzan.

June 17th.—The sky clouded over in the afternoon of this day, and there was some rain to lower the temperature, but the effect did not last long, as the air, even when it was not raining, was so full of moisture as to make the climate particularly relaxing and unpleasant. The Kurram valley, like all the trans-Indus country, is so far beyond the effects of the monsoon of the lower parts of India, that the customary hot-weather rains do not fall there, but the influence of these rains in the way of adding considerably to the moisture of the air is particularly felt. It is this that adds so much to the discomfort of the Peshawar valley in the hot weather, and it was felt, though in a lesser degree, the heat not being so intense, in Kurram. With this moisture-laden, relaxing air came cholera. It was rather bad at Thull; other cases were reported in the Kurram villages,

and at Shaluzan itself there were premonitory symptoms. The water-supply of the head-quarter camp was not very satisfactory, the stream running from the irrigated land above.

The General inspected the source of the water-supply, and arranged with the villagers that the water should be turned on for so many hours every morning, and a party of the Pioneers was stationed to carry this arrangement into effect.

On the 18th June, Lieutenant Whittall, a promising young officer attached to the 14th Bengal Lancers, died from cholera at Badesh Kheyl.

After his death the camp was removed to a higher table-land, on a spur enclosing the Kermanah river, where there was generally a breeze. The only drawback was the distance of the water-supply, for though the river was about 200 yards below the camp, there was rather a circuitous road for animals to get down to it.

Some of the tribes in the neighbourhood of Badesh Kheyl had shown themselves friendly. The Musazais had made their submission about the beginning of the month, but others in the vicinity still held aloof, and a party of Alisherzais raided the road about four miles from Badesh Kheyl, carrying off 100 bullocks employed in local transport duties, and their loads. Two of the owners, Khuttuks, were killed.

On the 25th June, Mr. Sinclair, C.S., Assistant Commissioner at Thull, and several of the civil subordinates who were in camp near him, were attacked with cholera. Mr. Sinclair died the following day.

On the return of the Punjab Chiefs' Contingent to India, the site of their camp being vacant, the whole of the Thull camp was shifted to it. There were several advantages in this site, with the corresponding disadvantages of the water-supply being more distant, and of the ground in its neighbourhood having been polluted. As long as the air is dry and the sun is warm, filth of all kinds is rapidly dried up, and is



imperceptible ; but when a shower of rain alters these conditions its presence becomes very evident and noxious. The cholera outbreak at Thull occurred, like many other ones reported, after a shower of rain.

June 20th.—Dr. Smith, Indian Medical Department, who was sent from the Kurram valley to Thull on account of the outbreak of cholera at that station, was murdered at Chappri, one march short of that place, by some thieves. He had pitched his tent in the cattle enclosure of the post, away from the guard. During the night some thieves pulled down the loose stone wall without disturbing anyone, and one man entering Dr. Smith's tent seized and ran off with his pillow. Dr. Smith pursued and grappled with the thief, who got away outside the enclosure. His companions then attacked him, and so severely wounded him with their long knives that he died soon from loss of blood. This murder added another item to the score that was being marked against the Zymukhts and their neighbours.

Colonel T. Gordon, C.S.I., who was now able to travel in a doolie, left the Kurram Field Force, and his brother, Colonel J. Gordon, who commanded at Thull, returned with him to that place.

Captain Woodthorpe with a party of officers made the ascent of Sikaram for the first time. The ascent had been postponed too late, for at this time of the year the haze obscured all the distant views, but he was enabled to ascertain the height, which was 15,600 feet. The ascent was commenced early in the morning—at 4 A.M.—from the Spingawi plateau, and occupied eight hours. Some signallers under Captain Straton accompanied him, and their signal from the top announced the arrival of the party. The descent was made in about three hours. Some of the party were unable to reach the top, partly from the fatigue and from the rarefaction of the air, but this did not affect all.

While the troops in the Kurram valley were being oppressed

by the heat, the head-quarter wing 23rd Pioneers were camped at an elevation of about 9,000 feet, in as beautiful a glen as could be found anywhere.

The object of placing them there was to work a quarry of fine slate, which was to be utilised hereafter in roofing the new cantonment. Skilled workers were obtained from men of the British regiments who had been employed at this trade, and these men reported favourably of the quality of the slate as far as they had seen it, but they expected it to improve as the quarrying became deeper.

The glen was a narrow one, with a torrent of water dashing over boulders. Its course did not run altogether at right angles to the Kurram valley; for about two miles distance from the valley it turned to the east, and ascended gradually in this direction for about two miles more, when it turned again to the north just before it reached the snow-line. The sides of the glen were covered with trees, among them many walnut-trees. Above the foliage the high grassy Alps towered up, some of the slopes being very nearly vertical, and seemingly impracticable for pasture lands.

To complete the pre-arrangements as regards the cantonment, a number of wood-cutters and sawyers were employed at the Peiwar Kotal, to cut down the timber that would be required for the roofs of the new buildings.

All the smaller logs were slid down the hill by the shortest road; but some of the largest beams were too long to follow the curves on the hill-side, and they were left at the top of the Kotal till suitable arrangements could be made to drag them down by elephants.

Limestone boulders were also collected in the Shaluzan torrent, and burned into lime by the men of the 23rd Pioneers.

The company of Sappers was in camp above the village of Shaluzan, about a mile above the cultivation, and were at work constructing a channel down the stream which should prevent

the water being wasted as much as it was, and it was hoped by this means a supply brought from a clear source would reach the new cantonment. This was laid out in a series of roads, crossing each other at right angles, after the usual arrangement of all new towns in these practical but unæsthetic days.

June 28th.—The camp at Badesh Kheyl being situated on a bare plateau, it was necessary to send out fatigue parties every day to bring in a supply of firewood. Two parties of the 21st Punjab Native Infantry and 11th Punjab Native Infantry were out for this purpose with an armed escort, but getting a little out of their sight, they were set upon by a party of Oosherzais, and a subadar of the 21st Punjab Native Infantry and his orderly were killed before any of the escort came up. The savages got clear away without any loss, and though they were followed up the hill by the 11th Native Infantry, who were ordered out, yet nothing more was seen of them.

June 30th.—The second step in the reduction of the Kurram Field Force was ordered this day, when one of its brigades was abolished. Brigadier General Forbes, who commanded the 2nd Brigade, was accordingly disestablished, and Captain Carr, 5th Punjab Cavalry, and Captain Scott, V.C., Brigade Majors, were directed to return to their regiments. Captain Scott was in orders to remain as Brigade Major to Brigadier-General Massy, who was appointed to command the brigade of troops at Alikheyl and Shaluzan.

Brigadier-General Cobbe, who had commanded the 1st Brigade of the Kurram Field Force, had been brought on the list of Brigadiers, and was posted to the Agra Brigade.

No changes were ordered in the number or disposition of the troops, nor was the appointment of Road Commandant abolished.

1st July.—The head-quarter camp was shifted to the Peiwar Kotal, a move which was appreciated by all who lived in the small Cabul-pattern tents. The heat and moist air at Kurram were very relaxing, and as there was no object in staying there

when the climate was beginning to affect the health of all, the change to the pine-woods, in a glade of which the camp was pitched, was very grateful. The snow had all disappeared from the southern face of Sika-ram, which towered up high above the tall pines, and its colouring was changed in consequence, the bare mass of limestone rock standing up yellow and light grey, with hardly a change of colour on its face, till lower down the green of the pine-forests contrasted pleasantly with it. The troops at the Peiwar Kotal employed their spare time in digging up the ground, which had been cleared of trees, and planting potatoes, in the hope of their coming up. The chances were against their doing so, for though the soil could not be finer, the rain-fall at the Peiwar Kotal at this time of the year seemed too slight to furnish the requisite amount of moisture. Other ground was taken up by Dr. Aitchison, the botanist of the force, on the southern slope of the Sufuid Koh, and a large quantity of potatoes was made over to the head-man of the village in the neighbourhood, with instructions how to plant them. The result, if satisfactory, would be the introduction of this vegetable all through the valley in the course of a few years, and it would thus afford a supply of food to the wild inhabitants, who have now to rob and plunder to get the means of subsistence.

July 5th.—The Mangals, who had attacked the reconnoitring party, in the bed of the Kurram, came into camp to make their submission. They paid up 500 rupees in cash for their fine, and pleaded inability to pay the remainder, except in sheep to the same value. The matter was thus arranged, and the party of head-men who came in, with two old women, to represent the tribe, were allowed to withdraw to await the arrival of the hostages of their tribe, who had been telegraphed for. On the morrow these arrived, but instead of ten only nine appeared. The tenth man had been sick when the order for their release came, and was detained till he should have recovered. He did

not, however, like the idea of being left alone in the hands of strangers after his brethren had departed, and so resolved to run away after them in the night. There was no great difficulty in carrying out this idea, but as he was passing by one of our sentries in camp he was shot dead, not replying to the sentry's challenge. This *contretemps* was very unfortunate, as it seemed to involve a breach of our engagements, and though no one was to blame except the unlucky man who was killed, the General remitted part of the fine, and returned them their 500 rupees, which, considering that the money value of a Mangal, according to the tribal estimate, was only about 50 rupees, fully made up for the loss of their tribesman.

Whenever a "jirga," or collection of the head-men of any tribe, was received, they were always accompanied by a party of the tribe, or of their followers, who, as well as the head-man, were all armed with knives and matchlocks. A few had shields as well, but these did not seem very common. The usual procedure, after they had sent on to say they were coming in, was to discuss preliminary matters with the Assistant Political Officer, Mahommed Hyat Khan, C.S.I., who would be engaged the whole day in talking over affairs with them, repeating the same story over and over again, till he was heartily tired of it himself. After all the points for discussion had been settled in this way, the jirga were introduced to the Political Officer, and subsequently to the General, who usually addressed them through Mahommed Hyat Khan, and at the conclusion of the interview presents of money and turbans were made to the head-men and others deserving of it.

It is a fact worth noting that no evil resulted from admitting sometimes as many as 200 or 300 armed men into camp, anyone of whom was able and capable of using his knife, and though in all the interviews the General's body-guard of four Goorkhas and two orderlies—Sikhs belonging to the 5th Punjab Infantry—were present in the background, yet there

was nothing to prevent any fanatic who did not object to lose his life, from murdering the General or anyone else. No extra precautions were taken at any time when these bodies of men were allowed into camp, and the result proved that this confidence was not misplaced.

July 15th.—Between the 5th to the 15th the only event worthy of record is the arrival of Brigadier-General Massy to take up the command of the advanced brigade of the Kurram troops, and on the 15th, Major Cavagnari, C.S.I., the newly-appointed Envoy to Cabul, came into camp accompanied by Captain Plowden, Deputy Commissioner at Kohat, who had political charge of the frontier below Thull. He was followed on the 16th by the remainder of the mission, which consisted of Mr. Jenkyns, C.I.E., Surgeon-Major Kelly, M.D., and Lieutenant Hamilton, V.C., Guide Corps, who commanded the small escort of Guide Cavalry and Guide Infantry, about sixty men altogether.

The 5th Punjab Infantry also passed through the Kotal, and camped with the mission near Zabbardast Killa on the 17th. The General and Envoy proceeded to Alikheyl, and the head-quarter and mission camps were pitched on B. Plateau, outside the walled-in camp there. This was rather empty, however, as some of its occupants had moved on to Drekulla, a distance of ten miles up the Hazardarakht defile, with a force under Brigadier-General Massy. In order to give as many officers as possible the opportunity of seeing the Shutargardan, two companies from the three British regiments, with those officers who were allowed to go on leave, a squadron of the 12th Bengal Cavalry, the 5th Goorkhas, and four guns No. 2 Mountain Battery, composed this force, which was made rather strong, both for the sake of showing due respect to Her Majesty's Envoy, and also to be on the safe side against any treacherous movement of the Ghilzais, though nothing appeared more improbable than that there should be any breach of the peace.

July 18th.—The cavalry line lost three horses from poison-grass. There were at least two kinds of this grass, one a bright green succulent-looking herb, and another a thin wiry kind; and there may have been others, known to the inhabitants of these parts, but all were unknown to the troops, and the consequence was that from the very commencement of the campaign horses had suffered, belonging both to the mounted corps as well as to private officers. In some cases the effect of the poison took a peculiar form, which resulted, after several days' inflammation, in the end of the tongue dropping off. The animals so bereft did not seem much the worse, and it only appeared to interfere with their drinking in a shallow stream. In other more severe cases the horses died from the poison.

The natives of the country recommended a drink of whey for any animal so poisoned, but another remedy, which was tried with some success, was to burn the poison-grass and let its fumes go up the nostrils of the animal, when the smoke, acting homœopathically, became an antidote.

The head-quarters and the Cabul Mission reached Drekulla at 9 A.M., and then, preceded by some of General Massy's force, they marched on to Karatiga, which was reached about 1 o'clock.

The road from Alikheyl up to this point was in very fair order. Up to Drekulla it was nearly wholly in the bed of the stream, but beyond this point it shifted from one side to the other as the bank allowed space, crossing and recrossing the water many times.

At nearly every one of these passages small foot-bridges had been thrown across, and though they were rough, and caused delay while the men filed over them, they preserved them from wetting their feet, which was an advantage when the heat of the sun, even at these high altitudes, was considered.

On arrival at Karatiga, Captain Straton and some of his signallers immediately ascended the slopes of a mountain over-

looking the camp to the north, and in about an hour reached a point from which they could signal to a post placed high up on the slopes of Matungi, the mountain overlooking Alikheyl.

The camp at Karatiga was placed in the junction of the main valley with one to the south formed by the spires of the mountain Saratiga.

Arrangements had been made with the Jaji tribes to supply the camp with grass for the horses, but beyond this, in these wild desolate regions, nothing was procurable.

The evening terminated in a pleasant dinner, which was given by the Envoy to the General and the staff; a dinner which will live long in the memory of the guests, and if the good wishes which were then expressed could have had effect, the subsequent sad events in Cabul would not have taken place.

July 19th.—The boundary of the Jaji territory was situated about half a mile from camp, marked by a projecting cliff of light-coloured rock, from which the simple name of the place, Karatiga, or “the white rock,” was taken.

The meaning of Saratiga was the reverse of this, its translation was “the black rock,” which had reference to its dark-coloured peaks, which stood up high against the blue sky streaked still with snow in its ravines, but otherwise all the snow had melted off everywhere, leaving high grassy mountains, which were uninhabited save by bands of predatory Mangals.

The arrangements for the day were that the Mission should proceed to the Afghan camp at the Shutargardan plain and halt there; but the General and staff, accompanied by all the officers on leave, were to be allowed to go as far as the Shutargardan pass itself.

About 8 A.M. news was brought into camp that the Afghan envoy, who was deputed to receive Major Cavagnari, was at the white rock, and shortly after, before the guard of honour had reached the durbar tent, the envoy himself followed quickly on the steps of the aide-de-camp who had preceded him Captain



Arthur Conolly, B.S.C., political officer at Alikheyl, in the place of Captain Rennick, who had been obliged to go on sick leave, with one of the General's aides-de-camp, had started to receive him as soon as his intentions were known, and meeting him about a quarter of a mile off, rode in with him to the camp. The General and Major Cavagnari received the visitor, and sitting down conversed for some time. After this, everything being packed and ready for a start, the horses were brought up and the march began. On rounding the "white rock" a squadron of an Afghan cavalry regiment was found drawn up in line on the bank. The men were dressed in old British red cloth uniforms with white belts, more or less pipe-clayed, rather baggy blue cotton trousers, with long boots innocent of blacking. The only purely native article about them was their head-dress, which, however, was also a copy of the present English helmet, but being made rather shapeless, of a soft dark grey felt, it was not becoming. The officers were very much the same as the men, but the colonel, who commanded the regiment, was dressed in an old staff tunic with gold embroidery. Nearly every man carried a whip with a wooden handle, which was stuck into his right boot when not required, and a large number of them carried eye shades, which were slung round their necks when not in use; they were great pieces of cardboard apparently covered with cloth, and fitted on the helmet above the peak, shading either the side or the front of the face from the sun, as required.

Their arms were a smooth-bore carbine carried over the thigh, muzzle downwards, and a tulwar. The best things about them were their horses, which looked well fed and hardy. They were superior, as a rule, to the general run of Cabul horses imported into India, and though a little heavy in the forehand, they were well adapted to a mountainous country. They followed their leaders, scrambling along the hill-side quite independently of the path, which seldom admitted more than two abreast.

About a mile beyond Karatiga, the Sarkhai Kotal was crossed ; the ascent, though steep, was not much more than 300 yards from the bed of the stream, and then the upland plain of the Shutargardan was gained, after descending down a short valley for about a quarter of an mile.

At Cassim Kheyl, in the centre of the plain, the Afghan camp was pitched, and all was in readiness to receive the Mission suitably. A large tent was conveniently placed near a running streamlet, and the water was diverted from it into a ditch dug along the length of one of the sides. This side, instead of being closed the whole length, with a doorway in the middle, as in our tents, had open window spaces cut in the tent cloth, thus giving lots of light and air, and enabling the arrangement of the water outside to be seen. The top and the floor of the tent were covered with a clean white linen cloth, which added much to its light and pleasant interior.

Not much use was made of the durbar tent at this time, the summit of the Shutargardan being the goal of most of the party, whence they might take a look at the promised land of Cabul, from which, as it was thought, they were for ever to be excluded. A ride of about three-quarters of an hour brought the whole of the party to the summit, and there a halt was made, while every one tried to fancy what the intervening road, from the point where it dipped out of sight to where it appeared again in the bottom of the valley, was like. It did not look a pleasant road to travel, nor were the plains of the Logar valley more enticing when seen from this high elevation. The misty haze of summer showed but little more than a green streak, which marked the course of the Logar river. On the further side, the Pughman range was hidden in the yellow haze, while to the far north an indistinct outline showed where the Hindoo Koosh ranges might be found. The city of Cabul was hidden by the spur of the mountain that enclosed the valley leading to the Shutargardan. The sun was bright and hot, but the air at this

elevation was delightful, and in altered conditions of life the summit of the Shutargardan, though bare, stony, and treeless, would not be a residence to be despised, when the malaria and heat of the valleys rendered a change necessary.

The Afghan escort was drawn up in line, while the party was scattered along the brow of the hill, and its colonel was disposed to be friendly. His conversation, however, represented the Afghan character altogether: had he and his regiment, and the other Afghan regiments which were still at Herat, been brought down to Cabul, instead of being left there, the British would not have been able to face them, and they would have kept the Peiwar Kotal against the invaders \*

In appearance this Afghan colonel, and in fact the whole of his men, were quite dissimilar from the tall hooked-nose class of Pathan, who represents to the ordinary Anglo-Indian the type of his race. These fine Jewish-looking men, belong altogether to the nomad sections of the Ghilzai clan, and are quite different from the Hazaras, a flat-faced Mongolian race, or from the inhabitants of Turkestan, from which this cavalry regiment was chiefly recruited, and from the other tribes or clans in Afghanistan. Of small size, their faces were of pure Caucasian type, and the whole of them might not have passed for foreigners if found in the ranks of the Spanish or Italian armies.

The Afghan camp at Cassim Kheyl was again reached on the return journey about 1 P.M., and this time most of the party

\* Judged by the light of after-events, this conversation had its significance. When the Afghan regiments from Herat did reach Cabul they were inflated with the same conceit. They had been able to oppress and keep down the Heratis, and therefore they were invincible. As yet they had had no opportunity to distinguish themselves, but now they saw their chance. How they took it, and the results to them and to the Mission, does not belong to this story, but it was a bad day for the old Afghanistan, though possibly a good day in the history of the world, when these mutinous regiments tried to carry on the policy which their previous master had failed in, and which their then master had renounced.

were accommodated in the white-lined tent, where the Afghan Sirdar, Khusrul Khan, received the English Envoy and the General with due ceremony. This man had been the Afghan Governor of Turkestan, and was recalled, it is said, for his pro-Russian proclivities. His face showed his Turkish origin, and had he worn a fez instead of a black wool Astrakhan cap, he might have passed as an Osmanli Turk. His face was not a pleasing one; heavy dark eyebrows shaded his eyes and a heavy moustache his mouth, but the expression of the eyes, when seen, was sinister, and the whole face was cruel, and though to some his very studied abstraction seemed to denote good manners, to others his silence with downcast eyes did not betoken a willing performance of the duty he was engaged in. He was well dressed, in a black cloth coat and breeches, with black boots and belts; a costume which showed the externals of civilisation, while all the other Afghans present were dressed in a more Eastern fashion, with loose chogas and baggy pyjamas. Among these men, and wearing a blue cloth choga with gilt embroidery, and a gold embroidered puggree, both the gift of the British officials for his services up to this time, was the chief of the Ghilzai clan, Padshah Khan. Below his outer garments his clothes were much on a par with those of his humblest followers, and in his appearance there was nothing to distinguish him from the crowd but the bright coat he was wearing. An elderly man with a thin face, hooked nose, and grey beard, the eye hungry-looking and restless, like all the half-starved mountaineer robbers of his clan, he could have been mistaken anywhere for a labourer, but still he was a man in authority, and for a time held the fortunes of Cabul in his hand. The ex-Amir Shere Ali, to bring over the tribe to his side, had appointed Padshah Khan as Wazir, or Prime Minister, of Cabul, which appointment he still held. Up to this time, however, he had been in friendly relations with the British, and had managed to please both parties, and his presence augured as well for the successful results of the mission

as the dark looks of Khudil Khan might seem to tell against its success. The evident wish of the Afghan ruler to do honour to the British Mission was, however, the most prominent object in view, and at this time concealed altogether any dark designs, if there were any existing, which is improbable, against the lives of the Mission. It had been settled that this Mission should be only a temporary one, to return to India in the autumn with the Amir, so that no anticipation of evil clouded the minds of those assembled in the white-lined tent.

About 1 o'clock all were invited to partake of a dinner, served in Afghan fashion.

Only four chairs, for the Envoy, his Secretary, Mr. Jenkyns, the General, and the Afghan Sirdar, were in the tent, and these were useless when the dinner was brought in and placed on the floor, on large trays about six feet long by three wide, and raised about six inches off the ground on short legs. These trays were painted papier-maché work in Arabesque designs, somewhat coarser than the Cashmere work of the same kind, but there was not much space left to see the ground-work. Each tray was covered with dishes of all kinds of food, prepared in the native style, which gave one a higher idea of the Afghan cooking, and thence of their civilisation, than could be entertained of the race, judging either by their words or actions.

The trays were filled much in the same way; there were pilafs of mutton and rice, curries, broiled fish, and kababs by way of solids, some plain puddings, and sweet-meats; but the most excellent portions of the menu to European tastes were the pickles and cream-cheese. The dinner was very good in its way, but there were some drawbacks connected with it which rather detracted from its excellence. There were no plates, knives and forks, and only one spoon to each tray. Large chapattis were served round to represent the first, and one's fingers did duty for the second, but it was difficult to drop a handful of rice into one's mouth without spilling most of it, while to sit cross-legged

on the floor in riding-boots and spurs for an hour, was trying, and added much to the difficulty.

After the attendants had passed round a basin and ewer to wash one's fingers, the tables and their contents were removed outside, where a crowd of hungry attendants soon demolished the piles of food which had remained untouched, and tea was brought round in cups, without milk. After this was disposed of the teapots came in again, but this time a brew of hot milk, sweetened and spiced, furnished the entertainment, and soon after the final adieus were exchanged. The mission remained for the night at Cassin Kheyl, and the General's party rode back to Karatiga, which was now deserted, save by two companies of Goorkhas, who were waiting there for the General and the survey party, who had taken the advantage of being in the neighbourhood to go to the top of "Saratiga."

They had left at 5 A.M., and were escorted by thirty Goorkhas and a badragga. Just after the General had left the camp they signalled down for instructions, as the badragga had objected to go any further, being afraid of Mangals, some of whom were supposed to be on the war-path. There was no one in camp to give an answer, and so as no Mangals were in sight Captain Woodthorpe determined to finish the day's work, relying on the Goorkhas alone. After some difficult mountain-climbing, where a false step involved death, the summit was reached after a climb of about seven hours. The summit was only just large enough for the plain table and the surveyors, but the work to be done from this point, which was over 13,000' feet high, was so important that they were loath to leave the cramped space till the very last minute. The General reached Karatiga about 3 o'clock, and, expected that the survey party would have returned or be close to that place by this time, but it was evident that the surveyors, who were seen high up on the mountain, could not be back till at least 5 o'clock.

Half the Goorkhas were left at Karatiga as a support for

them in case of necessity, and the General with the rest of the party, proceeded on to Drekulla, to which place the troops had returned during the day.

The survey party did not reach camp till 8 P M , having been on foot the whole day, since 5 A.M.

July 20th.—With the departure of the Cabul Mission, all the political work in the Kurram valley had terminated. Any further questions which related to tribes beyond the new frontier would be settled at Cabul itself. Most, if not all the questions affecting the tribes within our border, had already been disposed of. All the land that had been taken up for road-making and other purposes from individuals had been paid for, and there was nothing now to be done but to allow our new possessions to consolidate themselves with as little interference as possible.

On the return of the General to Alikheyl a durbar was held, to which all the chiefs and head-men of the surrounding clans were invited.

It was a kind of farewell meeting, as the command of the Kurram Valley Force was soon to be made over to General Massy, and the opportunity of receiving all these people near their own homes would not occur again to General Roberts for some time. The head-men knew this, and saw that their chance of earning more rewards had ceased for the present, and, therefore, the greater was the disappointment of those who found themselves undistinguished by even the usual turban. Their remarks became loud and angry while they saw their neighbours disappear with the evident tokens of the rewards they considered they had earned in their own estimation ; but there is little doubt but that every man who had, in reality, done anything to further British interests received his due reward, those who went away with nothing having done nothing. There would have been no advantage in the indiscriminate bestowal of presents on the undeserving as well as on those who had been of real assistance.

Gradually the crowd of hill-men cleared away out of camp, and with their reception the history of the Kurram Field Force of 1878-79 closes, as between this date and the departure of General Roberts on leave, there was no event worthy of record.

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## CHAPTER IX.

ACCOUNT OF THE PUNJAB CHIEFS' CONTINGENT, BY MAJOR W.  
ANDERSON, ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL.

THE Punjab Chiefs' Contingents, consisting of troops furnished by the Pattialla, Jheena, Nabha, Kappurthalla, Farid Koti and Nahun States, assembled at Lahore during the second week in December 1878, and after having been reviewed by His Excellency the Viceroy on the 17th December, they left Lahore in the following order, *en route* to the Punjab Frontier :—

		Guns.	Cavalry.	Infantry.
Farid Koti .	18th December 1878	—	52	210
Kappurthalla	19th „	3	102	491
Jheena .	20th „	3	203	500
Nabha .	21st „	3	207	457
Pattialla .	23rd „	4	304	817
Nahun .	8th January 1879 .	—	—	210

Each Contingent had its own political and military officers, & worked together in all matters concerning the troops of

their Contingents, and all orders were issued to the "alkars," or political and military officers, jointly.

The "alkars" with the Pattialla Contingent are—Bunshee Gunda Singh, Syud Jurdan Ally, and Lalla Bhugwan Doss.

Jheena Contingent—Sirdars Juggut Singh and Rattun Singh.

Nabha Contingent—Dewan Beshun Singh, Bunshee Budroodun Khan, and Lalla Nuthoo Lall.

Kappurthalla Contingent—Dewan Ram Jas, Sirdar Nabbi Bux, and Colonel Mahomed Ally.

Farid Koti Contingent—Sirdars Golun Singh, Albail Singh, and Buh Singh.

Nahun Contingent—Colonel Whiting.

The undermentioned British officers were appointed to the Contingent:—

Brigadier-General J. Watson, C.B., V.C., Bombay Staff Corps, to be Commandant and Chief Political Officer.

Major W. C. Anderson, 3rd Punjab Cavalry, Assistant Adjutant-General and Assistant Quartermaster-General.

Captain V. Rivaz, 4th Punjab Infantry, Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General and Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General.

Captain J. Pearson, R.A., Brigade-Major of Artillery.

Captain F. C. Massy, Bengal Staff Corps, Political Officer.

Captain J. D. Turnbull, 15th Bengal Cavalry, Aide-de-Camp to Brigadier-General Watson.

Surgeon-Major J. R. Drew to the medical charge.

Captain Burton, 1st Bengal Cavalry, and Captain Abbott, 42nd Native Infantry, were attached for general duty to the Contingents.

Mahommed Enzat Ally Khan, brother of the Nawab of Malari Koltah, was appointed Aide-de-Camp to the Brigadier-General; also Sirdar Gholab Singh.

Ten non-commissioned officers from the regular army were attached to the Contingents to help in teaching the men the use

of the Enfield rifle, and giving instruction in musketry. These non-commissioned officers belong to the 1st Bengal Infantry, 9th Bengal Infantry, and 30th Punjab Native Infantry.

The Jheena, Nabha, Kappurthalla, Farid Koti, and Nahun troops halted at Jhelum, and went through a course of musketry and target practice. The Pattialla Contingent halted at Rawal Pindi for the same purpose.

On leaving Pindi *en route* for Nowshera, orders were received for the Jheena and Kappurthalla Contingents to proceed *via* Kohat to Bannu, the other Contingents to proceed to Thull and the Kurram valley.

The Contingents had their own carriage, and the States supplied these troops and camp followers with every necessary required for a campaign in the Punjab Frontier. They had their own hospital establishments.

The Jheena and Kappurthalla Contingents, on arrival at Bannu, were employed in garrisoning the outposts of Bahadur Kheyl, Latumma, Kurram, Tochi, Jani Kheyl, and Tajurie, and took up some of the station guards and orderlies at Bannu.

The Nabha and Farid Koti Contingents arrived at Thull on the 19th February, the Pattialla Contingent on the 23rd February, and the Nahun troops on the 6th March.

On arrival of the Contingents at Thull, they occupied the posts of Raizan, Hangu, Mozum Talao, Sarozai, Gundiour, on the Thull and Kohat road; Kapyunga, Ahmed-i-Shama, and Jallamai, on the right bank of the river Kurram, and relieved the regular troops of the arduous and wearisome duty of escorting convoys from Thull to Kurram and back. The Contingents employed their own carriage for their baggage and rations.

On the 17th March the Nabha Contingent marched for Badesh Kheyl, where it arrived on the 19th, and soon after entrenched their camp. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief inspected the Contingent on the 20th March. .

On the 17th March His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief arrived at Thull, and inspected the Pattialla, Farid Koti, and Nahun troops.

The Pattialla and Nahun Infantry were employed in making a cart road to the plateau where the new cantonments of Thull are. The work was completed in a week, and does great credit to the Contingent troops, considering they were never employed on pioneering work before.

On the 11th April the Pattialla Contingent, consisting of two guns, 150 cavalry, and 417 infantry, marched from Thull to Kurram, where they arrived on the 18th. The remainder were left to garrison Thull.

From the 17th March the Contingent troops, besides garrisoning the posts on the Thull and Kohat road, and those on the right bank of the river Kurram, occupied the posts of Chappri, Manduri, Alizai, Shinnak, and Wali Mahommed Killa, on the left bank of the Kurram river, thus keeping open over ninety miles of General Roberts' lines of communication, a duty which they performed most creditably.

The duties of garrisoning outposts and escorting convoys were new to the troops of the Contingents, yet the soldierly manner in which they executed all orders and performed all duties demanded of them, and the eagerness and willingness shown by all ranks to learn and do their best, gained for them the confidence and high opinion of the British officers with whom they came in contact.

The troops suffered much from the inclemency of the weather, yet their hardships were borne without a murmur. All ranks performed their duties cheerfully, and displayed a soldier-like and most loyal spirit. From the time of the Contingents' leaving Lahore, not a complaint of any kind has been brought to the notice of either civil or military authorities against any one individual, either fighting-man or camp-follower, which speaks well for the conduct and behaviour of the men, and the

excellent manner in which the "alkars" managed their Contingents.

On the 6th May two men of the Pattialla Contingent—a havildar and sepoy—armed with only swords, were attacked by fifteen Zaimukhts, overpowered and murdered, four miles and a half from Thull, on the Chappri side of the Kafir Kotal.

On the 13th May the posts on the right bank of the river Kurram were abandoned, and the Contingents' troops withdrawn.

On the 8th May the Jheena and Kappurthalla Contingents came round from Bannu to Thull.

Peace with the Amir of Cabul having been proclaimed, the Contingents were ordered back to their States. The Jheena Contingent left Thull on the 31st May, Kappurthalla left Thull on the 3rd June, Nabha marched from Badesh Kheyl 3rd June, Farid Koti and Nahun left Thull on the 6th June, and Pattialla marched from Kurram on the 5th June.

The alkars of the Nabha Contingent were unbounded in their hospitality to all officers proceeding up and down the road. The mess-tent under the chunar-tree at the Nabha camp at Badesh Kheyl ought to be remembered by many a weary, hungry, and thirsty traveller.

The Pattialla alkars gave a picnic at Shaluzan to all the officers of the Kurram valley. 120 officers were able to accept, and about forty native officers. The entertainment was a great success.

It is to be hoped that the Punjab Chiefs' Contingents have left a favourable and lasting impression, and that their services will be appreciated.

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CASUALTIES in the CONTINGENTS from 17th December 1878 to  
31st May 1879.

Detail.	Patialla.	Jheena.	Nabha.	Kapur- thalla.	Farid Koti.	Nahun. *	Remarks.
Fighting men .	18	24	9	23	5	3	) Chiefly from fever and dysentery.
Camp-followers .	7	10	2	11	3	1	
Horses . .	9	7	6	2	1	..	
Mules . .	2	1	..	2	..	..	
Camels . .	89	78	63	124	47	21	
Elephants .	..	..	..	1	..	..	

*Causes of Mortality amongst the Camels.*

1. The climate was not suited to them.
- 2 The grazing was scanty and not what the camels were accustomed to.
3. Camels accompanying guards escorting convoys remained with the loads on their backs from 5.30 A.M. to 4, 6, and 11 P.M. Nothing to eat on arrival at camping-grounds.

W. C ANDERSON, Major,  
Assistant Adjutant-General.

## DISPOSITION RETURN OF THE PUNJAB CHIEFS' CONTINGENTS ON 15th May 1879.

Camp, Post, or Station.	Batteries, Regiments, Detachments.	Europeans.				Natives.				Ordnance.						Remarks.		
		Effective.		Sick.	Effective.		Sick.	12-pr. Howitzers.	9-pr. S. B.	6-pr. S. B.	Waggon.	Horses.	Mules.	Bullocks.	Elephants.		Camels.	
		Officers.	N. C. O. & Men.		Officers.	N. C. O. & Men.												
Rogh	Jheend Artillery	...	...	...	...	4	102	106	...	2	108	...	...	3	108	...	...	51
	" Cavalry	...	...	...	...	12	190	202	...	...	202	...	...	...	202	...	...	65
	Kapurthalla Artillery.	...	...	...	...	5	69	74	...	...	74	...	...	2	5	...	...	61
Thull	" Cavalry	...	...	...	...	2	97	99	...	3	102	...	...	...	102	...	...	...
	Staff	2	...	2	...	...	4	4	...	...	6	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Patialla Artillery	...	...	...	...	2	37	39	...	1	40	...	...	2	38	...	10	...
Thull	" Cavalry	...	...	...	...	8	275	283	...	5	288	...	...	2	288	...	...	80
	" Infantry	...	...	...	...	8	341	349	...	4	353	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Jheend Infantry	...	...	...	...	16	473	489	...	11	490	...	...	...	4	16	...	135
Thull	Kapurthalla Infantry.	1	...	...	...	1	16	17	...	1	17	...	...	...	3	20	...	3
	Farid Koti Cavalry	...	...	...	...	2	49	51	...	1	52	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	" Infantry	...	...	...	...	6	199	205	...	5	210	...	...	...	4	8	...	...
Thull	Nahm Infantry.	2	...	...	...	2	191	193	...	11	210	...	...	...	4	18	...	...
	Staff	1	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	Nabha Artillery	...	...	...	...	4	54	58	...	...	58	...	...	3	54	...	23	...
Thull	" Cavalry	1	...	...	...	1	11	12	...	...	12	...	...	3	201	...	2	...
	" Infantry	...	...	...	...	22	514	536	...	9	547	...	...	...	9	29	...	...
	Staff	5	...	...	...	...	3	3	...	...	8	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Thull	Patialla Artillery	...	...	...	...	3	40	43	...	...	43	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	" Cavalry	...	...	...	...	17	17	17	...	9	17	...	...	...	...	...	10	...
	" Infantry	...	...	...	...	16	445	461	...	...	9	...	...	...	...	...	4	...

W. C. ANDERSON, Major, Assistant Adjutant-General.

RETURN showing OUTPOSTS GARRISONED and ESCORTS TO CONVOYS,  
Furnished by P. C. C., from 1st March to 1st June 1879.

Outposts.	Pattialla.			Jheend.			Nabha.			Kappur-thalla.			Farid Koti.			Remarks.
	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Total.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Total.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Total.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Total.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Total.	
Mozum Talao	5	15	20	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	A post showing being held by two or more contingents, means that one relieved the other such as Farid Koti relieved Nabha, and Nabha Pattialla at the Brigur picket.
Sarruzai	25	20	45	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Gundiour	25	40	65	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Brigur Picket	...	30	30	...	...	...	30	30	...	...	...	...	30	30	...	
Kapyunga	...	...	...	...	...	...	12	20	32	...	...	...	2	25	27	
Ahmed-i-Shama	14	...	14	...	...	...	14	...	14	...	...	...	...	25	...	
Julianai	14	20	34	...	...	...	...	...	14	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Cherpur.	20	50	70	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Monadooria	25	100	125	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Alizai	14	20	34	...	...	...	14	...	14	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Shinnak	...	...	...	...	...	...	25	52	77	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Wally Md. Killa	14	20	34	...	...	...	12	18	30	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Bahadur Kheyl	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	14	50	64	...	...	...	...	
Lalumana	...	...	...	12	20	32	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Kurram	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	12	20	32	...	...	...	...	
Jani Kheyl	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	25	50	75	...	...	...	...	
Convoys.	228	665	893	8	30	38	146	238	384	35	35	45	102	147	48	
Total	414	940	1354	20	50	70	237	358	595	51	155	206	47	157	204	48

From 1st March to 31st May the Contingents furnished 452 cavalry and 1,103 infantry as escorts to commissariat convoys. Besides this, for six weeks the Nabha Contingent furnished daily grazing guards of cavalry and infantry for commissariat camels, about 2,500, kept at Badesh Kheyl.

W. C. ANDERSON, Major,

Assistant Adjutant-General.





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## APPENDICES.

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## APPENDIX I.

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RETURN of MULES and PONIES employed with the KURRAM FIELD  
FORCE.

	Hired.	Government.	Total.
Brought on Rolls in October 1878 . . .	1618	..	1618
" " November 1878 . . .	69	..	69
" " December 1878 . . .	143	..	143
" " January 1879 . . .	3	..	3
" " February 1879 . . .	82	..	82
" " March 1879 . . .	32	126	158
" " April 1879 . . .	..	18	18
" " May 1879 . . .	15	17	32
Total . . .	1962	161	2123
Deduct Casualties . . .	265	22	287
Balance on Rolls on 31st May . . .	1697	139	1836

*Detail of Casualties.*—Hired Mules: 162 cast, 75 died, 28 carried off.  
Government Mules: 2 died, 20 made over to No. 2 Mountain Battery.

# RETURN of CAMEL-CARRIAGE employed with the KURRAM FIELD FORCE.

Hired Carriage (Camels).	Shere Singh's Contractor.	Amballa.	Khut-tuk.	Total.
Brought on the Rolls in—				
October 1878 . . . . .	3190	..	992	4182
November 1878 . . . . .	2219	..	..	2219
December 1878 . . . . .	875	..	..	875
January 1879 . . . . .	792	..	..	792
February 1879 . . . . .	132	1581	125	1788
March 1879 . . . . .	46	..	45	91
April 1879 . . . . .	184	621	..	805
Strayed animals recovered up to 31st May . . . . .	40	33	36	109
Totals . . . . .	7478	2185	1198	10,861
<i>Casualties.</i>				
Died, cast, deserted, abandoned, strayed, and carried off, from 1st Nov. 1878 to 31st May 1879 . . . . .	6083	1600	1145	8828
Balance on Rolls 31st May 1879 . . . . .	1395	585	53	2033
<i>Government Camels.</i>				
Brought on Rolls from 1st March to 31st May 1879 . . . . .	..	..	..	3088
Died, abandoned, and strayed, up to 31st May 1879 . . . . .	..	..	..	777
Balance on Rolls 31st May 1879 . . . . .	..	..	..	2311
<i>Abstract.</i>				
Total actually brought on the Rolls, recoveries being deducted—				
Hired Camels . . . . .	..	..	..	10,752
Government Camels . . . . .	..	..	..	3088
Total . . . . .	..	..	..	13,840
Actual Losses during Campaign . . . . .	..	..	..	9496
Total Camels on Rolls K. F. F. on 31st May 1879 . . . . .	..	..	..	4844

## APPENDIX II.

—:O:—

RETURN of AMMUNITION expended during the KURRAM CAMPAIGN.

Date.	Place.	Shells Common.		Shells Shrapnel.		Small-arm Ammunition.			Remarks.
		9-pr.	7-pr.	9-pr.	7-pr.	M.H.	M.H. Carbine.	Sni-der.	
1878.									
Nov. 28	Turral, foot of								
	Peiwar . .	...	16	...	...	...	...	6048	
" 29	Ditto . .	...	...	...	...	...	...	44	
Dec. 2	Capture of Peiwar								
	Kotal . .	34	7	442	45	882	...	37,062	4 Horse Artillery guns fired 99 Shrapnel at the Spingawi.
" 13	Manjar Pass .	...	...	...	...	1476	...	6,390	
1879.									
Jan. 7	Matun Khost .	...	...	...	85	75	694	2,545	
" 8	Ditto . .	...	...	...	...	...	...	423	

## APPENDIX III.

:-0:-

LIST of STORES CAPTURED from the ENEMY at the ACTION of the  
PEIWAR KOTAL on the 2nd December 1878.

	Names of Stores.	No.
<b>ARMS :</b>		
Rifles, Enfield, long . . . . .		19
Bayonets . . . . .		15
<b>ACCOUTREMENTS :</b>		
Pouches, leather, ammunition, brown . . . . .		3
Slings, musket . . . . .		19
<b>HARNESS AND SADDLERY :</b>		
Saddles, park, mule . . . . .		39
Collars, neck, horse . . . . .		25
Pads, park, saddle, mule . . . . .		11
<b>ORDNANCE AMMUNITION :</b>		
Cartridges S.A. ballad, Enfield rifle . . . . .		114,689
"          "          matchlock . . . . .		22,490
"          S.A. blank . . . . .		17,670
"          filled gun 18-pr. S.B. . . . .		6
"          "          6-pr. " . . . . .		90
"          "          7-pr. R.M.L. S.B. . . . .		24
"          filled howitzer 25-pr. . . . .		38
Caps, percussion . . . . .		200,000
Fuzes, time, wood of sorts . . . . .		906
Portfires, filled, common . . . . .		230

Names of Stores.				No.
Shells, common, 7-pr. R.M.L.	.	.	.	957
„ shrapnel „	.	.	.	97
„ common, empty, 24-pr. S.B.	.	.	.	800
Shot case, 7-pr. R.M.L.	.	.	.	9
„ 6-pr. S.B.	.	.	.	16
„ 24-pr. howitzer	.	.	.	10
Shot, solid, 6-pr.	.	.	.	480
Tubes. copper, friction, 7-pr. R.M.L.	.	.	.	160

## ORDNANCE :

Boxes, packing, ammunition, mule	.	.	.	69
„ „ camel or elephant	.	.	.	6
„ „ S.A. ammunition	.	.	.	72
Carriages, gun, 6-pr. S.B.	.	.	.	4
„ „ 7-pr. R.M.L.	.	.	.	11
„ „ howitzer, 12 or 24-pr. S.B.	.	.	.	1
Brass gun, 9-pr. S.B.	.	.	.	1
„ „ 6-pr. „	.	.	.	4
„ „ howitzer, 24-pr.	.	.	.	2
Iron gun, R.M.L. 7-pr.	.	.	.	11
Waggons, gun and howitzer, 6 and 24-pr. S.B.	.	.	.	4



## APPENDIX IV.

-:O:-

THE TURIS OF THE KURRAM VALLEY.

May 5<sup>th</sup>.

THE *Bombay Gazette* says the following curious petition, presented in 1860, has been unearthed at Kohat :—

Petition of—

1. Sayyid Mirza Gul (of Ahmadzai, uncle to Sayyid Badshah).
2. Mir Ali (Gundi Khel of Topakkai).
3. Ghulam (Jafar Khel, Duparzai, cousin to Dur Khan, Duparzai).
4. Adam Khan (Saragala, Hamza Kheyl).
5. Mihr Ali (Sati Khel, Hamza Khel).
6. Arsala (Saragala, Hamza Khel).
7. Samand (Drewandi, Mustri Khel).
8. Nazar (Alizai of Khashta).

To Captain Henderson, Deputy Commissioner of Kohat, the Commissioner of the Peshawar Division :

The Khans of ancient lineage, high degree and great courage, and to all the English people.

Greeting,—May ye ever prosper !

We and the whole Turi race greet you ; graciously accept our greetings and good wishes !

O English gentlemen ! We appeal to you in God's name. By

the Duranis have we been ruined, and reduced to the last extreme of distress. They plunder us without restraint. With sighs and tears we appeal to you to free us from these oppressors, from these disturbers of our peace! Dishonour and insult have been heaped on us! Durani rule we loathe!

For British rule we yearn!

Sirs! be aware we Turis now number 20,000 households: some 6,000 will be left. Daily are our rulers diminishing our number.

Sirs! Kurram is a well-favoured and fertile country. If we are exterminated, it surely will be a source of regret to you. Take then this valley under your protection. Move but a single step forward, and you will free us from the burden of Durani rule.

If ye refuse to aid us, rest assured that at the last great day of judgment we will seize the skirts of your garments, and accuse you of this injustice before God Himself.

Ye are just rulers, ye have been made aware of the oppression we endure. If, therefore, ye do not respond to this appeal, nought is left for us but to trust in God, and wait with patience His decrees. We shall not be held accountable at the last; for we have done all that lay within our power to obtain aid and redress. And so again we greet you!

Know each day do three men unjustly suffer death at the hands of our rulers. No attention is paid by those in authority over them to our complaints.

Aye, even our daughters are daily torn away from us and married by force, but no regard is paid to our prayers for redress. We have hereby brought this also to your knowledge.

A tall man with a silk turban will deliver you this our petition. His name is Sayyid Mahommed Hussein; treat him kindly. He is an exile in your country from Durani oppression. Once he was chief of many Turis. Now he is a wanderer from door to door, though by birth he is well born.

Thou art a lord of mercy: thou canst also feel compassion for others and show them kindness. Dated 7th Shahan A. H. 1277 (2nd March, 1860).

(True copy.)

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## APPENDIX V.

-:0:-

No. 902.

Camp Ali Kheyl, 15th May 1879.

UNDER instructions from army head-quarters the whole of the transport with the Kurram Field Force will be reorganised in the following manner, as soon as the necessary arrangements can be made.

2. The animals will be divided into the following classes :

I. Regimental Transport.

II. *a.* Ordnance Park.

*b.* Sick Transport.

*c.* Engineer Park.

*d.* Commissariat Reserve.

III. General Transport.

3. Regimental carriage will be allotted as follows : the scale of Cabul equipment, as given in Quartermaster-General's No. 5949 A. dated 8th November 1878, is allowed for. Detailed statements are in the Adjutant-General's Office, and are to be copied by each arm concerned.

Branch of the Service.	Strength at which Estimated.	Baggage Camp Equipage.		Hospital.		Ammunition M.	Commissariat C & 3 days supplies	Private.		Spare.		Total.		Remarks.
		C.	M.	C.	M.			C.	M.	C.	M.	C.	M.	
A regiment of British Infantry	850	190	1	66	1	111	60	26	...	16	5	358	118	
A regiment of Native Infantry	850	119	3	42	3	111	27	8	1	9	6	205	124	
A Horse or Field Battery, Royal Artillery	170	60	5	15	...	38	35	6	1	6	2	160	8	
A Mountain Battery	240	34	3	8	3	8	17	4	1	3	...	74	7	
A Company of Sappers	100	24	...	6	2	2 camels. 13 mules.	3½	7½	4	2	1	45	20	
A Squadron of 9th Lancers	120	44	4	12	...	10	30	6	...	4	1	96	15	
A regiment of Native Cavalry	400	49	2	17	2	32	58	9	...	6	2	139	38	
Gatlings	30	9	2½	1	...	...	4	1½	...	1	...	15	4	

4. Each of the corps and departments marginally named will have

72nd Highlanders.  
5th Ghorkas.  
28th P. N. I.  
92nd Highlanders.  
5th P. N. I.  
21st P. N. I.  
23rd Pioneers.  
Sappers.  
F/A R. H. A.  
G/3 R. A.  
No. 2 Mountain Battery.  
9th Lancers.  
12th Bengal Cavalry.  
14th Bengal Lancers.  
Ordnance Park—500 camels.  
Engineer Park—150 mules.

The transport arrangements of corps not mentioned above will be maintained on the existing footing until further orders.

its proper complement of animals made over to it by the present Transport Department, and will remain permanently in charge of them. The Commissariat Department replaces casualties under instruction from the Assistant Quartermaster-General, to whom Requisition Form D. for fresh animals are to be sent.

5. In regiments of British infantry commanding officers will appoint a thoroughly efficient officer to the charge of the regimental transport. It is essential that he should have some knowledge of the native language and character, and possess a good temper.

6. For regiments of native infantry and cavalry a native officer will be appointed transport officer. He will work under the supervision of the quartermaster (or such other officer as the commandant may appoint) who will prepare and keep all written returns and records, and be responsible for all money payments.

7. For batteries of Artillery, 9th Lancers, and in the Sappers,

a non-commissioned officer will be appointed to the charge of the transport, an officer (British) being similarly nominated to supervise his work.

8. The transport officer, or transport non-commissioned officer, will be placed in charge of all the animals allotted to the regiment, with their gear and attendants, and he will be held responsible under the officer in command for the efficiency of the transport.

Commanding officers will select steady men as assistants in the proportion of one man to every hundred animals, an odd fifty, or number over fifty, being reckoned as an hundred. Thus a regiment having 220 camels and 135 mules, total 355, would have four assistants for the transport supervision.

10. The Government have sanctioned a horse-allowance of thirty rupees a month, and free forage for one horse, for regimental transport officers. The rates of pay for non-commissioned officers and men employed as assistants will be notified hereafter.

II. It must be clearly understood that the entire responsibility for the efficiency of the regimental transport rests on the commanding officer. He must be vigilant to see that the animals are properly fed and cared for, and must remember that the welfare and success of his corps will depend in a large measure on the efficiency of its transport.

12. Officers and men for the supervision of the departmental and general transport will be selected from the existing transport department, and will be appointed in the following proportion :—

Ordnance Park—		
1 officer for 500 animals.		
1 assistant per 100 „		
Depart- mental.	Sick Transport—1 non-com-	Under the supervision of the transport officer with the Ordnance Park.
	missioned officer.	
	Engineer's Park—1 non-com-	
	missioned officer.	
2 assistants.		

Commissariat Reserve supplies, at the rate of 1 officer for 500 animals and 1 assistant for 100 animals.

**General Transport—**

(Commissariat) Carts, local carriage, &amp;c. :

- 1 officer at Kohat.
- 2 „ Thull.
- 1 „ Kurram.

Commissariat reserve of spare and surplus animals as in the Departmental Commissariat Reserve above.

13. During a halt the regimental or departmental carriage may be employed on convoy, or any other duty, as may be directed by the Major-General commanding. When the carriage is so detached it will be accompanied by its own officers and assistants, and be entirely in their charge.

14. All references regarding regimental or departmental carriage requiring the orders of the Major-General, are to be made to the Assistant Quartermaster-General through the usual channel.

15. General officers commanding brigades will exercise a close supervision over the transport animals attached to the corps under their command.

16. Heads of departments will be responsible that the carriage under their charge is maintained in an efficient condition.

17. The departmental or other carriage may be sub-divided and attached to brigades whenever necessary.

18. Whenever carriage is transferred from one class to another (*e.g.* from a regiment to the general transport, or from one regiment to another) all hire and pay must be adjusted up to date of transfer and last hire, last pay, and last ration certificates (Form E.) given.

19. The following returns will be furnished from regiments and departments.

The proper forms of returns are in the Assistant Adjutant-General's Offices, and are to be copied by all concerned.

- Form A: Monthly return of Government and hired camels.
- „ B. Monthly return of Government and hired mules.
- „ C. Monthly bill on the Commissariat Department.
- „ D. Requisition on the Assistant Quartermaster-General for additional transport required.

- Form E. Last pay, ration, or hire certificate.  
 „ F. Nominal acquittance roll of hire of transport and pay of cattle-attendants. Monthly.  
 „ G. Punishment register for office record.  
 „ H. Indent for rations.  
 „ K. Morning report of transport cattle. Separate report to be kept for camels and mules.

All the above returns are to be sent to the Assistant Quartermaster-General at Field Force head-quarters. The word "TRANSPORT" is to be written on the cover.

Monthly returns and bills to be despatched not later than the 4th of the month.

Weekly returns to be sent in on Saturday.

20. Commanding officers are responsible that when the regiment or a detachment marches, not more transport is employed than is allowed by the regulations. On these occasions, indents showing the detailed requirements for carriage will be sent to the Assistant Quartermaster-General, who will issue the Major-General's orders as to the disposal of surplus animals, or arrange to supply deficiencies.

21. The following instructions regarding the care and management of transport animals are published for the guidance of all transport officers.

The Major-General requires the strictest observance of them.

I. Transport animals are of two classes, viz. animals the property of the Government, and those which have been hired.

II. Government animals receive the following rations :—

#### Camels.

1 seer of grain	} daily.
10 seers of bhoosa, or green fodder	
8 chittacks of salt a month.	

#### Mules.

2 seers of grain	} daily.
7 seers of dry grass or bhoosa, or	
10 seers of green grass	

The grain is to be obtained on indent from the Commissariat

Department; bhoosa or green fodder and grass are to be purchased locally. Advances for this or any other purpose are to be taken from the Commissariat Department, applications for which are to be submitted through the Assistant Quartermaster-General.

Advances are to be accounted for (Form C.) in bills drawn monthly on the Commissariat, which must show the qualities of forage purchased and the prices paid. The quantities of forage thus consumed must tally with the number of animals on the rolls, and the authorised scale of rations must not be exceeded.

III. Hired camels do not get grain or fodder when good jungle grazing is available. If there is no grazing, or if the grazing be bad or insufficient, the camels are to have the same, or a proportion of the same, ration as the Government camels. The necessity of the issue of such ration must be determined and certified to by the senior military officer on the spot.

IV. Hired mules when in work must get a seer of grain; if out of work, and if the grazing be good, the grain ration need not be issued. If mules should be halted where no grazing is available, then both grain and fodder must be given to them on the same scale as for Government mules, and under the certificate mentioned in paragraph III.

V. Grain and fodder for the hired animals are to be obtained in the same manner as for Government animals, but separate bills (Form C.) must be submitted for the cost.

VI. Commanding officers must see that every facility and assistance is given to the owners of the hired cattle to purchase forage. Generally speaking, they will do this of their own free will if proper arrangements are made for them.

VII. Transport officers are responsible that the animals in their charge actually get the rations above detailed. The assistants must invariably be present at feeding time, and effective measures must be taken to ensure that the grain and fodder are not misappropriated, and that full rations are given to the animals.

VIII. Transport officers are to make weekly inspections of the saddles and other gear; they are responsible that it is kept in good repair and serviceable. Government gear is to be repaired under regimental arrangements.



The cost of materials and of working them up is to be recovered by bills (Form C.) on the Commissariat Department.

The following are the articles of gear for Government carriage.

Camels :—

Ropes . . .	Two per camel.
Suleetah . . .	One per two camels.
Saddles and trees . . .	} One per camel.
Jhools . . .	
Leading ropes . . .	
Nathes . . .	

Mules :—

Head chain . . .	} One per mule.
Heel „ . . .	
Heel strap . . .	
Jhool . . .	
Surcingle . . .	
Pack-saddle and pad . . .	} One per three mules.
Bridle . . .	
Brush . . .	
Curry-comb . . .	} Two per three mules.
Pegs, iron . . .	
Hammer, iron . . .	

Owners of hired carriage must be compelled to keep their gear in proper order.

IX. It will be the duty of transport officers to draw and disburse all pay and hire for the transport animals under their charge, and monthly bills (Form C.) should be submitted on the Commissariat Department.

X. The following are the establishments maintained and the rates of hire for transport animals.

For Government camels :—

- One nail chowdrie on 50 rupees per 1,000 camels per mensem.
- One misaldar on 20 rupees per 880 camels.
- One jemadar on 12 rupees per 160 camels.

One surwan on 8 rupees for every three camels for regimental transport.

One surwan for every four camels for departmental and general transport.

For hired camels :—

One nail chowdrie on 50 rupees per 1,000 camels.

One misaldar on 15 rupees per 330 camels.

One duffadar surwan on 4 rupees for every 100 camels.

Surwans at the same scale as for Government camels paid by owners.

Camels : 15 rupees per mensem.

Spare camels : 7 rupees per annum.

For Government mules :—

One jemadar for every 100 mules on 14 rupees.

One duffadar for every 50 mules on 11 rupees.

One driver for every 3 mules on 8 rupees.

For hired mules :—

One jemadar on 15 rupees per mensem for every 100 mules.

One duffadar on 12 rupees per mensem for every 50 mules.

One driver to every three mules paid by owner.

Mules : 18 rupees per mensem.

Nominal acquittance rolls (Form F.) should also be kept up and sent in to the Assistant Quartermaster-General.

XI. Surwans or drivers can be flogged by Provost Marshal Establishment by order of commanding officers or heads of departments. Men of superior rank should, as a rule, be punished by fines, which will be credited to Government in the monthly bill (Form C.). Power to fine and to inflict corporal punishment\* can be exercised by a transport officer when absent from his headquarters on convoy or other detached duty.

XII. It is the transport officers to attend carefully to the following details :—.

1. The daily grooming and cleaning of all the animals, camels as well as mules.

\* A register of all punishments inflicted is to be kept by all transport officers (Form A.).

2. Watering and feeding to be at fixed hours. Duffadars and jemadars must be present at these times.

3. The cleanliness of the mules and camel lines.

4. The animals to be picketed in regular line.

XIII. All sick animals are to be placed in separate sick lines, and transport officers must pay particular attention to see that they are properly treated and cared for.

XIV. Depôts for sick animals will be established at the principal posts in charge of salootries, and animals not likely to get well for some time to be sent thither for treatment. All animals so sent are to be struck off the regimental or other rolls.

XV. The rationing of all carriage attendants will be arranged for by their respective transport officers, and will be obtained on the usual indents (Form H.) from the Commissariat Department.

22. The following rules concern the employment of the regimental carriage on convoy work. This is a very important duty, and the animals when thus employed will require the utmost care and attention from the transport officers and their assistants.

I. When the transport of a regiment or department is required for convoy duty, the number of animals to be employed will be notified by the Assistant Quartermaster-General.

II. The animals will be sent as directed to the Commissariat or other department in charge of the transport officer and his assistants.

III. An assistant should be left in charge of any animals which may remain in the regimental lines. The commanding officer is responsible that these animals are properly cared for, and the officer of the day or some other officer must be ordered to look after them.

IV. The transport officer will take over the stores for the convoy and give receipts for the quantities received. The despatching officer will furnish him with an invoice of the stores, by which they must be carefully checked, both on receipt and delivery.

The transport officer incurs no pecuniary responsibility in the matter, but it is his duty to protect the interests of the State to the utmost of his power. If any stores are plundered or lost within

circumstances of his own cognizance, he will give loss certificates to the department concerned.

V. When the animals are being loaded up, the stores are to be made over by the transport officer to the camel owners or attendants, who are to be held individually responsible that the stores are delivered in good order and not tampered with *en route*. If stores are stolen or damaged, a report of the circumstances is to be made to the Assistant Quartermaster-General, in view to the value being recovered.

VI. The assistants with the convoy should be placed by the transport officer in personal charge of a definite number of animals which should not as a rule exceed 100 to each assistant. The assistants are responsible that the animals are properly loaded, and that the loads do not exceed the authorised weights, which are as follows :—

For camels . . . .	4 maunds.
For mules . . . .	2 maunds.

The assistants will also check the number of bags, &c., made over to their camel-men.

VII. Spare animals at the rate of 5<sup>0</sup> per cent. are to be allowed. These animals are never to be laden with stores, except to meet casualties occurring on the line of march.

The transport officers will detail 3 per cent. of the surwans to follow in rear of the convoy with the spare animals. The best surwans should be selected for this purpose, and their camels distributed among the other men. A man can easily lead four or five camels on the line of march.

The surwans in rear will take charge of animals which fall out, and, if possible, bring them on to the encamping-ground.

VIII. The transport officer or his assistants will carefully examine the backs of all the animals after arrival at a halting-ground.

This is a very important matter, as the camel-attendants will, if possible, conceal the fact of their animals having been rubbed. A sore back taken in time is very easily cured.

IX. When at work, the saddle and gear must be examined daily

and the animals carefully examined for wounds, lameness, and sickness.

X. Government only grant compensation for animals killed or carried off by the enemy, or which die in consequence of the unusual severity of the weather.

Claims for compensation are to be referred to the Assistant Quartermaster-General for the Major-General's orders.

XI. Animals are to be unloaded immediately on their arrival at the new encamping-ground. The assistants will check the loads and report the number, complete or otherwise, to the transport officer on his arrival. Reports of casualties are to be made at the same time. No time should be lost after arrival in seeing the animals off to graze.

XII. When the transport of two or more regiments is working together on convoy, the order of march is to be changed from day to day, so as to give the animals an equal rest and time for grazing.

XIII. When two or more transport officers are with the same convoy, the senior will command the whole.

XIV. The above rules for convoy work apply equally when the transport is employed on the line of march with troops.

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## APPENDIX VI.

-:0:-

## THE AFGHAN DESPATCHES.

The *Gazette of India* containing further despatches relating to the Afghan War has now come to hand. The following is the order of the Governor-General in Council, dated Simla, 11th July :—

The Governor-General in Council hereby ordains the publication of further reports received from the Commander-in-Chief, relative to the more important operations of the campaign now successfully terminated in Afghanistan.

2. The Governor-General in Council takes this occasion to offer to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief his congratulations on the skilful conduct and satisfactory conclusion of the war.

3. The gallantry of the troops, both British and Native, of all branches of the service, has been conspicuously displayed wherever it was tested on the field of battle; whilst the steadiness of their discipline has been uninterruptedly maintained in the orderly occupation of positions, rapidly secured by their valour, and patiently protected by their presence.

4. The political objects of the war have been completely attained by its military results; and these are largely due to the efficiency with which, under the orders of His Excellency the Commander-in-

Chief, the tasks allotted to them have been carried out, and the difficulties opposed to them surmounted, by the general officers commanding the forces employed in the campaign.

5. The Governor-General in Council has received with pleasure from the Commander-in-Chief His Excellency's acknowledgments of the ability with which in the elaboration of his arrangements he has been assisted by the heads of the general staff of the army.

6. For their steady courage and disciplined endurance throughout the vicissitudes of this campaign, the highest praise is due to the officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers of the British and Native forces engaged.

7. The services rendered by the superior and subordinate officers of the medical, ordnance, survey, telegraph, and postal departments merit from the Government of India an acknowledgment which cannot be too unreservedly recorded.

8. The work required of the Commissariat Department—supply and transport—was of an exceptionally difficult and arduous character: and in acknowledging these difficulties, as also the zeal and energy evinced by the officers generally in overcoming them, it is incumbent also to place on record, that great credit is due to the civil and political officers from whom that department received such valuable assistance.

9. The other duties devolving on the political officers attached to the operating columns were of a very delicate character, requiring for their successful performance much tact and discretion. They have been performed to the entire satisfaction of the Governor-General in Council.

10. Special recognition is due to the valuable and self-denying labours of the clergy of all denominations, who were present with the troops in the field.

11. The Governor-General in Council desires to express his high appreciation of the cordial co-operation of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab and of the administrative officers of that province, in the prosecution of a campaign materially aided by the experienced advice and loyal assistance of the Punjab Government.

12. His Excellency the Governor of Bombay, by his personal supervision of the collection of supplies and transport in Sind, has rendered to the Government of India services which are most

highly appreciated and gratefully recorded by the Governor-General in Council.

13. The prompt and practical loyalty with which the just cause of the British Government in its declaration and prosecution of hostilities against the Amir of Cabul has been espoused and supported by the chiefs and princes of India, cannot be too warmly acknowledged ; and the Governor-General in Council highly appreciates the efficiency with which their military duties were performed by the contingents from the Punjab States, under their able commander.

14. The Governor-General in Council deeply deploras the many valuable lives lost, not only in action with the enemy, but also by the fatal effects of exposure and disease. He desires to express to the relatives of all who have thus perished in the cause of their country his deep sympathy in their bereavement.

A nominal return of casualties will hereafter be published.

15. The Governor-General in Council has recommended to Her Majesty's Government that a medal, with clasps for those present at Ali Musjid and Peiwar Kotal, be awarded to all officers and men engaged in the late Afghan war.






LONDON

PRINTED BY W. H. ALLEN AND CO., 13, WATERLOO PLACE, S.W.







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